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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20005
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December 20, 2007
Commissioner Donetta Davidson
Chair
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Dear Chair Davidson:
At its recent meeting in Austin, the EAC Standards Board passed 14 resolutions making comments on the proposed next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. This letter formally submits those resolutions to EAC under the public comment period, as prescribed by EAC.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have questions or need additional information.
Best wishes for a Happy New Year.
Sincerely,
Sarah Ball Johnson
Chair
Executive Board of the EAC Standards Board
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-06
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, There is uncertainty about the development of future voting technology; and
Whereas, Any accessibility requirements in the next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) must meet all accessibility requirements under federal law; and
Whereas, The innovation class as proposed in the next iteration of the VVSG contains no certification standards or certification process, it is premature to require software independence; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that the next iteration of the VVSG provide that software independence not be a requirement.
A True Record Attest: 
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-07
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, Open ended vulnerability testing is by nature an open test without restrictions; and
Whereas, Open ended vulnerability testing is not conducive to a conformance assessment; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it should remove the requirement for open ended vulnerability testing until such time as standards can be created to allow vulnerability testing to be a uniform and defined process for each voting system.
A True Record Attest: Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-08
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, The next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) is intended as a standards document for voting equipment; and
Whereas, Individual election jurisdictions create their own election administration practices; and
Whereas, The United States Election Assistance Commission’s Election Management Guidelines are intended as recommendations to election officials regarding election management practices; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it should remove all requirements that mandate election procedures instead of equipment standards.
A True Record Attest:
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-09
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, The next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) is a total rewrite of the previous version of the VVSG; and
Whereas, The next iteration of the VVSG creates expanded requirements for security, accessibility, usability, and testing; and
Whereas, The need for these requirements must be balanced against the cost of implementing these requirements; and
Whereas, No cost analysis was used in the creation of the next iteration of the VVSG; and
Whereas, The federal government has already appropriated 3.1 billion dollars for the purchase of voting equipment by the states; and
Whereas, Most of the money appropriated has been spent or committed by the states in order to meet the requirements of HAVA; and
Whereas, Total funding of HAVA has not yet taken place; and
Whereas, The potential cost of the next generation of voting machines must be known by election officials prior to the adoption of the next iteration of the VVSG; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it conduct research into and consider the financial impact of the next iteration of the VVSG in the areas of cost to develop, acquire, test, and administer the next generation of voting systems.
A True Record Attest: 
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-10
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, The next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) is a total rewrite of the previous versions of the VVSG; and
Whereas, The next iteration of the VVSG creates expanded requirements for security, accessibility, usability, and testing; and
Whereas, Many of the requirements in the next iteration of the VVSG could have an unintended impact on voter convenience and voter turnout; and
Whereas, The expanded requirements of the VVSG could have a chilling effect on the availability of the type of voting systems available; and
Whereas, The number of voters choosing to use early voting is increasing; and
Whereas, There is an increasing number of jurisdictions choosing to use vote centers; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it consider the impact on the election administrator’s ability to provide early voting and vote centers before adopting a standard.
A True Record Attest:
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-11
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, The next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) is a standards document intended to be tested against; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it should request the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) to clearly identify all “goal level” or non-testable requirements contained in the next iteration of the VVSG.
A True Record Attest:
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-12
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, Many states require their voting systems to be tested to the 2002 Voting Systems Standards (VSS) or 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG); and
Whereas, The 2005 VVSG becomes effective on December 13th, 2007; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it should remove any editorializing concerning the 2002 VSS or 2005 VVSG from the next iteration of the VVSG because it could undermine confidence in the voting process.
A True Record Attest:
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-13
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, The Standards Board has identified several areas of concern and has put those concerns forward in resolutions; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it seek to fully understand the consequences of the next iteration of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) before establishing an effective date for the new set of standards.
A True Record Attest: 
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-14
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act; and
Whereas, For two full years after the adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) no system has been certified to the 2005 VVSG; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it create a period of time where it would allow already 2005 certified voting systems to be upgraded or modified under the 2005 VVSG while all uncertified voting systems must be tested under the next iteration of the VVSG.
A True Record Attest: 
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission STANDARDS BOARD |
RESOLUTION 2007-15
Whereas, The Election Assistance Commission is an agency of the United States federal government created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); and
Whereas, The Executive Board of the Standards Board requested the assistance of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) Ad Hoc Committee to review the next iteration of the VVSG; and
Whereas, The VVSG Ad Hoc Committee has spent many hours reviewing the next iteration of the VVSG; and
Whereas, The VVSG Ad Hoc Committee has provided an extensive report with suggestions titled “Additional Resolution Issues”; and
Whereas, The Standards Board would like to formally acknowledge the efforts of the VVSG Ad Hoc Committee; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Standards Board hereby forwards the VVSG Ad Hoc Committee Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission for their consideration during their review of the next iteration of the VVSG.
A True Record Attest:
Tonni Bartholomew,
Secretary of the Standards Board
Executive Board
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Submitted by Executive Board on December 13, 2007
Approved as to Form by Resolution Committee on December 13, 2007
Submitted to the Standards Board for Approval/Denial on December 13, 2007
Passed on December 13, 2007
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COMMITTEE MEMBER |
SECTION NUMBER |
ISSUE OR SECTION SUMMARY |
SUGGESTION |
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Lynn Bailey |
General |
Plain language
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The only concern that I have that was not formally addressed in a Resolution is the fact that parts of the document are highly technical – to the point of being difficult, if not impossible, for the layman to understand. I realize that the EAC and others have attempted (apparently to no avail) to get the plain language companion document from NIST, and I would encourage us to continue our pursuit of this goal as well. |
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.1-A.9 IVVR vote-capture device, IVVR unambiguous interpretation of cast vote |
Each IVVR shall contain human-readable summary of the votes cast to ensure that hand audits and recounts can be done using only human-readable parts of the paper record.
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This section lists the human-readable content that must be contained on the IVVR. Since machines are used for early voting and some jurisdictions use the same machine at multiple sites, the requirement to list the polling place should be removed and replaced with machine ID to identify which machine was used for the IVVR. Also, may be necessary to add the date to know when the IVVR was voted for those jurisdictions that have early voting. Replace terminology “ballot configuration” with ballot style. |
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.3-A VVPAT, prints and displays a paper record, and 4.4.2.3-B VVPAT, ease of record comparison |
The VVPAT prints and displays the VVPR for voter to compare with a summary of the voter’s electronic ballot selections and shall be designed to facilitate the voter’s rapid and accurate comparison. |
Add a discussion section to clarify that the intent of these sections is for voters to be able to compare the paper record with the screen. |
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.3-D VVPAT, vote rejection process requirements |
If the VVPR is rejected, the VVPAT shall immediately print an indication that the vote is rejected (in view of voter), electronically store a record that the VVPR was rejected and the summary of choices, and deposit the rejected VVPR into the ballot box or other receptacle.
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Add to the discussion section that if a VVPR is rejected, the VVPAT would deposit the rejected VVPR into the ballot box or receptacle at the end of the voting process. It should not have to be deposited immediately, otherwise that will waste paper. Why keep electronic rejected records – wouldn’t a jurisdiction only need the accepted records? |
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.3-D.3 VVPAT, rejected vote election official intervention |
When a VVPAT reaches the configurable limit of rejected VVPRs per voter or per machine it shall remove the voter’s choices from the screen; place the rejected VVPR into the ballot box/receptacle; clearly display that a VVPR has been rejected and indicate the need for election official intervention; and suspend normal operations until re-enabled by authorized official.
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If any indication of the voter’s choices must be removed from the screen if the VVPAT reaches a configured limit of rejected VVPRs per voter or per machine, there would be no way for election officials to counter argue if a voter says that the VVPAT is not printing the correct selections. Theoretically, a voter could shut down a machine if an election official cannot verify the unit is not printing the voter’s choices correctly. |
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.4-B VVPAT, paper roll, required human-readable content per roll |
For paper-roll VVPATs, the paper roll shall be marked with:
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As with 4.4.1-A.9, the human-readable content of the paper roll needs to include the machine # and not the polling place. Should also include the date the tape is printed.
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.4-C VVPAT, paper roll, information per VVPR |
Each VVPR produced by a paper-roll VVPAT shall include: a.Ballot configuration b.Type of voting (provisional, early, etc.) c.Complete summary of voter’s choices d.For each ballot contest 1)Contest name (Governor) 2)Any additional information needed for unambiguous interpretation of VVPR 3)Clear indication if the contest was undervoted 4)Clear indication if the choice is a write-in vote e.Indication if the ballot has been accepted or rejected by the voter. |
For each VVPR, add the date it is printed. In item (e), remove the word ballot and replace with VVPR.
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.4-E VVPAT, cut-sheet, content requirements per electronic
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Each VVPR produced by a cut-sheet VVPAT shall include: a.Polling place b.Reporting context c.Date of election d.Ballot configuration e.Type of voting (provisional, early, etc.) f.Complete summary of voter’s choices g.For each ballot contest 1)Contest name (Governor) 2)Any additional information needed for unambiguous interpretation of VVPR 3)Clear indication if the contest was undervoted 4)Clear indication if the choice is a write-in vote h.Indication of whether each sheet has been accepted or rejected by the voter. |
In the title of this requirement, remove the word
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.4-F.2 VVPAT, cut-sheet, VVPR sheets verified individually
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For VVPRs split across multiple cut-sheets, the ballot choices on each sheet shall be submitted to the voter for verification separately. a.A verification screen shall be presented to the voter for each sheet separately. b.When a voter accepts or rejects the contents of a sheet, the votes contained on that sheet and verification screen shall be committed to memory. c.Configurable limits on rejected VVPRs per voter shall count each rejected sheet as a rejected VVPR. d.Configurable limits on rejected VVPRs per machine shall not count more than one rejected VVPR per voter. e.When a rejected VVPR requires election official intervention, the VVPAT shall indicate which sheets have been accepted and which have been rejected. |
This section needs clarified to clearly indicate that if the VVPR is split across multiple sheets, and if VVPR sheets can be individually accepted or rejected, that there must be a complete set of accepted ballots for each voter. For instance, if the ballot choices are going to be split across 3 sheets for each voter, we would want a complete set of accepted sheets, not 2 accepts and 1 reject.
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.6-C VVPAT, paper-roll, support tamper-seals and locks
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Paper-roll VVPATs shall be designed so that when rolls are removed from the voting device: a.All paper containing the VVPRs is contained inside the secure, opaque container. b.The container supports being tamper-sealed and locked. c.The container supports being labeled with the device serial number, precinct, and other identifying information to support audits and recounts.
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Clarify in the discussion section to state when poll workers remove the paper containing the VVPRs, the paper is in a container. Once removed, a separate container is not necessary.
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Shelly Growden |
1 - 4.4.2.6-D VVPAT, paper-roll, mechanism to view spooled records
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Paper-roll VVPATs shall have a mechanism for an auditor to unspool the paper, view each VVPR in its entirety, and then respool the paper without modifying the paper in any way or causing the paper to become electrically charged.
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Add to the discussion that the intent is to allow ease of handling of the paper rolls. An election official should be able to remove the paper from the spool with having to “un-spool” the paper so that VVPRs can be secured separately from the container. |
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Nikki Trella |
1 – 5.2.1 Software identification verification
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Refers to: (1) ways of locating & identifying software using directory paths and filenames or memory addresses & byte strings; and (2) ability to determine if software has been modified. (p. 120) |
Request that language be added to clarify that it includes both election and non-election specific software. |
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Nikki Trella |
1 -5.3-A Software installation state restriction
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Vote-capture devices must allow software to be loaded only when it is in pre-voting state. (p. 127) |
Suggest a corresponding requirement (about when software can be loaded) for optical scan tabulators. |
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Nikki Trella |
1 - 5.3-E Software digital signature verification
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Digital signature associated with software and created by designated entities must be validated before loading software on programmed devices. (p. 128) |
Requirement needs to be re-written. As currently written, it seems to require a test lab, NSRL or notary repository – instead of the digital signature created by the entity – to be validated. Suggested re-write: A digital signature associated with the software and created by a test lab, National Software Reference Library (NSRL), or notary repository SHALL be successfully validated before placing the software on programmed devices of voting systems. |
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Nikki Trella |
1 - 5.3-E.1 |
Software installation programs must validate the digital signature created by designated entities. (p. 129) |
Requirement needs to be re-written. As currently written, it seems to require a test lab, NSRL or notary repository – instead of the digital signature created by the entity – to be validated. Suggested re-write: Software installation programs SHALL validate a digital signature of the software created by a test lab, National Software Reference Library (NSRL), or notary repository before installing software on programmed devices of voting systems. |
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Jim Silrum |
1 – 6.5.3 Period of retention (informative) |
Period of retention |
There should be a separate retention period for optical scan jurisdictions that does not include the retention of electronic records. The ballots retained for 22 months is enough. This may be covered if all election procedures are removed from the VVSG. |
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Jim Silrum |
General |
Electronic transfer of election materials |
The elimination of electronic transfer of election materials should be relaxed. Eliminating electronic transfers puts a serious time burden on rural jurisdictions. In North Dakota for example we receive our ballot proofs and return our edits of the ballots by electronic transfer. If we had to do all of this by mail, we’d never meet our ballot preparation deadlines. We also transmit unofficial election results in the same way and in the future we could transfer programming securely. The safety net in all of these is that nothing is used in or after an election without being tested to make sure it is working correctly. |
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Jim Silrum |
General |
Requirements for election procedures |
In working on the assignment you have given, I have discovered that some of our working group’s recommendations may already be covered by existing resolutions. However, I emphasize the word “may” because whether or not they are covered depends on the full meaning of the phrases “election procedures” and “election management practices,” and election administration practices” used in the third resolution (according to the order they were sent to us).
Perhaps the Executive Committee should think about clarifying the scope of what is meant by this resolution by adding something like the following:
Be It Further Resolved that the Standards Board recommends to the United States Election Assistance Commission that it define “equipment standards” as those elements for which a voting system can be quantifiably and qualitatively tested.
A case in point from part 1 chapter 6.3 section 4.2, “The use of a "cheater" adapter for older type receptacles with only two-blade capacity and no dependable grounding conductor should be prohibited." This is beyond the scope of what can be tested because it is completely in the control of the election official.
I suggest this addition because I think the EAC will need some guidelines as to what would qualify to be removed in the VVSG if they accept the validity of the resolution. The case in point that I brought up above is also revealing to the difficulty of the task that is being asked of the EAC because it is embedded within a section that is for the most part about equipment standards and the election procedure could easily be missed.
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John Lindback |
2 - 3.1.1.2-A |
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Discussion section states manufacturers may submit failure analysis and corrective actions. Such important information should be required - not optional. |
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John Lindback |
2 – 3.1.2-A Other uses for documentation |
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The section recommends that the documentation be placed in escrow but does not recommend who should do it. Precise responsibility should be assigned. |
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John Lindback |
2 – 3.1.3-A |
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Standard suggests that the manufacturer decides what is proprietary and what is not. Standard should reference that manufacturers must comply with EAC requirements. |
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John Lindback |
2 - 3.3.2-B |
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Does this include all peripherals and all possible configurations? If so, the standard should be specific. |
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John Lindback |
2 - 3.5.5-A |
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Recommend that the list "shall" be included in the |
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John Lindback |
2 - 3.5.5-D Physical Security, power usage requirement |
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Add at end of sentence "and any limitations, if any." |
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Russ Ragsdale |
3 – 2.6.2 Software distribution requirements for repositories, test labs, and manufacturers |
Describes how certified voting system software is to be distributed. Requires digital signatures for software distribution packages and allows distribution by email, FTP, and websites. |
Applies to manufacturers, labs, and repositories. Repositories may be jurisdictions such as a secretary of state’s office. Maintaining a trusted build may be a good thing, but these requirements extend beyond product to process and may govern end-user procedures. |
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Gary Poser |
1 - 7.6-B.5 Closing Polls, Programmed vote-capture devices, report on poll closing procedures |
Test Method question relating to Part 3 Chapter 3, 5, 5.2.3-A was 'After polls are closed in part 3.F disabling the acceptance of ballots, is there a test of any re-opening of the polls to add additional ballots (missed absentees, etc) and showing proper audit trails, correct totals with additional ballots?' NIST Answer: Reopening of polls is prohibited by Part 1 Req. 7.6-B.5. The change history of this requirement follows.
1990 VSS 2.2.3.1. System shall prevent reopening of polls. 2002 VSS I.2.5.1.e. Prevent unauthorized* reopening of polls. VVSG'05 I.2.4.1.e. (same as 2002) VVSG'05 Public Review Issue #1817, 20050930, Sequoia says polls should never be reopened. Subcommittee e-mail, 200602 Brit Williams, Sharon Turner Buie, and Alice Miller agree that polls should never be reopened. (Discussion was about early voting.) Working draft, 20070831. Given unanimous input that polls should never be reopened, changed the requirement & |