

Guide to the Canvass



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Introduction

The canvass is a culmination of all the data generated during an election cycle. More importantly, it is a process that allows election officials to confirm the accuracy of that data and identify areas for improvement. The canvass process aggregates and confirms every valid ballot cast and counted, including mail, uniformed and overseas citizen, early voting, Election Day, and provisional ballots.¹ While post-election audits and recounts are frequently utilized to confirm the accuracy of ballot tabulation, the canvass assesses the eligibility of every ballot cast and counted and examines adherence to procedures.

A thorough canvass must look beyond the ballots. Election officials examine the work of office staff and poll workers, including the completion of chain of custody forms, reconciliation paperwork, and all forms comprising the audit trail for ballots, equipment, and supplies. This report documents and explains the comprehensive nature of the canvass—providing best practices and essential procedures for election officials. Additionally, it provides a template for election officials to create a summary report of their canvass findings to share with the public.

Definitions

Adjudication - process of resolving cast ballots to reflect voter intent.

Audit Trail - information recorded during election activities to reconstruct steps followed or to later verify actions taken with respect to election procedures and voting systems.

Canvass - aggregating or confirming every valid ballot cast and counted, which includes absentee, early voting, Election Day, provisional, challenged, and uniformed and overseas citizen.

Canvass Board - a group of individuals working together, following specific rules and procedures, to compile, review, and validate election materials.

Chain of Custody - a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date/time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer.

Challenged Ballot - ballot voted by an individual whose eligibility to vote has been questioned by another (typically an election official). The ballot is held until the reason for the challenge is resolved

Cure - the process of fixing an error or providing information to an elections office when your ballot has originally been rejected for counting.

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) - an electronic voting system that utilizes electronic components for the functions of ballot presentation, vote capture, vote recording, and tabulation which are logically and physically integrated into a single unit. A DRE produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and in printed hardcopy.

Duplicate Ballot - a ballot substituted for a damaged or partially invalid ballot. Duplicate ballots are usually remade by a regulated process where the votes from the damaged or partially invalid ballot are duplicated onto another ballot that can be tabulated by a scanner.

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¹ Jurisdictions may issue additional ballot types, like challenged and 17-year-old voter ballots. The canvass practices outlined in this report can be applied to additional ballot types though not specifically mentioned.

Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) - a blank ballot provided by the Federal Voting Assistance Program by which military and overseas voters can vote by writing in their choices and returning the ballot to their elections office.

In-Person Voting - voting before or on Election Day where the voter completes the ballot in person at a designated polling site, elections office, or vote center that is overseen by election officials or poll workers.

Provisional Ballot - a ballot cast by a voter who was not on the list of eligible voters, whose information was incomplete or not accurate, or who had already received a ballot in the mail and was allowed to vote.

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) - UOCAVA citizens are U.S. citizens who are active members of the Uniformed Services, the Merchant Marine, and the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, their eligible family members, and U.S. citizens residing outside the United States. This Act provides the legal basis for these citizens' absentee voting requirements for federal offices.

Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - in DRE systems, a paper document containing evidence of a voter's contest selections that they can check before officially casting the ballot.

Write-in - a vote for a candidate that was not listed on the ballot. In some jurisdictions, voters may do this by filling in a write-in space provided on a paper ballot, or they may use a keypad, touch screen, or other electronic means to enter the name on an electronic voting device.

Preparation

Preparation for the canvass begins before the election cycle. Election officials estimate supply and staffing needs based on the type of election, projected turnout, and modes of voting. Documenting the procedures used from initial preparation through results certification ensures uniformity and continuity. For elections offices that lack documented canvass procedures, the beginning of a new election cycle offers the opportunity to assess and document their process.

Roles and Responsibilities

Elections involve a variety of individuals and groups. Voters, candidates, political parties, volunteers, election officials, and the public all have some interest in and, in some cases, a direct impact on the canvass process. Election officials should draft standard operating procedures outlining roles and responsibilities for each part of the canvass. Standardized procedures help employees, volunteers, observers, oversight boards, the media, and the public understand the process and ensure uniformity in completing tasks. Below is an example of defined roles and responsibilities, but roles and tasks may differ depending on the jurisdiction.

- Poll workers
 - Verify and document voter eligibility and issue ballots
 - Maintain chain of custody for ballots (voted and unvoted), election equipment and supplies, poll books, and storage media

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 Complete documentation, including chain of custody, voting location reconciliation, and issues log

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- Elections office staff
 - Maintain chain of custody for ballots (voted and unvoted), mail ballot applications and envelopes, election equipment and supplies, poll books, and storage media
 - Review eligibility of mail ballots and reconcile the number of ballots found eligible with the mail ballots counted
 - Research eligibility of provisional ballots
 - o Review poll worker documentation and issues from voting locations
- Canvass Board/Board of Elections/Board of Supervisors²
 - Determine the eligibility of mail, provisional, and challenged ballots
 - Resolve questions of voter intent and signature mismatches
 - Review and verify write-in votes
 - o Ultimately, may be responsible for certifying election results
- Observers (if permitted by law)
 - o Watch and ask questions during the canvass process
 - May be able to challenge ballots
 - Adhere to laws and rules for observation

Jurisdictions may use several separate boards based on the ballot type being canvassed. Examples include, but are not limited to, Provisional Ballot, Duplication, Write-In, and Adjudication Boards. If used, these Boards may be responsible for determining ballot eligibility and voter intent rather than the Canvass Board.

Canvassing

The canvass is a comprehensive process that ensures the integrity of election results before certification. Unofficial results typically do not include all valid ballots. Election officials must tabulate mail ballots, including UOCAVA ballots, that arrive after Election Day and provisional ballots before generating final results. The Canvass Board also reexamines returns from Election Day and early voting locations and reconciles them with the poll books. While election officials release unofficial results after polls close on election night, the canvass is the process that generates the official results. The end of the canvass and official results certification is not necessarily the end of the election cycle. Some jurisdictions audit the election post-certification, and most state laws provide some form of a recount or the ability to contest the election results. The accuracy and integrity of the canvass are critical to these post-certification challenges.

Chain of Custody Review

Election officials establish procedures for documenting the chain of custody for Election Day, in-person early, and mail voting supplies, equipment, and ballots. A complete chain of custody is essential to the integrity of the item being tracked. The <u>EAC's Best Practices: Chain of Custody</u>³ report provides election officials with information on establishing robust chain of custody procedures. During the canvass, election officials review compliance with chain of custody procedures.

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² This report uses "Canvass Board" to refer to the body or official responsible for the canvass process. In jurisdictions that use a multimember board, the Canvass Board members may be non-partisan or bipartisan and appointed by their local political party.

³ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain of Custody Best Practices.pdf

Poll workers return equipment and supplies to the elections office on election night after polls close. While elections office staff track items as they are returned, the canvass provides the opportunity to scrutinize chain of custody documentation and verify all materials were secured and returned. Additional items, like voting equipment and larger supplies, may be returned in the days after the election. Again, the chain of custody must be maintained and reviewed during the canvass.

Chain of custody also applies to early and mail voting supplies and equipment. While these items may not leave the elections office, it is still critical to maintain a chain of custody and document their use and location. Chain of custody review for ballots and voting equipment storage media is included in the sample procedures outlined in the Ballot and Voter Reconciliation section.

During the canvass, election officials must (1) account for all items and (2) ensure the chain of custody is complete. Below is a sample procedure for ensuring supplies and equipment were returned and secured.

Equipment and Supply Canvass Sample Procedure	
Verify (using equipment serial numbers or supply lists) the item has been returned	
Confirm the item is properly secured (e.g., security seals intact, locked, etc.)	
Review the chain of custody for completeness	
Document the condition of the item	
Complete the chain of custody log with the storage location and two (preferably bipartisan) signatures	

Ballot and Voter Reconciliation

Election officials issue and receive several types of ballots—Election Day, early in-person, mail, UOCAVA, provisional, and more (as applicable). Election officials track every ballot generated, issued, and returned by type. In addition to reconciling the ballots cast, election officials assess whether procedures were followed during the election cycle, verify provisional voters and late-arriving mail ballots, and ensure the ballots counted align with the number of eligible voters who participated in the election. This section outlines essential steps election officials must incorporate into their ballot canvass.

No matter the type of ballot being canvassed, election officials should reconcile voters and ballots cast by precinct. Looking at this level of detail, rather than just total voters to total ballots cast, can reveal issues like voters receiving the wrong ballot style. If voters received the wrong ballot style, election officials can:

If Canvass Boards must open a secured container during any part of the canvass, they must maintain the chain of custody and resecure the container when finished.

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- Determine the scope of the problem (How many ballots did it affect?)
- Identify the source of the issue (Did it happen during early voting, on Election Day, or with mail ballots?)
- Update training and procedures to mitigate the risk of the same issue in future elections

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Ballot & Voter Reconciliation Materials Required			
Documentation		Voter Data	
Election Day Poll Worker Reconciliation		Mail Ballot Applications (including UOCAVA applications)	
Early Voting Daily Reconciliation		Voter Check-in Data	
Mail Ballot Reconciliation		Paper or Electronic Poll Books	
Issue Logs		Ballots	
Chain of Custody Documentation		Late Arriving Mail Ballots	
Provisional Ballot Affidavits ⁴		VVPAT Containers	
Precinct Voting Equipment Printouts (Zero and Totals Tapes from precinct scanners or VVPATs)		Ballot Containers (voted, unused, provisional, and spoiled)	
Unofficial Results		Electronic Storage Media Containers	

Documentation Review

The audit trail election officials create to track supplies, voting equipment, and ballots is central to the integrity of the election. It is strong evidence of a trustworthy election when properly completed. Following each election, the canvass provides election officials the opportunity to review staff and poll workers' adherence to documentation procedures.

Election officials must assess the completeness and accuracy of documentation completed by staff and poll workers during in-person and mail voting. During early voting, staff should reconcile the voters checked in and ballots cast daily. Election officials can more easily identify and resolve discrepancies when addressed on the same day. Similarly, staff processing mail ballot applications (if required), issuing ballots, and receiving returned ballots should track the number of each daily. Staff must secure the ballots throughout the election cycle.

Jurisdictions using ballot drop boxes must ensure rigorous chain of custody and reconciliation procedures are in place. Election officials must track:

- Who emptied each drop box? (teams of two, preferably bipartisan)
- When were the drop boxes emptied?
- How many ballots were removed from each drop box?
- Security seal information for ballot drop boxes and containers



⁴ In some jurisdictions, the provisional voter affidavit is printed on the provisional ballot envelope.

Once the teams return the ballots to the elections office, election officials must process the ballots and verify the ballots processed match the number of ballots reported as collected. During the canvass, election officials review the chain of custody for ballots returned via drop box and ensure pickup teams followed procedure.

For all pre-printed ballots sent to voting locations, poll workers must verify the ballots cast, spoiled ballots, and unvoted ballots equal the total ballots sent to the location.

On Election Day, poll workers verify voter eligibility, issue ballots, and secure cast ballots and voting equipment. After the polls close, poll workers reconcile the voters checked in to ballots cast. For jurisdictions that use precinct scanners or DRE machines, poll workers must secure the electronic storage media along with the ballots or VVPATs to return to the elections office. Whether the poll books are paper or electronic, poll workers must document the regular and provisional voter check-ins and secure the poll book. Election officials confirm poll workers followed these procedures to ensure the final results include all eligible ballots.

Implementing strict procedures for chain of custody and reconciliation supports the integrity of the election and simplifies the canvass. If the reconciliation documentation is complete and accurate for each precinct canvassed, the canvass process can quickly confirm staff and poll worker efforts. Election officials must train staff and poll workers to document any issues throughout the election cycle. Again, such documentation will assist in the canvass process.

Documentation Review Essential Steps	
In-Person Voting Documentation	
Verify poll workers or early voting staff (workers) properly completed forms	
Review reconciliation of voters checked in and ballots cast	
Review any noted issues	
Review the poll book and confirm workers followed procedures to verify each voter's eligibility and document the check-in	
Confirm voter check-ins match the reconciliation (including the provisional voter reconciliation)	
Verify the unofficial results match the totals printed from the voting equipment when the polls closed	
Confirm the ballots counted matched the regular voters checked in	
Mail Voting Documentation	
Ensure staff followed procedures when verifying eligibility and issuing ballots	
Document the total applications received, rejected, and accepted/ballots sent for domestic civilian ballots and UOCAVA voters	
Review staff reconciliation of returned eligible ballots and ballots cast	
Review any noted issues	
Reconcile the ballots found eligible before the close of polls with the ballots counted in the unofficial results	

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Voter Verification

During the canvass, election officials in jurisdictions that accept mail ballots received after Election Day or issue provisional ballots continue verifying voter and ballot eligibility. Late arriving mail ballots, including UOCAVA ballots, must be processed and verified following the jurisdiction's procedures. Additionally, election officials must hold any Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWABs) received from eligible UOCAVA voters until all returned UOCAVA ballots are processed, as the FWAB will not count if the voter's original ballot is returned.

Typically, elections office staff processes provisional ballots, conducts any necessary research, and, depending on their findings, recommends the Canvass Board accept or reject the ballot for counting. Ultimately, the Canvass Board or chief election official determines whether provisional ballots are eligible for counting. The rules for whether provisional ballots are eligible vary by state. Research may include verifying a voter with a new name did not vote under their old name or coordinating with other elections offices to verify voters who moved from other jurisdictions did not vote at their previous addresses.

Tracking the number of late mail ballots and provisional ballots received, accepted for counting, and rejected is critical. The ballots accepted must reconcile with the ballots cast in the final results. Maintaining detailed documentation for every mail and provisional ballot in the mail and provisional ballot databases allows election officials to compile the necessary data quickly.

Voter Verification Essential Steps	
Late Arriving Mail (including UOCAVA) Ballots	
Document returned ballots in the voter registration or mail ballot database	
Review returned ballot envelope, determine eligibility, and document in database	
Sort envelopes by eligibility determination (eligible, questionable, or rejected), document the number of envelopes in each category, and batch for further processing	
FWABs – Verify eligibility of UOCAVA voters who submitted FWABs and sort eligible FWABs for further processing (duplication)	
Store all rejected ballots in secured container and store per retention requirements	
Provisional Ballots	
Confirm the number of provisional ballot envelopes matches the provisional voters checked in	
Input all provisional voter data into the voter registration or provisional database	
Verify the database includes all provisional ballots received	
Research and document the eligibility of each provisional ballot following elections office's procedures	
Sort reviewed provisional ballots by type (e.g., voter changed name, voter was unregistered, voter registered in another county, etc.)	

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Ballot Review

Ballot review during the canvass includes documenting whether provisional ballots and mail ballots with eligibility issues are accepted for counting, resolving questions of voter intent, and duplicating ballots that the voting system cannot correctly tabulate. Elections office staff flag returned mail ballots that need further review, which may be escalated to senior staff or the Canvass Board, who ultimately resolves the issue. Three common issues with mail ballot envelopes include:

- Missing or mismatched signatures
- Incomplete information some states require voters to provide identification information (e.g., date of birth, last four digits of social security number, or driver's license number, etc.), a witness signature, or notarization
- Wrong or missing ballot

Many elections offices provide an online tool for voters to track the status of their mail ballot. For returned ballots that cannot be verified, the tool should provide the ballot's status and information on how to cure the ballot, if permitted.

As voters return mail ballots throughout the election cycle, election officials track and compile data showing the number of ballots returned and accepted for counting and with incomplete or insufficient information to verify the returned ballot's eligibility.

Election officials must provide the Canvass Board with

Ballot Curing

When elections officials cannot verify the eligibility of a returned ballot, many states provide the voter the opportunity to cure the issue before their ballot is rejected. Curing may also apply to provisional voters. For example, in a state where voters must show identification, a provisional voter without identification may have the opportunity to provide identification to the elections office after Election Day and have their provisional ballot counted.

applicable voter intent guidelines for resolving questionable marks and write-in votes, also known as adjudication. It is essential to provide written guidance to ensure consistency and transparency. Election officials must document the Board's decisions on each ballot. If Boards adjudicate ballots electronically, each Board should have unique logins and passwords, and the system should log each adjudication session as a part of the audit trail.

Similarly, election officials should develop a written procedure for duplicating ballots. Ballots may require duplication for various reasons, including torn or damaged ballots that the voting system cannot scan. The procedures must ensure that teams of at least two (preferably bipartisan) election workers or Canvass Board members remake the original ballot, label it as the original, and mark the original and duplicate ballot with a unique identifier. Election officials must document the number of duplicate ballots.

Lastly, election officials must verify and maintain the chain of custody for all ballots and note any issues. Ballot containers, including VVPAT containers, should remain sealed throughout the canvass. If the Canvass Board must open a container, election officials must ensure they resecure it. It is a best practice to keep a log of each sealed ballot container, noting each time it is accessed with the date, time, seal information, who opened the container, and reason for accessing the ballots. Once the containers are stored, election officials can complete the chain of custody with the storage location.

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Ballot Review Essential Steps	
Provisional Ballots	
Canvass Board reviews research and determines eligibility of each provisional ballot	
Staff documents Board's determinations in database and verifies the eligible and rejected ballots equals the total provisional ballots	
Store all rejected provisional ballots in a secured container and store per retention requirements	
Open the eligible provisional ballots and prepare for tabulation	
Document any ballots that must be duplicated and sort for further processing	
Ballot Eligibility	
Mail and UOCAVA ballots – document Board determinations on eligibility of questionable returned ballots (e.g., signature mismatches, questionable postmarks, etc.), sort eligible ballots for tabulation, and store rejected ballots in secured containers per retention requirements	
Resolve questions of voter intent (e.g., write-in votes and questionable marks)	
Duplication – remake all ballots flagged for duplication ensuring the original and remade ballots are uniquely identified for audit purposes	
Chain of Custody	
Review ballot containers and ensure all chain of custody information was properly completed and containers are secured	
Ensure all late arriving, provisional, and questionable ballots are tabulated and stored in secured containers per retention requirements	

Final Results & Performance Evaluation

After all eligible ballots are processed, election officials can tabulate the final election results. By canvassing ballots by precinct and type, election officials know exactly how many ballots cast the final results should reflect. Election officials can then create a summary of the ballot-to-voter reconciliation data. Before submitting the final results for certification, election officials verify the ballots cast in each precinct match the number expected from the ballot reconciliation process. If the results reflect all eligible ballots, election officials can submit the final results and reconciliation summary to the certification authority.

In some jurisdictions, the Canvass Board is also the certification authority, but others rely on a single chief election official or separate certifying board. Especially where the certifying authority is not involved in the canvass process, election officials may opt to create a detailed canvass report summarizing the process, any issues encountered, and actions taken. All documentation generated during the canvass should be made available for review.

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Election officials should also use the canvass as an opportunity to evaluate the function of early and Election Day voting locations and office staff in processing mail ballots. Issues uncovered in the canvass may require additional training or a change in procedure. The evaluation should be comprehensive based on canvass data and location performance. For example, if a location completed all necessary documentation accurately, but voters experienced long wait times on Election Day, election officials should review the cause of the line issue and develop a plan to mitigate it in future elections.

Generating Final Results Essential Steps	
Results	
Verify any issues found during the canvass of the unofficial results have been addressed	
Verify all late arriving mail, provisional, and questionable ballots found eligible have been processed	
Tabulate the final results and generate a precinct-level report	
Confirm each precincts' ballots cast matches the number of ballots found eligible during the canvass	
Prepare summary and precinct-level results and a summary of the canvass data for the certification authority	
Performance Evaluation	
Evaluate performance of early voting and Election Day voting locations and office staff in following procedures and completing necessary documentation	
Create plan to update procedures and trainings based on lessons learned	

Post-Canvass Reporting

Following the canvass, local election officials have several reporting obligations. First, they must ensure all voters who participated in the election are accurately accredited for voting in the voter registration system. If the certification authority is different than the Canvass Board, election officials must prepare the final results, summary information, and any other documentation generated during the cavass for the certification authority. Election officials should publicize the final election results and the canvass results to the public and label online results as "official."

Voter History

Election officials update the records of all voters who participated in the election to reflect their participation—also known as updating voter history. Voter history is typically maintained in the voter registration database and tracks every election a voter participates in. Participation does not necessarily mean the voter's ballot counted. Frequently, states direct local election officials to give voter history to voters who cast a mail or provisional ballot that ultimately did not count or who signed in to vote in person but left without casting a ballot. Therefore, the number of voters receiving history often exceeds the ballots cast in the election.

Voter history records all voters who participated in an election and keeps voters' registrations active. Indicating a voter's registration is active keeps voter registration lists up to date. An active voter registration means the voter can participate normally in subsequent elections, sign petitions, and not be



subject to removal from the voter registration list. Additionally, voter history data is important for analyzing voter participation statistics and estimating future participation.

Certification, Recounts, and Election Contests

In addition to the final election results, election officials must provide reconciliation data, chain of custody information, and documented issues for the certifying authority's review. The reconciliation summaries developed during the canvass can quickly verify and explain that the ballots cast accurately reflect the eligible voters who participated in the election. Providing documentation of a complete chain of custody for ballots, equipment, and supplies enhances the integrity of the final results.

A well-documented canvass can also give credibility to election results in the event of a recount or election contest. Well-documented does not mean no issues were discovered. It means election officials completed a thorough and meaningful check on election procedures and offered solutions to prevent similar issues in future elections. Given the complexity of election administration and the number of people involved, issues will arise. The canvass allows election officials to discover, disclose, and redress those issues in a way that promotes confidence.

Communicating Results with the Public

The public cannot know the value of the canvass if they do not know what it is. Election officials must communicate with the public about the canvass in plain language and in an accessible manner. Election officials spend considerable time conveying the message that election night returns are not final. The next step is making the public aware of what happens between unofficial election night returns and certified results.

Before Election Day, election officials should promote their canvass process and invite the public to watch. Canvass procedures can be posted on the elections office's website, and copies can be provided to anyone who observes in person. Even outside of the election cycle, election officials should include information on the canvass when engaging the public at community events or speaking engagements.

While the canvass is in progress, election officials can keep the public informed with daily updates. Updates can be posted on the website and social media accounts and shared with local media. When officials complete the canvass and certify the results, election officials should also provide the public with the summary of the main findings (see Figure 1 for a Sample Ballot Canvass Summary). Providing information about the canvass process from start to finish helps voters better understand how election results are certified and that the results they see on election night are not yet official.

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Figure 1 – Sample Ballot Canvass Summary

Election Day Ballot	Canvass	Mail Ballot Canva	SS
Voters Checked-in	1,445	Applications Received	1,215
Ballots Counted	1,444	Applications Approved	1,203
Notes: Poll workers in precinct	005 noted one	Applications Rejected	12
voter who checked in but left w	vithout casting a	Unregistered	6
ballot.		Signature Mismatch	2
Early Voting Ballot (Canvass	Wrong Address	3
Voters Checked-in	1,782	Wrong Name	1
Ballots Counted	1,782	Returned Voted Ballots	1,194
Notes: One ballot from precinc	t 004 jammed (as	Returned Ballots Counted	1,179
documented by staff). Canvass	Board sorted all	Returned Ballots Rejected	15
precinct 004 ballots and confirr	ned 314 ballots	Signature Mismatch	6
were cast, but the unofficial res	ults reflected 313	Wrong Ballot	1
ballots. All precinct 004 ballots		No Ballot	1
for the official results, which re	conciles with the	Late Postmark	4
voters checked in.		Past Deadline	3
Provisional Ballot C	anvass	Notes: Staff attempted to follow	up with all
Provisional Voters Checked-in	123	persons who submitted rejected	applications.
Provisional Ballots Received	122	Voters with registration issues w	ere provided
Provisional Ballots Counted	99	with information on updating the	eir registrations.
Provisional Ballots Rejected	23	UOCAVA Ballot Da	ata
Unregistered in State	12	Applications Received	78
Voted in Wrong Precinct	1	Applications Approved	76
Failed to Sign Envelope	2	Applications Rejected	2
Signature Mismatch	0	Unregistered	1
Failed to Provide Current	1		•
		Signature Mismatch	0
Address		Signature Mismatch Wrong Address	1
Address Failed to Provide ID	3	-	
	3 0	Wrong Address	1
Failed to Provide ID		Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted	1 0
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct	0 4 002 noted one	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots	1 0 66
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked	0 4 002 noted one	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted	1 0 66 64
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct	0 4 002 noted one	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected	1 0 66 64 2
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked	0 4 002 noted one	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch	1 0 66 64 2 1
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked	0 4 002 noted one	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch Wrong Ballot	1 0 66 64 2 1 0
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked ballot and left.	0 4 002 noted one in but refused the	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch Wrong Ballot No Ballot	1 0 66 64 2 1 0 0
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked	0 4 002 noted one in but refused the	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch Wrong Ballot No Ballot Past Deadline	1 0 66 64 2 1 0 0 0 1
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked ballot and left. 4,568 Ballots C	0 4 002 noted one in but refused the ounted	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch Wrong Ballot No Ballot Past Deadline FWABs Received	1 0 66 64 2 1 0 0 1 2
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked ballot and left.	0 4 002 noted one in but refused the ounted	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch Wrong Ballot No Ballot Past Deadline FWABs Received FWABs Rejected Original Ballot Counted	1 0 66 64 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 2 0
Failed to Provide ID No Ballot in Envelope Voter Already Voted Notes: Poll workers in precinct provisional voter who checked ballot and left. 4,568 Ballots C	0 4 002 noted one in but refused the ounted	Wrong Address Wrong Name Returned UOCAVA Ballots Returned UOCAVA Counted Returned UOCAVA Rejected Signature Mismatch Wrong Ballot Wrong Ballot FWABs Received FWABs Received FWABs Rejected	1 0 66 64 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 2

*Voters participated includes all voters who checked in to vote in person and voters who returned their mail ballots.

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