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Herewith are the Minutes of the meeting of the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Board Of Advisors held on Wednesday, April 27, through Thursday, April 28, 2005. The meeting convened on April 27 at 8:30 a.m. in Cambridge, Massachusetts at the Marriott Boston Cambridge Hotel, 2 Cambridge Center and adjourned at 12:41 p.m. on April 28, 2005.

Call to Order: Chair Lewis called the meeting to order at 8:30 a.m.

Roll Call: Chair Lewis called the roll and found present Secretary Chris Nelson, Ms. Mary Herrera, Secretary Mary Kiffmeyer, Secretary Rebecca Vigil-Giron, Mr. Tom Wilkey, Ms. Wendy Noren, Ms. Helen Purcell, Ms. Beverly Kaufman, Mr. David Orr, Mr. Tony Sirvello, Mr. J.R. Harding, Mr. Noel Hillman, Mr. Hans von Spakovsky, Ms. Polli Brunelli, Mr. Wesley Kliner, Mr. Thomas Shortbull, Mr. Joseph Crangle, Ms. Sue Sautermeister, and Secretary Robin Carnahan. Chair Lewis also recognized that Mr. Jim Dickson and Mr. Christopher Thomas were not present at roll call, but were scheduled to arrive later in the day.

Changes in Agenda: Chair Lewis asked that the Board not take any official votes until they adopted a set of bylaws in the following day’s business session. He then announced that the EAC Commissioners’ Q and A session would be moved to 8:30 AM the following day.

Updates and Reports: Chair Lewis asked each member to describe a few concerns they wished to address. The members raised concerns in an effort to improve the development process of the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG). Amongst the various concerns raised were members’ desires to discuss and integrate public comment into the process; concerns regarding the states’ lack of guidance in acquiring systems prior to the release of the final voting systems guidelines; the development of Board of Advisors bylaws; means to improve voter registration systems and reduce voter fraud; and various other obstacles facing EAC, State and local election officials in administering the mandates set forth in HAVA.

EAC Update: Thereafter, Chair Lewis introduced EAC EAC Chair Hillman, who provided the Board with an update on EAC. EAC EAC Chair Hillman gave a brief
summary of the challenges facing EAC, as well as milestones from the previous year, including its move in April 2004 to its new office space at 1225 New York Avenue, the publication of State plans, disbursements of requirements payments to States and issuance of best practices.

EAC Chair Hillman went on to discuss the schedule of payments being made to the states. She noted that Alaska, Guam and New York had not yet received any Title II payments because they had not met the administrative complaints procedures or five percent matching requirements, mandated by HAVA. Additionally, she noted the schedule of 2005 meetings and discussed EAC’s intention to hold public hearings in the field.

EAC Chair Hillman then reported on EAC’s success in obtaining an increase in its 2005 budget to $10 million for its operating budget and $4 million for research projects. These increases allowed EAC and the Technical Development Guidelines Committee (TGDC) to move forward with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) on the development of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). EAC Chair Hillman indicated that of this $14 million budget, approximately half is devoted including the development of guidance and VVSG. EAC's fiscal year 2006 budget request is approximately $17 million.

Furthermore, EAC Chair Hillman discussed the FY 2005 cap of 22 full-time employees and EAC's efforts for FY 2006 to have that number increased to 26, so that EAC may properly take over lab accreditation, voting system certification and the ongoing review and auditing of all state reports. EAC has decided to contract out a lot of the work it could do internally if it had more staff. Chair Hillman then described how the budget request process works.

EAC Chair Hillman then told the Board that the Commissioners would receive recommendations from the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) by May 9th. Thereafter, the guidelines will be posted for public comment for 90 days, at the end of which, EAC will make changes to the VVSG as appropriate. During the comment period, EAC plans to hold 3 public hearings. The entire process should take approximately 120 days and is required by HAVA.
EAC Chair Hillman provided a summary of the research and study projects EAC is working on, including issuing guidance on provisional voting, the impact of voter ID requirements, issuing statewide voter registration database guidance, studying and surveying Election Day 2004, UOCAVA, and NVRA as required under HAVA. The Election Day study will establish baseline information and statistics for further study and comparison. In addition, EAC will do a study on electronic voting and a report on Free Absentee Ballot Postage some time in the near future.

EAC Chair Hillman stated that all EAC meetings, including those of the Board of Advisors and Standards Board, are open to the public. General Counsel Juliet Thompson stated that the Board would be able to have telephonic meetings concerning upcoming studies as long as they are published.

Mr. Noel Hillman stated his concern that EAC does not yet have an Inspector General to oversee the process of disbursing funds and offered his help in securing Inspector General services for EAC. EAC Chair Hillman stated that the Commission has been working to establish a cooperative relationship with another agency for the use of Inspector General services and they are close to establishing such a relationship. Commissioner Soaries added that they are aware of the need to secure such services.

Commissioner Martinez commented on the interface between the Single State Audit Act and the duties of the Inspector General and stated that the Commissioners recently received guidance from GAO. In addition the Comptroller General has an obligation to audit funds at least once during the life of the funds.

Commissioner Martinez further commented that although the Commission reviewed the state plans that were submitted, its due diligence is limited to certification that a state had received a Title II payment, had filed a state plan published in the Federal Register, had an administrative complaint procedure in place, and had put up a 5 percent match. EAC will rely on the states to inform itself when it makes a material change to its plan, but will also perform audits to ensure that funds are being used for the intended purposes.

Chair Lewis expressed understanding that data collection at the local levels can sometimes be difficult, but stated that the first data collection instrument was thorough and served as a good benchmark.
Chair Lewis introduced Mr. Mike Sciortino, Chair of the Standards Board, who stated that the Board recently elected and organized an executive board. The executive board met in Washington, DC with members of the Advisory Board and National Academy of Sciences to develop a framework for the proposed guidance on Statewide Voter Registration Database List. Commissioner Martinez thanked Chair Sciortino for his leadership and guidance. Commissioner Martinez also indicated that the Standard Board's meetings would be transcribed and open to the public. Mr. Wilkey requested that the Voting Standards Subcommittee convene briefly during the break.

Recess:
The meeting was recessed until 10:45 AM.

Reconvene:
When the meeting reconvened, Chair Lewis stated that those wishing to propose changes to the bylaws should discuss proposals at 1:15 p.m. at the back of the room towards the end of the working lunch. He also indicated to the Board changes to the Board contact roster should be submitted to Sheila Banks at EAC, who contact information is on the last page of the roster of the Board of Advisors. Chair Lewis then asked Mr. Wilkey, Chair of the Board's Standards Committee, to provide an update on voting systems standards.

Voting System Standards:
Mr. Wilkey stated that he would be available to review the TGDC's proposed Voluntary Voting System Guidelines over the next few days. He encouraged Board Members not to be intimidated by the technical data and to ask for help in understanding the guidelines when necessary. He described the voting standards process as open and transparent and expressed amazement at its progress. Mr. Wilkey then stated that the 1990 standards took five years to develop and that there was a gap of time during which election officials determined what changes should be made to the standards.

Under HAVA, the TGDC and NIST had to produce its product in nine months and Mr. Wilkey stated that it was a monumental effort. Mr. Wilkey suggested that members of his committee, members of the board who were on the TGDC and a parallel group from the standards board convene for a day to get a briefing on the document. Mr. Wilkey asked Ms. Thompson if the contents of that meeting would be displayed on the website or otherwise be made available for the two groups. Mr. von Spakovsky asked when the latest version would be available and Mr. Wilkey responded that it would probably be available in the middle of June and that it
would be available on the website. Mr. Wilkey then encouraged everyone to read the overview enclosed in the booklets as a start.

Chair Lewis suggested that the Board of Advisors work like a legislative body and listen to recommendations its committees make to it. Commissioner Martinez informed Mr. von Spakovsky that the Commission intends to transmit the initial set of recommendation to Board of Advisors members when they receive them.

Chair Lewis asked Commissioner Martinez if there was sufficient time for Mr. Wilkey’s committee and TGDC members to get together during the 90-day period. Commissioner Martinez stated that there would be ample time and that HAVA requires a minimum period of 90 days for review but as the Chair suggested, that period may extend longer than 90 days if necessary to ensure due diligence. Secretary Kiffmeyer suggested that the Board try to give guidance as early in the process as possible. Commissioner DeGregorio then suggested to Chair Lewis to request that Board members who worked with NIST on the standards in the past discuss their experiences.

EAC Chair Hillman stated that the EAC has encouraged Board Members to review information as it became available and has sent letters in advance of the dates documents would be posted so that they could plan accordingly. Mr. von Spakovsky indicated concern over when Board Members would be getting a draft of voting standards for comments and EAC Chair Hillman stated that the Commissioners would take his suggestion under advisement that the Board get a draft when the Commissioners receive their draft.

Chair Lewis requested that Ms. Purcell and Mr. Harding comment on their experiences as members of TGDC. Ms. Purcell stated that the TGDC broke into three subcommittees and met by conference call every week or every other week. In addition the TGDC had several plenary sessions and planned to issue the recommended VVSG to the Commissioners by May 9, 2005. Ms. Purcell stated that she was on the Security and Transparency Subcommittee and worked on Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Ms. Purcell also brought attention to the fact that what has been accomplished by TDGC to date is on the NIST website.

Mr. Harding stated that the reason the TGDC broke into committees is because it was the only way to manage the work since the document is so large. The TGDC also informed the NIST
officials of election officials' limitations and practical needs and resources. Mr. Harding suggested that a process be developed so that Board members can ask prompt questions to narrow the focus of comments.

Ms. Noren encouraged everyone on the Advisory Board to read the documents on NIST's website and to digest the technical standards as part of their legal obligation. She also stated that the Advisory Board has a huge duty to assure that standards are in place for the 2006 election.

Ms. Purcell commented that most election officials have been using the same equipment for decades and that the goal is long-term. She also stated that she was impressed with how fast the NIST was able to assimilate election information and how much time they devoted to learning about elections.

Secretary Carnahan asked if Version 1 would be finalized on May 9, 2005 and if Version 2 would be available by December 31, 2005. Ms. Purcell responded that they were aiming to finalize Version 2 in November. Secretary Carnahan then asked if vendors that would be able to meet the new guidelines as required by state law.

Chair Lewis stated that it was a false expectation to have the standards coincide with the availability of new equipment in compliance with standards.

Mr. Dickson asked if the final point of the document would be May 9, 2005, or after the comment period and Chair Lewis responded that it would be after the comment period and publishing in the Federal Register. Chair Lewis also indicated that there could be changes between the May 9, 2005, version and what goes into the Federal Register. Mr. Dickson finally asked what the thinking was in terms of a one-time purchase and the existence of evolving standards. Mr. Harding responded that election officials would need to purchase equipment as well as maintenance agreements with their sums.

Secretary Vigil-Giron stated that her state (NM) was moving toward uniformity of all systems and looks forward to the enactment of standards as a positive evolution.

Mr. Orr expressed confusion about the difference between the reality of purchasing compliant systems and the reality of the legal obligation to purchase compliant systems. Chair Lewis responded
that the first legal basis is that machines bought in compliance with
the 2002 standards are still operable. However, the reality is that
some political groups will expect the standards to be adopted
immediately. Chair Lewis understands the frustration that follows
from such expectations, but it is the reality.

Commissioner Martinez reiterated a point Ms. Noren made, that
each state has to look at its own state law to determine which
guidelines to follow and what equipment will be in compliance.
The Commissioner also indicated that guidelines on VVPAT were
intended to be the first of several different ways to achieve
independent verification. Guidelines on others would be addressed
in future iterations of VVSG.

Secretary Nelson asked what impact Version 1 will have on ITA
certification and Commissioner Martinez responded that the
Commission will consider whether grandfathering is appropriate in
that regard. The TGDC has indicated to the Commissioners that
any policy on grandfathering should be decided by the EAC and
not decided by the TGDC.

Secretary Kiffmeyer expressed her concern that the Board
considers public perception and she complimented the Board on
their discussion.

Mr. Dickson asked if putting the expectation of updates into a
contract with vendors would result in their taking advantage of that
reliance. Ms. Noren stated that there may be a holdup problem, but
that with guidance from NIST and EAC, vendors should be able to
offer more accurate pricing.

Mr. Kliner and Commissioner Martinez discussed how
grandfathering standards could affect legislatures’ ability to plan
for implementing new guidelines. Commissioner Martinez
discussed the possibility of issuing guidelines with an
implementation date far enough in the future to allow states to
effectuate the changes. Ms. Paquette cautioned that Volume 2,
which is available on NIST’s website, may not accurately represent
the balance in security systems that EAC wishes to achieve.

Recess and Reconvening: The meeting recessed for lunch at 12:13 PM and reconvened
at 1:34 PM.

State Voter Registration Lists: Commissioner Martinez informed that under sections
311 and 312 of HAVA, EAC is obligated to issue guidance on the implementation of the administrative requirements in Title III. This includes Voting System Standards under Sections 301-303.

Commissioner Martinez indicated that EAC convened a working group to recommend draft guidelines on Statewide Voter Registration Lists. Among the members who participated were Secretary Nelson, Secretary Vigil-Giron, Ms. Sautermeister, Ms. Noren and Mr. von Spakovsky.

Commissioner Martinez noted that tab 7 in the Board’s briefing book contains the draft guideline, which was published in the Federal Register on April 18, 2005.

EAC Chair Hillman stated that in conversations with Members of Congress, she has suggested that they reserve judgment about how and when HAVA dollars are spent until critical deadlines have been met by the States. Although states have an idea of the cost of replacing voting systems, many are finding that it will be much more expensive to develop, implement or update the voter registration. They may therefore have to amend their HAVA spending plans.

Secretary Kiffmeyer stated that it was not explicit in the language in the draft guidance that the state list be the official list. She also expressed concern about the definition of the word “expedited.” Commissioner Martinez responded that the working group gave much attention to the language in Section 303(a)(1)(VI). As an example, Colorado elected to use a real-time transfer to comply with the expedited basis language in the statute. However, other states may interpret “expedited” differently. California currently plans that its statewide system will pull information from local databases, which will not happen instantaneously. The working group agreed that the term expedited should mean at least once every 24 hours.

Secretary Kiffmeyer stated that her question had more to do with the time between when a voter is issued a paper card and when it is entered into the system. Commissioner Martinez stated that once the information actually goes into the local official’s database, the guidance recommends an upload every 24 hours. The 24-hour period does not start until the local official enters the information into the database.

Secretary Nelson stated that the working group recognized the problems election officials might have in getting many
registrations at once. He also thanked EAC and other members of the working group for a good and productive experience.

Mr. Dickson asked about obligations under Motor Voter and Commissioner Martinez indicated that the statute requires that there be coordination of the statewide voter registration list with "other agency databases." The statute also requires that there be regular coordination between the Statewide Voter Registration List and death records and felony status. Question 10 of the draft guidance deals with how the Statewide Voter Registration list should be coordinated with other registration databases, which includes agencies defined by NVRA. Commissioner Martinez indicated that there was a great deal of discussion in the working group about the obligations created under Motor Voter.

EAC Chair Hillman noted that EAC has fielded concern from various groups that certain social service agencies are not meeting their responsibilities under NVRA. In some cases, when the agencies are not meeting their obligations, election officials may not follow up with them.

Mr. Thomas stated that the data will show who is complying and who is not. He asserted that where less than 50 percent of a state's registrations come through motor vehicles, that state is probably not doing their job in those offices. Mr. Thomas noted that HAVA specifically does not use real-time language and although real-time may be a nice concept, he doesn't believe it's necessary. In his state of Michigan, they do an update every 24 hours. Mr. Thomas stated that the draft guidance do not sanction bottom-up systems that are not functional. He stated that functionality should include the NVRA purging processes.

Secretary Kifineyer stated that her state of Minnesota built a real-time system for $5.3 million. She then asked Ms. Herrera how long it took to enter her state's 13,000 registrations. Ms. Herrera responded that it took about 3 weeks to enter all the registration forms because there were duplicates and other problems in verifying the entries.

Mr. Kliner was appreciative of the language in response to question 10 because the worry in Tennessee was that integration in real-time would increase the chance for a security breach. He indicated that he thought the 24 hour batch process would allay fears that local elections might have about computerized processes.
EAC Chair Hillman noted that this was the first time EAC put together a working group and the Commission was pleased that it went so well. Commissioner Martinez expressed his appreciation for the people who participated in the process and invited comments in the upcoming weeks.

Other Topics:

Chair Lewis asked if anyone had a subject matter they wished to discuss. Ms. Sautermeister emphasized the importance of the voter registration process, especially as it concerns states being able to share information. Chair Lewis stated that one of the long-term goals would be integration from state-to-state, but until the state databases are functional in that manner, it would be unlikely.

Ms. Purcell informed about changes being proposed by the state legislature to Arizona's voter laws. She noted one such measure that would require identification and disallow a person from receiving a ballot if they did not have identification.

Mr. Shortbull stated that South Dakota uses an affidavit system that he thinks works out well. He complimented Secretary of State Nelson on his efforts to work out glitches in the affidavit system. He expressed concerns that voter ID requirements could result in denial of civil rights. Commissioner Martinez stated that EAC is limited by NVRA and HAVA, but that Justice has enforcement authority under Title III of HAVA. HAVA does not preclude a state from imposing an ID requirement. HAVA also states in Section 303(b) that if someone is unable to vote because of a lack of ID, they should still be able to cast a provisional ballot.

Mr. Dickson stated that the Carter-Baker Commission is considering the issues of identification requirements and state interactive voter registration databases.

Chair Lewis stated that the Board would bypass a discussion of voter registration problems for another time and invited comments on the National Mail-In Registration Form.

Karen Lynn-Dyson introduced herself as the research manager for EAC. She advised the board about EAC's efforts to update the NVRA mail-in voter registration form. She also noted that EAC is considering the idea of a web-based form that would be able to be updated frequently. EAC will produce a Spanish version of the form and is looking at translating the form into six other languages. The final draft should be ready for public comment in July.
Chair Lewis asked if EAC has determined that a registration must have a driver's license number or other unique identifier in order to be a valid registration. Commissioner Martinez responded that EAC has not given an interpretation to that particular question. Mr. von Spakovsky of the Department of Justice stated that voter registration for Federal office cannot be accepted or processed by a state unless the application includes a driver’s license or similar identification.

Mr. Wilkey pointed out the problem of the high number of citizens who cannot read or write. He recommended that EAC have the form reviewed by a literacy expert and commented on how some states use graphics to make the form easy to read and fill out.

Secretary Vigil-Giron pointed out that there are three provisions of the Voting Rights Act that are due to expire in 2007 that will affect minority voters. Thirty-six or 37 states were told that they had 5 percent language minority populations and had to include election materials in those languages.

**Provisional Voting:** Chairman Lewis stated that the next topic was provisional voting and that there may be additional time for other topics at the end. He asked for a starting point for the discussion.

Commissioner Martinez briefed the board on implementation of provisional voting. He noted the variance among states regarding when a provisional vote would be counted. He stated that 27 states in the country require that for a provisional vote to be counted, it had to have been cast in the voter’s assigned precinct. Ohio is an example of one of those states.

Other states provide that if you vote in the correct county, but not the correct precinct, at least a partial ballot will count for Federal office. Georgia and New Mexico are examples of these states.

EAC will likely develop practices on implementing provisional voting. He noted that EAC held a public hearing on this issue in Columbus, Ohio and found that many states had not codified their provisional voting procedures. Florida is an example of one state that has codified its provisional voting procedures.

Commissioner Martinez further stated that EAC will undertake an effort to survey all states to determine how states are handling implementation of provisional voting.
EAC Vice Chair DeGregorio stated that the use of statewide databases throughout the country should help eliminate provisional voting for a lot of people. The overall goal is to have as few provisional ballots as possible. He also noted that EAC is collecting data on the numbers of provisional votes cast and counted in the 2004 election.

Several board members commented on various efforts being made by states and local jurisdictions to assure accurate voter lists and access to this information on Election Day by poll workers. Ms. Herrera asked why EAC hadn't come up with guidelines on how to count or process provisional ballots since provisional voting is a HAVA requirement. Commissioner Martinez responded that HAVA gives responsibility for methods of compliance and implementation to the states. EAC will issue guidance and best practices to inform jurisdictions but the states will have to promulgate their own procedures.

A general information discussion ensued about various procedures and rates of provisional votes cast and counted.

EAC Vice-Chair DeGregorio stated that preliminary statistics collected by EAC indicate that in states that had a statewide database in place for the 2004 election, about 6/10ths of one percent of registered voters used provisional ballots. In states that did not have a statewide database, the rate is about 1.4 percent, approximately double. However, there was no difference in ballots that were ultimately counted; 65 percent in states with a statewide voter registration system and 64.4 percent in states without a statewide voter registration system.

Chair Lewis stated that provisional voting was obviously a contentious issue because elected officials cannot agree on how to handle it. EAC Chair Hillman added that HAVA leaves it up to the states to define the jurisdiction and determine how and when a provisional ballot will be cast. Nonetheless, she encouraged the board to exercise its prerogative and provide advice and suggestions to EAC on how it should approach its various areas of responsibility.

**Studies and Data Collection:** Chair Lewis then introduced the next area of discussion, EAC studies and data collection.

EAC Chair Hillman pointed everyone to tab five of their binder, the Help America Vote Act tab. At the beginning of Section 241, it states that on a periodic basis, EAC shall conduct studies. Section
241 specifies 18 areas and a 19th on such other matters as EAC determines appropriate.

Sections 271 through 283 talk about grants for research on voting technology improvements and testing of equipment and technology, but those provisions are not funded by Congress, so EAC does not have money to provide grants for research on voting technology improvements or to do pilot program testing. EAC nonetheless is conscious of its role in certifying labs and will find money to do testing as appropriate.

Sections 302 through 305 address provisional voting, voting information, computerized statewide voter registration list requirements, minimum requirements and methods of implementation left to the discretion of the states. All of these sections govern the areas where EAC will issue guidance. EAC has put mechanisms in place to complete studies required by NVRA and overseas voting and EAC Chair Hillman anticipates that the data EAC collects in the 2006 election will guide the work it does afterwards.

EAC Chair Hillman noted that EAC has scoped out the basic framework for the 2006 research and study agenda. By the end of August 2005, EAC will have broadly identified its research agenda and study activities for 2007.

Commissioner Martinez stated that EAC is trying to use their appropriation for 2005 to focus on their obligations under the statute; development of voting system guidelines through NIST, the convening of statutory bodies, the development of guidance pursuant to Sections 311 and 312, and the mandated research. The only project that EAC is doing that is discretionary is the Election Day survey, which was sent to the states and was important for establishing a benchmark. Section 241 of HAVA has a laundry list of items that Congress has suggested and that EAC should research eventually. The question is whether there will be funds available to do some of the suggested research, and the Commissioners are interested in input from the Board on what areas of Section 241 EAC should explore.

Chair Lewis stated that during the break, he was approached by two officials, one state and one local, who requested that EAC invite comment from election officials before they release the Election Day survey to the public. Chair Lewis then asked if the Commissioners had determined what studies they planned to do in 2006 and 2007.
EAC Chair Hillman responded that EAC had not yet identified specific studies it would conduct but rather had established a broad framework that was included with its FY 2006 budget request.

Chair Lewis requested that members of the Board look at Section 241 and then facilitated a discussion that resulted in the board recommending prioritized areas of study under HAVA Section 241.

The top five areas recommended are:

(8) Methods of recruiting, training and improving the performance of poll workers.
(2) Ballot designs for elections for Federal office.
(3) Methods of voter registration, maintaining secure and accurate lists of registered voters (including the establishment of a centralized, interactive, statewide voter registration list linked to relevant agencies and all polling sites) and ensuring that registered voters appear on the voter registration list at the appropriate polling site.
(5) Methods of ensuring the accessibility of voting, registration, polling places and voting equipment to all voters, including individuals with disabilities (including the blind and visually impaired), Native American or Alaska Native citizens, and voters with limited proficiency in the English language.
(4) Methods of conducting provisional voting.

Recess: The meeting recessed for the evening at 4:46 PM.

Reconvening: Chair Lewis reconvened the meeting at 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, April 28, 2005.

Updates and Reports: Chair Lewis outlined the agenda for the day’s proceedings. The first session would be a Q and A session with EAC commissioners. After that would be a report of the Executive Director Search Committee, which would be conducted with the Board of Advisors members only. At the conclusion of the committee report, the meeting will be reopened to the public for adoption of bylaws and election of officers. After that, the board can vote on any issues.

Chair Lewis outlined the voting procedures to elect officers and answered questions accordingly.
Chair Lewis then invited the Board to pose questions to the Commissioners. Thereafter, the Commissioners would ask questions of the Board.

A number of issues were discussed during the Q and A session. Mr. Harding indicated that members of the Access Board were at EAC's disposal to assist in developing a VVSG that could be digested by the general public. The Commissioners answered various questions regarding anecdotal statements being made about the November 2004 election; possible means to increase voter turnout; VVPAT and possible alternatives; possible scenarios for jurisdictions not in compliance with HAVA come January 2006; access to EAC website; the voting systems certification and laboratory accreditation processes; the high rate of turnover amongst volunteers at groups that do voter registration training; and obstacles facing state and local election officials.

Executive Director Search Committee Report: The Board then met in Closed Session for 20-30 minutes to receive a report from its Executive Director Search Committee.

Adoption of Bylaws: Chair Lewis stated that the meeting was reopened to the public and that they would move on to the business section of the meeting. According to Robert’s Rules, the group would read the bylaws and consider them as individual sections. After adoption of the bylaws and review of the proxies, there would be elections of officers. He then invited Ms. Kaufman, Chair of the Bylaws Committee, to go through the first reading of the bylaws.

Ms. Kaufman reported that the Bylaws Committee consisted of Beverly Kaufman, Chair, Wendy Noreen, Sue Sautermeister, Ernie Hawkins, and Doug Lewis. The first draft of recommended bylaws was distributed to the Board via e-mail prior to the meeting and copies were distributed on April 27. The Committee members in attendance had a mini-meeting on the 27th and were joined by other board members (Mr. von Spakovsky, Secretary Kiffmeyer, Nelson, and Mr. Crangle) who submitted recommendations for amendment. After the discussion, their suggestions were accepted and distributed to the board.

Mr. von Spakovsky moved to dismiss the reading because everyone in attendance had the bylaws in front of them and the friendly amendments had been accepted by the committee. He also moved to accept the bylaws. Secretary Vigil-Giron seconded the motion.
Secretary Kiffmeyer agreed with the dispensing of the reading, but had a question about a proposed amendment. Chair Lewis asked if Mr. von Spakovsky would amend his motion to dispense with the reading first and Mr. von Spakovsky agreed; Secretary Nelson seconded. Chair Lewis agreed that they would proceed without reading the bylaws and would proceed to the consideration.

As to Article 1, hearing no objections, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor of adopting Article 1 say, “aye.” The Board voted to adopt Article 1.

Mr. Harding asked if Article 2 should cite the Federal Advisory Committee Act and Chair Lewis responded that he thought it was cited. Mr. Harding stated that the Article refers to the Act without a citation. Mr. Harding agreed with Chair Lewis that the Board could incorporate the citation by reference and attach them to future editions.

As to Article 2, hearing no objections, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor of adopting Article 2 say “aye.” The Board voted to adopt Article 2.

Chair Lewis stated that Article 3 came straight from the law, but contained an incorrect item. Item I should read, “two members appointed by the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Elections Officials, and Treasurers.”

Mr. Hillman observed that he knew the language came from the law, but for the record, there is no such thing as the Office of Public Integrity in the Department of Justice. It is the Public Integrity Division of the Department of Justice. Chair Lewis asked that the correct information be sent to EAC.

As to Article 3, membership, hearing no objections, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor of adopting Article 3 say “aye”. The Board voted to adopt Article 3.

As to Article 4, terms of service and filling of vacancies, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor of adopting Article 4 say “aye”. The Board voted to adopt Article 4.

As to Article 5, officers, no one voiced an objection that the Board shall elect a Chair, Vice-Chair and Secretary; and the officers shall be elected by secret ballot, each position lasting for a period of one year, with no officer serving more than two consecutive terms in one office. Chair Lewis stated that he noticed while looking at the
bylaws that there was no indication of when elections or meetings would be held. Ms. Sautermeister explained that they only have to meet once a year and did not want to limit it to a certain meeting. Secretary Nelson suggested that it specify the required meeting as the first meeting each year. Mr. Thomas asked if the term of office would be affected with no meeting specified and Chair Lewis suggested that the term be one year or until the next election is held, to which Mr. Thomas agreed.

Secretary Vigil-Giron asked if the Parliamentarian is going to adopt rules of order or if the Board would adopt Robert's rules. Secretary Carnahan asked if the Committee suggested having party differences between the Chair and Vice Chair. Chair Lewis stated that he was hoping not to do that although he would consider it. There are some members of the group who cannot be identified with a particular political party and should not be ruled out because of that. Secretary Carnahan commented that EAC is separated by party and so are Secretaries of State. Chair Lewis indicated his understanding, but stated that some people in the group are not supposed to engage in partisan politics. Secretary Carnahan suggested that the Board categorize people as part of a party or independent or undeclared.

Ms. Kaufman stated that she agreed and that the Committee discussed the same issue but decided it would be better left to discussion. Mr. Dickson pointed out that the group had half an hour and asked that they deal with the issue expeditiously. Secretary Carnahan proposed an amendment to include a statement that the party filling a seat shall not fill the same seat two years in a row and that the Chair and Vice Chair should be from different parties. Chair Lewis suggested that one person being unaffiliated should not preclude their predecessor from also being unaffiliated. Secretary Vigil-Giron seconded. Chair Lewis asked if there was further discussion on the amendment that the Chair and Vice Chair be of different political parties. Mr. Hillman asked for guidance from the General Counsel and stated that he assumed that a Board of Advisors was an apolitical entity, so party identification might be unusual.

EAC Chair Hillman state that HAVA specifically says that appointment to the Board shall take into consideration party affiliation so there is a balance. Mr. von Spakovsky stated that in the year and a half that the Board has been operating, politics has not played a part in the Executive Committee and he did not wish to introduce politics now. There is a large mix of members on the Board, from all levels of government and Mr. von Spakovsky
stated that he does not want to know what political party each member affiliates with because it is unimportant to the Board’s work.

Mr. Crangle stated that he thought most Americans look at party affiliation in terms of public image, and in that sense, it may be advisable to adopt the amendment. Mr. Hillman agreed with Mr. von Spakovsky about because he believes that identifying people with political parties suggests partisanship. Mr. Shortbull called the question and Chair Lewis asked for a vote on whether to adopt the procedure that the Chair and Vice Chair should be from different political parties. Nine were in favor and twelve were opposed, so the motion failed.

As to Article 5, added to the number 3 was “or until the next election.” Added to number four was “for a specific office.” And added as number 6 is “elections shall be held at the first meeting of each calendar year.” Hearing no further comment, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor say “aye.” The Board voted to adopt Article 5.

As to Article 6, duties of the officers, Chair Lewis asked all those in favor say “aye.” The Board voted in favor of Article 6.

As to Article 7, meetings, Chair Lewis noted that the amendments notice went from 30 to 45 days and may be waived by a majority agreement of the members; meetings may be held by electronic means. EAC Chair Hillman asked that the number of meetings per calendar year be subject to the availability of funds. Hearing no further objections, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor say “aye.” The Board voted to adopt Article 7.

EAC Chair Hillman asked about the waiver in Article 7. EAC is required to post a notice of all meetings in the Federal Register and wanted to be sure that they still provided for notice in the Federal Register. Ms. Noren suggested adding, “but not less than 14 days prior to” and Mr. von Spakovsky suggested to the extent permitted by law. It was his amendment and he intended that if there were an emergency, the group could waive the period. Chair Lewis agreed to change the language to “as permitted by law” and amended since it was already adopted.

As to Article 8, quorum and proxy voting, Chair Lewis suggested that proxies be given up to the day of the session. Mr. Crangle moved on the motion and Mr. Shortbull seconded. Thereafter, the Board voted to amend to subparagraph 2 of Article 8 to include the
The words “up to the day of the meeting.” The board voted to adopt Article 8.

As to Article 9, standing committees, Secretary Kiffmeyer suggested that E and F use parallel language since they require separate members from NASED and NASS. Secretary Vigil-Giron seconded the motion and Ms. Kaufman stated that she did not want to dilute the representation of IACREOT or NACRC as a result. Secretary Vigil-Giron stated that the goal was to represent different perspectives. Ms. Sautermeister asked if the motion only pertained to Voting Systems Standards Committee, to which Chair Lewis responded in the affirmative. He also noted that he would be objecting to it because it did not include a representative from the Elections Center. He suggested the addition of an H and an I and that the Election Center be represented. Secretary Kiffmeyer asked Chair Lewis if he was suggesting an amendment to the amendment proposed and he responded yes.

Mr. Nelson stated that his original intention in the language was to make sure that there was at least one person representing the state level organization, not to include someone from every organization. Ms. Herrera stated that it was important to separate Secretaries of State and State Election Directors since they certify and qualify machines. Chair Lewis suggested that they say one member from NACRC, IACREOT, the Election Center, NASS, and NASED be part of it, eliminating E through G, and the Committee would be 11 members instead of nine. The two added members would be the Election Center and dividing NASS and NASED.

Mr. Dickson asked if the Board was properly balancing interest groups in terms of groups that represent citizens and Chair Lewis responded that there would be five from the groups they just talked about and one from disabilities. Chair Lewis asked if they should add more groups from non-elections organizations. Mr. Kliner stated that if they expanded the groups, some of the people that would like to serve but are not affiliated could participate. Chair Lewis asked Secretary Nelson if it would be possible to say that the Chair can select members who are not part of the organizations and Secretary Nelson responded that he could have three at-large appointments form the board. Chair Lewis suggested that the Chair of the Board of Advisors select from people who are not already representative of the five organizations mentioned. Ms. Kaufman suggested restating the language to read each of the five organizations mentioned could have only one representative on the Committee.
Secretary Vigil-Giron asked if the group needed to correct the IACREOT name, and Chair Lewis pointed out that it did need to be corrected throughout. Mr. Dickson requested that the language be specific as to the pool from which the Chair could select members since he hoped the document would be around for many years.

The Board voted in favor of amending E to read, “One member, excluding the Chair, shall represent each of the following organizations.”

Mr. Dickson moved to create subsection F, which would allow the Chair to select members who are not members specified in section E. Thereafter, the Board voted in favor of this amendment.

As to Article 9, hearing no objection, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor say “aye.” The Board voted in favor of Article 9.

As to Article 10, amendments, Chair Lewis noted that the bylaws could be amended not less than 30 days prior to an annual meeting. Mr. Dickson asked if the bylaws can only be amended at something designated as an annual meeting. Secretary Kiffmeyer suggested not using the annual meeting language since they struck it in an earlier adoption. Chair Lewis suggested eliminating the word annual, which would include electronic meetings as well. Ms. Kaufman asked if they would still need a two-thirds vote to adopt bylaws and Secretary Nelson responded that two-thirds was correct.

As to Article 10, as amended, Chair Lewis asked that all in favor say “aye.” The Board voted in favor of Article 10, as amended.

**Proxy Voting:**

EAC Chair Hillman expressed her hope that the availability of a proxy vote would not encourage people not to attend in person. Of the 37 members of the board eight are not very responsive and EAC is doing their best to work on them, but that does mean that 29 members are active and EAC Chair Hillman hopes to see a majority at every meeting.

Mr. Dickson suggested that the bylaws committee should decide on whether or not to limit the number of proxies. Chair Lewis stated that the issue would be assigned to the bylaws committee for recommendations at the next meeting. Secretary Kiffmeyer suggested that the bylaws reconcile the timing for getting proposing bylaw changes and getting information out to members.
so that the Chair has a reasonable ability to get proposals and pass them on without it having to happen on the same day. Chair Lewis stated that ordinarily the proxies would be submitted to a Proxy committee to verify them as legitimate, but he suggested doing a quick adoption. There were proxies from David Orr, Wendy Noren, James Elekes, Ernie Hawkins, Jim Carnes, and Secretary Kiffineyer. Chair Lewis responded to a question by indicating that the proxy would vote for those not present.

Mr. Crangle asked how people could vote by proxy before the adoption of the bylaws and Chair Lewis responded that he told everyone in advance that there would be proxies assuming the adoption of the bylaws. The Board voted to accept the proxies as submitted for this meeting.

Chair Lewis stated that Mr. Harding, Ms. Purcell, Ms. Kaufman, Director Brunelli, and the Chair would vote for themselves and their proxies. Chair Lewis counted 19 present and 6 proxies, with one non-voting member present. He got agreement that a majority would be 13 and passed around the ballots.

**Election of Officers:** Chair Lewis asked for nominations for Chair. Secretary Vigil-Giron nominated Mr. Crangle. Ms. Purcell nominated Ms. Kaufman. Each candidate made brief presentations about their interests in serving as Chair of the EAC Board of Advisors.

Votes were cast, Chair Lewis counted the votes and found that Ms. Kaufman received a majority of the votes with 18. Mr. Crangle moved to have the vote cast unanimously, Mr. Hillman seconded the motion and the Board voted in favor of the motion. Mr. Lewis congratulated Ms. Kaufman, who immediately assumed responsibilities as chair of the Board.

Chair Kaufman recognized Mr. Sirvello, who nominated Mr. von Spakovsky for the position of Vice-Chair. Secretary Vigil-Giron nominated Mr. Thomas. Mr. Shortbull stated that he was uneasy about having a member from the Department of Justice as an officer of Board.

The votes were cast and the ballots were counted with Mr. Thomas winning a majority with 14 votes.

Chair Kaufman asked for nominations for the office of Secretary. Mr. Shortbull nominated Secretary Vigil-Giron, who declined because of her duties as NASS President, but nominated Mr. Sirvello. Former Chair Lewis moved for nominations to cease,
which Ms. Herrera seconded. The Board voted in favor of the motion. Thereafter, The Board voted in favor of Mr. Sirvello as Secretary.

Chair Kaufman thanked Mr. Lewis for his invaluable services as the Board’s first chair. She stated that she has some huge shoes to fill and is grateful for the opportunity.

Mr. Dickson moved to have the Advisory Board urge EAC to engage experts to help with ballot design. The motion was seconded.

Mr. Harding asked what Mr. Dickson’s intent was in suggesting the motion. Mr. Dickson stated that he wanted to get at the hard science of ballot design. Secretary Nelson asked if it was appropriate to direct the Commission to work with a particular organization. Chair Kaufman suggested that Mr. Dickson change the wording of his motion to soften the directive. Mr. Dickson agreed to insert “such as” so that other groups could be considered.

Chair Kaufman restated the motion moved that the Board urge EAC to engage experts to help with guidance on ballot design. Specifically, she moved that they reach out to those in low literacy, such as Democracy Design and simplified language. The Board voted in favor of the motion.

Ms. Purcell requested that suggestions on the VVSG from the Board members be e-mailed to Ms. Purcell or Mr. Harding.

Mr. Shortbull moved that the Executive Director report be moved to EAC, which was seconded by Mr. Harding. The Board voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Thomas moved to adjourn. The motion was seconded by Secretary Vigil-Giron.

Adjournment: The meeting was adjourned at 12:41 P.M.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01/12/05</td>
<td>EAC staff draft proposes SOW for Provisional Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/13/05</td>
<td>EAC staff presents draft proposed SOW for Provisional Voting to Commissioners</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/17/05</td>
<td>EAC staff drafts proposed SOW for Voter ID</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/18-02/14/05</td>
<td>EAC staff, in consultation with the Commissioners, draft proposed combined SOW for Provisional Voting and Voter ID</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/17/05</td>
<td>EAC staff meets with Commissioners and distributes SOW and outline of contracting process via email for Commissioner approval</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/02/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Commissioners meet to discuss Provisional Voting and Voter ID Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/23/05</td>
<td>EAC staff discuss Evaluation Criteria for the Provisional Voting and Voter ID RFP via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/30/05</td>
<td>EAC staff discuss Technical Evaluation Criteria for Provisional Voting and Voter ID Contract via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/24/05</td>
<td>EAC Commissioners Approve Contract Award to Eagleton</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/25/05</td>
<td>Eagleton notified of Contract Award</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/26/05</td>
<td>EAC Commissioner, EAC staff, and Eagleton meet at EAC office. Political balance of Peer Review Group amongst topics discussed. Commissioner DeGregorio subsequently suggests additional Peer Review Group participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/03/05</td>
<td>EAC staff notifies bidders via email that Eagleton has been awarded the Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/06/05</td>
<td>Eagleton submits Revised Workplan extending deadlines to EAC staff via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/07-06/17/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton conduct email discussion regarding Eagleton’s plans to survey local election officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/09/05</td>
<td>EAC staff notifies Eagleton via email that 06/06 Workplan is not an acceptable deliverable</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/17/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton’s revised workplan via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/20/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton’s revised workplan via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/23-07/15/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss Peer Review Group via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/23/05</td>
<td>EAC staff emails Eagleton’s proposed Peer Review Group to the Commissioners</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/27/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Commissioners discuss the proposed Peer Review Group at briefing</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/06-07/07/05</td>
<td>Eagleton emails EAC staff information regarding Eagleton’s local election official survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/08/05</td>
<td>Eagleton submits response to EAC staff’s suggestion for additional Peer Review Group, including a list of proposed members</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/12/05</td>
<td>EAC Commissioners and staff hold teleconference with Eagleton</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/14/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss sample size and budget allocation for</td>
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<td>survey of local election officials via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/14/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton June 2005 Progress Report via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/15/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton hold teleconference approving the composition</td>
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<td>of Eagleton's Peer Review Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/15/05</td>
<td>EAC staff emails Final Agenda for 07/28/05 hearing to Eagleton</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/15-07/26/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss details of 07/28 hearing via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/19-07/21/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton hold email discussion regarding Eagleton's</td>
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<td>proposal for research regarding provisional ballot design. EAC staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>declines Eagleton's proposal for adding ballot design to the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/19-08/08/05</td>
<td>Dates for meeting with EAC staff discussed with Eagleton via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/28/05</td>
<td>EAC Public hearing held at Cal/Tech in Pasadena. Eagleton briefs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EAC Commissioners on progress of research</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/01/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss Peer Review Group via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/04/05</td>
<td>Vice-Chair DeGregorio provides EAC staff with a list of centrist/</td>
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<td>conservative groups via email in regards to Peer Review Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/08/05</td>
<td>Meeting with Eagleton on 09/06 at the EAC confirmed via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/09/05</td>
<td>Eagleton holds first teleconference with Peer Review Group regarding</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Provisional Voting Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/15/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives July 2005 Progress Report from Eagleton via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/19-09/02/05</td>
<td>Commissioners, EAC staff, and Eagleton discuss potential members of</td>
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<td>Peer Review Group via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/01/05</td>
<td>Eagleton submits materials to EAC staff for 09/06 briefing via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/01-09/03/06</td>
<td>Eagleton emails answers to questions regarding the Provisional Voting</td>
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<td>Report analysis to EAC staff. Additional materials Fed Exed to EAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/05/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives copy of Eagleton’s PowerPoint presentation and</td>
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<td>alternatives document for 09/06 meeting via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/06/05</td>
<td>Commissioners and EAC staff hold briefing with Eagleton to review</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provisional Voting Draft of Analysis and Alternatives Paper and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>discuss outline and direction of the Preliminary Guidance Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/14/05</td>
<td>Eagleton sends email to EAC staff requesting EAC Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>feedback on Alternative Next Steps</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/15/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton August 2005 Progress Report via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/21/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Provisional Voting Survey Report from Eagleton</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/30/05</td>
<td>Teleconference with Eagleton, EAC staff, and Commissioner Martinez</td>
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<td>to discuss general direction and objective of research</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/30/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives September 2005 Progress Report and Peer Review</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group Summary Comments from Eagleton via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/17/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives October 2005 Progress Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/14/05</td>
<td>EAC staff meets with Eagleton regarding execution of surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/15-11/23/05</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss the status of the reports and the</td>
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<td>process for completion of reports via email</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/15/05</td>
<td>Eagleton requests No-Cost Extension and EAC staff initiates process via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/28/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton's Provisional Voting Report via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/29/05</td>
<td>EAC staff contacts Eagleton via email to request more detailed invoices for the new fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/13/05</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton November 2005 Progress Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/17/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton December 2005 Progress Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/25/06</td>
<td>EAC staff approves Eagleton's no-cost extension request and notifies Eagleton via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/16/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton January 2006 Progress Report and inquires as to status of Voter ID Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/22/06</td>
<td>Eagleton holds teleconference with Peer Review Group regarding Voter ID Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/23/06</td>
<td>EAC staff discusses comments/edits to Eagleton via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/15/06</td>
<td>EAC staff inquires into ETA for Eagleton's Voter ID Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/16/06</td>
<td>EAC staff approves Eagleton Draft Voter ID Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/17/06</td>
<td>Eagleton Draft Voter ID Report distributed via email to Commissioners for comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/16/06</td>
<td>Eagleton emails Voter ID Report Appendix to EAC staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/16/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton February 2006 Progress Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/17/06</td>
<td>EAC staff emails Eagleton requesting explanation for using CPS rather than Election Day Survey data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/21/06</td>
<td>Eagleton responds via email to EAC staff's inquiry into reasoning for use of CPS data rather than Election Day Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/24/06</td>
<td>EAC staff informs Eagleton via email that it has requested Commissioner feedback regarding the Draft Voter ID Report by COB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/28/06</td>
<td>EAC staff poses a number of questions via email regarding Eagleton's statistical manipulations, use of Census data, and statements made in Voter ID Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/28/06</td>
<td>EAC staff sends email request to Eagleton for confirmation that final payment invoice information is forthcoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/28/06</td>
<td>EAC staff participates in teleconference with Eagleton project staff, sharing general thoughts and posing questions about data and statements in Voter ID Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/31/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton's Draft Voter ID Report for 04/03 meeting via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/03/06</td>
<td>Commissioners Hillman and Davidson, EAC staff, and Eagleton meet in the morning to discuss Voter ID Report. Commissioners DeGregorio and Martinez, EAC staff, and Eagleton meet in the afternoon to discuss Voter ID Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/06</td>
<td>EAC staff sends email to Eagleton inquiring into next steps for the final Provisional Ballot and Voter ID Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/13/06</td>
<td>EAC staff has teleconference with Eagleton regarding next steps for the final Provisional Ballot and Voter ID Reports. EAC staff requests that Eagleton convene a teleconference with Peer Review Group and EAC staff and/or Commissioners to discuss statistical analysis and Voter ID...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Report. EAC also reports that it will convene second Peer Review Group to seek further feedback. Eagleton also provides EAC staff with an extension timeline via email.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/14/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton's March 2006 Progress Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/06</td>
<td>EAC staff begins to process Eagleton's No-cost Extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/06</td>
<td>Eagleton formally requests No-Cost Extension via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/25-04/27/06</td>
<td>EAC staff has email discussion with Eagleton regarding project timeline over next several weeks, including peer review, teleconference, and presentations at board meetings and public hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/26/06</td>
<td>EAC staff approves Eagleton's No-Cost Extension Request and notifies Eagleton via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/27/06</td>
<td>EAC staff requests final draft of Provisional Ballot Report from Eagleton via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/28/06</td>
<td>EAC staff notifies Eagleton via email of Peer Review Group that the EAC has selected for Voter ID Report and sets 05/11 deadline for review and teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/01/06</td>
<td>EAC staff contacts Voter ID Peer Review Group via email regarding review and 05/11 teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/04/06</td>
<td>Eagleton distributes Revised Voter ID Analysis to EAC staff via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/05/06</td>
<td>EAC staff distributes Revised Voter ID Analysis to 2nd Peer Review Group via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/08/06</td>
<td>EAC staff inquires via email as to the status of the final report on Provisional Voting from Eagleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/09/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton's Draft Voter ID Report via email</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/09/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton Draft Voter ID Report and Appendices and Distributes to Peer Review Group via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/09/06</td>
<td>EAC staff informs Eagleton via email that the Commissioners will review the final Provisional Voting and Voter ID Reports at their 05/16 and 05/18 meeting and that materials for distribution to the Board of Advisors and Standards Board must be ready by 05/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/09-05/17/06</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss details regarding presentations to the 05/23 and 05/24 Standards Board and Board of Advisors Meetings via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/11/06</td>
<td>Teleconference between EAC staff, Eagleton, members of the original Peer Review Group, and additional Peer Review Group members selected by the EAC regarding Voter ID Draft Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/12/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton's Draft of Provisional Voting Report for Review by the Standards Board and Board of Advisors via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/16/06</td>
<td>Commissioners and EAC staff hold briefing to discuss the presentation of Eagleton's Draft of Provisional Voting Report to the Standards Board and Board of Advisors. EAC staff emails feedback to Eagleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/17/06</td>
<td>EAC staff receives Eagleton's Draft of Voter ID Report and Appendices for Review by the Standards Board and Board of Advisors via email. EAC staff emails the information to the Commissioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/18/06</td>
<td>Commissioners and EAC staff hold briefing to discuss the presentation of Eagleton's Draft of Voter ID Report to the Standards Board and</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/18-22/06</td>
<td>EAC discusses details of Provisional Voting presentation with Eagleton via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/23/06</td>
<td>Eagleton presents Provisional Voting Report to EAC Standards Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/24/06</td>
<td>Eagleton presents Provisional Voting Report to EAC Board of Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/06/06</td>
<td>Eagleton sends letter to Commissioner DeGregorio regarding Provisional Voting and Voter ID Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/08-06/26/06</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss conclusion of the Contract via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/05/06</td>
<td>EAC Executive Director sends letter to Eagleton regarding lack of clarity and ETA for final results of Voter ID study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/29/06</td>
<td>Final Provisional Voting and Voter ID Draft Reports received by EAC staff from Eagleton via email. Attachments sent Fed Ex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/30/06</td>
<td>EAC staff sends letter to Eagleton regarding remaining tasks to close out Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/06</td>
<td>Telephone conversation between Eagleton and EAC staff regarding EAC's 06/30/06 letter regarding remaining tasks to close out Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/06/06</td>
<td>Eagleton emails written summary of remaining tasks to close out Contract to EAC staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/19/06</td>
<td>Eagleton submits June 2006 Progress Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/20/06</td>
<td>Eagleton submits April 2006 and May 2006 Progress Reports via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/16/06</td>
<td>Eagleton submits final letter regarding Study Release to EAC staff via email and requests release of both Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/24/06</td>
<td>Commissioners and EAC staff hold briefing regarding Eagleton Provisional Voting Draft Report and EAC Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/24-09/06/06</td>
<td>EAC Commissioners and staff discuss Eagleton Provisional Voting Draft Report and EAC Statement to be released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/28/06</td>
<td>EAC staff notified via email by Michael McDonald that Eagleton has released data from Provisional Voting and Voter ID Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/31/06</td>
<td>EAC Executive Director notifies Eagleton that it is not authorized to release the Voter ID Draft Report as the Report has not been finalized and has not been officially released by the EAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/15/06</td>
<td>EAC Commissioners and staff discuss release of information from the Voter ID Report to Hill staffers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/28-09/29/06</td>
<td>After meeting with EAC staff, HR Communications edits Eagleton Provisional Voting Report for clarity and tone. HR Communications emails edits to EAC staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/02/06</td>
<td>EAC staff emails the professionally edited draft of Provisional Voting Report to Commissioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/03/06</td>
<td>EAC Commissioners and staff discuss the Provisional Voting Report at briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/03/06</td>
<td>Eagleton contract closed and $2,910.77 balance remaining deobligated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/04/06</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton review via email what information has been released regarding the Eagleton Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/06</td>
<td>Eagleton writes to EAC Executive Director requesting an approximate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/23/07</td>
<td>Federal Reporter Notice published regarding 02/28/07 Public Hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/30-02/06/07</td>
<td>EAC staff discusses Eagleton Voter ID Draft Report and potential talking points for Voter ID segment of Public Hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/06/07</td>
<td>Eagleton submits draft text of Presentation for 02/08 EAC Public Hearing to EAC staff via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/08/07</td>
<td>EAC holds Public Hearing where Eagleton provides Testimony and submits Voter ID Draft Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/06/07</td>
<td>Commissioners and EAC staff hold briefing regarding Eagleton Draft Voter ID Report and EAC Draft Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/07/07</td>
<td>Commissioner Davidson appears before House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/06-03/20/07</td>
<td>EAC staff and Eagleton discuss edits to Voter ID Draft Report via email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/21-03/29/07</td>
<td>EAC staff, and Eagleton discuss edits to Press Statement accompanying release of Eagleton Voter ID Draft Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/30/07</td>
<td>EAC releases Eagleton Voter ID Draft Report and Statement, Commissioner Rodriguez and Eagleton interviewed by NPR</td>
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EAC REPORT ON VOTING FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Voting fraud and intimidation are phrases familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, they mean different things to different people. Voting fraud and intimidation are phrases used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and, at times, even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of these topics has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voting fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has begun this, phase one, of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the existence and enforcement of election crimes in this country.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the EAC to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC's Executive Board and Board of Advisors. Voting fraud and voter intimidation were among these topics the EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the common understanding of voting fraud and voter intimidation, but no comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not an extensive review of existing voting fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. To conduct that type of extensive research, a basic understanding had to first be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voting fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voting fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, who worked with EAC staff and interns to conduct the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic and to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged to (1) research the current state of information on the topic of voting

1 Biographies for Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, the two consultants hired by EAC, are attached as Appendix "1".
fraud and voter intimidation; (2) develop a uniform definition of voting fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) propose recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voting fraud and intimidation and conducted interviews with experts in the field. EAC consultants and staff then presented their initial findings to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

The Honorable Todd Rokita  
Indiana Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers  
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board

J.R. Perez  
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

Barbara Arnwine  
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law  
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

Benjamin L. Ginsberg  
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP  
Counsel to national Republican campaign committees and Republican candidates

Robert Bauer  
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia  
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

Mark (Thor) Hearne II  
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri  
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

Barry Weinberg  
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Technical Advisor:  
Craig Donsanto  
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of relevant cases, studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voting fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited by EAC staff to produce this final report.
EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

To begin our study of voting fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voting fraud and intimidation. The information available about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles, and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voting fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted and reports published about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix “2”:

**Articles and Reports**

• Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise, "Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?" A Report to the Center for Voting Rights & Protection, September, 2004.


• Democratic National Committee, "Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio," DNC Services Corporation, 2005

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voting fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive, nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voting fraud or voter intimidation in the United States. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voting fraud or intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as
"Building Confidence in U.S. Elections," suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the "Preliminary findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud," produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate because there is little agreement on what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, even legal practices, that allegedly cause vote suppression.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by nongovernmental groups create opportunities for fraud. A number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:

**Wade Henderson**  
Executive Director,  
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

**Wendy Weiser**  
Deputy Director,  
Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

**William Groth**  
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

**Lori Minnite**  
Barnard College, Columbia University

**Neil Bradley**  
ACLU Voting Rights Project

**Pat Rogers**  
Attorney, New Mexico

**Nina Perales**  
Counsel,  
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

**Rebecca Vigil-Giron**  
Secretary of State, New Mexico

**Sarah Ball Johnson**  
Executive Director,  
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

**Stephen Ansolobohere**  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Chandler Davidson**  
Rice University
These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by nongovernmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it was the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, the stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and that it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation, which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws,
voter identification laws, polling place locations, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voting fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state's attorney general. Regardless, voting fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that many local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute election crimes perpetrated in elections with a federal candidate on the ballot or perpetrated by a public official under the color of law. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement. Some allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “3”.

Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed more than 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voting fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from courts of appeal. This is not surprising, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “4”.

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voting fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,
• non-citizens voting,
• vote buying,
• deceptive practices, and
• fraud by election officials.

While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voting fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a “battleground” or “swing” state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voting fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charges and prosecutions of voting fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voting fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding or agreement of what constitutes “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation.” Some think of voting fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and improper activities. To arrive at a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

New Terminology

The phrase “voting fraud” is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. “Fraud” is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

Fraud, n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.


A “voter” is a person who is eligible to and engages in the act of voting. Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of “voting fraud,” it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed by the voter or in which the voter is the victim. Thus, a voter who intentionally provides false information on a voter
registration application or intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to vote for that person would be committing "voting fraud." Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter's polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase "voting fraud" does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not perpetrated by the voter and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, "voting fraud" does not capture actions or willful inaction by candidates and election workers. When an election official willfully and knowingly refuses to register to vote a legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the voter nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" that would serve as the basis for a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the use of legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such, EAC has defined "election crimes," a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes.

The Definition of an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public who desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon intentional or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.
The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, an election official, a candidate, or the public, in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting (either early, absentee, or election day); vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.

**Acts of Deception**

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter's precinct or polling place, the date and time of the election or a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance to possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making, or knowingly possessing, a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate in one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once during the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a material false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

**Acts of Coercion**

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other thing of value to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
o Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
o Knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or to delay the process of voting;
o As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his/her vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself/herself or another of an employee’s ballot;
o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;
o Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official’s duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;
o Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and
o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other thing of value in exchange for registering to vote.

Acts of Damage or Destruction

o Destroying completed voter registration applications;
o Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments;
o Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;
o Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as the person intended;
o Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;
o Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and
o Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

Failure or Refusal to Act

o Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;
o Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;
o Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;
o Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;
o Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;
o Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;
o Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction;
o Knowingly removing the eligibility status of a voter who is eligible to vote; and
o Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.

What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of “election crimes.” All criminal or civil violations related to campaign finance contribution limitations, prohibitions, and reporting either at the state or federal level are not “election crimes” for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not “election crimes,” even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not “election crimes,” and actions that do not rise to the level of criminal activity, such as a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not “election crimes.”

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can research the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working groups and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to law enforcement officials, specifically federal District Election Officers (“DEOs”) and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contained allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, some of the articles contained information about investigations into such
activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to
determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and
summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the
date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently
cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research
should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.

Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of
Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1
Project. This project involved using a toll-free voter hotline that voters could call for poll
locations, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint.
In 2004, this resulted in more than 200,000 calls received and more than 56,000 recorded
complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the
project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the
callers, the information regarding 56,000 complaints may provide insight into the
problems voters may have experienced, especially issues regarding intimidation or
suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of
Justice

According to a recent GAO report, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation.
Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of
complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system.
Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and
“monitor field reports” from Election Day.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every
District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voting fraud
and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely
provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections.
Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.
Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. By attending the symposium, researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research

EAC should measure voting fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets, and it must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.
Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing fraud when absentee ballots are used.

Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers will use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the “ease of commission” and the impact of the fraud.

Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether a vote was recorded by someone who is deceased or if felons are noted as having voted.

Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers and phone calls with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how and where such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

EAC should study the extent to which states are utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during, and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.
Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive, national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges, and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and the working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine the volume and type of election crimes being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

Likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to comply with Section 402 of HAVA. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state’s chief election official. Those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated, and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition
of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses will be collected.

**Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred**

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating, and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. These data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

**Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes**

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

**Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures**

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from
areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

CONCLUSION

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and voters. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention, and prosecution of election crimes.
EAC REPORT ON VOTER FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Voter fraud and intimidation is a phrase familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, it means different things to different people. Voter fraud and intimidation is a phrase used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and at times even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of this topic has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voter fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, EAC has begun this, phase one, of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the true existence and enforcement of election crimes in this country.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voter fraud and voter intimidation was a topic that EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voter fraud and intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voter fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. That type of research is well beyond the basic understanding that had to be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voter fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voter fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, who along with EAC staff and interns conducted the research that forms the basis of this report. Consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic. In addition, consultants were chosen to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged (1) to research the current state of information on the topics of voter fraud and voter intimidation, (2) to develop a uniform definition of voter fraud and voter intimidation, and (3) to propose recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voter fraud and intimidation. In addition, EAC consultants conducted interviews with selected
experts in the field. Last, EAC consultants and staff presented their study to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

**The Honorable Todd Rokita**  
Indiana Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

**Kathy Rogers**  
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board

**J.R. Perez**  
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

**Barbara Arnwine**  
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law  
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

**Benjamin L. Ginsberg**  
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP  
Counsel to national Republican campaign committees and Republican candidates

**Robert Bauer**  
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia  
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

**Mark (Thor) Hearne II**  
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri  
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

**Barry Weinberg**  
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

**Technical Advisor:**  
**Craig Donsanto**  
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of existing laws, cases, studies and reports on voter fraud and intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voter fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited to produce this final report.

**EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION**

To begin our study of voter fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voter fraud and intimidation. What the world knows about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation.
Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voter fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voter Fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted about the concepts of voter fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voter fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix “__”:

Articles and Reports


• The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald “Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voter Fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General,” The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, December 2005.

• Democratic National Committee, “Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio,” DNC Services Corporation, 2005

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


Books


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voter fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voter fraud or voter intimidation. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voter fraud or intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voter fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as "Building Confidence in U.S. Elections," suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the "Preliminary findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud," produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.
Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate. Generally speaking there is little agreement on what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation even legal practices that they allege suppress the vote.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by third-party groups create opportunities for fraud. A number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of voters of a certain party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voter fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voter fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included

Wade Henderson  
Executive Director,  
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser  
Deputy Director,  
Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

William Groth  
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite  
Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley  
ACLU Voting Rights Project

Nina Perales  
Counsel,  
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

Pat Rogers  
Attorney, New Mexico

Rebecca Vigil-Giron  
Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson  
Executive Director,  
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobohere  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson  
Rice University

Tracey Campbell  
Author, Deliver the Vote

Douglas Webber  
Assistant Attorney General, Indiana

Heather Dawn Thompson  
Director of Government Relations,  
National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky  
Assistant General Counsel,  
American Center for Voting Rights
These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by third-party groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud, citing as reasons that it was the most likely type of fraud to be discovered and that there are stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws, voter identification laws, the location of polling places, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voter fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state’s attorney general. Regardless, voter fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies
have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction. They can only prosecute crimes related to elections involving federal candidates. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement, including those that allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive and those that feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix "__".

**Case Law and Statutes**

Consultants reviewed over 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voter fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from appeal courts. This is not a surprising situation, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix "__".

**Media Reports**

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voter fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,
- non-citizens voting,
- vote buying,
- deceptive practices, and
- fraud by election officials.

While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voter fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation.
throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a "battleground" or "swing" state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voter fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charge and prosecutions of voter fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voter fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding of what is and what is not "voter fraud" and "voter intimidation." Some think of voter fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and appropriate activities. In order to come up with a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

New Terminology

The phrase "voter fraud" is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. "Fraud" is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

\[
\textit{Fraud}, \text{n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.}
\]


A "voter" is a person who is eligible to and engages in the act of voting. Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of "voter fraud," it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed by the voter or in which the voter is the victim. Thus, a voter who intentionally provides false information on a voter registration application or intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to vote for that person would be committing "voter fraud." Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter's polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase "voter fraud" does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not perpetrated by the voter and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, "voter fraud" does not capture actions or willful inaction by candidates and election workers. When an election official willfully and knowingly
refuses to register to vote an otherwise legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a
crime that involves neither the voter nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases "voter fraud" and "voter intimidation" are
used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially
civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are
pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or
federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who
believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the civil
division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred
to as "voter fraud" and "voter intimidation" that would serve as the basis of a future,
comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we
recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of
activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both
financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal
acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the
use legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such,
EAC has defined "election crimes," a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter
registration and voting processes.

What is an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal
law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process,
eligible persons to be excluded from the election process, ineligible votes to be cast in an
election, eligible votes not to be cast or counted, or other interference with or invalidation
of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of
decception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Generally speaking, election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election
officials, or any other members of the public that desire to criminally impact the result of
an election. However, crimes that are based upon knowing or willful failure to act
assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with
regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.

The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, or the public, in general.
Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not
limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system
preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or election day; vote
tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is
not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal
government consider criminal activity related to elections.
Acts of Deception

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter’s precinct or polling place, regarding the date and time of the election or regarding a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making, or knowingly possessing, a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate at one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once at the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a material false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

Acts of Coercion

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other valuable thing to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
- Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
- Knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or delay the process of voting;
- As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself or another of an employee’s ballot;
Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;

Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official's duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;

Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and

Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for registering to vote.

**Acts of Damage or Destruction**

Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments for the purpose of enabling the voter to vote his or her ballot;

Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;

Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as he intended;

Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;

Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and

Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

**Failure or Refusal to Act**

Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;

Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;

Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;

Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;

Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;

Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;

Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction; and

Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.
What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of “election crimes.” All crimes or civil violations related to campaign finance reporting either at the state or federal level are not “election crimes” for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not “election crimes,” even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not “election crimes.” Last, actions that do not rise to the level of criminal activity, that is a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not “election crimes.”

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can study the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working group, and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to people in law enforcement, specifically federal District Election Officers (“DEOs”) and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.
Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a 1-800 voter hotline where voters could call for poll location, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in over 200,000 calls received and over 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 200,000 complaints may provide a good deal of insight into the problems voters experienced, especially those in the nature of intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety in ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and monitor field reports from Election Day.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the
National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants

**Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research**

EAC should measure voter fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have historically been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets. The sample must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations

**Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law**

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

**Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day**

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls in on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation.

**Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud**

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing them.

**Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud**

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers can use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the ease of commission and the impact of the fraud.

**Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons**
Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether deceased voters or felons actually voted.

**Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices**

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

**Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation**

EAC should study the extent to which states are actually utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

**Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts**

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.

**Accepted Recommendations**

There has never been a comprehensive study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.
Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine what volume and type of election crimes are being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

**Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints**

Likely sources of complaints concerning voting crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish as a part of complying with HAVA. Those complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints under those procedures with the state’s chief election official and those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses can be collected.

**Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred**

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. This data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

**Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes**
While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

*Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures*

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

**CONCLUSION**

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and political pundants. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC through its clearinghouse role will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention and prosecution of election crimes.
EAC REPORT ON VOTER FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Voter fraud and intimidation is a phrase familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, it means different things to different people. Voter fraud and intimidation is a phrase used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and at times even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of this topic has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voter fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, EAC has begun this phase of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the true existence and enforcement of election crimes in this country.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voter fraud and voter intimidation was a topic that EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voter fraud and intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voter fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. That type of research is well beyond the basic understanding that had to be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voter fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voter fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, who along with EAC staff and interns conducted the research that forms the basis of this report. Consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic. In addition, consultants were chosen to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged (1) to research the current state of information on the topics of voter fraud and voter intimidation, (2) to develop a uniform definition of voter fraud and voter intimidation, and (3) to propose recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voter fraud and intimidation. In addition, EAC consultants conducted interviews with selected
experts in the field. Last, EAC consultants and staff presented their study to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

**The Honorable Todd Rokita**  
Indiana Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

**Kathy Rogers**  
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board

**J.R. Perez**  
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

**Barbara Arnwine**  
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law  
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

**Benjamin L. Ginsberg**  
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP  
Counsel to national Republican campaign committees and Republican candidates

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope, and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of existing laws, cases, studies and reports on voter fraud and intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voter fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited to produce this final report.

**EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION**

To begin our study of voter fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voter fraud and intimidation. What the world knows about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation.
Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voter fraud and voter intimidation.

**Reports and Studies of Voter Fraud and Intimidation**

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted about the concepts of voter fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voter fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix "__":

**Articles and Reports**


- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


Books


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voter fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voter fraud or voter intimidation. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voter fraud or intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voter fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as "Building Confidence in U.S. Elections," suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the "Preliminary findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud," produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.
Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate. Generally speaking, there is little agreement on what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, even legal practices that they allege suppress the vote.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by third-party groups create opportunities for fraud. A number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of voters of a certain party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voter fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voter fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:

- **Wade Henderson**
  Executive Director,
  Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

- **Wendy Weiser**
  Deputy Director,
  Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

- **William Groth**
  Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

- **Lori Minnite**
  Barnard College, Columbia University

- **Neil Bradley**
  ACLU Voting Rights Project

- **Nina Perales**
  Counsel,
  Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

- **Pat Rogers**
  Attorney, New Mexico

- **Rebecca Vigil-Giron**
  Secretary of State, New Mexico

- **Sarah Ball Johnson**
  Executive Director,
  State Board of Elections, Kentucky

- **Stephen Ansolobohere**
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology

- **Chandler Davidson**
  Rice University

- **Tracey Campbell**
  Author, *Deliver the Vote*

- **Douglas Webber**
  Assistant Attorney General, Indiana

- **Heather Dawn Thompson**
  Director of Government Relations,
  National Congress of American Indians

- **Jason Torchinsky**
  Assistant General Counsel,
  American Center for Voting Rights
Robin DeJarnette
Executive Director,
American Center for Voting Rights

Harry Van Sickle
Commissioner of Elections,
Pennsylvania

Joseph Sandler
Counsel
Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz
Executive Director
New York City Board of Elections

Sharon Priest
Former Secretary of State, Arkansas

Kevin Kennedy
Executive Director
State Board of Elections, Wisconsin

Evelyn Stratton
Justice
Supreme Court of Ohio

Tony Sirvello
Executive Director
International Association of Clerks, Recorder's, Election Officials and Treasurers

Joseph Rich
Former Director
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

Craig Donsanto
Director, Public Integrity Section
U.S. Department of Justice

John Tanner
Director
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by third-party groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud, citing as reasons that it was the most likely type of fraud to be discovered and that there are stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws, voter identification laws, the location of polling places, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voter fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state's attorney general. Regardless, voter fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies
have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction. They can only prosecute
cri mes related to elections involving federal candidates. Those interviewed differed on
the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement, including those that allege that
prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive and those that feel that the current laws are
sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “__”.

Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed over 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search
ter ms related to voter fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came
from appeal courts. This is not a surprising situation, since most cases that are publicly
reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court
level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were
applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest
number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of
stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper
delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying
and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “__”.

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of
potential voter fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,
- non-citizens voting,
- vote buying,
- deceptive practices, and
- fraud by election officials.

While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voter fraud
and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations
were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed,
whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media
reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation
throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a "battleground" or "swing" state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voter fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charges, and prosecutions of voter fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voter fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding of what is and what is not "voter fraud" and "voter intimidation." Some think of voter fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and appropriate activities. In order to come up with a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

New Terminology

The phrase "voter fraud" is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. "Fraud" is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

Fraud, n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.


A "voter" is a person who is eligible to and engages in the act of voting. Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of "voter fraud," it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed by the voter or in which the voter is the victim. Thus, a voter who intentionally provides false information on a voter registration application or intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to vote for that person would be committing "voter fraud." Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter’s polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase "voter fraud" does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not perpetrated by the voter and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, "voter fraud" does not capture actions or willful inaction by candidates and election workers. When an election official willfully and knowingly
refuses to register to vote an otherwise legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the voter nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases “voter fraud” and “voter intimidation” are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as “voter fraud” and “voter intimidation” that would serve as the basis of a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the use of legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such, EAC has defined “election crimes,” a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes.

What is an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process, eligible persons to be excluded from the election process, ineligible votes to be cast in an election, eligible votes not to be cast or counted, or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Generally speaking, election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public that desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon knowing or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.

The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, or the public, in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or election day; vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.
Acts of Deception

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter’s precinct or polling place, regarding the date and time of the election or regarding a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance to possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making, or knowingly possessing, a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate at one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter;
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once at the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a material false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

Acts of Coercion

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other valuable thing to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
- Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
- Knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or to delay the process of voting;
- As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself or another of an employee’s ballot;
Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;

Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official’s duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;

Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and

Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for registering to vote.

**Acts of Damage or Destruction**

Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments for the purpose of enabling the voter to vote his or her ballot;

Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;

Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as he intended;

Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;

Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and

Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

**Failure or Refusal to Act**

Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;

Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;

Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;

Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;

Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;

Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;

Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction; and

Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.
What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of "election crimes." All crimes or civil violations related to campaign finance reporting either at the state or federal level are not "election crimes" for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not "election crimes," even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not "election crimes." Last, actions that do no rise to the level of criminal activity, that is a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not "election crimes."

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can study the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants developed recommendations. In addition, the working group and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to people in law enforcement, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.
Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a 1-800 voter hotline where voters could call for poll location, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in over 200,000 calls received and over 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 200,000 complaints may provide a good deal of insight into the problems voters experienced, especially those in the nature of intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation, attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and monitor field reports from Election Day.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the
National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

**Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research**

EAC should measure voter fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have historically been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets. The sample must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

**Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law**

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

**Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day**

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation.

**Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud**

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing them.

**Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud**

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers can use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the ease of commission and the impact of the fraud.

**Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons**
Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether deceased voters or felons actually voted.

**Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices**

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

**Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation**

EAC should study the extent to which states are actually utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

**Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts**

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.

**Accepted Recommendations**

There has never been a comprehensive study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.
Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine what volume and type of election crimes are being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

**Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints**

Likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint procedures that states were required to establish as a part of complying with HAVA. Those complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints under those procedures with the state’s chief election official and those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses can be collected.

**Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred**

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. This data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

**Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes**
While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

*Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures*

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

**CONCLUSION**

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and political pundants. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention and prosecution of election crimes.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to study a host of topics, including "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation." In 2005, EAC embarked on an initial review of the existing knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation. The goal of that study was to develop a working definition of "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" and to identify research methodology to conduct a comprehensive, nationwide study of these topics.

EAC staff along with two, bipartisan consultants reviewed the existing information available about voting fraud and voter intimidation, including reading articles, books and reports; interviewing subject matter experts; reviewing media reports of fraud and intimidation; and studying reported cases of prosecutions of these types of crimes. It is clear from this review that there is a great deal of debate on the pervasiveness of fraud in elections as well as what constitute the most common acts of fraud or intimidation. There is also no apparent consensus on the meaning of the phrases "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation." Some think of voting fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal activities.

In order to facilitate future study of these topics, EAC developed a working definition of "election crimes." "Election crimes" are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

From EAC's review of existing information on the issue, it was apparent that there have been a number of studies that touched on various topics and regions of the country concerning voting fraud and intimidation, but that there had never been a comprehensive, nationwide study of these topics. EAC will conduct further research to provide a comprehensive, nationwide look at "election crimes." Future EAC study of this topic will focus on election-related, criminal activity and will not include acts that are exclusively civil wrongs, campaign finance violations, and violations of ethical provisions. EAC will study these concepts by surveying the states' chief election officials about complaints they received through their administrative complaint processes, election crime investigation units regarding complaints received and those referred to law enforcement, and law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies regarding complaints received and charges filed.
INTRODUCTION

Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, they mean different things to different people. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and, at times, even the lawful application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of these topics has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voting fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has begun this, phase one, of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a working definition of election crimes and adopted research methodology on how to assess the existence and enforcement of election crimes in the United States.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the EAC to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are topics that the EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voting fraud and voter intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. The initial study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voting fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. To conduct that type of extensive research, a basic understanding had to first be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voting fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voting fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, who worked with EAC staff and interns to conduct the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic and the need to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged with (1) researching the current state of information on the topic

1 Biographies for Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, the two consultants hired by EAC, are attached as Appendix “1”.

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of voting fraud and voter intimidation; (2) developing a uniform definition of voting fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) proposing recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voting fraud and intimidation and conducted interviews with experts in the field. EAC consultants and staff then presented their initial findings to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

**The Honorable Todd Rokita**
Indiana Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

**Kathy Rogers**
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board

**J.R. Perez**
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

**Barbara Arnwine**
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

**Benjamin L. Ginsberg**
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP
Counsel to National Republican Campaign Committees and Republican candidates

**Robert Bauer**
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

**Mark (Thor) Hearne II**
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

**Barry Weinberg**
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

*Technical Advisor:*

**Craig Donsanto**
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of relevant cases, studies and reports on voting fraud and voter intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voting fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants.
or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited by EAC staff to produce this final report.

EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

To begin our study of voting fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voting fraud and voter intimidation. The information available about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles, and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voting Fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted and reports published about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports, and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix "2":

Articles and Reports


• Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise, "Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?" A Report to the Center for Voting Rights & Protection, September, 2004.


• Democratic National Committee, “Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio,” DNC Services Corporation, 2005

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


Books


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voting fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive, nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voting fraud or voter intimidation in the United States. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voting fraud or voter intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 Presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as "Building Confidence in U.S. Elections," suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the "Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud," produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate because there is little agreement concerning what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, including legal practices that allegedly cause vote suppression.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by nongovernmental groups create opportunities for fraud. For example, a number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

**Interviews with Experts**

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:
Wade Henderson
Executive Director,
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser
Deputy Director,
Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

William Groth
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite
Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley
ACLU Voting Rights Project

Pat Rogers
Attorney, New Mexico

Nina Perales
Counsel,
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

Rebecca Vigil-Giron
Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson
Executive Director,
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobehere
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson
Rice University

Douglas Webber
Assistant Attorney General, Indiana

Heather Dawn Thompson
Director of Government Relations,
National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky
Assistant General Counsel,
American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette
Executive Director,
American Center for Voting Rights

Harry Van Sickle
Commissioner of Elections,
Pennsylvania

Tony Sirvello
Executive Director
International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers

Joseph Sandler
Counsel
Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz
Executive Director
New York City Board of Elections

Sharon Priest
Former Secretary of State, Arkansas

Kevin Kennedy
Executive Director
State Board of Elections, Wisconsin

Tracey Campbell
Author, Deliver the Vote
These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by nongovernmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it is the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, there are stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation, which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws, voter identification laws, polling place locations, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voting fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state's attorney general. Regardless, voting fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that many local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute election crimes perpetrated in elections with a federal candidate on the ballot or perpetrated by a public official under the color of law. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement. Some allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “3”.

Evelyn Stratton  
Justice  
Supreme Court of Ohio

Craig Donsanto  
Director, Public Integrity Section  
U.S. Department of Justice

Joseph Rich  
Former Director  
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division  
U.S. Department of Justice

John Tanner  
Chief  
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division  
U.S. Department of Justice
Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed more than 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voting fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from courts of appeal. This is not surprising, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “4”.

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voting fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters on voter registration list and/or voting,
- multiple voting,
- felon voting,
- non-citizens voting,
- vote buying,
- deceptive practices, and
- fraud by election officials.

While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voting fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a “battleground” or “swing” state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voting fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not
provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charges and prosecutions of voting fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voting fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding or agreement of what constitutes “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation.” Some think of voting fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal activities. To arrive at a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future. As a result, EAC has adopted the use of the term “election crimes” for its future study.

Current Terminology

The phrase “voting fraud” is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. “Fraud” is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

Fraud, n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.


“Voting” is the act of casting votes to decide an issue or contest. Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of “voting fraud,” it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed to influence the act of voting. Thus, a voter who intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to vote for that person would be committing “voting fraud.” Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter’s polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase “voting fraud” does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not related to the act of voting and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, “voting fraud” does not capture actions or willful inaction in the voter registration process. When an election official willfully and knowingly refuses
to register to vote a legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the act of voting nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation” are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

New Terminology

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation” that would serve as the basis for a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. Because the current terminology has such a variety of applications and meanings, “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation” can be read to encompass almost any act associated with an election. Such broad terminology is not useful in setting the boundaries of a future study. A definition must set parameters for future study by applying limitations on what is included in the concepts to be studied. The current terminology applies no such limitations.

Thus, EAC has adopted the use of the phrase “election crimes” to limit the scope of its future study. This term captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes and excludes civil wrongs and non-election related crimes. EAC adopted this definition because it better represents the spectrum of activities that we are able to and desire to study. In addition, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study all “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation,” including criminal acts, civil actions, as well as allegations of voter suppression through the use of legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. Finally, by limiting this definition to criminal acts, EAC can focus its study on a set of more readily measurable data. Criminal behavior is readily defined through state and federal statutes and is prosecuted by government agencies. This is not the case with civil matters. Civil actions can be prosecuted by individuals and/or government entities. Furthermore, what constitutes civil action is far less defined, subject to change, and can vary from case to case. A more complete discussion of the concept of “election crimes” follows along with a list of excluded actions.
The Definition of an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public who desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon intentional or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.

The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, an election official, a candidate, or the public in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or on election day; vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.

**Acts of Deception**

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter's precinct or polling place, the date and time of the election or a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance to possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making or knowingly possessing a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate in one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once during the same election;
o Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
o Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
o Knowingly making a materially false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
o Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

Acts of Coercion

o Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used, force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage, harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
o Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other thing of value to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
o Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
o Knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or to delay the process of voting;
o As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his/her vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself/herself or another of an employee’s ballot;
o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;
o Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official’s duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;
o Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and
o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other thing of value in exchange for registering to vote.
Acts of Damage or Destruction

- Destroying completed voter registration applications;
- Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments;
- Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;
- Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as the person intended;
- Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;
- Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and
- Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

Failure or Refusal to Act

- Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;
- Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;
- Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;
- Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;
- Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;
- Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;
- Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction;
- Knowingly removing the eligibility status of a voter who is eligible to vote; and
- Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.

What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of "election crimes." All criminal or civil violations related to campaign finance contribution limitations, prohibitions, and reporting either at the state or federal level are not "election crimes" for purposes of this study and any future...
study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not "election crimes," even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate's office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate's office is not an election crime. Last, violations of ethical provisions and the Hatch Act are not "election crimes." Similarly, civil or other wrongs that do not rise to the level of criminal activity (i.e., a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony) are not "election crimes."

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can research the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working groups and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to law enforcement officials, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contained allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, some of the articles contained information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations found in the literature review.
Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a toll-free voter hotline that voters could call for poll locations, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in more than 200,000 calls received and more than 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 56,000 complaints may provide insight into the problems voters may have experienced, especially issues regarding intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

According to a recent GAO report, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and “monitor field reports” from Election Day.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voting fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public
Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

**Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research**

EAC should measure voting fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets, and it must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

**Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law**

Future research should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

**Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day**

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.

**Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud**

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide
recommendations on more effective measures for preventing fraud when absentee ballots are used.

**Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud**

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers will use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the "ease of commission" and the impact of the fraud.

**Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons**

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether a vote was recorded by someone who is deceased or if felons are noted as having voted.

**Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices**

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers and phone calls with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how and where such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

**Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation**

EAC should study the extent to which states are utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

**Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts**

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during, and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.
Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive, national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges, and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and the working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine the volume and type of election crimes being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

The likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to comply with Section 402 of HAVA. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state’s chief election official. Those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.
In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated, and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses will be collected.

**Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred**

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating, and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. These data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

**Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes**

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.
Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available for the effort.

CONCLUSION

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and voters. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention, and prosecution of election crimes.
APPENDIX 1 – BIOGRAPHIES OF JOB SEREBROV AND TOVA WANG


APPENDIX 2 – SUMMARIES OF BOOKS, REPORTS AND ARTICLES


APPENDIX 3 – SUMMARIES OF INTERVIEWS


APPENDIX 4 – SUMMARIES OF CASES REVIEWED

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Election Crimes Branch is responsible for supervising federal criminal investigations and prosecutions of election crimes.

Questions

How are Prosecution Decisions Made?

Craig Donsanto must approve all investigations that go beyond a preliminary stage, all charges, search warrant applications and subpoenas and all prosecutions. The decision to investigate is very sensitive because of the public officials involved. If a charge seems political, Donsanto will reject it. Donsanto gives possible theories for investigation. Donsanto and Noel Hillman will decide whether to farm out the case to an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA). Donsanto uses a concept called predication. In-other-words, there must be enough evidence to suggest a crime has been committed. The method of evaluation of this evidence depends on the type of evidence and its source. There are two types of evidence---factual (antisocial behavior) and legal (antisocial behavior leading to statutory violations). Whether an indictment will be brought depends on the likelihood of success before a jury. Much depends on the type of evidence and the source. Donsanto said he “knows it when he sees it.” Donsanto will only indict if he is confident of a conviction assuming the worst case scenario – a jury trial.

A person under investigation will first receive a target letter. Often, a defendant who gets a target letter will ask for a departmental hearing. The defendant’s case will be heard by Donsanto and Hillman. On occasion, the assistant attorney general will review the case. The department grants such hearings easily because such defendants are likely to provide information about others involved.

The Civil Rights Division, Voting Rights Section makes its own decisions on prosecution. The head of that division is John Tanner. There is a lot of cooperation between the Voting Section and the Election Crimes Branch.

Does the Decision to Prosecute Incorporate Particular Political Considerations within a State Such as a One Party System or a System in which the Party in Power Controls the Means of Prosecution and Suppresses Opposition Complaints?

Yes. Before, the department would leave it to the states. Now, if there is racial animus involved in the case, there is political bias involved, or the prosecutor is not impartial, the department will take it over.

Does it Matter if the Complaint Comes from a Member of a Racial Minority?
No. But if the question involves racial animus, that has also always been an aggravating factor, making it more likely the Department will take it over.

**What Kinds of Complaints Would Routinely Override Principles of Federalism?**

Federalism is no longer a big issue. DOJ is permitted to prosecute whenever there is a candidate for federal office on the ballot.

**Are There Too Few Prosecutions?**

DOJ can't prosecute everything.

**What Should Be Done to Improve the System?**

The problem is asserting federal jurisdiction in non-federal elections. It is preferable for the federal government to pursue these cases for the following reasons: federal districts draw from a bigger and more diverse jury pool; the DOJ is politically detached; local district attorneys are hamstrung by the need to be re-elected; DOJ has more resources—local prosecutors need to focus on personal and property crimes—fraud cases are too big and too complex for them; DOJ can use the grand jury process as a discovery technique and to test the strength of the case.

In *U.S. v. McNally*, the court ruled that the mail fraud statute does not apply to election fraud. It was through the mail fraud statute that the department had routinely gotten federal jurisdiction over election fraud cases. 18 USC 1346, the congressional effort to "fix" *McNally*, did not include voter fraud.

As a result, the department needs a new federal law that allows federal prosecution whenever a federal instrumentality is used, e.g. the mail, federal funding, interstate commerce. The department has drafted such legislation, which was introduced but not passed in the early 1990s. A federal law is needed that permits prosecution in any election where any federal instrumentality is used.

**Other Information**

The Department has held four symposia for District Election Officers (DEOs) and FBI agents since the initiation of the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative. In 2003, civil rights leaders were invited to make speeches, but were not permitted to take part in the rest of the symposium. All other symposia have been closed to the public. (Peg will be sending us the complete training materials used at those sessions. These are confidential and are the subject of FOIA litigation).

There are two types of attorneys in the division: prosecutors, who take on cases when the jurisdiction of the section requires it; the US Attorney has recused him or herself; or when the US Attorney is unable to handle the case (most frequent reason) and braintrust attorneys who analyze the facts, formulate theories, and draft legal documents.
Donsanto provided us with three case lists: 

- **Open cases (still being investigated)** as of January 13, 2006 – confidential; election fraud prosecutions and convictions as a result of the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative October 2002-January 13, 2006; and cases closed for lack of evidence as of January 13, 2006.

If we want more documents related to any case, we must get those documents from the states. The department will not release them to us.

Although the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate complaints of fraud, the number of cases that the department is investigating and the number of indictments the department is pursuing are both up dramatically.

Since 2002, the department has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters, and double voters than ever before. Previously, cases were only brought against conspiracies when there was a pattern or scheme to corrupt the process rather than individual offenders acting alone. For deterrence purposes, charges were not brought against individuals—those cases went unprosecuted. This change in direction, focus, and level of aggression was by the decision of the Attorney General. The reason for the change was for deterrence purposes. He Attorney General decided to add the pursuit of individuals who vote when not eligible to vote (noncitizens, felons) or who vote more than once.

The department is currently undertaking three pilot projects to determine what works in developing the cases and obtaining convictions and what works with juries in such matters to gain convictions:

1. **Felon voters in Milwaukee.**

2. **Alien voters in the Southern District of Florida.** FYI – under 18 USC 611, to prosecute for “alien voting” there is no intent requirement. Conviction can lead to deportation. Nonetheless, the department feels compelled to look at mitigating factors such as was the alien told it was OK to vote, does the alien have a spouse that is a citizen.

3. **Double voters in a variety of jurisdictions.**

The department does not maintain records of the complaints that come in from DEOs, U.S attorneys and others during the election that are not pursued by the department. Donsanto asserted that U.S attorneys never initiate frivolous investigations.

According to the new handbook, the department can take on a case whenever there is a federal candidate on the ballot.
Interview with John Tanner, Director Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

February 24, 2006

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Voting Section is charged with the civil enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), and Title III of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).

Note: Mr. Tanner's reluctance to share data, information and his perspective on solving the problems presented an obstacle to conducting the type of interview that would help inform this project as much as we would have hoped. Mr. Tanner would not give us any information about or data from the section's election complaint intake system, the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system and its formal process for tracking and managing work activities in pursuing complaints and potential violations of the voting laws, and would give us only a selected few samples of attorney-observer reports, reports that every Voting Section attorney who is observing elections at poll sites on Election Day is required to submit. He would not discuss in any manner any current investigations or cases the section is involved in. He also did not believe it was his position to offer us recommendations as to how his office, elections, or the voting process might be improved.

Authority and Process
The Voting Section, in contrast to the Public Integrity Section as Craig Donsanto described it, typically focuses on systemic problems resulting from government action or inaction, not problems caused by individuals. Indeed, the section never goes after individuals because it does not have the statutory authority to do so. In situations in which individuals are causing problems at the polls and interfering with voting rights, the section calls the local election officials to resolve it.

Federal voting laws enforced by the section only apply to state action, so the section only sues state and local governments — it does not have any enforcement power over individuals. Most often, the section enters into consent agreements with governments that focus on poll worker training, takes steps to restructure how polls are run, and deals with problems on Election Day on the spot. Doing it this way has been most effective — for example, while the section used to have the most observers in the South, with systematic changes forced upon those jurisdictions, have made it so now the section now does not get complaints from the South.

The section can get involved even where there is no federal candidate on the ballot if there is a racial issue under the 14th and 15th Amendments.

When the section receives a complaint, attorneys first determine whether it is a matter that involves individual offenders or a systemic problem. When deciding what to do
with the complaint, the section errs on the side of referring it criminally to avoid having any because they do not want civil litigation to complicate a possible criminal case.

When a complaint comes in, the attorneys ask questions to see if there are even problems there that the complainant is not aware are violations of the law. For example, in the Boston case, the attorney did not just look at Spanish language cases under section 203, but also brought a Section 2 case for violations regarding Chinese and Vietnamese voters. When looking into a case, the attorneys look for specificity, witnesses and supporting evidence.

Often, lawsuits bring voluntary compliance.

**Voter Intimidation**

Many instances of what some people refer to as voter intimidation are more unclear now. For example, photographing voters at the polls has been called intimidating, but now everyone is at the polls with a camera. It is hard to know when something is intimidation and it is difficult to show that it was an act of intimidation.

The fact that both parties are engaging in these tactics now makes it more complicated. It makes it difficult to point the finger at any one side.

The inappropriate use of challengers on the basis of race would be a violation of the law. Mr. Tanner was unaware that such allegations were made in Ohio in 2004. He said there had never been a formal investigation into the abusive use of challengers.

Mr. Tanner said a lot of the challenges are legitimate because you have a lot of voter registration fraud as a result of groups paying people to register voters by the form. They turn in bogus registration forms. Then the parties examine the registration forms and challenge them because 200 of them, for example, have addresses of a vacant lot.

However, Mr. Tanner said the Department was able to informally intervene in challenger situations in Florida, Atkinson County, Georgia and in Alabama, as was referenced in a February 23 Op-Ed in USA Today. Mr. Tanner reiterated the section takes racial targeting very seriously.

Refusal to provide provisional ballots would be a violation of the law that the section would investigate.

Deceptive practices are committed by individuals and would be a matter for the Public Integrity Section. Local government would have to be involved for the Voting Section to become involved.

Unequal implementation of ID rules, or asking minority voters only for ID would be something the section would go after. Mr. Tanner was unaware of allegations of this in 2004. He said this is usually a problem where you have language minorities and the poll workers cannot understand the voters when they say their names. The section has never
formally investigated or solely focused a case based on abuse of ID provisions. However, implementation of ID rules was part of the Section 2 case in San Diego. Mr. Tanner reiterated that the section is doing more than ever before.

When asked about the section's references to incidents of vote fraud in the documents related to the new state photo identification requirements, Mr. Tanner said the section only looks at retrogression, not at the wisdom of what a legislature does. In Georgia, for example, everyone statistically has identification, and more blacks have ID than whites. With respect to the letter to Senator Kit Bond regarding voter ID, the section did refer to the perception of concern about dead voters because of reporting by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. It is understandable that when you have thousands of bogus registrations that there would be concerns about polling place fraud. Very close elections make this even more of an understandable concern. Putting control of registration lists in the hands of the states will be helpful because at this higher level of government you find a higher level of professionalism.

It is hard to know how much vote suppression and intimidation is taking place because it depends on one's definition of the terms – they are used very loosely by some people. However, the enforcement of federal law over the years has made an astounding difference so that the level of discrimination has plummeted. Registration of minorities has soared, as can be seen on the section's website. Mr. Tanner was unsure if the same was true with respect to turnout, but the gap is less. That information is not on the section's website.

The section is not filing as many Section 2 cases as compared to Section 203 cases because many of the jurisdictions sued under Section 2 in the past do not have issues anymore. Mr. Tanner said that race based problems are rare now.

NVRA has been effective in opening up the registration process. In terms of enforcement, Mr. Tanner said they do what they can when they have credible allegations. There is a big gap between complaints and what can be substantiated. Mr. Tanner stated that given the high quality of the attorneys now in the section, if they do not investigate it or bring action, that act complained of did not happen.

Recommendations
Mr. Tanner did not feel it was appropriate to make recommendations.

Note: We contend that Mr. Tanner's reluctance to share data, information and his perspective on solving the problems presented an obstacle to conducting the type of interview that would help inform this project as much as we would have hoped. We did not have access to any information about or data from the section's election complaint intake phone logs or data or even general information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system—its formal process for tracking and managing work activities in pursuing complaints and potential violations of the voting laws. Only a selected few samples of attorney-observer reports were provided, reports that every Voting Section
attorney who is observing elections at poll sites on Election Day is required to submit.

Mr. Tanner would not discuss any current investigations or cases the section is involved in.
October 19, 2006

The Honorable Rush Holt
1019 Longworth Building
Washington, DC 20515

RE: October 16, 2006 Letter

Dear Congressman Holt:

Your letter of October 16, 2006 requests the release of EAC’s Voter Fraud and Intimidation Report. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify the purpose and status of this study.

In late 2005, EAC hired two consultants for the purpose of assisting EAC with two things: 1) developing a uniform definition of the phrase voter fraud, and 2) making recommendations on how to further study the existence, prosecution, and means of deterring such voter fraud. In May 2006, a status report on this study was given to the EAC Standards Board and EAC Board of Advisors during their public meetings. During the same week, a working group convened to react to and provide comment on the progress and potential conclusions that could be reached from the work of the two consultants.

The conversation at the working group meeting was lively on the very points that we were trying to accomplish as a part of this study, namely what is voter fraud and how do we pursue studying it. Many of the proposed conclusions that were suggested by the consultants were challenged by the working group members. As such, the consultants were tasked with reviewing the concerns expressed at the working group meeting, conducting additional research as necessary, and providing a draft report to EAC that took into account the working group’s concerns and issues.

That draft report is currently being vetted by EAC staff. EAC will release a final report from this study after it has conducted a review of the draft provided by the consultants. However, it is important to remember the purpose of this study – finding a uniform definition of voter fraud and making recommendations on how to study the existence, prosecution and deterrence of voter fraud -- as it will serve as the basis of the EAC report on this study.

Thank you for your letter. You can be assured that as soon as a final report on the fraud and intimidation study is available, a copy will be made available to the public.

Sincerely,

Paul S. DeGregorio
Chairman
Voter Suppression & Intimidation:
- Voter suppression efforts are sometimes racially based, and sometimes based on partisan considerations.
- Hard to know how much vote suppression and intimidation is taking place because it depends on one's definition of the terms – they are used very loosely by some people. Many instances of what some people refer to as voter intimidation are more unclear now (e.g.; photographing voters at the polls has been called intimidating, but now everyone is at the polls with a camera). It is hard to know when something is intimidation and it is difficult to show that it was an act of intimidation.
- The fact that both parties are engaging in these tactics now makes it more complicated. It makes it difficult to point the finger at any one side.
- Some advocates assert that, given the additional resources and latitude given to the DOJ enforcement of acts such as double voting and noncitizen voting, there should be an equal commitment to enforcement of acts of intimidation and suppression cases.
- Examples:
  - spreading of false information, such as phone calls, flyers, and radio ads that intentionally mislead as to voting procedures, such as claiming that if you do not have identification, you cannot vote, and providing false dates for the election.
  - Observers with cameras, which people associate with potential political retribution or even violence.
  - Intimidating police presence at the polls.
  - open hostility by poll workers toward minorities (racial and language), or poll workers asking intimidating questions;
  - groups of officious-looking poll watchers at the poll sites who seem to be some sort of authority looking for wrongdoing;
  - challenges
    - There are cases where challenger laws have been beneficial and where they have been abused (Brennan is currently working on developing a model challenger law).
    - No way to determine whether a challenge is in good or bad faith, and there is little penalty for making a bad faith challenge. The fact that there are no checks on the challenges at the precinct level, or even a requirement of concurrence from an opposing party challenger leads to the concern that challenge process will be abused. The voter on the other hand, will need to get majority approval of county election board members to defeat the challenge.
    - Especially in jurisdictions that authorize challenges, the use of challenge lists and challengers goes beyond partisanship to racial suppression and intimidation.
  - instances where civic groups and church groups intimidate members to vote in a specific manner, not for reward, but under threat of being ostracized or even telling them they will go to hell. (AR, KY)
  - moving poll sites.
  - having Indians vote at polling places staffed by non-Indians often results in incidents of disrespect towards Native voters, judges aren't familiar with Indian last names and are more dismissive of solving discrepancies with native voters.
  - intimidation at the poll sites in court houses. Many voters are afraid of the county judges or county employees and therefore will not vote. They justifiably believe their ballots will be opened by these employees to see who they voted for, and if they voted against the county people, retribution might ensue. (AR)

Fraud in Voting:
NOTE: Many interviewees appear to have made claims regarding the quantity and type of voting fraud based on incomplete data, their personal experience, or their impressions (e.g.; voting fraud
SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

has been confined to absentee ballots; there is no in person assumption of others' voter identities to vote).

- The most commonly cited example of voting fraud mentioned was absentee ballot fraud (e.g.; vote selling involving absentee ballots, the filling out of absentee ballots en masse, people at nursing homes filling out the ballots of residents, and union leaders getting members to vote a certain way by absentee ballot).
- Many assert that impersonation, or polling place fraud, is probably the least frequent type because:
  - impersonation fraud is more likely to be caught and is therefore not worth the risk
  - unlike in an absentee situation, actual poll workers are present to disrupt impersonation fraud, for instance, by catching the same individual voting twice
  - if one votes in the name of another voter, and that voter shows up at the polls, the fraud will be discovered
  - one half to one quarter of the time the person will be caught (there is a chance the pollworker will have personal knowledge of the person, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox has mentioned that there are many opportunities for discovery of in person fraud as well).
  - deterrent is that it's a felony, and that one person voting twice is not an effective way to influence an election. One would need to get a lot of people involved for it to work
- Vote buying still occurs and, in some cases, it is hard to distinguish between intimidation and vote buying.
- Tampering with ballots in transit between poll and election office is a concern (AR)

Voter Registration:
- Some assert that registration fraud is the major issue (esp unsupervised voter registration drives by political parties and advocacy groups that pay workers to register voters)
- Some assert that various groups abuse the existence of list deadwood to make claims about fraudulent voting.
- Some assert that when compiling such lists and doing comparisons, which are used as the basis for challenges, sound statistical methods must be utilized, and often are not. Matching protocols without faulty assumptions will have a 4 percent to 35 percent error rate —that's simply the nature of database work. Private industry has been working on improving this for years. .
- If someone is on a voter list twice, that does not mean that voter has voted twice.
- Many problems will be addressed by the statewide database required under HAVA

Enforcement:
- States vary in their authority to intervene in and track voter intimidation-voter suppression and voting fraud cases (e.g.; in AR, enforcement is the responsibility of counties, in IN it is responsibility of State AG).
- Voter fraud and intimidation is difficult to prove. It is very hard to collect the necessary factual evidence to make a case, and doing so is very labor-intensive
- Some believe that voter suppression matters are not pursued formally because often they involve activities that current law does not reach.
- Only two interviewees assert that current state and federal codes seem sufficient for prosecuting fraud, and are not under-enforced (no need for additional laws).
- Some advocacy groups assert that the government does not engage in a sustained investigation of voter suppression matters or pursue any kind of resolution to them. There is a perception that the Department of Justice has never been very aggressive in pursuing cases of vote suppression, intimidation and fraud, and that choices DOJ has made with respect to where they have brought claims do not seem to be based on any systematic analysis of where the biggest problems are.
- Some advocates point out that, once the election is over, civil litigation becomes moot.
SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
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• The development of a pre-election challenge list targeted at minorities (some claim this has never been pursued, yet Mr. Tanner said the DOJ was able to informally intervene in challenger situations in Florida, Atkinson County, Georgia and in Alabama), long lines due to unequal distribution of voting machines based on race, list purges based on race, unequal application of voter ID rules, and refusal to offer a provisional ballot on the basis of race would be VRA violations.

• DOJ asserts there is a big gap between complaints and what can be substantiated

• DOJ Voting Rights Section - Federal Voting Rights Act only applies to state action, so the section only sues State and local governments - it does not have any enforcement power over individuals. Most often, the section enters into consent agreements with governments that focus on poll worker training, takes steps to restructure how polls are run, and deals with problems on Election Day on the spot. When deciding what to do with the complaint, the section err[s] on the side of referring it criminally because they do not want civil litigation to complicate a possible criminal case

• DOJ Election Crimes Branch – DOJ is permitted to prosecute whenever there is a candidate for federal office, but can't prosecute everything. Deceptive practices that are committed by individuals and would be a matter for the Public Integrity Section; local government would have to be involved for the voting section to become involved. The problem is asserting federal jurisdiction in non-federal elections. (In U.S. v. McNally, the court ruled that the mail fraud statute does not apply to election fraud. It was through the mail fraud statute that the department had routinely gotten federal jurisdiction over election fraud cases. 18 USC 1346, the congressional effort to "fix" McNally, did not include voter fraud.)

• It is preferable for the federal government to pursue these cases for the following reasons:
  o federal districts draw from a bigger and more diverse jury pool;
  o the DOJ is politically detached; local district attorneys are hamstrung by the need to be re-elected;
  o DOJ has more resources - local prosecutors need to focus on personal and property crimes - fraud cases are too big and too complex for them;
  o DOJ can use the grand jury process as a discovery technique and to test the strength of the case.

• Some assert that election crimes are not high on the priority list of either district attorneys or grand juries; therefore, complaints of election crime very rarely are prosecuted or are indicted by the grand jury.

• Political parties have devoted extraordinary resources into 'smoking out' fraudulent voters

Recommendations Re Laws & Procedures:

• It is important to keep clear who the perpetrators of the fraud are and where the fraud occurs because that effects what the remedy should be.

• Support Senator Barak Obama's bill for combating voter harassment and deceptive practices. (Many jurisdictions do not currently have laws prohibiting voter harassment and deceptive practices.)

• Support a new law that allows the DOJ to bring civil actions for suppression that are not race based, for example, deceptive practices or wholesale challenges to voters in jurisdictions that tend to vote heavily for one party.

• Support a new federal law that allows federal prosecution whenever a federal instrumentality is used, e.g. the mail, federal funding, interstate commerce (DOJ has drafted such legislation, which was introduced but not passed in the early 1990s.)

• Put stronger teeth in the voter fraud laws; step up enforcement against fraud and provide stiffer penalties as current penalties make the risk of committing fraud relatively low

• There should be increased resources dedicated to expanded DOJ monitoring efforts. This might be the best use of resources since monitors and observers act as a deterrent to fraud and intimidation.

• Some advocate that all election fraud and intimidation complaints should be referred to the State Attorney General's Office to circumvent the problem of local political prosecutions. The
SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

Attorney General should take more responsibility for complaints of fraud because at the local level, politics interferes

- Some advocate greater resources for district attorneys. In addition, during election time, there should be an attorney in the DA's office who is designated to handle election prosecution
- Would be useful to have recommendations for prosecutors investigating fraudulent activity
- Better trained poll workers
- Polling places should be open longer, run more professionally but there needs to be fewer of them so that they are staffed by only the best, most professional people (Voting Centers).
- Move elections to weekends. This would involve more people acting as poll workers who would be much more careful about what was going on.
- A day should be given off of work without counting as a vacation day so that better poll workers are available.
- Early voting at the clerk's office is good because the people there know what they are doing. People would be unlikely to commit fraud at the clerk's office. This should be expanded to other polling places in addition to that of the county clerk.
- Many assert that the best defense against fraud will be better voter lists.
  - States should be urged to implement statewide voter lists in accordance with the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), the election reform law enacted by Congress in 2002 following the Florida debacle
  - Linking voter registration databases across states may be a way to see if people who are registered twice are in fact voting twice
  - New legislation or regulations are needed to provide clear guidance and standards for generating voter lists and purging voters, otherwise states could wrongfully disenfranchise eligible voters; purging must be done in a manner that uses the best databases, and looks at only the most relevant information
  - The process for preventing ineligible ex-felons from casting ballots needs to be improved
  - Statewide registration databases should be linked to social service agency databases
- Challenge laws need to be reformed, especially ones that allow for pre-election mass challenges with no real basis. There is no one size fits all model for challenger legislation, but some bad models involving hurdles for voters lead to abuse and should be reformed. There should be room for poll workers to challenge fraudulent voters, but not for abuse. (KY has list of defined reasons for which they can challenge a voter, such as residency, and the challengers must also fill out paperwork to conduct a challenge) Last minute challenges should not be permitted
- False information campaigns should be combated with greater voter education, the media could do more to provide information about what is legal and what is illegal
- Improve the protective zone around polling places: the further vote suppressers can keep people away from the polls, the better.
- States should be encouraged to:
  - Codify into law uniform and clear published standards for voter registration, challenges, voter ID, poll worker training, use and counting of provisional votes, the distribution of voting equipment and the assignment of official pollworkers among precincts, to ensure adequate and nondiscriminatory access
  - Standardize forms
  - Modify forms and procedures based on feedback from prosecutors
- Ensure good security procedures for the tabulation process and more transparency in the vote counting process
- Conduct post-election audits
- Many advocate eliminating "no excuse" absentee voting.
- Some recommend reducing partisanship in election administration, but others are skeptical of the feasibility of this
SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

- Some strongly recommend requiring voter ID, while others strongly oppose it as a voter suppression tactic, asserting that states should not adopt requirements that voters show identification at the polls, beyond those already required by federal law (requiring that identification be shown only by first time voters who did not show identification when registering.) and that states could use signature comparisons.
- Political parties should monitor the processing of voter registrations and purging of registered by local election authorities on an ongoing basis to ensure the timely processing of registrations and changes, including both newly registered voters and voters who move within a jurisdiction or the state, and the Party should ask state Attorneys General to take action where necessary to force the timely updating of voter lists or to challenge, unlawful purges and other improper list maintenance practices.

Future Study Recommendations:
- Just because there was no prosecution, does not mean there was no vote fraud; very hard to come up with a measure of voter fraud short of prosecution
- EAC should conduct a survey of the general public that asks whether they have committed certain acts or been subjected to any incidents of fraud or intimidation. This would require using a very large sample, and we would need to employ the services of an expert in survey data
- EAC should work with the Census Bureau to have them ask different, additional questions in their Voter Population Surveys
- EAC should talk to private election lawyers
1. Everyone does not define voting fraud and voter intimidation the same way.

In some cases, what may have been honest administrative mistakes or errors due to poor poll worker training are lumped together with genuine voter suppression efforts and labeled as voter intimidation or voting fraud. Examples: (1) many authors consider certain voter suppression tactics to be voter intimidation that do not rise to the definition used in criminal enforcement of election crimes; (2) some charge that a DOJ ballot integrity measure in South Dakota was voter intimidation; and (3) some mistakes made in the maintenance of voter registration lists are labeled as fraud.

2. There seems to be no systematic nationwide study that reports all (or most) verified instances of voting fraud and voter intimidation or suppression efforts in a particular election or a particular period in U.S. history.

Some sources focus on certain areas of the country, which can bias the study if these areas are more or less susceptible to fraud and suppression. Some focus on the alleged (but not necessarily verified) misdeeds of one political party or another. Still others focus on unverified allegations reported to a toll-free phone line. In some cases, it is not clear if the incidents were intentional voter suppression or genuine poll worker mistakes (e.g.; not providing provisional ballots or in appropriately asking voters for ID). Minnite's study is as close as they get to a systematic study.

3. There are a number of obstacles to gathering compete data on voting fraud and voter intimidation/suppression nationwide in any election.

Authors often have limited resources (time and money) to collect such information. Investigation and prosecution of voting fraud and voter intimidation or suppression occurs at different levels of government (Federal, state and local). These investigations and prosecutions are not reported to and recorded by a central authority. Some voting fraud is inherently more difficult to identify and to prove than others (e.g.; impersonation of another voter at the polls is more difficult, due to the transient nature of some jurisdictions and the fact that impersonators not identified as a fraud at the polls are hard to identify later, than voter registration, vote buying, and absentee ballot fraud). At least some voting fraud and voter intimidation appears to go unreported and uninvestigated, and some prosecutions are unsuccessful due to local politics and law enforcement affiliations and the lack of sufficient resources at the Federal, state, and local levels to support the labor intensive effort.

4. Most sources seem to agree that voter registration and absentee balloting fraud are the most common forms of voting fraud. Absentee ballot fraud often is accompanied by vote buying or voter coercion. Also frequently alleged were instances of ineligible voters (usually felons, but sometime non-citizens, under aged individuals, or non-residents) that voted. But not all agree that these are the only common forms of fraud.
Some contend that voting in the name of another at the polling place is common, but that such instances are extremely hard to prove. Most instances of ineligible voters voting were linked to improper voter list maintenance or confusion on the part of local election officials as to state law on felon disenfranchisement.

5. A number of sources have identified numerous instances of attempted voter suppression, but no instances of voter intimidation that could be prosecuted under Federal criminal laws is alleged.

Examples of voter suppression efforts include: (1) phone calls and mailings deliberately directing targeted voters to vote on the wrong day or to go to the wrong polling place, or that provide incorrect and threatening information about the voter qualifications and legal consequences of voting; (2) targeted, inappropriate challenges to voters at the polls or shortly before election day; (3) people posing as law enforcement agents at targeted polling places. When such tactics target minority communities, they may be attacked through civil action by DOJ under Voting Rights Act provisions, but they do not qualify for criminal penalties under Federal voter intimidation law. Currently, there is no Federal election law providing criminal penalties for voter suppression efforts. When the suppression adversely affects a political party, but does not have a racial component, DOJ may be hard pressed to pursue the matter unless other Federal criminal law has been violated (e.g.; suppression of phone banks in New Hampshire).

6. Unsupervised voter registration drives by political parties and advocacy groups are a primary source of fraudulent voter registration applications and missing (perhaps deliberately) voter registration applications.

The practice of paying persons to man voter registration drives (particularly, but not only, when the person is paid by the head) is a frequent source of fraudulent voter registration applications. Partisan drives have resulted in applications from persons of “the wrong party” being held back or destroyed. Therefore, while the applicant believes they have registered, the election official has no record of that registration.

7. Many authors contend that proper implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) will reduce or at least not increase the potential for fraud and voter suppression, but some argue that provisions in these laws increase the likelihood of fraud or voter suppression.

Many argue that proper implementation of the list maintenance and fail-safe voting provisions of the NVRA and HAVA’s requirements for the statewide voter registration list, voter ID for certain first-time voters, and provisional voting will reduce the potential for voting fraud and voter intimidation. Others argue that the list maintenance provisions of NVRA cause “dead wood” to be left on the voter rolls, providing opportunity for fraud, or that HAVA’s voter ID and list matching requirements can be used as voter suppression tactics.
8. Proper recordkeeping and post-election auditing is an important key to identifying and preventing voting fraud, and for subsequent prosecution of such activities; but is not being done consistently.

9. Poll worker recruitment and training is a key component to combating actions that are perceived as suppressing or intimidating voters.

10. Both sides on election reform debates are using incomplete data to bolster their arguments.
Attached is a copy of the draft voter fraud-voter intimidation report that combines all of the pieces provided to me by the consultants, except for the voluminous Nexis research and case law charts. Tom wants to get this before the Commissioners ASAP, but I need some other eyes to look it over before we do. Although I’ve made some formatting changes to provide some consistency in presentation, and corrected a couple of glaring errors, I remain concerned about a number of issues:

• As you know, references to DOJ actions/responses have caused some concern at DOJ. But both consultants are adamantly opposed to EAC making substantive changes to their report. Perhaps using footnotes clearly labeled as EAC footnotes would be a method of addressing this issue?

• There are some recommendations regarding DOJ that we (the consultants and I) were told would not be supported by DOJ, and other references to DOJ, none of which have been reviewed by the department. I think we ought to give Craig Donsanto and John Tanner a chance to provide feedback on each of these sections.

• I am a little concerned about the naming of names, particularly in the section that addresses working group concerns. If we publish it as is, it might end up as fodder for some very negative newspaper articles.

• The report currently uses three different voices: third person, first person singular, first person plural. I think this looks really clumsy. If we are not actually making substantive changes, perhaps we could get away with making the presentation consistent in this regard.

• Because the consultants submitted the report in pieces, they did not include proper sequeways. I don’t know if we should leave it as is, or insert them where needed.

Please let me know what you think. If it would help, we can schedule a teleconference. --- Peggy
Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation

Report to the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
on
Preliminary Research & Recommendations

By
Job Serebrov and Tova Wang
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Appendix 1: List of Individuals Interviewed

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Introduction

Charge Under HAVA


Scope of Project

The Commission employed a bipartisan team of legal consultants, Tova Wang and Job Serebrov to develop a preliminary overview work product to determine the quantity and quality of vote fraud and voter intimidation that is present on a national scale. The consultants’ work is neither comprehensive nor conclusive. This first phase of an envisioned two-phase project was constrained by both time and funding. The consultants’ conclusions and recommendations for phase II will be contained in this report.

The consultants, working without the aid of a support staff, divided most of the work. However, the final work product was mutually checked and approved. They agreed upon the steps that were taken needed and the method employed. For all of the documentary sources, the consultants limited the time period under review from January 1, 2001 to January 1, 2006. The research performed by the consultants included interviews, an extensive Nexis search, a review of existing literature, and case research.

Interviews: The consultants chose the interviewees by first coming up with a list of the categories of types of people they wanted to interview. Then the consultants separately, equally filled those categories with a certain number of people. Due to time and resource constraints, the consultants had to pare down this list substantially – for instance, they had to rule out interviewing prosecutors altogether – but still got a good range of people to talk to. The ultimate categories were academics, advocates, elections officials, lawyers and judges. Although the consultants were able to talk to most of the people they wanted to, some were unavailable and a few were not comfortable speaking to them, particularly judges. The consultants together conducted all of the interviews, either by phone or in person. Then the consultants split up drafting the summaries. All summaries were reviewed and mutually approved. Most of the interviews were extremely informative and the consultants found the interviewees to be extremely knowledgeable and insightful for the most part.

Nexis: Initially, the consultants developed an enormous list of possible Nexis search terms. It soon became obvious that it would be impossible to conduct the research that way. As a result, consultant Wang performed the Nexis search by finding search term combinations that would yield virtually every article on a particular subject from the last
five years. Consultant Serebrov approved the search terms. Then Wang created an excel
spreadsheet in order to break down the articles in way in which they could be effectively
analyzed for patterns. Each type of fraud is broken down in a separate chart according to
where it took place, the date, the type of election it occurred in, what the allegation was,
the publication it came from. Where there was a follow up article, any information that
that suggested there had been some further action taken or some resolution to the
allegation was also included. For four very complicated and long drawn out situations –
Washington State, Wisconsin, South Dakota in 2004, and the vote buying cases in a
couple of particular jurisdictions over the last several years –written summaries with
news citations are provided.

Existing Literature: Part of the selections made by the consultants resulted from
consultant Wang’s long-term familiarity with the material while part was the result of a
joint web search for articles and books on vote fraud and voter intimidation and
suggestions from those interviewed by the consultants. The consultants reviewed a wide
range of materials from government reports and investigations, to academic literature, to
reports published by advocacy groups. The consultants believe that they covered the
landscape of available sources.

Cases: In order to properly identify all applicable cases, the consultants first developed
an extensive word search term list. A Westlaw search was performed and the first one
hundred cases under each word search term were then gathered in individual files. This
resulted in a total of approximately 44,000 cases. Most of these cases were federal as
opposed to state and appellate as opposed to trial. Consultant Serebrov analyzed the
cases in each file to determine if they were on point. If he found that the first twenty
cases were inapplicable, Serebrov would sample forty to fifty other file cases at random
to determine applicability. If the entire file did not yield any cases, the file would be
discarded. All discarded word search terms were recorded in a separate file. Likewise, if
the file only yielded a few applicable cases, it would also be discarded. However, if a
small but significant number of cases were on point, the file was later charted. The
results of the case search were stark because relatively few applicable cases were found.
Working Definition of Fraud and Intimidation

Note: The definition provided below is for the purposes of this EAC project. Most of the acts described come within the federal criminal definition of fraud, but some may not.

Election fraud is any intentional action, or intentional failure to act when there is a duty to do so, that corrupts the election process in a manner that can impact on election outcomes. This includes interfering in the process by which persons register to vote; the way in which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; and the process by which election results are canvassed and certified.

Examples include the following:

- falsifying voter registration information pertinent to eligibility to cast a vote, (e.g. residence, criminal status, etc.);
- altering completed voter registration applications by entering false information;
- knowingly destroying completed voter registration applications (other than spoiled applications) before they can be submitted to the proper election authority;
- knowingly removing eligible voters from voter registration lists, in violation of HAVA, NVRA, or state election laws;
- intentional destruction by election officials of voter registration records or balloting records, in violation of records retention laws, to remove evidence of election fraud;
- vote buying;
- voting in the name of another;
- voting more than once;
- coercing a voter's choice on an absentee ballot;
- using a false name and/or signature on an absentee ballot;
- destroying or misappropriating an absentee ballot;
- felons, or in some states ex-felons, who vote when they know they are ineligible to do so;
- misleading an ex-felon about his or her right to vote;
- voting by non-citizens who know they are ineligible to do so;
- intimidating practices aimed at vote suppression or deterrence, including the abuse of challenge laws;
- deceiving voters with false information (e.g.; deliberately directing voters to the wrong polling place or providing false information on polling hours and dates);
- knowingly failing to accept voter registration applications, to provide ballots, or to accept and count voted ballots in accordance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act;
- intentional miscounting of ballots by election officials;
- intentional misrepresentation of vote tallies by election officials;
- acting in any other manner with the intention of suppressing voter registration or voting, or interfering with vote counting and the certification of the vote.
Voting fraud does not include mistakes made in the course of voter registration, balloting, or tabulating ballots and certifying results. For purposes of the EAC study, it also does not include violations of campaign finance laws.
Summaries of Research Conducted

Interviews

Common Themes

- There is virtually universal agreement that absentee ballot fraud is the biggest problem, with vote buying and registration fraud coming in after that. The vote buying often comes in the form of payment for absentee ballots, although not always. Some absentee ballot fraud is part of an organized effort; some is by individuals, who sometimes are not even aware that what they are doing is illegal. Voter registration fraud seems to take the form of people signing up with false names. Registration fraud seems to be most common where people doing the registration were paid by the signature.

- There is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, “dead” voters, noncitizen voting and felon voters. Those few who believe it occurs often enough to be a concern say that it is impossible to show the extent to which it happens, but do point to instances in the press of such incidents. Most people believe that false registration forms have not resulted in polling place fraud, although it may create the perception that vote fraud is possible. Those who believe there is more polling place fraud than reported/investigated/prosecuted believe that registration fraud does lead to fraudulent votes. Jason Torchinsky from the American Center for Voting Rights is the only interviewee who believes that polling place fraud is widespread and among the most significant problems in the system.

- Abuse of challenger laws and abusive challengers seem to be the biggest intimidation/suppression concerns, and many of those interviewed assert that the new-identification requirements are the modern version of voter intimidation and suppression. However there is evidence of some continued outright intimidation and suppression, especially in some Native American communities. A number of people also raise the problem of poll workers engaging in harassment of minority voters. Other activities commonly raised were the issue of polling places being moved at the last moment, unequal distribution of voting machines, videotaping of voters at the polls, and targeted misinformation campaigns.

- Several people indicate – including representatives from DOJ – that for various reasons, the Department of Justice is bringing fewer voter intimidation and suppression cases now and is focusing on matters such as noncitizen voting, double voting and felon voting. While the civil rights section continues to focus on systemic patterns of malfeasance, the public integrity section is focusing now on individuals, on isolated instances of fraud.

- The problem of badly kept voter registration lists, with both ineligible voters remaining on the rolls and eligible voters being taken off, remains a common concern. A few people are also troubled by voters being on registration lists in two states. They said that there was no evidence that this had led to double voting, but it opens the door to the possibility. There is great hope that full
implementation of the new requirements of HAVA – done well, a major caveat – will reduce this problem dramatically.

**Common Recommendations:**

- Many of those interviewed recommend better poll worker training as the best way to improve the process; a few also recommended longer voting times or voting on days other than election day (such as weekends) but fewer polling places so only the best poll workers would be employed.
- Many interviewed support stronger criminal laws and increased enforcement of existing laws with respect to both fraud and intimidation. Advocates from across the spectrum expressed frustration with the failure of the Department of Justice to pursue complaints.
  - With respect to the civil rights section, John Tanner indicated that fewer cases are being brought because fewer are warranted – it has become increasingly difficult to know when allegations of intimidation and suppression are credible since it depends on one’s definition of intimidation, and because both parties are doing it. Moreover, prior enforcement of the laws has now changed the entire landscape – race based problems are rare now. Although challenges based on race and unequal implementation of identification rules would be actionable, Mr. Tanner was unaware of such situations actually occurring and the section has not pursued any such cases.
  - Craig Donsanto of the public integrity section says that while the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate claims of fraud, the number of cases the department is investigating and the number of indictments the section is pursuing are both up dramatically. Since 2002, the department has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters and double voters than ever before. Mr. Donsanto would like more resources so it can do more and would like to have laws that make it easier for the federal government to assume jurisdiction over voter fraud cases.
- A couple of interviewees recommend a new law that would make it easier to criminally prosecute people for intimidation even when there is not racial animus.
- Almost everyone hopes that administrators will maximize the potential of statewide voter registration databases to prevent fraud. Of particular note, Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of Elections for Kentucky, emphasized that having had an effective statewide voter registration database for more than thirty years has helped that state avoid most of the fraud problems that have been alleged elsewhere, such as double voting and felon voting.
- Several advocate expanded monitoring of the polls, including some associated with the Department of Justice.
- Challenge laws, both with respect to pre-election day challenges and challengers at the polls, need to be revised by all states to ensure they are not used for purposes of wrongful disenfranchisement and harassment.
Several people advocate passage of Senator Barak Obama's "deceptive practices" bill.

There is a split on whether it would be helpful to have nonpartisan election officials – some indicated they thought even if elections officials are elected nonpartisanly they will carry out their duties in biased ways nonetheless. However, most agree that elections officials pursuing partisan agendas is a problem that must be addressed in some fashion. Suggestions included moving election responsibilities out of the secretary of states' office; increasing transparency in the process; and enacting conflict of interest rules.

A few recommend returning to allowing use of absentee ballots "for cause" only if it were politically feasible.

A few recommend enacting a national identification card, including Pat Rogers, an attorney in New Mexico, and Jason Torchinsky from ACVR, who advocates the scheme contemplated in the Carter-Baker Commission Report.

A couple of interviewees indicated the need for clear standards for the distribution of voting machines.

Nexis Research

**Absentee Ballot Fraud**

According to press reports, absentee ballots are abused in a variety of ways:

- Campaign workers, candidates and others coerce the voting choices of vulnerable populations, usually elderly voters.
- Workers for groups and individuals have attempted to vote absentee in the names of the deceased.
- Workers for groups, campaign workers and individuals have attempted to forge the names of other voters on absentee ballot requests and absentee ballots and thus vote multiple times.

It is unclear how often actual convictions result from these activities (a handful of articles indicate convictions and guilty pleas), but this is an area in which there have been a substantial number of official investigations and actual charges filed, according to news reports where such information is available. A few of the allegations became part of civil court proceedings contesting the outcome of the election.

While absentee fraud allegations turn up throughout the country, a few states have had several such cases. Especially of note are Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, and most particularly, Texas. Interestingly, there were no articles regarding Oregon, where the entire system is vote by mail.

**Voter Registration Fraud**
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According to press reports, the following types of allegations of voter registration fraud are most common:

- Registering in the name of dead people
- Fake names and other information on voter registration forms
- Illegitimate addresses used on voter registration forms
- Voters being tricked into registering for a particular party under false pretenses
- Destruction of voter registration forms depending on the party the voter registered with

There was only one self evident instance of a noncitizen registering to vote. Many of the instances reported on included official investigations and charges filed, but few actual convictions, at least from the news reporting. There have been multiple reports of registration fraud in California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.

Voter Intimidation and Suppression

This is the area which had the most articles in part because there were so many allegations of intimidation and suppression during the 2004 election. Most of these remained allegations and no criminal investigation or prosecution ensued. Some of the cases did end up in civil litigation.

This is not to say that these alleged activities were confined to 2004 – there were several allegations made during every year studied. Most notable were the high number of allegations of voter intimidation and harassment reported during the 2003 Philadelphia mayoral race.

A very high number of the articles were about the issue of challenges to voters’ registration status and challengers at the polling places. There were many allegations that planned challenge activities were targeted at minority communities. Some of the challenges were concentrated in immigrant communities.

However, the tactics alleged varied greatly. The types of activities discussed also include the following:

- Photographing or videotaping voters coming out of polling places.
- Improper demands for identification
- Poll watchers harassing voters
- Poll workers being hostile to or aggressively challenging voters
- Disproportionate police presence
- Poll watchers wearing clothes with messages that seemed intended to intimidate
- Insufficient voting machines and unmanageably long lines
Although the incidents reported occurred everywhere, not surprisingly, many came from “battleground” states. There were several such reports out of Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

“Dead Voters and Multiple Voting”

There were a high number of articles about people voting in the names of the dead and voting more than once. Many of these articles were marked by allegations of big numbers of people committing these frauds, and relatively few of these allegations turning out to be accurate according to investigations by the newspapers themselves, elections officials and criminal investigators. Often the problem turned out to be a result of administrative error, poll workers mis-marking of voter lists, a flawed registration list and/or errors made in the attempt to match names of voters on the list with the names of the people who voted. In a good number of cases, there were allegations that charges of double voting by political leaders were an effort to scare people away from the voting process.

Nonetheless there were a few cases of people actually being charged and/or convicted for these kinds of activities. Most of the cases involved a person voting both by absentee ballot and in person. A few instances involved people voting both during early voting and on Election Day, which calls into question the proper marking and maintenance of the voting lists. In many instances, the person charged claimed not to have voted twice on purpose. A very small handful of cases involved a voter voting in more than one county and there was one substantiated case involving a person voting in more than one state. Other instances in which such efforts were alleged were disproved by officials.

In the case of voting in the name of a dead person, the problem lay in the voter registration list not being properly maintained, i.e. the person was still on the registration list as eligible to vote, and a person taking criminal advantage of that. In total, the San Francisco Chronicle found 5 such cases in March 2004; the AP cited a newspaper analysis of five such persons in an Indiana primary in May 2004; and a senate committee found two people to have voted in the names of the dead in 2005.

As usual, there were a disproportionate number of such articles coming out of Florida. Notably, there were three articles out of Oregon, which has one hundred percent vote-by-mail.

Vote Buying

There were a surprising number of articles about vote buying cases. A few of these instances involved long-time investigations in three particular jurisdictions as detailed in the vote buying summary. There were more official investigations, indictments and convictions/pleas in this area. All of these cases are concentrated in the Midwest and South.

Deceptive Practices
In 2004 there were numerous reports of intentional disinformation about voting eligibility and the voting process meant to confuse voters about their rights and when and where to vote. Misinformation came in the form of flyers, phone calls, letters, and even people going door to door. Many of the efforts were reportedly targeted at minority communities. A disproportionate number of them came from key battleground states, particularly Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. From the news reports found, only one of these instances was officially investigated, the case in Oregon involving the destruction of voter registration forms. There were no reports of prosecutions or any other legal proceeding.

**Non-citizen Voting**

There were surprisingly few articles regarding noncitizen registration and voting – just seven all together, in seven different states across the country. They were also evenly split between allegations of noncitizens registering and noncitizens voting. In one case charges were filed against ten individuals. In one case a judge in a civil suit found there was illegal noncitizen voting. Three instances prompted official investigations. Two cases, from this nexis search, remained just allegations of noncitizen voting.

**Felon Voting**

Although there were only thirteen cases of felon voting, some of them involved large numbers of voters. Most notably, of course, are the cases that came to light in the Washington gubernatorial election contest (see Washington summary) and in Wisconsin (see Wisconsin summary). In several states, the main problem has been the large number of ineligible felons that remained on the voting list.

**Election Official Fraud**

In most of the cases in which fraud by elections officials is suspected or alleged, it is difficult to determine whether it is incompetence or a crime. There are several cases of ballots gone missing, ballots unaccounted for and ballots ending up in a worker’s possession. In two cases workers were said to have changed peoples’ votes. The one instance in which widespread ballot box stuffing by elections workers was alleged was in Washington State. The judge in the civil trial of that election contest did not find that elections workers had committed fraud. Four of the cases are from Texas.

**Existing Research**

There are many reports and books that describe anecdotes and draw broad conclusions from a large array of incidents. There is little research that is truly systematic or scientific. The most systematic look at fraud is the report written by Lori Minnite. The most systematic look at voter intimidation is the report by Laughlin McDonald. Books
written about this subject seem to all have a political bias and a pre-existing agenda that makes them somewhat less valuable.

Researchers agree that measuring something like the incidence of fraud and intimidation in a scientifically legitimate way is extremely difficult from a methodological perspective and would require resources beyond the means of most social and political scientists. As a result, there is much more written on this topic by advocacy groups than social scientists. It is hoped that this gap will be filled in the “second phase” of this EAC project.

Moreover, reports and books make allegations but, perhaps by their nature, have little follow up. As a result, it is difficult to know when something has remained in the stage of being an allegation and gone no further, or progressed to the point of being investigated or prosecuted or in any other way proven to be valid by an independent, neutral entity. This is true, for example, with respect to allegations of voter intimidation by civil rights organizations, and, with respect to fraud, John Fund’s frequently cited book. Again, this is something that it is hoped will be addressed in the “second phase” of this EAC project by doing follow up research on allegations made in reports, books and newspaper articles.

Other items of note:

- There is as much evidence, and as much concern, about structural forms of disenfranchisement as about intentional abuse of the system. These include felon disenfranchisement, poor maintenance of databases and identification requirements.

- There is tremendous disagreement about the extent to which polling place fraud, e.g. double voting, intentional felon voting, noncitizen voting, is a serious problem. On balance, more researchers find it to be less of a problem than is commonly described in the political debate, but some reports say it is a major problem, albeit hard to identify.

- There is substantial concern across the board about absentee balloting and the opportunity it presents for fraud.

- Federal law governing election fraud and intimidation is varied and complex and yet may nonetheless be insufficient or subject to too many limitations to be as effective as it might be.

- Deceptive practices, e.g. targeted flyers and phone calls providing misinformation, were a major problem in 2004.

- Voter intimidation continues to be focused on minority communities, although the American Center for Voting Rights uniquely alleges it is focused on Republicans.
Cases

After reviewing over 40,000 cases, the majority of which came from appeals courts, I have found comparatively very few which are applicable to this study. Of those that are applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerges. However, it seems that the greatest areas of fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility. But because so few cases provided a picture of these current problems, I suggest that case research for the second phase of this project concentrate on state trial-level decisions.

Methodology

The following is a summary of interviews conducted with a number of political scientists and experts in the field as to how one might undertake a comprehensive examination of voter fraud and intimidation. A list of the individuals interviewed and their ideas are available, and all of the individuals welcome any further questions or explanations of their recommended procedures.

- In analyzing instances of alleged fraud and intimidation, we should look to criminology as a model. In criminology, experts use two sources: the Uniform Crime Reports, which are all reports made to the police, and the Victimization Survey, which asks the general public whether a particular incident has happened to them. After surveying what the most common allegations are, we should conduct a survey of the general public that ask whether they have committed certain acts or been subjected to any incidents of fraud or intimidation. This would require using a very large sample, and we would need to employ the services of an expert in survey data collection. (Stephen Ansolobohere, MIT)

- Several political scientists with expertise in these types of studies recommended a methodology that includes interviews, focus groups, and a limited survey. In determining who to interview and where the focus groups should be drawn from, they recommend the following procedure:
  - Pick a number of places that have historically had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation; from that pool pick 10 that are geographically and demographically diverse, and have had a diversity of problems
  - Pick a number of places that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation; from that pool pick 10 places that match the geographic and demographic make-up of the previous ten above (and, if possible, have comparable elections practices)
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- Assess the resulting overall reports and impressions resulting from these interviews and focus groups, and examine comparisons and differences among the states and what may give rise to them.

In conducting a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, district election officers, they recommend that:

- The survey sample be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets
- The survey must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations

(Allan Lichtman, American University; Thad Hall, University of Utah; Bernard Grofman, UC – Irvine)

- Another political scientist recommended employing a methodology that relies on qualitative data drawn from in-depth interviews with key critics and experts on all sides of the debate on fraud; quantitative data collected through a survey of state and local elections and law enforcement officials; and case studies. Case studies should focus on the five or ten states, regions or cities where there has been a history of election fraud to examine past and present problems. The survey should be mailed to each state's attorney general and secretary of state, each county district attorney's office and each county board of elections in the 50 states. (Lorraine Minnite, Barnard College)

- The research should be a two-step process. Using LexisNexis and other research tools, a search should be conducted of news media accounts over the past decade. Second, interviews with a systematic sample of election officials nationwide and in selected states should be conducted. (Chandler Davidson, Rice University)

- One expert in the field posits that we can never come up with a number that accurately represents either the incidence of fraud or the incidence of voter intimidation. Therefore, the better approach is to do an assessment of what is most likely to happen, what election violations are most likely to be committed – in other words, a risk analysis. This would include an analysis of what it would actually take to commit various acts, e.g. the cost/benefit of each kind of violation. From there we could rank the likely prevalence of each type of activity and examine what measures are or could be effective in combating them. (Wendy Weiser, Brennan Center of New York University)

- Replicate a study in the United States done abroad by Susan Hyde of the University of California- San Diego examining the impact of impartial poll site observers on the incidence of election fraud. Doing this retrospectively would require the following steps:
  - Find out where there were federal observers
  - Get precinct level voting information for those places
Analyze whether there was any difference in election outcomes in those places with and without observers, and whether any of these results seem anomalous.

Despite the tremendous differences in the political landscapes of the countries examined by Hyde in previous studies and the U.S., Hyde believes this study could be effectively replicated in this country by sending observers to a random sample of precincts. Rather than compare the incumbent’s vote share, such factors such as voter complaints, voter turnout, number of provisional ballots used, composition of the electorate, as well as any anomalous voting results could be compared between sites with and without monitors.

For example, if intimidation is occurring, and if reputable monitors make intimidation less likely or voters more confident, then turnout should be higher on average in monitored precincts than in unmonitored precincts. If polling station officials are intentionally refusing to issue provisional ballots, and the polling station officials are more likely to adhere to regulations while being monitored, the average number of provisional ballots should be higher in monitored precincts than in unmonitored precincts. If monitors cause polling station officials to adhere more closely to regulations, then there should be fewer complaints (in general) about monitored than unmonitored precincts (this could also be reversed if monitors made voters more likely to complain).

Again, random assignment controls for all of the other factors that otherwise influence these variables.

One of the downsides of this approach is it does not get at some forms of fraud, e.g. absentee ballot fraud; those would have to be analyzed separately.

Another political scientist recommends conducting an analysis of vote fraud claims and purging of registration rolls by list matching. Allegations of illegal voting often are based on matching of names and birth dates. Alleged instances of double voting are based on matching the names and birth dates of persons found on voting records. Allegations of ineligible felon (depending on state law), deceased, and of non-citizen voting are based on matching lists of names, birth dates, and sometimes addresses of such people against a voting records. Anyone with basic relational database skills can perform such matching in a matter of minutes.

However, there are a number of pitfalls for the unwary that can lead to grossly over-estimating the number of fraudulent votes, such as missing or ignored middle names and suffixes or matching on missing birth dates. Furthermore, there is a surprising statistical fact that a group of about three hundred people with the same first and last name are almost assured to share the exact same birth date, including year. In a large state, it is not uncommon for hundreds of Robert Smiths (and other common names) to have voted. Thus, allegations of vote fraud
or purging of voter registration rolls by list matching almost assuredly will find a large proportion of false positives: people who voted legally or are registered to vote legally.

Statistics can be rigorously applied to determine how many names would be expected to be matched by chance. A simulation approach is best applied here: randomly assign a birth date to an arbitrary number of people and observe how many match within the list or across lists. The simulation is repeated many times to average out the variation due to chance. The results can then be matched back to actual voting records and purge lists, for example, in the hotly contested states of Ohio or Florida, or in states with Election Day registration where there are concerns that easy access to voting permits double voting. This analysis will rigorously identify the magnitude alleged voter fraud, and may very well find instances of alleged fraud that exceed what might have otherwise happened by chance.

This same political scientist also recommends another way to examine the problem: look at statistics on provisional voting: the number cast might provide indications of intimidation (people being challenged at the polls) and the number of those not counted would be indications of "vote fraud." One could look at those jurisdictions in the Election Day Survey with a disproportionate number of provisional ballots cast and cross reference it with demographics and number of provisional ballots discarded. (Michael McDonald, George Mason University)

- Spencer Overton, in a forthcoming law review article entitled *Voter Identification*, suggests a methodology that employs three approaches—investigations of voter fraud, random surveys of voters who purported to vote, and an examination of death rolls provide a better understanding of the frequency of fraud. He says all three approaches have strengths and weaknesses, and thus the best studies would employ all three to assess the extent of voter fraud. An excerpt follows:

1. **Investigations and Prosecutions of Voter Fraud**

   Policymakers should develop databases that record all investigations, allegations, charges, trials, convictions, acquittals, and plea bargains regarding voter fraud. Existing studies are incomplete but provide some insight. For example, a statewide survey of each of Ohio's 88 county boards of elections found only four instances of ineligible persons attempting to vote out of a total of 9,078,728 votes cast in the state's 2002 and 2004 general elections. This is a fraud rate of 0.00000045 percent. The Carter-Baker Commission's Report noted that since October 2002, federal officials had charged 89 individuals with casting multiple votes, providing false information about their felon status, buying votes, submitting false voter registration information, and voting improperly as a non-citizen. Examined in the context of the 196,139,871 ballots cast between October 2002 and
August 2005, this represents a fraud rate of 0.0000005 percent (note also that not all of the activities charged would have been prevented by a photo identification requirement).

A more comprehensive study should distinguish voter fraud that could be prevented by a photo identification requirement from other types of fraud — such as absentee voting and stuffing ballot boxes — and obtain statistics on the factors that led law enforcement to prosecute fraud. The study would demand significant resources because it would require that researchers interview and pour over the records of local district attorneys and election boards.

Hard data on investigations, allegations, charges, pleas, and prosecutions is important because it quantifies the amount of fraud officials detect. Even if prosecutors vigorously pursue voter fraud, however, the number of fraud cases charged probably does not capture the total amount of voter fraud. Information on official investigations, charges, and prosecutions should be supplemented by surveys of voters and a comparison of voting rolls to death rolls.

2. Random Surveys of Voters

Random surveys could give insight about the percentage of votes cast fraudulently. For example, political scientists could contact a statistically representative sampling of 1,000 people who purportedly voted at the polls in the last election, ask them if they actually voted, and confirm the percentage who are valid voters. Researchers should conduct the survey soon after an election to locate as many legitimate voters as possible with fresh memories.

Because many respondents would perceive voting as a social good, some who did not vote might claim that they did, which may underestimate the extent of fraud. A surveyor might mitigate this skew through the framing of the question (“I’ve got a record that you voted. Is that true?”).

Further, some voters will not be located by researchers and others will refuse to talk to researchers. Photo identification proponents might construe these non-respondents as improper registrations that were used to commit voter fraud.

Instead of surveying all voters to determine the amount of fraud, researchers might reduce the margin of error by focusing on a random sampling of voters who signed affidavits in the three states that request photo identification but also allow voters to establish their identity through affidavit—Florida, Louisiana, and South Dakota. In
South Dakota, for example, only two percent of voters signed affidavits to establish their identity. If the survey indicates that 95 percent of those who signed affidavits are legitimate voters (and the other 5 percent were shown to be either fraudulent or were non-responsive), this suggests that voter fraud accounts for, at the maximum, 0.1 percent of ballots cast.

The affidavit study, however, is limited to three states, and it is unclear whether this sample is representative of other states (the difficulty may be magnified in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of hundreds of thousands of voters). Further, the affidavit study reveals information about the amount of fraud in a photo identification state with an affidavit exception—more voter fraud may exist in a state that does not request photo identification.

3. Examining Death Rolls

A comparison of death rolls to voting rolls might also provide an estimate of fraud.

Imagine that one million people live in state A, which has no documentary identification requirement. Death records show that 20,000 people passed away in state A in 2003. A cross-referencing of this list to the voter rolls shows that 10,000 of those who died were registered voters, and these names remained on the voter rolls during the November 2004 election. Researchers would look at what percentage of the 10,000 dead-but-registered people who “voted” in the November 2004 election. A researcher should distinguish the votes cast in the name of the dead at the polls from those cast absentee (which a photo identification requirement would not prevent). This number would be extrapolated to the electorate as a whole.

This methodology also has its strengths and weaknesses. If fraudulent voters target the dead, the study might overestimate the fraud that exists among living voters (although a low incidence of fraud among deceased voters might suggest that fraud among all voters is low). The appearance of fraud also might be inflated by false positives produced by a computer match of different people with the same name. Photo identification advocates would likely assert that the rate of voter fraud could be higher among fictitious names registered, and that the death record survey would not capture that type of fraud because fictitious names registered would not show up in the death records. Nevertheless, this study, combined with the other two, would provide important insight into the magnitude of fraud likely to exist in the absence of a photo identification requirement.
Consultants’ Recommendations

**Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews**

Time and resource constraints prevented the consultants from interviewing the full range of participants in the process. As a result, we recommend that any future activity in this area include conducting further interviews.

In particular, we recommend that more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and parties be interviewed. These individuals have the most direct inside information on how the system works -- and at times does not work. They are often the first people voters go to when something goes wrong and are often responsible for fixing it. They are the ones who must carry out the measures that are designed to both prevent fraud and voter intimidation and suppression. They will most likely know what, therefore, is and is not working.

It would also be especially beneficial to talk to people in law enforcement, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

The Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has all of the 93 U.S. Attorneys appoint Assistant U.S. Attorneys to serve as DEOs for two years. DEOs are required to

- screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes and should become matters for investigation;
- oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election crimes in their districts;
- coordinate their district’s (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ headquarters prosecutors;
- coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related matters;
- issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these complaints; and
- supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on election day.
Given the great responsibilities of the DEOs, and the breadth of issues they must deal with, they undoubtedly are great resources for information and insight as to what types of fraud and intimidation/suppression are occurring in their districts.

In many situations, however, it is the local district attorneys who will investigate election fraud and suppression tactics, especially in local elections. They will be able to provide information on what has gone on in their jurisdictions, as well as which matters get pursued and why.

Finally, those who defend people accused of election related crimes would also be useful to speak to. They may have a different perspective on how well the system is working to detect, prevent, and prosecute election fraud.

**Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Nexis Research**

The Nexis search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by both consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. However, without being able to go beyond the agreed search terms, it could not be determined whether there was any later determination regarding the allegations, investigation or charges brought. This leaves a gaping hole: it is impossible to know if the article is just reporting on “talk” or what turns out to be a serious affront to the system.

As a result, we recommend that follow up Nexis research be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case. This would provide a much more accurate picture of what types of activities are actually taking place.

**Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review**

Similarly, many allegations are made in the reports and books that we analyzed and summarized. Those allegations are often not substantiated in any way and are inherently time limited by the date of the writing. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation.

Therefore, we recommend follow up to the literature review: for those reports and books that make or cite specific instances of fraud or intimidation, a research effort should be made to follow up on those references to see if and how they were resolved.

**Recommendation 4: Review Complaints File With MyVote1 Project Voter Hotline**

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a 1-800 voter hotline where voters could call for poll location, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint.
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In 2004, this resulted in over 200,000 calls received and over 56,000 recorded complaints. The researchers in charge of this project have done a great deal of work to parse and analyze the data collected through this process, including going through the audio messages and categorizing them by the nature of the complaint. These categories include registration, absentee ballot, poll access, ballot/screen, coercion/intimidation, identification, mechanical, provisional (ballot).

We recommend that further research include making full use of this data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 200,000 complaints should provide a good deal of insight into the problems voters experienced, especially those in the nature of intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety in ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation, the Section was extremely reluctant to provide the consultants with useful information. Further attempts should be made to obtain relevant data. This includes the telephone logs of complaints the Section keeps and information from the database – the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system – the Section maintains on complaints received and the corresponding action taken. We also recommend that further research include a review and analysis of the observer and monitor field reports from Election Day that must be filed with the Section.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Similarly, the consultants believe it would be useful for any further research to include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. As noted above, the DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

The consultants also believe it would be useful for any further activity in this area to include attendance at the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. According to the Department,

Prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices are required to attend annual training conferences on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses... These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. As a result of these conferences, there is a nationwide increase in Department expertise relating to the prosecution of election crimes and the enforcement of voting rights.

By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following:

- How District Election Officers are trained, e.g. what they are taught to focus their resources on, how they are instructed to respond to various types of complaints
- How information about previous election and voting issues is presented
- How the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants

**Recommendation 8: Employ Academic or Individual to Conduct Statistical Research**

Included in this report is a summary of various methodologies political scientists and others suggested to measure voter fraud and intimidation. While we note the skepticism of the Working Group in this regard, we nonetheless recommend that in order to further the mission of providing unbiased data, further activity in this area include an academic institution and/or individual that focuses on sound, statistical methods for political science research.

**Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law**

Finally, consultant Tova Wang recommends that future researchers review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

According to Craig Donsanto, long-time Director of the Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice:

> As with other statutes addressing voter intimidation, in the absence of any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is the Criminal Division's position that section 1973gg-10(1) applies only to intimidation which is accomplished through the use of threats of physical or economic duress. Voter "intimidation" accomplished through less drastic means may present violations of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(i), which are enforced by the Civil Rights Division through noncriminal remedies.

Mr. Donsanto reiterated these points to us on several occasions, including at the working group meeting.
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As a result, researchers should examine if there is some way in which current law might be revised or new laws passed that would reach voter intimidation that does not threaten the voter physically or financially, but rather threatens the voter's right to vote as a tangible value in itself. Such an amendment or law would reach all forms of voter intimidation, no matter if it is motivated by race, party, ethnicity or any other criteria. The law would then potentially cover, for example, letters and postcards with language meant to deter voters from voting and both pre-election and Election Day challengers that are clearly mounting challenges solely on illegitimate bases.

In the alternative to finding a way to criminalize such behavior, researchers might examine ways to invigorate measures to deter and punish voter intimidation under the civil law. For example, there might be a private right of action created for voters or groups who have been subjected to intimidation tactics in the voting process. Such an action could be brought against individual offenders; any state or local actor where there is a pattern of repeated abuse in the jurisdiction that such officials did not take sufficient action against; and organizations that intentionally engage in intimidating practices. As a penalty upon finding liability, civil damages could be available plus perhaps attorney's fees.

Another, more modest measure would be, as has been suggested by Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley, to bring parity to fines for violations under the Voting Rights Act. Currently the penalty for fraud is $10,000 while the penalty for acts to deprive the right to vote is $5,000.

Working Group Recommendations

**Recommendation 1: Employ Observers To Collect Data in the 2006 and/or 2008 Elections**

At the working group meeting, there was much discussion about using observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls in the upcoming elections. Mr. Ginsberg recommended using representatives of both parties for the task. Mr. Bauer and others objected to this, believing that using partisans as observers would be unworkable and would not be credible to the public.

There was even greater concern about the difficulties in getting access to poll sites for the purposes of observation. Most states strictly limit who can be in the polling place. In addition, there are already so many groups doing observation and monitoring at the polls, administrators might object. There was further concern that observers would introduce a variable into the process that would impact the outcome. The very fact that observers were present would influence behavior and skew the results.

Moreover, it was pointed out, many of the problems we see now with respect to fraud and intimidation does not take place at the polling place, e.g. absentee ballot fraud and deceptive practices. Poll site monitoring would not capture this activity. Moreover, with
increased use of early voting, poll site monitoring might have to go on for weeks to be effective, which would require tremendous resources.

Mr. Weinberg suggested using observers in the way they are utilized in international elections. Such observers come into a jurisdiction prior to the election, and use standardized forms at the polling sites to collect data.

**Recommendation 2: Do a Study on Absentee Ballot Fraud**

The working group agreed that since absentee ballot fraud is the main form of fraud occurring, and is a practice that is great expanding throughout the country, it would make sense to do a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud. Such a study would be facilitated by the fact that there already is a great deal of information on how, when, where and why such practices are carried out based on cases successfully prosecuted. Researchers could look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing them.

**Recommendation 3: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud**

Working group members were supportive of one of the methodologies recommended for studying this issue, risk analysis. As Mr. Bauer put it, based on the assumption that people act rationally, do an examination of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit, given the relative costs and benefits. In that way, researchers can rank the types of fraud that are the easiest to commit at the least cost with the greatest effect, from most to least likely to occur. This might prove a more practical way of measuring the problems than trying to actually get a number of acts of fraud and/or intimidation occurring. Mr. Greenbaum added that one would want to examine what conditions surrounding an election would be most likely to lead to an increase in fraud. Mr. Rokita objected based on his belief that the passions of partisanship lead people to not act rationally in an election.

**Recommendation 4: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons**

Picking up on a suggestion made by Spencer Overton and explained in the suggested methodology section, Mr. Hearne recommended studying the issue using statistical database matching. Researchers should compare the voter roll and the list of people who actually voted to see if there are "dead" and felon voters. Because of the inconsistent quality of the databases, however, a political scientist would need to work in an appropriate margin of error when using such a methodology.

**Recommendation 5: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices**

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of

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1 See Appendix C, and section on methodology
groups, including the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices, which may be available for review and analysis. This is also an area in which there is often tangible evidence, such as copies of the flyers and postcards themselves. All of this information should be reviewed and analyzed to see how such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

Recommendation 6: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure As Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

The EAC should study the extent to which states are actually utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 7: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts that are running before, during and after election day would be an effective means of disposing with complaints and violations in an expeditious manner. Pennsylvania employs such a system, and the EAC should consider investigating how well it is working to deal with fraud and intimidation problems.
Key Working Group Observations and Concerns

Working Group Observations

1. **The main problems today are structural barriers to voting and administrative error.** Mr. Perez observed that, in accordance with the research, the biggest issues today are structural barriers to voting, not stealing votes. Election administrators share this view. Election fraud is negligible, and to the extent it occurs, it needs to be prosecuted with stronger criminal laws. The biggest problem is properly preparing people, which is the responsibility of election administrators.

2. **Most fraud and intimidation is happening outside of the polling place.** Mr. Greenbaum observed that with respect to both voter fraud and voter suppression, such as deceptive practices and tearing up voter registration forms, most of that is taking place outside of the polling place.

3. **This issue cannot be addressed through one study or one methodology alone.** Mr. Weinberg observed that since there is such a variety in types of fraud and intimidation, one solution will not fit all. It will be impossible to obtain data or resolve any of these problems through a single method.

4. **The preliminary research conducted for this project is extremely valuable.** Several of the working group members complimented the quality of the research done and although it is only preliminary, thought it would be useful and informative in the immediate future.

5. **The Department of Justice is exploring expanding its reach over voter suppression activities.** In the context of the conversation about defining voter intimidation, Mr. Donsanto pointed out that while voter intimidation was strictly defined by the criminal law, his section is beginning to explore the slightly different concept of vote suppression, and how to pursue it. He mentioned the phone-jamming case in New Hampshire as an initial success in this effort. He noted that he believes that vote suppression in the form of deceptive practices ought to be a crime and the section is exploring ways to go after it within the existing statutory construct. Mr. Bauer raised the example of a party sending people dressed in paramilitary outfits to yell at people as they go to the polls, telling them they have to show identification. Mr. Donsanto said that under the laws he has to work with today, such activity is not considered corrupt. He said that his lawyers are trying to “bend” the current laws to address aggravated cases of vote suppression, and the phone-jamming case is an example of that. Mr. Donsanto said that within the Department, the term vote “suppression” and translating it into a crime is a “work in progress.”
6. **Registration fraud does not translate into vote fraud.** Ms. Rogers, Mr. Donsanto and others stated that although phony voter registration applications turned in by people being paid by the form was a problem, it has not been found in their experience to lead to fraudulent voters at the polls. Ms. Rogers said such people were motivated by money, not defrauding the election.

7. **Handling of voter fraud and intimidation complaints varies widely across states and localities.** Ms. Rogers and others observed that every state has its own process for intake and review of complaints of fraud and intimidation, and that procedures often vary within states. The amount of authority secretaries of state have to address such problems also is different in every state. Mr. Weinberg stated he believed that most secretaries of state did not have authority to do anything about these matters. Participants discussed whether secretaries ought to be given greater authority so as to centralize the process, as HAVA has mandated in other areas.

**Working Group Concerns**

1. Mr. Rokita questioned whether the purpose of the present project ought to be on assessing the level of fraud and where it is, rather than on developing methods for making such measurements. He believed that methodology should be the focus, “rather than opinions of interviewees.” He was concerned that the EAC would be in a position of “adding to the universe of opinions.”

2. Mr. Rokita questioned whether the “opinions” accumulated in the research “is a fair sampling of what’s out there.” Ms. Wang responded that one of the purposes of the research was to explore whether there is a method available to actually quantify, in some way, how much fraud there is and where it is occurring in the electoral process. Mr. Rokita replied that “Maybe at the end of the day we stop spending taxpayer money or it’s going to be too much to spend to find that kind of data. Otherwise, we will stop it here and recognize there is a huge difference of opinion on that issue of fraud, when it occurs is obtainable, and that would possibly be a conclusion of the EAC.” Ms. Sims responded that she thought it would be possible to get better statistics on fraud and there might be a way of “identifying at this point certain parts in the election process that are more vulnerable, that we should be addressing.”

3. Mr. Rokita stated that, “We’re not sure that fraud at the polling place doesn’t exist. We can’t conclude that.”

4. Mr. Rokita expressed concern about working with a political scientist. He believes that the “EAC needs to be very careful in who they select, because all the time and effort and money that’s been spent up to date and would be spent in the future could be invalidated by a wrong selection in the eyes of some group.”
NEXIS Charts
Case Charts
Appendix 1
List of Individuals Interviewed

Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leadership Conference for Civil Rights
Wendy Weiser, Deputy Director, Democracy Program, The Brennan Center
William Groth, attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation
Lori Minnite, Barnard College, Columbia University
Neil Bradley, ACLU Voting Rights Project
Nina Perales, Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
Pat Rogers, attorney, New Mexico
Rebecca Vigil-Giron, Secretary of State, New Mexico
Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Kentucky
Stephen Ansolobehere, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Chandler Davidson, Rice University
Tracey Campbell, author, Deliver the Vote
Douglas Webber, Assistant Attorney General, Indiana, (defendant in the Indiana voter identification litigation)
Heather Dawn Thompson, Director of Government Relations, National Congress of American Indians
Jason Torchinsky, Assistant General Counsel, American Center for Voting Rights
Robin DeJarnette, Executive Director, American Center for Voting Rights
Joseph Rich, former Director of the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Joseph Sandler, Counsel to the Democratic National Committee
John Ravitz, Executive Director, New York City Board of Elections
John Tanner, Director, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
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Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Wisconsin
Evelyn Stratton, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio

Tony Sirvello, Executive Director, International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers

Harry Van Sickle, Commissioner of Elections, Pennsylvania

Craig Donsanto, Director, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice

Sharon Priest, former Secretary of State, Arkansas
Appendix 2
List of Literature Reviewed

Reports


Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Attorney’s Office “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” May 10, 2005.


Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation – Preliminary Research & Recommendations

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


Books


Legal

*Indiana Democratic Party vs. Rokita*, U.S. District Court Southern District of Indiana (Indianapolis) 1:05-cv-00634, U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 06-2218

*Common Cause of Georgia vs. Billups*, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia (Rome) 4:05-cv-00201-HLM U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 05-15784

Appendix 3
Excerpt from “Machinery of Democracy,” a Brennan Center Report

APPENDIX C

BRENNAN CENTER TASK FORCE ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY,
LAWRENCE NORDEN, CHAIR

Excerpted from pp. 8-19

METHODOLOGY

The Task Force concluded, and the peer review team at NIST agreed, that the best approach for comprehensively evaluating voting system threats was to: (1) identify and categorize the potential threats against voting systems, (2) prioritize these threats based upon an agreed upon metric (which would tell us how difficult each threat is to accomplish from the attacker’s point of view), and (3) determine, utilizing the same metric employed to prioritize threats, how much more difficult each of the catalogued attacks would become after various sets of countermeasures are implemented.

This model allows us to identify the attacks we should be most concerned about (i.e., the most practical and least difficult attacks). Furthermore, it allows us to quantify the potential effectiveness of various sets of countermeasures (i.e., how difficult the least difficult attack is after the countermeasure has been implemented).

Other potential models considered, but ultimately rejected by the Task Force, are detailed in Appendix B.

IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS

The first step in creating a threat model for voting systems was to identify as many potential attacks as possible. To that end, the Task Force, together with the participating election officials, spent several months identifying voting system vulnerabilities. Following this work, NIST held a Voting Systems Threat Analysis Workshop on October 7, 2005. Members of the public were invited to write up and post additional potential attacks. Taken together, this work produced over 120 potential attacks on the three voting systems. They are detailed in the catalogs annexed. Many of the attacks are described in more detail at http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers.htm.

The types of threats detailed in the catalogs can be broken down into nine categories: (1) the insertion of corrupt software into machines prior to Election Day; (2) wireless and other remote control attacks on voting machines on Election Day; (3) attacks on tally servers; (4) miscalibration of voting machines; (5) shut off of voting machine features intended to assist voters; (6) denial of service attacks; (7) actions by corrupt poll workers or others at the polling place to affect votes cast; (8) vote buying schemes; (9) attacks on ballots or VVPT. Often, the actual attacks
involve some combination of these categories. We provide a discussion of each type of attack in “Categories of Attacks,” infra at pp. 24–27.

PRIORITIZING THREATS:
NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Without some form of prioritization, a compilation of the threats is of limited value. Only by prioritizing these various threats could we help election officials identify which attacks they should be most concerned about, and what steps could be taken to make such attacks as difficult as possible. As discussed below, we have determined the level of difficulty for each attack where the attacker is attempting to affect the outcome of a close statewide election.

There is no perfect way to determine which attacks are the least difficult, because each attack requires a different mix of resources—well-placed insiders, money, programming skills, security expertise, etc. Different attackers would find certain resources easier to acquire than others. For example, election fraud committed by local election officials would always involve well-placed insiders and a thorough understanding of election procedures; at the same time, there is no reason to expect such officials to have highly skilled hackers or first-rate programmers working with them. By contrast, election fraud carried out by a foreign government would likely start with plenty of money and technically skilled attackers, but probably without many conveniently placed insiders or detailed knowledge of election procedures.

Ultimately, we decided to use the “number of informed participants” as the metric for determining attack difficulty. An attack which uses fewer participants is deemed the easier attack.

We have defined “informed participant” as someone whose participation is needed to make the attack work, and who knows enough about the attack to foil or expose it. This is to be distinguished from a participant who unknowingly assists the attack by performing a task that is integral to the attack’s successful execution without understanding that the task is part of an attack on voting systems.

The reason for using the security metric “number of informed participants” is relatively straightforward: the larger a conspiracy is, the more difficult it would be to keep it secret. Where an attacker can carry out an attack by herself, she need only trust herself. On the other hand, a conspiracy that requires thousands of people to take part (like a vote-buying scheme) also requires thousands of people to keep quiet. The larger the number of people involved, the greater the likelihood that one of them (or one who was approached, but declined to take part) would either inform the public or authorities about the attack, or commit some kind of error that causes the attack to fail or become known.

Moreover, recruiting a large number of people who are willing to undermine the integrity of a statewide election is also presumably difficult. It is not hard to imagine two or three people agreeing to work to change the outcome of an election. It seems far less likely that an attacker could identify and employ hundreds or thousands of similarly corrupt people without being discovered.
We can get an idea of how this metric works by looking at one of the threats listed in our catalogs: the vote-buying threat, where an attacker or attackers pay individuals to vote for a particular candidate. This is Attack Number 26 in the PCOS Attack Catalog (though this attack would not be substantially different against DREs or DREs w/ VVPT). In order to work under our current types of voting systems, this attack requires (1) at least one person to purchase votes, (2) many people to agree to sell their votes, and (3) some way for the purchaser to confirm that the voters she pays actually voted for the candidate she supported. Ultimately, we determined that, while practical in smaller contests, a vote-buying attack would be an exceptionally difficult way to affect the outcome of a statewide election. This is because, even in a typically close statewide election, an attacker would need to involve thousands of voters to ensure that she could affect the outcome of a statewide race.

For a discussion of other metrics we considered, but ultimately rejected, see Appendix C.

**DETERMINING NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS**

**DETERMINING THE STEPS AND VALUES FOR EACH ATTACK**

The Task Force members broke down each of the catalogued attacks into its necessary steps. For instance, Attack 12 in the PCOS Attack Catalog is “Stuffing Ballot Box with Additional Marked Ballots.” We determined that, at a minimum, there were three component parts to this attack: (1) stealing or creating the ballots and then marking them, (2) scanning marked ballots through the PCOS scanners, probably before the polls opened, and (3) modifying the poll books in each location to ensure that the total number of votes in the ballot boxes was not greater than the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.

Task Force members then assigned a value representing the minimum number of persons they believed would be necessary to accomplish each goal. For PCOS Attack 12, the following values were assigned:

- **Minimum number required to steal or create ballots:** 5 persons total.
- **Minimum number required to scan marked ballots:** 1 per polling place attacked.
- **Minimum number required to modify poll books:** 1 per polling place attacked.

After these values were assigned, the Brennan Center interviewed several election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned to each attack. When necessary, the values and steps were modified. The new catalogs, including attack steps and values, were then reviewed by Task Force members. The purpose of this review was to ensure, among other things, that the steps and values were sound.

These steps and values tell us how difficult it would be to accomplish a single attack in a single polling place. They do not tell us how many people it would take to change the outcome of an election successfully – that depends, of course, on specific facts about the jurisdiction: how many votes are generally recorded in each polling
place, how many polling places are there in the jurisdiction, and how close is the race? For this reason, we determined that it was necessary to construct a hypothetical jurisdiction, to which we now turn.

**NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO CHANGE STATEWIDE ELECTION**

We have decided to examine the difficulty of each attack in the context of changing the outcome of a reasonably close statewide election. While we are concerned by potential attacks on voting systems in any type of election, we are most troubled by attacks that have the potential to affect large numbers of votes. These are the attacks that could actually change the outcome of a statewide election with just a handful of attack participants.

We are less troubled by attacks on voting systems that can only affect a small number of votes (and might therefore be more useful in local elections). This is because there are many non-system attacks that can also affect a small number of votes (i.e., sending out misleading information about polling places, physically intimidating voters, submitting multiple absentee ballots, etc.). Given the fact that these non-system attacks are likely to be less difficult in terms of number of participants, financial cost, risk of detection, and time commitment, we are uncertain that an attacker would target voting machines to alter a small number of votes.

In order to evaluate how difficult it would be for an attacker to change the outcome of a statewide election, we created a composite jurisdiction. The composite jurisdiction was created to be representative of a relatively close statewide election. We did not want to examine a statewide election where results were so skewed toward one candidate (for instance, the re-election of Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 2000, where he won 73% of the vote), that reversing the election results would be impossible without causing extreme public suspicion. Nor did we want to look at races where changing only a relative handful of votes (for instance, the Governor’s race in Washington State in 2004, which was decided by a mere 129 votes) could affect the outcome of an election; under this scenario, many of the potential attacks would involve few people, and therefore look equally difficult.

We have named our composite jurisdiction “the State of Pennasota.” The State of Pennasota is a composite of ten states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada, Wisconsin and Minnesota. These states were chosen because they were the ten “battleground” states that Zogby International consistently polled in the spring, summer, and fall 2004. These are statewide elections that an attacker would have expected, ahead of time, to be fairly close.

We have also created a composite election, which we label the “Governor’s Race” in Pennasota. The results of this election are a composite of the actual results in the same ten states in the 2004 Presidential Election.

We have used these composites as the framework by which to evaluate the difficulty of the various catalogued attacks. For instance, we know a ballot-box stuffing attack would require roughly five people to create and mark fake ballots, as
well as one person per polling place to stuff the boxes, and one person per polling
place to modify the poll books. But, in order to determine how many informed
participants would be needed to affect a statewide race, we need to know how
many polling places would need to be attacked.

The composite jurisdiction and composite election provide us with information
needed to answer these questions: i.e., how many extra votes our attackers would
need to add to their favored candidate’s total for him to win, how many ballots
our attackers can stuff into a particular polling place’s ballot box without arousing
suspicion (and related to this, how many votes are generally cast in the average
polling place), how many polling places are there in the state, etc. We provide
details about both the composite jurisdiction and election in the section entitled

LIMITS OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Of the possible metrics we considered, we believe that measuring the number of
people who know they are involved in an attack (and thus could provide evidence
of the attack to the authorities and/or the media), is the best single measure of
attack difficulty; as already discussed, we have concluded that the more people an
attacker is forced to involve in his attack, the more likely it is that one of the participants
would reveal the attack’s existence and foil the attack, perhaps sending
attackers to jail. However, we are aware of a number of places where the
methodology could provide us with questionable results.

By deciding to concentrate on size of attack team, we mostly ignore the need for
other resources when planning an attack. Thus, a software attack on DREs which
makes use of steganography, to hide attack instruction files (see “DRE w/ VVPT
Attack No.1a,” discussed in greater detail, infra at pp. 62–65) is considered easier
than an attack program delivered over a wireless network at the polling place (see
discussion of wireless networks, infra at pp. 85–91). However, the former attack
probably requires a much more technologically sophisticated attacker.

Another imperfection with this metric is that we do not have an easy way to represent
how much choice the attacker has in finding members of his attack team.

Thus, with PCOS voting, we conclude that the cost of subverting a routine audit
of ballots is roughly equal to the cost of intercepting ballot boxes in transit and
substituting altered ballots (see discussion of PCOS attacks, infra at pp. 77–83).
However, subverting the audit team requires getting a specific set of trusted people
to cooperate with the attacker. By contrast, the attacker may be able to decide
which precincts to tamper with based on which people he has already recruited
for his attack.

In an attempt to address this concern, we considered looking at the number of
“insiders” necessary to take part in each attack. Under this theory, getting five
people to take part in a conspiracy to attack a voting system might not be particularly
difficult. But getting five well-placed county election officials to take part in
the attack would be (and should be labeled) the more difficult of the two attacks.
Because, for the most part, the low-cost attacks we have identified do not necessarily
involve well placed insiders (but could, for instance, involve one of many
people with access to commercial off the shelf software (“COTS”) during development
or at the vendor), we do not believe that using this metric would have substantially changed our analysis.35

Finally, these attack team sizes do not always capture the logistical complexity of an attack. For example, an attack on VVPT machines involving tampering with the voting machine software and also replacing the paper records in transit requires the attacker to determine what votes were falsely produced by the voting machine and print replacement records in time to substitute them. While this is clearly possible, it raises a lot of operational difficulties — a single failed substitution leaves the possibility that the attack would be detected during the audit of ballots.

We have tried to keep these imperfections in mind when analyzing and discussing our least difficult attacks.

We suspect that much of the disagreement between voting officials and computer security experts in the last several years stems from a difference of opinion in prioritizing the difficulty of attacks. Election officials, with extensive experience in the logistics of handling tons of paper ballots, have little faith in paper and understand the kind of breakdowns in procedures that lead to traditional attacks like ballot box stuffing; in contrast, sophisticated attacks on computer voting systems appear very difficult to many of them. Computer security experts understand sophisticated attacks on computer systems, and recognize the availability of tools and expertise that makes these attacks practical to launch, but have no clear idea how they would manage the logistics of attacking a paper-based system. Looking at attack team size is one way to bridge this difference in perspective.

EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING COUNTERMEASURE SETS

The final step of our threat analysis is to measure the effect of certain countermeasures against the catalogued attacks. How much more difficult would the attacks become once the countermeasures are put into effect? How many more informed participants (if any) would be needed to counter or defeat these countermeasures?

Our process for examining the effectiveness of a countermeasure mirrors the process for determining the difficulty of an attack: we first asked whether the countermeasure would allow us to detect an attack with near certainty. If we agreed that the countermeasure would expose the attack, we identified the steps that would be necessary to circumvent or defeat the countermeasure. For each step to defeat the countermeasure, we determined the number of additional informed participants (if any) that an attacker would need to add to his team.

As with the process for determining attack difficulty, the Brennan Center interviewed numerous election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned. When necessary, the values and steps for defeating the countermeasures were altered to reflect the input of election officials.

COUNTERMEASURES EXAMINED

BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The first set of countermeasures we looked at is the “Basic Set” of countermeasures. This Basic Set was derived from security survey responses we received
from county election officials around the country, as well as additional interviews with more than a dozen current and former election officials. Within the Basic Set of countermeasures are the following procedures:

Inspection

The jurisdiction is not knowingly using any uncertified software that is subject to inspection by the Independent Testing Authority (often referred to as the “ITA”).

Physical Security for Machines

- Ballot boxes (to the extent they exist) are examined (to ensure they are empty) and locked by poll workers immediately before the polls are opened.
- Before and after being brought to the polls for Election Day, voting systems for each county are locked in a single room, in a county warehouse.
- The warehouse has perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards.
- Access to the warehouse is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.
- Some form of “tamper evident” seals are placed on machines before and after each election.
- The machines are transported to polling locations five to fifteen days before Election Day.

Chain of Custody/Physical Security of Election Day Records

- At close of the polls, vote tallies for each machine are totaled and compared with number of persons that have signed the poll books.
- A copy of totals for each machine is posted at each polling place on Election Night and taken home by poll workers to check against what is posted publicly at election headquarters, on the web, in the papers, or elsewhere.
- All audit information (i.e., Event Logs, VVPT records, paper ballots, machine printouts of totals) that is not electronically transmitted as part of the unofficial upload to the central election office, is delivered in official, sealed and hand-delivered information packets or boxes. All seals are numbered and tamper-evident.
- Transportation of information packets is completed by two election officials representing opposing parties who have been instructed to remain in joint custody of the information packets or boxes from the moment it leaves the precinct to the moment it arrives at the county election center.
Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation – Preliminary Research & Recommendations

- Each polling place sends its information packets or boxes to the county election center separately, rather than having one truck or person pick up this data from multiple polling locations.

- Once the sealed information packets or boxes have reached the county election center, they are logged. Numbers on the seals are checked to ensure that they have not been replaced. Any broken or replaced seals are logged. Intact seals are left intact.

- After the packets and/or boxes have been logged, they are provided with physical security precautions at least as great as those listed for voting machines, above. Specifically, for Pennsylvania, we have assumed the room in which the packets are stored have perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards and county police officers; and access to the room is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.

Testing

- An Independent Testing Authority has certified the model of voting machine used in the polling place.

- Acceptance Testing is performed on machines at time, or soon after they are received by County.

- Pre-election Logic and Accuracy testing is performed by the relevant election official.

- Prior to opening the polls, every voting machine and vote tabulation system is checked to see that it is still configured for the correct election, including the correct precinct, ballot style, and other applicable details.

REGIMEN FOR AUTOMATIC ROUTINE AUDIT PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES.

The second set of countermeasures is the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit Plus Basic Set of Countermeasures.

Some form of routine auditing of voter-verified paper records occurs in 12 states, to test the accuracy of electronic voting machines. They generally require between 1 and 10% of all precinct voting machines to be audited after each election.

Jurisdictions can implement this set of countermeasures only if their voting systems produce some sort of voter-verified paper record of each vote. This could be in the form of a paper ballot, in the case of PCOS, or a voter-verified paper trail ("VVPT"), in the case of DREs.

We have assumed that jurisdictions take the following steps when conducting an Automatic Routine Audit (when referring to this set of assumptions “Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit”):
The Audit

- Leaders of the major parties in each county are responsible for selecting a sufficient number of audit-team members to be used in that county.43

- Using a highly transparent random selection mechanism (see point ii, below), the voter-verified paper records for between a small percentage of all voting machines in the State are selected for auditing.

- Using a transparent random selection method, auditors are assigned to the selected machines (two or three people, with representatives of each major political party, would comprise each audit team).

- The selection of voting machines, and the assignment of auditors to machines, occurs immediately before the audits take place. The audits take place as soon after polls close as possible – for example, at 9 a.m. the morning after polls close.

- Using a transparent random selection method, county police officers, security personnel and the video monitor assigned to guard the voter-verified records are chosen from a large pool of on-duty officers and employees on election night.

- The auditors are provided the machine tallies and are able to see that the county tally reflects the sums of the machine tallies before the start of the inspection of the paper.

- The audit would include a tally of spoiled ballots (in the case of VVPT, the number of cancellations recorded), overvotes, and undervotes.

Transparent Random Selection Process

In this report, we have assumed that random auditing procedures are in place for both the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit and Regimen for Parallel Testing. We have further assumed procedures to prevent a single, corrupt person from being able to fix the results. This implies a kind of transparent and public random procedure.

For the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit there are at least two places where transparent, random selection processes are important: in the selection of precincts to audit, and in the assignment of auditors to the precincts they will be auditing.

Good election security can employ Transparent Random Selection in other places with good effect:

- the selection of parallel testers from a pool of qualified individuals.

- the assignment of police and other security professionals from on-duty lists, to monitor key materials, for example, the VVPT records between the time that they arrive at election central and the time of the completion of the ARA.
If a selection process for auditing is to be trustworthy and trusted, ideally:

- The whole process will be publicly observable or videotaped; 
- The random selection will be publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone observing will be able to verify that the sample was chosen randomly (or at least that the number selected is not under the control of any small number of people); and
- The process will be simple and practical within the context of current election practice so as to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on election officials.

There are a number of ways that election officials can ensure some kind of transparent randomness. One way would be to use a state lottery machine to select precincts or polling places for auditing. We have included two potential examples of transparent random selection processes in Appendix F. These apply to the Regimen for Parallel Testing as well.

**REGIMEN FOR PARALLEL TESTING PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES.**

The final set of countermeasures we have examined is “Parallel Testing” plus the Basic Set of countermeasures. Parallel Testing, also known as election-day testing, involves selecting voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible during the period that votes are being cast.

**Parallel Testing**

In developing our set of assumptions for Parallel Testing, we relied heavily upon interviews with Jocelyn Whitney, Project Manager for Parallel Testing in the State of California, and conclusions drawn from this Report. In our analysis, we assume that the following procedures would be included in the Parallel Testing regimen (when referring to this regimen “Regimen for Parallel Testing”) that we evaluate:

- At least two of each DRE model (meaning both vendor and model) would be selected for Parallel Testing;
- At least two DREs from each of the three largest counties would be parallel tested;
- Counties to be parallel tested would be chosen by the Secretary of State in a transparent and random manner.
- Counties would be notified as late as possible that machines from one of their precincts would be selected for Parallel Testing;
- Precincts would be selected through a transparent random mechanism;
- A video camera would record testing;
- For each test, there would be one tester and one observer;
Parallel Testing would occur at the polling place;

The script for Parallel Testing would be generated in a way that mimics voter behavior and voting patterns for the polling place;

At the end of the Parallel Testing, the tester and observer would reconcile vote totals in the script with vote totals reported on the machine.

Transparent Random Selection Process

We further assume that the same type of transparent random selection process that would be used for the Regimen for Automatic Routine Audit would also be employed for the Regimen for Parallel Testing to determine which machines would be subjected to testing on Election Day.

APPENDIX C

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY METRICS CONSIDERED

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The decision to use the number of informed participants as the metric for attack level difficulty came after considering several other potential metrics. One of the first metrics we considered was the dollar cost of attacks. This metric makes sense when looking at attacks that seek financial gain – for instance, misappropriating corporate funds. It is not rational to spend $100,000 on the misappropriation of corporate funds if the total value of those funds is $90,000. Ultimately, we rejected this metric as the basis for our analysis because the dollar cost of the attacks we considered were dwarfed by both (1) current federal and state budgets, and (2) the amounts currently spent legally in state and federal political campaigns.

Time of Attack

The relative security of safes and other safety measures are often rated in terms of “time to defeat.” This was rejected as metric of difficulty because it did not seem relevant to voting systems. Attackers breaking into a house are concerned with the amount of time it might take to complete their robbery because the homeowners or police might show up. With regard to election fraud, many attackers may be willing to start months or years before an election if they believe they can control the outcome. As discussed supra at pp. 35–48, attackers may be confident that they can circumvent the independent testing authorities and other measures meant to identify attacks, so that the amount of time an attack takes becomes less relevant.
Appendix 4
Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Working Group

The Honorable Todd Rokita
Indiana Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board

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Mark (Thor) Hearne II
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

Barry Weinberg
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

EAC Invited Technical Advisor:

Craig Donsanto
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice
1 Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R
2 The MyVote1 Project Final Report, Fels Institute of Government, University of Pennsylvania, November 1, 2005, Pg. 12
3 Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R, p. 4. This same report criticizes some of the procedures the Section used for these systems and urged the Department to improve upon them in time for the 2004 presidential election. No follow-up report has been done since that time to the best of our knowledge.
4 "Department Of Justice To Hold Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium," U.S. Department of Justice press release, August 2, 2005
6 Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley, Jr., Voting Rights Act Reauthorization: Research-Based Recommendations to Improve Voting Access, Chief Justice Earl Warrant Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, 2006, p. 29
EAC REPORT ON VOTING FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, they mean different things to different people. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and, at times, even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of these topics has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voting fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has begun this, phase one, of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the existence and enforcement of election crimes in the United States.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the EAC to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are topics that the EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voting fraud and voter intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voting fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. To conduct that type of extensive research, a basic understanding had to first be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voting fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voting fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, who worked with EAC staff and interns to conduct the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic and the need to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged with (1) researching the current state of information on the topic of voting fraud and voter intimidation; (2) developing a uniform definition of voting fraud and voter intimidation; (3) assessing the existence and enforcement of such crimes in the United States; (4) identifying the methods and processes that states have in place to address such crimes; and (5) making recommendations for improving the administration of elections for federal office.

1 Biographies for Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, the two consultants hired by EAC, are attached as Appendix "1".
fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) proposing recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voting fraud and intimidation and conducted interviews with experts in the field. EAC consultants and staff then presented their initial findings to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

**The Honorable Todd Rokita**  
Indiana Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

**Kathy Rogers**  
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board

**J.R. Perez**  
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

**Barbara Arnwine**  
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law  
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

**Benjamin L. Ginsberg**  
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP  
Counsel to National Republican Campaign Committees and Republican candidates

**Robert Bauer**  
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia  
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

**Mark (Thor) Hearne II**  
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri  
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

**Barry Weinberg**  
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

*Technical Advisor:*  
**Craig Donsanto**  
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of relevant cases, studies and reports on voting fraud and voter intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voting fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited by EAC staff to produce this final report.
EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

To begin our study of voting fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voting fraud and voter intimidation. The information available about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles, and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voting fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted and reports published about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix "2":

Articles and Reports


- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voting fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive, nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voting fraud or voter intimidation in the United States. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voting fraud or voter intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 Presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as
“Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,” suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate because there is little agreement concerning what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, including legal practices that allegedly cause vote suppression.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by nongovernmental groups create opportunities for fraud. For example, a number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:

**Wade Henderson**  
Executive Director,  
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

**Wendy Weiser**  
Deputy Director,  
Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

**William Groth**  
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

**Lori Minnite**  
Barnard College, Columbia University

**Neil Bradley**  
ACLU Voting Rights Project

**Pat Rogers**  
Attorney, New Mexico

**Nina Perales**  
Counsel,  
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

**Rebecca Vigil-Giron**  
Secretary of State, New Mexico

**Sarah Ball Johnson**  
Executive Director,  
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

**Stephen Ansolobohere**  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Chandler Davidson**  
Rice University
These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by nongovernmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it is the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, there are stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation, which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws,
voter identification laws, polling place locations, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voting fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state’s attorney general. Regardless, voting fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that many local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute election crimes perpetrated in elections with a federal candidate on the ballot or perpetrated by a public official under the color of law. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement. Some allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “3”.

**Case Law and Statutes**

Consultants reviewed more than 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voting fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from courts of appeal. This is not surprising, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “4”.

**Media Reports**

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voting fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,
• non-citizens voting,
• vote buying,
• deceptive practices, and
• fraud by election officials.

While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voting fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a "battleground" or "swing" state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voting fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charges and prosecutions of voting fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voting fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding or agreement of what constitutes "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation." Some think of voting fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and appropriate activities. To arrive at a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

New Terminology

The phrase "voting fraud" is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. "Fraud" is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

**Fraud, n. 1.** A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.


"Voting" is the act of casting votes to decide an issue or contest. Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of "voting fraud," it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed to influence the act of voting. Thus, a voter who intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to
vote for that person would be committing "voting fraud." Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter’s polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase "voting fraud" does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not related to the act of voting and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, "voting fraud" does not capture actions or willful inaction in the voter registration process. When an election official willfully and knowingly refuses to register to vote a legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the act of voting nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" that would serve as the basis for a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the use of legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such, EAC has defined "election crimes," a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes.

**The Definition of an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study**

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public who desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon intentional or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.
The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, an election official, a candidate, or the public in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or on election day; vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.

**Acts of Deception**

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter's precinct or polling place, the date and time of the election or a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance to possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making or knowingly possessing a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate in one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once during the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a materially false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

**Acts of Coercion**

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other thing of value to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
o Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
  o Knowingly challenging a person's right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or to delay the process of voting;
  o As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his/her vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself/herself or another of an employee's ballot;
  o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;
  o Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official's duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;
  o Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and
  o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other thing of value in exchange for registering to vote.

Acts of Damage or Destruction

  o Destroying completed voter registration applications;
  o Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments;
  o Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;
  o Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as the person intended;
  o Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;
  o Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and
  o Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

Failure or Refusal to Act

  o Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;
  o Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;
  o Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;
Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;
- Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;
- Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;
- Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction;
- Knowingly removing the eligibility status of a voter who is eligible to vote; and
- Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.

What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of "election crimes." All criminal or civil violations related to campaign finance contribution limitations, prohibitions, and reporting either at the state or federal level are not "election crimes" for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not "election crimes," even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not "election crimes," and actions that do not rise to the level of criminal activity, such as a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not "election crimes."

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can research the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working groups and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to law enforcement officials, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contained allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, some of the articles contained information about investigations into such
activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

**Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review**

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.

**Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline**

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a toll-free voter hotline that voters could call for poll locations, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in more than 200,000 calls received and more than 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 56,000 complaints may provide insight into the problems voters may have experienced, especially issues regarding intimidation or suppression.

**Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice**

According to a recent GAO report, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and “monitor field reports” from Election Day.

**Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers**

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voting fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.
Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research

EAC should measure voting fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets, and it must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.
Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing fraud when absentee ballots are used.

Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers will use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the “ease of commission” and the impact of the fraud.

Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether a vote was recorded by someone who is deceased or if felons are noted as having voted.

Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers and phone calls with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how and where such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

EAC should study the extent to which states are utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during, and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.
Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive, national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges, and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and the working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine the volume and type of election crimes being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

Likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to comply with Section 402 of HAVA. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state’s chief election official. Those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated, and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition
of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses will be collected.

**Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred**

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating, and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. These data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

**Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes**

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

**Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures**

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from
areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

CONCLUSION

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and voters. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention, and prosecution of election crimes.
INTRODUCTION

Voting fraud and intimidation are phrases familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, they mean different things to different people. Voting fraud and intimidation are phrases used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and, at times, even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of these topics has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voting fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has begun this phase of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the existence and enforcement of election crimes in this country, the United States.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the EAC to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are topics that the EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voting fraud and voter intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voting fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. To conduct that type of research, a basic understanding had to first be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voting fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voting fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, who worked with EAC staff and interns to conduct the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic and to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged with (1) research the current state of information on the topic of voting

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1 Biographies for Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, the two consultants hired by EAC, are attached as Appendix “1”.

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fraud and voter intimidation; (2) develop a uniform definition of voting fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) propose recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voting fraud and intimidation and conducted interviews with experts in the field. EAC consultants and staff then presented their initial findings to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

**The Honorable Todd Rokita**  
Indiana Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

**Kathy Rogers**  
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board

**J.R. Perez**  
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

**Barbara Arnwine**  
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law  
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

**Benjamin L. Ginsberg**  
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP  
Counsel to National Republican Campaign Committees and Republican candidates

**Robert Bauer**  
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia  
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

**Mark (Thor) Hearne II**  
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri  
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

**Barry Weinberg**  
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

**Technical Advisor:**

**Craig Donsanto**  
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of relevant cases, studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that were conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voting fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited by EAC staff to produce this final report.
EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

To begin our study of voting fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voting fraud and intimidation. The information available about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles, and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voting fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted and reports published about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix “2”:

Articles and Reports


• Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise, "Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?" A Report to the Center for Voting Rights & Protection, September, 2004.


• Democratic National Committee, “Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio,” DNC Services Corporation, 2005

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voting fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive, nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voting fraud or voter intimidation in the United States. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voting fraud or intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as
“Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,” suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate because there is little agreement on what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, e.g., legal practices, that allegedly cause vote suppression.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by nongovernmental groups create opportunities for fraud. A number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:

- **Wade Henderson**
  Executive Director, Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

- **Wendy Weiser**
  Deputy Director, Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

- **William Groth**
  Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

- **Lori Minnite**
  Barnard College, Columbia University

- **Neil Bradley**
  ACLU Voting Rights Project

- **Pat Rogers**
  Attorney, New Mexico

- **Nina Perales**
  Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

- **Rebecca Vigil-Giron**
  Secretary of State, New Mexico

- **Sarah Ball Johnson**
  Executive Director, State Board of Elections, Kentucky

- **Stephen Ansolobohere**
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology

- **Chandler Davidson**
  Rice University
These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by nongovernmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it was the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, the stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and that it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation, which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws,
voter identification laws, polling place locations, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voting fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state’s attorney general. Regardless, voting fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that many local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute election crimes perpetrated in elections with a federal candidate on the ballot or perpetrated by a public official under the color of law. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement. Some allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “3”.

Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed more than 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voting fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from courts of appeal. This is not surprising, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “4”.

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voting fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,
DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voting fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding or agreement of what constitutes "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation." Some think of voting fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and appropriate activities. To arrive at a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

New Terminology

The phrase "voting fraud" is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. "Fraud" is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

Fraud, n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.


A "voter" is a person who is eligible to and engages in the act of voting. Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms, a definition of "voting fraud," fraudulent or deceptive acts committed by the voter or in which the voter is the victim. Thus, a voter who intentionally provides false information on a voter
registration application or intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to vote for that person would be committing "voting fraud." Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter's polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase "voting fraud" does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not perpetrated by the voter and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, "voting fraud" does not capture actions or willful inaction by candidates and election workers. When an election official willfully and knowingly refuses to register to vote a legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the voter nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as "voting fraud" and "voter intimidation" that would serve as the basis for a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the use of legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such, EAC has defined "election crimes," a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes.

The Definition of an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public who desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon intentional or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.
The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, an election official, a candidate, or the public in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to, qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or election day; vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.

Acts of Deception

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter’s precinct or polling place, the date and time of the election or a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance to possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making, or knowingly possessing, a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate in one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once during the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely; or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote; requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a material false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

Acts of Coercion

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint; or inflicting, threatening to inflict; or causing to be inflicted damage harm; or loss; upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other thing of value to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
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- Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
- Knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or to delay the process of voting;
- As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his/her vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself/herself or another of an employee’s ballot;
- Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;
- Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official’s duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;
- Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and
- Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other thing of value in exchange for registering to vote.

Acts of Damage or Destruction

- Destroying completed voter registration applications;
- Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments;
- Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;
- Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as the person intended;
- Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;
- Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and
- Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

Failure or Refusal to Act

- Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;
- Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;
- Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;
Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;
- Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;
- Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;
- Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction;
- Knowingly removing the eligibility status of a voter who is eligible to vote; and
- Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.

**What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study**

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of "election crimes." All criminal or civil violations related to campaign finance contribution limitations, prohibitions, and reporting either at the state or federal level are not "election crimes" for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not "election crimes," even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate's office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate's office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not "election crimes," and actions that do not rise to the level of criminal activity, such as a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not "election crimes."

**RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES**

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can research the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working groups and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews**

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to law enforcement officials, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

**Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research**

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contained allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, some of the articles contained information about investigations into such
activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

**Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review**

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.

**Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVotel” Voter Hotline**

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVotel Project. This project involved using a toll-free voter hotline that voters could call for poll locations, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in more than 200,000 calls received and more than 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVotel data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 56,000 complaints may provide insight into the problems voters may have experienced, especially issues regarding intimidation or suppression.

**Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice**

According to a recent GAO report, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and “monitor field reports” from Election Day.

**Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers**

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voting fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.
Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research

EAC should measure voting fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets, and it must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.
Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing fraud when absentee ballots are used.

Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers will use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the “ease of commission” and the impact of the fraud.

Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether a vote was recorded by someone who is deceased or if felons are noted as having voted.

Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers and phone calls with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how and where such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

EAC should study the extent to which states are utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during, and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.
Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive, national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges, and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and the working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine the volume and type of election crimes being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

Likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to comply with Section 402 of HAVA. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state’s chief election official. Those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated, and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition
of election crimes provided above in this report so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses will be collected.

**Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred**

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating, and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. These data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

**Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes**

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

**Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures**

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from
areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

CONCLUSION

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and voters. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention, and prosecution of election crimes.
INTRODUCTION

Voter fraud and intimidation is a phrase familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, it means different things to different people. Voter fraud and intimidation is a phrase used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and at times even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of this topic has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voter fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, EAC has begun this, phase one, of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the true existence and enforcement of election crimes in this country.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voter fraud and voter intimidation, listed in §§241(b)(6) and (7) were topics that EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voter fraud and intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voter fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. That type of research is well beyond the basic understanding that had to be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voter fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voter fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Tova Wang and Job Serebrov, who along with EAC staff and interns conducted the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic and In addition, consultants were chosen to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged to: (1) to research the current state of information on the topics of voter fraud and voter intimidation; (2) to develop a uniform definition of voter fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) to propose recommended strategies for researching this subject.
EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voter fraud and intimidation. In addition, EAC consultants conducted interviews with selected experts in the field. Last, EAC consultants and staff presented their study to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

**The Honorable Todd Rokita**  
Indiana Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

**Kathy Rogers**  
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State  
Member, EAC Standards Board

**J.R. Perez**  
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

**Barbara Arnwine**  
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law  
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

**Benjamin L. Ginsberg**  
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP  
Counsel to national Republican campaign committees and Republican candidates

**Robert Bauer**  
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia  
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

**Mark (Thor) Hearne II**  
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri  
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

**Barry Weinberg**  
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

**Technical Advisor:**  
Craig Donsanto  
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of existing laws, relevant cases, studies and reports on voter fraud and intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voter fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited to produce this final report.

**EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION**

To begin our study of voter fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voter fraud and intimidation. What the world knows about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles and books.
There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voter fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voter Fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies and reports published conducted about the concepts of voter fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a baseline understanding of the information that is currently available about voter fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix "__":

Articles and Reports


• The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald “Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voter Fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General,” The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, December 2005.

• Democratic National Committee, “Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio,” DNC Services Corporation, 2005

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

• Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."


During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voter fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voter fraud or voter intimidation in the U.S. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voter fraud or intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voter fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as "Building Confidence in U.S. Elections," suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the "Preliminary findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud," produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District
Attorney's Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate. Generally, speaking there is little agreement on what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation and even legal practices that they allege suppress the vote.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by third-party non-governmental groups has created opportunities for fraud. A number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with members of a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voter fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voter fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included

**Wade Henderson**  
Executive Director,  
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

**Wendy Weiser**  
Deputy Director,  
Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

**William Groth**  
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

**Lori Minnite**  
Barnard College, Columbia University

**Neil Bradley**  
ACLU Voting Rights Project

**Nina Perales**  
Counsel,  
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

**Pat Rogers**  
Attorney, New Mexico

**Rebecca Vigil-Giron**  
Secretary of State, New Mexico

**Sarah Ball Johnson**  
Executive Director,  
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

**Stephen Ansolobehere**  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Chandler Davidson**  
Rice University

**Tracey Campbell**  
Author, *Deliver the Vote*

**Douglas Webber**  
Assistant Attorney General, Indiana

**Heather Dawn Thompson**
These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by third-party non-governmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud, citing as reasons that it was the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, and that there are stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and that it was an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws, voter identification laws, the location of polling places, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.
Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voter fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state’s attorney general. Regardless, voter fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction. They can only prosecute election crimes related to elections with a federal candidate on the ballot and those committed by a public official under color of law involving federal candidates. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement, Some including those that allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others and those that feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “___”.

Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed over 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voter fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from appeal courts. This is not a surprising situation, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “___”.

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voter fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,
- non-citizens voting,
- vote buying,
- deceptive practices, and
While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voter fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a “battleground” or “swing” state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voter fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charge and prosecutions of voter fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

**DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES**

From our study of available information on voter fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding of what is and what is not “voter fraud” and “voter intimidation.” Some think of voter fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and appropriate activities. In order to come up with a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

**New Terminology**

The phrase “voter fraud” is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. “Fraud” is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

*Fraud, n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. *Fraud is usu a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.*


A “voter” is a person who is eligible to and engages in the act of voting. Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of “voter fraud,” it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed by the voter or in which the voter is the victim. Thus, a voter who intentionally provides false information on a voter registration application or intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to vote for that person would be committing “voter fraud.” Similarly, a person
who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter's polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase "voter fraud" does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not perpetrated by the voter and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, "voter fraud" does not capture actions or willful inaction by candidates and election workers. When an election official willfully and knowingly refuses to register to vote an otherwise legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the voter nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases "voter fraud" and "voter intimidation" are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the civil division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as "voter fraud" and "voter intimidation" that would serve as the basis for a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the use legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such, EAC has defined "election crimes," a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes.

What is an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process, eligible persons to be excluded from the election process, ineligible votes to be cast in an election, eligible votes not to be cast or counted, or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception; acts of coercion; acts of damage or destruction; and failures or refusals to act.

Generally speaking, election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public that desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon knowing or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.
The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, or the public, in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or election day; vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.

**Acts of Deception**

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter's precinct or polling place, regarding the date and time of the election or regarding a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making, or knowingly possessing, a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate at one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once at the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a material false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

**Acts of Coercion**

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other valuable thing to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;
o Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
o Knowingly challenging a person's right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or delay the process of voting;
o As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself or another of an employee's ballot;
o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;
o Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official's duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;
o Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and
o Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for registering to vote.

**Acts of Damage or Destruction**

- Destroying completed voter registration applications that are necessary for the applicants to exercise their right to vote;
- Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments for the purpose of enabling the voter to vote his or her ballot;
- Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;
- Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as he intended;
- Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;
- Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and
- Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

**Failure or Refusal to Act**

- Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;
- Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;
DRAFT – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

- Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;
- Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;
- Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;
- Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;
- Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction; and
- Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.

What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of “election crimes.” All criminal or civil violations related to campaign finance contribution limitations and prohibitions, as well as reporting either at the state or federal level are not “election crimes” for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. The federal agency responsible for administering federal campaign finance law and monitoring the status of state campaign finance law is the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not “election crimes,” even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not “election crimes.” Last, actions that do no rise to the level of criminal activity, that is a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not “election crimes.”

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can study the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants developed recommendations. In addition, the working group and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to people in law enforcement, specifically federal District Election Officers (“DEOs”) and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research
The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

**Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review**

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.

**Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline**

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a 1-800 voter hotline where voters could call for poll location, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in over 200,000 calls received and over 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 200,000 complaints may provide a good deal of insight into the problems voters experienced, especially those in the nature of intimidation or suppression.

**Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice**

Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety in-of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and monitor field reports from Election Day.

**Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers**

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud.
and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

**Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium**

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

**Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research**

EAC should measure voter fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have historically been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets. The sample must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

**Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law**

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

**Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day**

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls in on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and
Concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.

**Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud**

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing them.

**Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud**

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers can use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the ease of commission and the impact of the fraud.

**Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons**

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether deceased voters or felons are noted as having actually voted.

**Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices**

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

**Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation**

EAC should study the extent to which states are actually utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

**Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts**

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.
Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine what volume and type of election crimes are being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

Likely sources of complaints concerning voting crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to as a part of complying with HAVA §402. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state’s chief election official and these complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states’ chief election officers regarding complaints that have
identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

CONCLUSION

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and political pundits. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC through its clearinghouse role will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention and prosecution of election crimes.
been filed, investigated and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses can be collected.

Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. This data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter
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EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

Articles


This report describes the pervasive and repeated practices of voter intimidation and vote suppression that have taken place in very recent years and during contemporary American history. It goes on to describe the numerous instances of voter intimidation and suppression during the 2000 election, the 1990s, the 1980s and back through the civil rights movement of the 1960s, putting current efforts in historical perspective. Describing the chronology of events in this way demonstrates the developing patterns and strategic underpinnings of the tactics used over the last forty years. Examples include:

- Florida law enforcement questioned elderly African American voters in Orlando regarding the 2003 mayoral race, which had already been resolved, shortly before the 2004 election;
- the 2004 Florida felon purge list;
- the case of South Dakota in 2004 in which Native Americans were improperly and illegally required to show photo identification at the polls or denied the right to vote, and similar improper demands for ID from minorities in other parts of the country;
- the use of challengers in minority districts in many locations;
- the challenge to the right of African American students to vote in Texas in 2004;
- the presence of men looking like law enforcement challenging African American voters at the polls in Philadelphia in 2003;
- the distribution of flyers in Louisiana and elsewhere in a number of elections over the last few years in minority areas telling them to vote on the wrong day; and
- the FBI investigation into thousands of Native American voters in South Dakota in 2002.


Argues that "the discriminatory use of so-called 'ballot security' programs" has been a reoccurring scandal since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These programs are deceptively presented as preventing voter fraud and thereby furthering good government. However, McDonald states "but far too often they [the ballot security programs] are actually designed to suppress minority voting -- and for nakedly partisan purposes." Blames the federal government as well as the states for use of suspect ballot security programs. McDonald cites several ballot security efforts that were really disguised attempts at minority voter suppression:

- SD-DOJ “voting integrity initiative”.
- AR - poll watchers driving away voters in predominantly black precincts by taking photos of them and demanding identification during pre-election day balloting.
- MI - "spotters" at heavily Democratic precincts was an effort to intimidate black voters and suppress Democratic turnout
- SC - one county's officials instituted a new and unauthorized policy allowing them to challenge voters who gave rural route or box numbers for their registration address (disproportionately affecting African Americans).
- the 1981 gubernatorial election anti-fraud initiative leading to the well known consent decree prohibiting the Republicans from repeating this, a similar Republican effort in Louisiana in 1986 in Senator John Breaux's race which again resulted in prohibition by a state court judge, and a similar effort by Republicans in Senator Jesse Helms 1990 reelection.

States that HAVA "contains provisions that may enhance the opportunities for harassment and intimidation of minorities through ballot-security
EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

Programs (especially voter ID). Indicates that the crux of the problem is lax enforcement of federal voters rights laws ("there is no record of the purveyors of any ballot-security program being criminally prosecuted by federal authorities for interfering with the right to vote." The only positive case law McDonald cited was a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that affirmed "an award of damages ranging from $500 to $2,000, payable by individual poll officials to each of seven black voters who had been unlawfully challenged, harassed, denied assistance in voting or purged from the rolls in the town of Crawfordsville [Arkansas].")

Recommends that Congress and the states should adopt "nondiscriminatory, evenly applied measures to ensure the integrity of the ballot."


Current voter registration practices were determined to be insufficient to ensure the accuracy of voter registration lists used by poll workers or to prevent ineligible persons from registering to vote. In six municipalities where sufficient information was available, there was 105 instances of potentially improper or fraudulent voting in the 2004 elections. These included: 98 ineligible felons who may have voted; 2 individuals who may have voted twice; 1 voter who may have been underage; and 4 absentee ballots that should not have been counted because the voters who cast them died before Election Day (all but dead voters were forwarded to appropriate district attorneys for investigation). Statutes require that clerks send cards to everyone who registers by mail or on Election Day. However, only 42.7% of the 150 municipalities surveyed sent cards to both groups, and 46% did not send any address verification cards to those registering to vote on Election Day in November 2004. Statutes also require clerks to provide the local district attorney with the names of any Election Day registrants whose cards are undeliverable at the address provided. However, only 24.3% of the clerks who sent cards also forwarded names from undeliverable cards to district attorneys. District attorneys surveyed indicated that they require more information than is typically provided to conduct effective investigations. To ensure that voter registration lists contain only the names of qualified electors, municipal clerks are required by statute to remove or inactivate the names of individuals who have not voted in four years, to update registration information for individuals who move or change their names, and to remove or deactivate the names of deceased individuals. They are also required to notify registered voters before removing their names from registration lists. These statutory requirements are not consistently followed:

- 85.3% of municipalities removed the names of inactive voters from their voter registration lists;
- 71.4% sometimes or always notified registered voters before removing their names; and
- 54.0% reported removing the names of ineligible felons.

Registration lists contain duplicate records and the names of ineligible individuals (e.g., more than 348,000 electronic voter registration records from eight municipalities were reviewed, identifying 3,116 records that appear to show individuals who are registered more than once in the same municipality).

Recommendations:
- adjust the early registration deadline to provide clerks more time to prepare registration lists;
- establish more stringent requirements for special registration deputies, including prohibiting compensation based on the number of individuals registered;
- establish uniform requirements for demonstrating proof of residence for all registrants;
- provide municipal clerks with more flexibility in the use of address verification cards;
- Authorize civil penalties for local election officials and municipalities that fail to comply with election laws; and
- implement mandatory elections training requirements for municipal clerks.

Report also recognized that the new HAVA registration procedures would help with existing registration problems.
On January 26, 2005, the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorney’s Office formed a task force to investigate alleged voting irregularities during the November 2004 elections. The task force has made the following specific determinations based on evidence examined to date:

- evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in names of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting in names believed to be fake.
- more than 200 felons voted when they were not eligible to do so. (In order to establish criminal cases, the government must establish willful violations in individual instances);
- persons who had been paid to register voters as “deputy registrars” falsely listed approximately 65 names in order to receive compensation for the registrations. (The evidence does not indicate that these particular false registrations were later used to cast votes); and,
- the number of votes counted from the City of Milwaukee exceeds the number of persons recorded as voting by more than 4,500. (Evidence indicates widespread record keeping errors with respect to recording the number of voters)

The investigation concentrated on the 70,000+ same-day registrations. It found that a large majority of the reported errors were the result of data entry errors, such as street address numbers being transposed. However, the investigation also found more than 100 instances where votes were cast in a manner suggesting fraud. These include:

- persons with the same name and date of birth recorded as voting more than once;
- persons who live outside Milwaukee, but who used non-existent City addresses to register and vote in the City (141 of them were same day registrants; in several instances, the voter explicitly listed municipality names other than Milwaukee on the registration cards);
- persons who registered and voted with identities and addresses that cannot in any way be linked to a real person;
- persons listed as voting under a name and identity of a person known to be deceased;
- persons whose identities were used to vote, but who in subsequent interviews told task force investigators that they did not, in fact, vote in the City of Milwaukee.

Investigation also found:

- persons who were paid money to obtain registrations allegedly falsified approximately 65 names on registration forms, allegedly to obtain more money for each name submitted.
- more than 200 felons who were not eligible to vote in the 2004 election, but who are recorded as having done so.
- same-day registrations were accepted in which the card had incomplete information that would help establish identity. For example: 48 original cards for persons listed as voting had no name; 548 had no address; 28 did not have signatures; and another 23 cards had illegible information (part of approximately 1,300 same-day registrations for which votes were cast, but which election officials could not authenticate as proper voters within the City).
- the post-election misfiling or loss of original green registration cards that were considered duplicates, but that in fact corresponded to additional votes. These cards were used to record votes, but approximately 100 cards of interest to investigators can no longer be located. In addition, other original green registration cards continue to be found.
Among the observations made that are relevant to the EAC study of fraud and intimidation are the following:

- The November 2004 elections showed that irregularities and fraud still occur.
- Failure to provide voters with such basic information as their registration status and their polling site location raises a barrier to voting as significant as inconsistent procedures on provisional ballots or voter ID requirements.
- There is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election.
- The Commission is concerned that the different approaches to identification cards might prove to be a serious impediment to voting.
- Voter registration lists are often inflated by the inclusion of citizens who have moved out of state but remain on the lists. Moreover, under the National Voter Registration Act, names are often added to the list, but counties and municipalities often do not delete the names of those who moved. Inflated voter lists are also caused by phony registrations and efforts to register individuals who are ineligible. At the same time, inaccurate purges of voter lists have removed citizens who are eligible and are properly registered.
- Political party and nonpartisan voter registration drives generally contribute to the electoral process by generating interest in upcoming elections and expanding participation. However, they are occasionally abused. There were reports in 2004 that some party activists failed to deliver voter registration forms of citizens who expressed a preference for the opposing party.
- Vote by mail raises concerns about privacy, as citizens voting at home may come under pressure to vote for certain candidates, and it increases the risk of fraud.
- While election fraud is difficult to measure, it occurs. The U.S. Department of Justice has launched more than 180 investigations into election fraud since October 2002. These investigations have resulted in charges for multiple voting, providing false information on their felon status, and other offenses against 89 individuals and in convictions of 52 individuals. The convictions related to a variety of election fraud offenses, from vote buying to submitting false voter registration information and voting-related offenses by non-citizens. In addition to the federal investigations, state attorneys general and local prosecutors handle cases of election fraud. Other cases are never pursued because of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence for prosecution or because of the low priority given to election fraud cases.
- Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud.
- Non-citizens have registered to vote in several recent elections.
- The growth of "third-party" (unofficial) voter registration drives in recent elections has led to a rise in reports of voter registration fraud.
- Many states allow the representatives of candidates or political parties to challenge a person's eligibility to register or vote or to challenge an inaccurate name on a voter roll. This practice of challenges may contribute to ballot integrity, but it can have the effect of intimidating eligible voters, preventing them from casting their ballot, or otherwise disrupting the voting process.

Its pertinent recommendations for reform are as follows:

- Interoperable state voter databases are needed to facilitate updates in the registration of voters who move to another state and to eliminate duplicate registrations, which are a source of potential fraud.
- Voters should be informed of their right to cast a provisional ballot if their name does not appear on the voter roll, or if an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote, but States should take additional and effective steps to inform voters as to the location of their precinct.
- The Commission recommends that states use "REAL ID" cards for voting purposes.
- To verify the identity of voters who cast absentee ballots, the voter's signature on the absentee ballot can be matched with a digitized
version of the signature that the election administrator maintains. While such signature matches are usually done, they should be done consistently in all cases, so that election officials can verify the identity of every new registrant who casts an absentee ballot.

- Each state needs to audit its voter registration files to determine the extent to which they are accurate (with correct and current information on individuals), complete (including all eligible voters), valid (excluding ineligible voters), and secure (with protections against unauthorized use). This can be done by matching voter files with records in other state agency databases in a regular and timely manner, contacting individuals when the matches are inconclusive, and conducting survey research to estimate the number of voters who believe they are registered but who are not in fact listed in the voter files.

- Each state should oversee political party and nonpartisan voter registration drives to ensure that they operate effectively, that registration forms are delivered promptly to election officials, that all completed registration forms are delivered to the election officials, and that none are "culled" and omitted according to the registrant's partisan affiliation. Measures should also be adopted to track and hold accountable those who are engaged in submitting fraudulent voter registrations. Such oversight might consist of training activists who conduct voter registration drives and tracking voter registration forms to make sure they are all accounted for. In addition, states should apply a criminal penalty to any activist who deliberately fails to deliver a completed voter registration form.

- Investigation and prosecution of election fraud should include those acts committed by individuals, including election officials, poll workers, volunteers, challengers or other nonvoters associated with the administration of elections, and not just fraud by voters.

- In July of even-numbered years, the U.S. Department of Justice should issue a public report on its investigations of election fraud. This report should specify the numbers of allegations made, matters investigated, cases prosecuted, and individuals convicted for various crimes. Each state's attorney general and each local prosecutor should issue a similar report.

- The U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Public Integrity should increase its staff to investigate and prosecute election-related fraud.

- In addition to the penalties set by the Voting Rights Act, it should be a federal felony for any individual, group of individuals, or organization to engage in any act of violence, property destruction (of more than $500 value), or threatened act of violence that is intended to deny any individual his or her lawful right to vote or to participate in a federal election.

- To deter systemic efforts to deceive or intimidate voters, the Commission recommends federal legislation to prohibit any individual or group from deliberately providing the public with incorrect information about election procedures for the purpose of preventing voters from going to the polls.

- States should define clear procedures for challenges, which should mainly be raised and resolved before the deadline for voter registration. After that, challengers will need to defend their late actions. On Election Day, they should direct their concerns to poll workers, not to voters directly, and should in no way interfere with the smooth operation of the polling station.

- State and local jurisdictions should prohibit a person from handling absentee ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged family member, the U.S. Postal Service or other legitimate shipper, or election officials. The practice in some states of allowing candidates or party workers to pick up and deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.

- All states should consider passing legislation that attempts to minimize the fraud that has resulted from "payment by the piece" to anyone in exchange for their efforts in voter registration, absentee ballot, or signature collection.

- Nonpartisan structures of election administration are very important, and election administrators should be neutral, professional, and impartial.

- No matter what institutions are responsible for conducting elections, conflict-of-interest standards should be introduced for all federal, state, and local election officials. Election officials should be prohibited by federal and/or state laws from serving on any political campaign committee, making any public comments in support of a candidate, taking a public position on any ballot measure, soliciting campaign funds, or otherwise campaigning for or against a candidate for public office. A decision by a secretary of state to serve as co-chair of his or her party's presidential

Recommendation on Voter Identification:

- Report premises its burdensome identification proposals on the need to ensure ballot integrity and on the existence of or potential for widespread fraud. However, the Report admits that there is simply "no evidence" that the type of fraud that could be solved by stricter voter identification – individual voters who misrepresent their identity at the polls – is a widespread problem.

- The photo ID proposal guards against only one type of fraud: individuals arriving at the polls to vote using false information, such as the name of another registered voter, or a recent but not current address. Since the costs of this form of fraud are extremely high (federal law provides for up to five years’ imprisonment), and the benefits to any individual voter are extremely low, it is highly unlikely that this will ever occur with any frequency.

- The limited types of fraud that could be prevented by a Real ID requirement are extremely rare and difficult.

- In the most comprehensive survey of alleged election fraud to date, Professor Loraine Minnite and David Callahan have shown that the incidence of individual voter fraud at the polls is negligible. A few prominent examples support their findings. In Ohio, a statewide survey found four instances of ineligible persons voting or attempting to vote in 2002 and 2004, out of 9,078,728 votes cast – a rate of 0.00004%. Earlier this year, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox stated that she could not recall one documented case of voter fraud relating to the impersonation of a registered voter at the polls during her ten-year tenure as Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State.

- The Report attempts to support its burdensome identification requirements on four specific examples of purported fraud or potential fraud. None of the Report's cited examples of fraud stand up under closer scrutiny. This response report goes through each instance of fraud raised by the Commission report and demonstrates that in each case the allegation in fact turned out later not to be true or the fraud cited was not of the type that would be addressed by a photo identification requirement.

- The Report fails to provide a good reason to create greater hurdles for voters who vote at the polls than for those who vote absentee. Despite the fact that absentee ballots are more susceptible to fraud than regular ballots, the Report exempts absentee voters from its proposed Real ID and proof of citizenship requirements.

Other points in ID requirement:

- Report does not explain why the goals of improved election integrity will not be met through the existing provisions in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).

- Report fails to consider alternative measures to advance its goals that are less restrictive to voters. To the extent that any limited fraud by individuals at the polls does trickle into the system, it can be addressed by far less restrictive alternatives. The first step is to recognize that only voters who appear on the registration list may vote a regular ballot. Proper cleaning of registration lists – and proper use of the lists at the poll – will therefore go a long way toward ensuring that every single ballot is cast by an eligible voter.

- In addition to the better registration lists that full implementation will provide, better record keeping and administration at the polls will reduce the limited potential for voting by ineligible persons. In the unlikely event that implementation of current law is not able to wipe out whatever potential for individual fraud remains, there are several effective and less burdensome alternatives to the Report's Real ID recommendation that received wholly insufficient consideration.

- Costs - If required as a precondition for voting, photo identification would operate as a de facto poll tax that could disenfranchise low-income voters. To alleviate this burden, the Report appropriately recommends that the "Real ID" card itself be issued free of charge. Nevertheless, the
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percentage of Americans without the documentary proof of citizenship necessary to obtain Real IDs is likely to remain high because the requisite documents are both expensive and burdensome to obtain. (Each of the documents an individual is required to show in order to obtain a "Real ID" card or other government-issued photo ID card costs money or presumes a minimal level of economic resources. Unless the federal and all state governments waive the cost of each of these other forms of identification, the indirect costs of photo IDs will be even greater than their direct costs. In addition, since government-issued IDs may only be obtained at specified government offices, which may be far from voters' residences and workplaces, individuals seeking such IDs will have to incur transportation costs and the costs of taking time off from work to visit those offices during often-abbreviated business hours.)

- Since voting generally depends on the voter's address, and since many states will not accept IDs that do not bear an individual's current voting address, an additional 41.5 million Americans each year will have ID that they may not be able to use to vote.
- The burden would fall disproportionately on the elderly, the disabled, students, the poor, and people of color.
- The ID recommendations reduce the benefits of voter registration at disability and other social service agencies provided by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Individuals who seek to register at those offices—which generally do not issue IDs Census data demonstrate that African Americans and Latinos are more than three times more likely than whites to register to vote at a public assistance agency, and that whites are more likely than African Americans and Latinos to register when seeking a driver's license. Accordingly, the voter registration procedure far more likely to be used by minorities than by whites will no longer provide Americans with full eligibility to vote.
- The Report's proposal to use Real ID as a condition of voting is so excessive that it would prevent eligible voters from proving their identity with even a valid U.S. passport or a U.S. military photo ID card. The Report's proposal to use Real ID as a condition of voting is so excessive that it would prevent eligible voters from proving their identity with even a valid U.S. passport or a U.S. military photo ID card

Recommendation on Database Information Sharing Across States - serious efficacy, privacy, and security concerns raised by a nationally distributed database of the magnitude it contemplates. These problems are exacerbated by the Report's recommendation that an individual's Social Security number be used as the broadly disseminated unique voting identifier.

Recommendation on Voting Rights of Ex-Felons - This recommendation would set a standard more generous than the policies of the most regressive thirteen states in the nation but more restrictive than the remaining thirty-seven. The trend in the states is toward extension of the franchise.


Focuses on vote suppression through “ballot security programs” (programs that, in the name of protecting against vote fraud, almost exclusively target heavily black, Latino, or Indian voting precincts and have the intent or effect of discouraging or preventing voters in those precincts from casting a ballot). Noteworthy characteristics of these programs:

- focus on minority precincts almost exclusively
- is often on only the flimsiest evidence that vote fraud is likely to be perpetrated in such precincts;
- in addition to encouraging the presence of sometimes intimidating white Republican poll watchers or challengers who may slow down voting lines and embarrass potential voters by asking them humiliating questions, these programs have sometimes posted people in official-looking uniforms with badges and side arms who question voters about their citizenship or their registration
- warning signs may be posted near the polls, or radio ads may be targeted to minority listeners containing dire threats of prison terms for people who are not properly registered—messages that seem designed to put minority voters on the defensive.
- sometimes false information about voting qualifications is sent to minority voters through the mail.
- doing mailings, collecting returned materials, and using that as a basis for creating challenger lists and challenging voters at the polls.
started in the 1950s and continues to today (problem with this practice is that reasons for a mailing to be returned include a wrong address, out of date or inaccurate addresses, poor mail delivery in minority areas, and matching mistakes)

Provide numerous examples from the last 50 years to demonstrate his thesis, going through the historical development of Republican ballot security programs from the 1950s through to the present (including more recent incidents, such as 1981 in New Jersey, 1982 Dallas, Louisiana 1986, Houston 1986, Hidalgo 1988 Orange County 1988, North Carolina 1990, South Carolina 1980-1990, and South Dakota 2002). Author cites and quotes internal Republican letters and memoranda, primary sources and original documents, media reports, scholarly works, as well as the words of judges' rulings in some of the cases that ended up in litigation to prove his argument. Author cites and quotes internal Republican letters and memoranda, primary sources and original documents, media reports, scholarly works, as well as the words of judges' rulings in some of the cases that ended up in litigation to prove his argument.

Some of the features of vote suppression efforts put forth by Republicans under the guise of ballot security programs:

1. An organized, often widely publicized effort to field poll watchers in what Republicans call “heavily Democratic,” but what are usually minority, precincts;
2. Stated concerns about vote fraud in these precincts, which are occasionally justified but often are not;
3. Misinformation and fear campaigns directed at these same precincts, spread by radio, posted signs in the neighborhoods, newspapers, fliers, and phone calls, which are often anonymously perpetrated;
4. Posting “official-looking” personnel at polling places, including but not limited to off-duty police—sometimes in uniform, sometimes armed;
5. Aggressive face-to-face challenging techniques at the polls that can confuse, humiliate, and intimidate—as well as slow the voting process—in these same minority precincts;
6. Challenging voters using inaccurate, unofficial lists of registrants derived from “do-not-forward” letters sent to low-income and minority neighborhoods;
7. Photographing, tape recording, or videotaping voters; and
8. Employing language and metaphors that trade on stereotypes of minority voters as venal and credulous.

The report ends with some observations on the state of research on the incidence of fraud, which the author finds lacking. He suggests that vote suppression of qualified minority voters by officials and partisan poll-watchers, challengers, and uniformed guards should also be considered as included in any definition of election fraud. Recommends Democrats should not protest all programs aimed at ballot integrity, but rather work with Republicans to find solutions to problems that confront both parties and the system as a whole.


Presents results from the first nationwide study to document the implementation of American felony disenfranchisement law. Data came from two main sources: a 33-state survey of state elections officials (spring 2004) and telephone interviews with almost one hundred city, county, town, and parish officials drawn from 10 selected states.

Major Conclusions:

1. Broad variation and misunderstanding in interpretation and enforcement of voting laws (more than one-third [37%] of local officials interviewed in ten states either described their state's fundamental eligibility law incorrectly, or stated that they did not know a central aspect of that law. Local registrars differ in their knowledge of basic eligibility law, often within the same state. Differences also emerge in how they are notified of criminal convictions, what process they use to suspend, cancel, or "purge" voters from the rolls, whether particular documents are required to restore a voter to eligibility, and whether they have information about the criminal background of new arrivals to the state.)

2. Misdemeanants disenfranchised in at least five states (the commonly-used term "felon disenfranchisement" is not entirely accurate, since at
least five states – Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, South Carolina, and Maryland -- also formally bar some or all people convicted of misdemeanors from voting [it is likely that misdemeanants in other states who do retain the formal right to vote could have difficulty exercising that right, given ignorance of their eligibility and the lack of clear rules and procedures for absentee voting by people in jail who have not been convicted of a felony / Maryland excludes persons convicted of many misdemeanors, such as "Unlawful operation of vending machines," "Misrepresentation of tobacco leaf weight," and "Racing horse under false name.")

3. Significant ambiguities in voting laws (disenfranchisement in Tennessee is dependent on which of five different time periods a felony conviction occurred between 1973 and the present / in Oregon, disenfranchisement is determined not by conviction or imprisonment for a felony, but for being placed under Department of Corrections supervision / since 1997, some persons convicted of a felony and sentenced to less than 12 months' custody have been sent to county jails and hence, are eligible to vote.

4. Disenfranchisement results in contradictory policies within states (the "crazy-quilt" pattern of disenfranchisement laws exists even within states / Alabama and Mississippi have both the most and least restrictive laws in the country, a result which is brought about by the fact that certain felonies result in the loss of voting rights for life, while others at least theoretically permit people in prison to vote / most felonies in Alabama result in permanent disenfranchisement, but drug and DUI offenses have been determined to not involve the "moral turpitude" that triggers the loss of voting rights / in Mississippi, ten felonies result in disenfranchisement, but do not include such common offenses as burglary and drug crimes.

5. Confusing policies lead to the exclusion of legal voters and the inclusion of illegal voters: The complexity of state disenfranchisement policies results in frequent misidentification of voter eligibility, largely because officials differ in their knowledge and application of disqualification and restoration law and procedures.

6. Significant variation and uncertainty in how states respond to persons with a felony conviction from other states: No state has a systematic mechanism in place to address the immigration of persons with a felony conviction, and there is no consensus among indefinite-disenfranchisement states on whether the disqualification is properly confined to the state of conviction, or should be considered in the new state of residence. Interpretation and enforcement of this part of disenfranchisement law varies not only across state lines, but also from one county to another within states. Local officials have no way of knowing about convictions in other states, and many are unsure what they would do if a would-be voter acknowledged an old conviction. Because there is no prospect of a national voter roll, this situation will continue even after full HAVA implementation.

7. Disenfranchisement is a time-consuming, expensive practice: Enforcement requires elections officials to gather records from different agencies and bureaucracies, including state and federal courts, Departments of Corrections, Probation and Parole, the state Board of Elections, the state police, and other counties' elections offices.

Policy Implications

1. Policies disenfranchising people living in the community on probation or parole, or who have completed a sentence are particularly difficult to enforce: States which disenfranchise only persons who are currently incarcerated appear able to enforce their laws more consistently than those barring non-incarcerated citizens from voting.

2. Given large-scale misunderstanding of disenfranchisement law, many eligible persons incorrectly believe they cannot vote, or have been misinformed by election officials: More than one-third of election officials interviewed incorrectly described their state's law on voting eligibility. More than 85% of the officials who misidentified their state's law either did not know the eligibility standard or specified that the law was more restrictive than was actually the case.

3. Occasional violation of disenfranchisement law by non-incarcerated voters not surprising: Given the complexity of state laws and the number of state officials who lack an understanding of restoration and disqualification procedures, it should come as no surprise that many voters are ignorant of their voting status, a fact that is likely to have resulted in hundreds of persons with a felony conviction registering and voting illegally in recent years.
4. Taken together, these findings undermine the most prominent rationale for disenfranchisement: that the policy reflects a strong, clear consensus that persons with a felony conviction are unfit to vote and constitute a threat to the polity: First, when significant numbers of the people who administer elections do not know important aspects of disenfranchisement law, it is hard to conclude that the restriction is necessary to protect social order and the "purity" of the ballot box. Second, because they are all but invisible in the sentencing process, "collateral" sanctions like disenfranchisement simply cannot accomplish the denunciatory, expressive purposes their supporters claim. We now know that disenfranchisement is not entirely "visible" even to the people running American elections. Third, deep uncertainty regarding the voting rights of people with felony convictions who move from one state to another indicates that we do not even know what purpose disenfranchisement is supposed to serve — whether it is meant to be a punishment, or simply a non-penal regulation of the franchise.

**Recommendations**

1. **Clarify Policies Regarding Out-of-State Convictions**: State officials should clarify their policies and incorporate into training programs the means by which a felony conviction in another state affects an applicant’s voting eligibility. For example, sentence-only disenfranchisement states should clarify that newcomers with old felony convictions from indefinite disenfranchisement states are eligible to vote. And those states which bar some people from voting even after their sentences are completed must clarify whether new arrivals with old felony convictions from sentence-only disenfranchisement states are automatically eligible, and must explain what procedures, if any, should be followed for restoration.

2. **Train Election Officials**: Clarify disenfranchisement policies and procedures for all state and local election officials through development of materials and training programs in each state. At a minimum, this should include distribution of posters, brochures and FAQ sheets to local and state elections offices.

3. **Train Criminal Justice Officials**: Provide training on disqualification and restoration policies for all correctional and criminal justice officials, particularly probation and parole staff. Correctional and criminal justice officials should also be actively engaged in describing these policies to persons under criminal justice supervision.

4. **Review Voting Restrictions on Non-Incarcerated People**: Given the serious practical difficulty of enforcing laws disqualifying people who are not incarcerated from voting – problems which clearly include both excluding eligible people from voting and allowing those who should be ineligible to vote — state policymakers should review such policies to determine if they serve a useful public purpose.
• States should adopt legislation requiring government-issued photo ID at the polls and for any voter seeking to vote by mail or by absentee ballot. Government-issued photo identification should be readily available to all citizens without cost and provisions made to assure availability of government-issued identification to disabled and low-income citizens.

• States should adopt legislation requiring that all polling places be fully accessible and accommodating to all voters regardless of race, disability or political persuasion and that polling locations are free of intimidation or harassment.

• States should create and maintain current and accurate statewide voter registration databases as mandated by the federal Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) and establish procedures to assure that the statewide voter roll is current and accurate and that the names of eligible voters on the roll are consistent with the voter roll used by local election authorities in conducting the election.

• States should adopt legislation establishing a 30-day voter registration cutoff to assure that all voter rolls are accurate and that all registrants can cast a regular ballot on Election Day and the election officials have opportunity to establish a current and accurate voter roll without duplicate or fictional names and assure that all eligible voters (including all recently registered voters) are included on the voter roll at their proper precinct.

• States should adopt legislation requiring voter registration applications to be delivered to the elections office within one week of being completed so that they are processed in a timely manner and to assure the individuals registered by third party organizations are properly included on the voter roll.

• States should adopt legislation and penalties for groups violating voter registration laws, and provide the list of violations and penalties to all registration solicitors. Legislation should require those organizations obtaining a voter’s registration to deliver that registration to election officials in a timely manner and should impose appropriate penalties upon any individual or organization that obtains an eligible voter’s registration and fails to deliver it to election authorities.

• States should adopt legislation prohibiting “bounty” payment to voter registration solicitors based on the number of registration cards they collect.


Written after the 2000 election, thesis of report is that structural disenfranchisement—the effect of breakdowns in the electoral system, is the new poll tax. Structural disenfranchisement includes “bureaucratic blunders, governmental indifference, and flagrant disregard for voting rights.” Blame for structural disenfranchisement is laid squarely at the feet of states and localities that “shirk their responsibilities or otherwise manipulate election systems,” resulting in voters “either turned away from the polls or their votes are thrown out.” Data and conclusions in the Report are taken from eight sample case studies of states and cities across the country and a survey of state election directors that reinforces the findings of the case studies (New York City-in six polling places Chinese translations inverted the Democrats with the Republicans; Georgia—the state computer crashed two weeks before the election, dropping thousands of voters from the rolls; Virginia-registration problems kept an untold number from voting; Chicago—in inner-city precincts with predominately minority populations, almost four out of every ten votes cast for President (in 2000) were discarded; St. Louis—thousands of qualified voters were placed on inactive lists due to an overbroad purge; Florida—a voting list purge of voters whose name and birth date closely resembled those of people convicted of felonies; and, Texas—significant Jim Crow like barriers to minority voting.) Most ballot blockers involve the structural elements of electoral administration: “ill-trained poll workers, failures to process registration cards on time or at all, inaccurate ballot translations and a shortage of translators to assist voters who have limited English language skills.”

Findings:

• election directors lack the resources to effectively do their jobs and some lack the “ability or will to force local election officials to fix serious
problems;
• election officials are highly under funded and legislatures refuse to grant their requests for more money;
• due to a lack of funds, election officials must use old and inferior equipment and can't improve training or meet structural needs;
• election officials are generally unaware of racial disparities in voting; only three of the 50 state election administrators are non-white.

Recommendations:
• federal policies that set nationwide and uniform election policies;
• federal guarantee of access to provisional ballots;
• enforcement of voter disability laws;
• automatic restoration of voting rights to those convicted of a crime after they have completed their sentence;
• a centralized data base of voters administered by non-partisan individuals;
• federal standards limiting precinct discarded vote rates to .25 %;
• federal requirements that jurisdiction provide voter education, including how to protect their right to vote; and laws that strengthen the ability of
  individuals to bring actions to enforce voting rights and anti-discrimination laws.


A September 15, 2005 Report submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General included lists of purportedly illegitimate votes in New Jersey in the 2004
  general election, including lists of 10,969 individuals who purportedly voted twice and lists of 4,756 voters who were purportedly dead or incarcerated in
  November 2004. Analysis of the suspect lists reveals that the evidence submitted does not show what it purports to show: cause for concern
  that there is serious risk of widespread fraud given the state of the New Jersey voter registration rolls. These suspect lists were compiled by
  attempting to match the first name, last name, and birth date of persons on county voter registration files. Analysis reveals several serious problems
  with the methodology used to compile the suspect lists that compromise the lists' practical value. For example, middle initials were ignored
  throughout all counties, so that "J______ A. Smith" was presumed to be the same person as "J G. Smith." Suffixes were also ignored, so that fathers
  and sons – like "B Johnson" and "B Johnson, Jr." – were said to be the same person. A presumption that two records with the same
  name and date of birth must represent the same person is not consistent with basic statistical principles.

Re Claim of Double Voting by 4,497 Individuals:
• 1,803 of these 4,397 records of ostensibly illegal votes seem to be the product of a glitch in the compilation of the registration files (far more likely
  that data error is to blame for the doubly logged vote - to irregularities in the data processing and compilation process for one single county);
• another 1,257 entries of the 4,397 records probably represent similar data errors;
• approximately 800 of the entries on the list likely represent different people, with different addresses and different middle initials or suffixes;
• for approximately 200 of the entries in this category, however, less information is available (lack of or differences in middle initial or middle name);
• 7 voters were apparently born in January 1, 1880 – which is most likely a system default for registrations lacking date-of-birth information;
• for 227 voters, only the month and year of birth are listed: this means only that two voters with the same name were born in the same month and
  year, an unsurprising coincidence in a state of several million people;
• leaves approximately 289 votes cast under the same name and birth date – like votes cast by “P______ S. Rosen,” born in the middle of the baby
  boom – but from two different addresses. It may appear strange, but there may be two P______ S. Rosens, born on the same date in 1948 – and
such coincidences are surprisingly common. In a group of just 23 people, it is more likely than not that two will share the same birthday. For 40 people, the probability is 90%. Many, if not most, of the 289 alleged double votes of persons registered at different addresses most likely reflect two separate individuals sharing a first name, last name, middle initial, and birth date.

But there is no doubt that there are duplicate entries on New Jersey's registration rolls. It is well known that voter registration rolls contain "deadwood" – registration entries for individuals no longer living at a given address or deceased. There is no evidence, however, that these extra registrations are used for widespread illegal voting. Moreover, the problem of deadwood will soon be largely resolved: both the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 require states to implement several systems and procedures as of January 1, 2006, that will clean the voter rolls of duplicate or invalid entries while protecting eligible voters from unintended disfranchisement.

Democratic National Committee, "Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio," DNC Services Corporation, 2005

Study re 2004 election in Ohio. Findings considered related to EAC study:

- Statewide, 6% of all voters reported feelings of intimidation: 16 percent of African Americans reported experiencing intimidation versus only 5% of white voters.

- African American voters were 1.2 times more likely than white voters to be required to vote provisionally. Of provisional voters in Cuyahoga County, 35% were African American, compared to 25% of non-provisional voters, matched by geography.

- Under Ohio law, the only voters who should have been asked for identification were those voting in their first Federal election who had registered by mail but did not provide identification in their registration application. Although only 7% of all Ohio voters were newly registered (and only a small percentage of those voters registered by mail and failed to provide identification in their registration application), more than one third (37% reported being asked to provide identification—meaning large numbers of voters were illegally required to produce identification. African American voters statewide were 47% more likely to be required to show identification than white voters. Indeed, 61% of African American men reported being asked to provide identification at the polls.

- Scarcity of voting machines caused long lines that deterred many people from voting: 3% of voters who went to the polls left their polling places and did not return due to the long lines; statewide, African American voters reported waiting an average of 52 minutes before voting while white voters reported waiting an average of 18 minutes; overall, 20% of white Ohio voters reported waiting more than twenty minutes, while 44% of African American voters reported doing so.

The report also includes a useful summary and description of the reports that came through Ohio Election Protection on Election Day, which included a wide variety of problems, including voter intimidation and discrimination.

Pertinent recommendations:

- codify into law all required election practices, including requirements for the adequate training of official poll workers
- adopt legislation to make clear and uniform the rules on voter registration.
- adopt uniform and clear published standards for the distribution of voting equipment and the assignment of official pollworkers among precincts, to ensure adequate and nondiscriminatory access
- improve training of official poll workers
- adopt clear and uniform rules on the use of, and the counting of, provisional ballots, and distribute them for public comment well in advance of each election day
- not adopt requirements that voters show identification at the polls, beyond those already required by federal law; vigorously enforce, to the full extent permitted by state law, a voter's right to vote without showing identification.
• make voter suppression a criminal offense at the state level, in all states
• implement statewide voter lists in accordance with the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA")
• expend significantly more resources in educating voters on where, when and how to vote.
• partisan officials who volunteer to work for a candidate should not oversee or administer any elections.

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."

Supervision of the Justice Department's nationwide response to election crimes:

Election Crimes Branch oversees the Department's handling of all election crime allegations other than those involving civil rights violations, which are supervised by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division. Specifically, the Branch supervises four types of corruption cases: crimes that involve the voting process, crimes involving the financing of federal election campaigns, crimes relating to political shakedowns and other patronage abuses, and illegal lobbying with appropriated funds. Vote frauds and campaign-financing offenses are the most significant and also the most common types of election crimes. The purpose of Headquarters' oversight of election crime matters is to ensure that the Department's nationwide response to election crime is uniform, impartial, and effective. An Election Crimes Branch, headed by a Director and staffed by Section attorneys on a case-by-case basis, was created within the Section in 1980 to handle this supervisory responsibility.

Voting Fraud:

During 2002 the Branch assisted United States Attorneys' Offices in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin in handling vote fraud matters that occurred in their respective districts. During 2003 the Branch assisted United States Attorneys' Offices in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin in handling vote fraud matters that occurred in their respective districts. During 2004 the Branch assisted United States Attorneys' Offices in the following states in the handling of vote fraud matters that occurred in their respective districts: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. This assistance included evaluating vote fraud allegations to determine whether investigation would produce a prosecutable federal criminal case, helping to structure investigations, providing legal advice concerning the formulation of charges, and assisting in establishing several task force teams of federal and state law enforcement officials to investigate vote fraud matters.

Litigation:

The Branch Director or Section attorneys also prosecute selected election crimes, either by assuming total operational responsibility for the case or by handling the case jointly with a United States Attorney's Office. The Section also may be asked to supervise the handling of a case in the event of a partial recusal of the local office. For example, in 2002 the Branch continued to supervise the prosecution of a sheriff and his election attorney for using data from the National Crime Information Center regarding voters' criminal histories to wage an election contest.
District Election Officer Program:
The Branch also assists in implementing the Department’s long-standing District Election Officer (DEO) Program. This Program is designed to ensure that each of the 93 United States Attorneys’ Offices has a trained prosecutor available to oversee the handling of election crime matters within the district and to coordinate district responses with Headquarters regarding these matters. The DEO Program involves the appointment of an Assistant United States Attorney in each federal district to serve a two-year term as a District Election Officer; the training of these prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of election crimes; and the coordination of election-related initiatives and other law enforcement activities between Headquarters and the field. In addition, the DEO Program is a crucial feature of the Department’s nationwide Election Day Program, which occurs in connection with the federal general elections held in November of even-numbered years. The Election Day Program ensures that federal prosecutors and investigators are available both at the Department’s Headquarters in Washington and in each district to receive and handle complaints of election irregularities from the public while the polls are open and that the public is aware of how these individuals can be contacted on election day. In 2002 the Department enhanced the DEO Program by establishing a Ballot Integrity Initiative.

Ballot Integrity Initiative:
Beginning in September of 2002, the Public Integrity Section, acting at the request of the Attorney General, assisted in the implementation of a Ballot Integrity Initiative for the 2002 general election and subsequent elections. This initiative included increasing the law enforcement priority the Department gives to election crimes; holding a special day-long training event in Washington, DC for representatives of the 93 United States Attorneys’ Offices; publicizing the identities and telephone numbers of the DEOs through press releases issued shortly before the November elections; and requiring the 93 U.S. Attorneys to communicate the enhanced federal prioritization of election crime matters to state and local election and law enforcement authorities. As part of Ballot Integrity Initiative, on October 8, 2002, the Public Integrity Section and the Voting Rights Section of the Department’s Civil Rights Division co-sponsored a Voting Integrity Symposium for District Election Officers representing each of the 93 federal judicial districts. Topics discussed included the types of conduct that are prosecutable as federal election crimes and the federal statutes used to prosecute such cases. Attorney General John Ashcroft delivered the keynote address on the importance of election crime and ballot integrity enforcement. Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division Ralph Boyd and Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Michael Chertoff also spoke to attendees on the protection of voting rights and the prosecution of election cases. As part of Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative, on September 23 and 24, 2003, the Public Integrity Section and the Voting Rights Section of the Department’s Civil Rights Division co-sponsored a two-day Symposium for DEOs representing each of the 93 federal judicial districts. Topics discussed included the types of conduct that are prosecutable as federal election crimes and the federal statutes used to prosecute such cases. Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division Alexander Acosta and Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Christopher A. Wray delivered the keynote addresses on the importance of protecting voting rights and the prosecution of election cases. On July 20 and 21, 2004, the Public Integrity Section and the Voting Section of the Department’s Civil Rights Division co-sponsored a two-day symposium for DEOs representing each of the 93 federal judicial districts. Topics discussed included the types of conduct that are prosecutable as federal election crimes and the federal statutes available to prosecute such cases, and the handling of civil rights matters involving voting. Attorney General John Ashcroft delivered the keynote address on the importance of protecting voting rights and the prosecution of election fraud. In addition, Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray of the Criminal Division and Assistant Attorney General R. Alexander Acosta of the Civil Rights Division addressed conference attendees on voting rights and election fraud enforcement issues respectively.

As a result of the Initiative, during 2002 the number of election crime matters opened by federal prosecutors throughout the country increased significantly, as did the Section’s active involvement in election crime matters stemming from the Initiative. At the end of 2002, the Section was supervising and providing advice on approximately 43 election crime matters nationwide. In addition, as of December 31, 2002, 11 matters involving possible election crimes were pending in the Section. During 2002 the Section closed two election crime matters and continued its operational supervision of 8 voting fraud cases (conspiracy to illegally obtain criminal history records to use to challenge voters (AL) and 7 cases of vote buying involving 10 defendants (KY).
Addresses the role of the United States Department of Justice in matters of election fraud, specifically: what sort of election-related conduct is potentially actionable as a federal crime; what specific statutory theories apply to frauds occurring in elections lacking federal candidates on the ballot, what federalism; procedural, and policy considerations impact on the federalization of this type of case; and how Assistant United States Attorneys should respond to this type of complaint. As a general rule, the federal crime of voter fraud embraces only organized efforts to corrupt the election process itself: i.e., the registration of voters, the casting of ballots, and the tabulation and certification of election results. Moreover, this definition excludes all activities that occur in connection with the political campaigning process, unless those activities are themselves illegal under some other specific law or prosecutorial theory. This definition also excludes isolated acts of individual wrongdoing that are not part of an organized effort to corrupt the voting process. Mistakes and other gaffs that inevitably occur are not included as voter fraud. Prosecuting election fraud offenses in federal court is further complicated by the constitutional limits that are placed on federal power over the election process. The conduct of elections is primarily a state rather than a federal activity.

Four situations where federal prosecution is appropriate:
1. Where the objective of the conduct is to corrupt the outcome of a federal elective contest, or where the consequential effect of the corrupt conduct impacts upon the vote count for federal office;
2. Where the object of the scheme is to discriminate against racial, ethnic or language minority groups, the voting rights of which have been specifically protected by federal statutes such as the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1973 et seq.);
3. Where federalization is required in order to redress longstanding patters of electoral fraud, either at the request of state or local authorities, or in the face of longstanding inaction by state authorities who appear to be unwilling or unable to respond under local law; and,
4. Where there is a factual basis to believe that fraudulent registration or voting activity is sufficiently connected to other from of criminal activity that pursuing the voter fraud angle will yield evidence useful in the prosecution of other categories of federal offense.

Four advantages to federal prosecution:
1. Voter fraud investigations are labor intensive - local law enforcement agencies often lack the manpower and the financial resources to take these cases on;
2. Voter fraud matters are always politically sensitive and very high profile endeavors at the local level – local prosecutors (who are usually themselves elected) often shy away from prosecuting them for that reason; the successful prosecution of voter fraud cases demands that critical witnesses be examined under oath before criminal charges based on their testimony are filed.
3. Many states lack the broad grand jury process that exists in the federal system; and
4. The defendants in voter fraud cases are apt to be politicians - or agents of politicians - and it is often impossible for either the government or the defendant to obtain a fair trial in a case that is about politics and is tried to a locally-drawn jury. The federal court system provides for juries to be drawn from broader geographic base, thus often avoiding this problem.

Several prosecutorial theories used by United States Attorneys to federalize election frauds are discussed.

Four questions used by prosecutors in evaluating the credibility of election complaints:
1. does the substance of the complaint assuming it can be proven through investigation - suggest a potential crime; 
2. is the complaint sufficiently fact-specific that it provides leads for investigators to pursue; 
3. is there a federal statute that can be used to federalize the criminal activity at issue; and,
4. is there a special federal interest in the matter that warrants federalization rather than deferral to state law enforcement.

All federal election investigations must avoid the following: non-interference in elections unless absolutely necessary to preserve evidence; interviewing voters during active voting periods; seizing official election documentation; investigative activity inside open polls; and prosecutors must adhere to 18 U.S.C. section 592, prohibiting the stationing of armed men at places where voting activity is taking place.
Election crimes based on race or language minority status are treated as civil rights matters under the Voting Rights Act.


Election Protection 2004 was the nation’s most far-reaching effort to protect voter rights before and on Election Day. The historic nonpartisan program included: (1) a toll-free number, 1-866-OUR-VOTE, with free, immediate and multi-lingual assistance to help voters with questions about registration and voting, and assist voters who encounter barriers to the ballot box; (2) distribution of more than five million “Voters’ Bills of Rights” with state-specific information; (3) 25,000 volunteers, including 6,000 lawyers and law students, who watched for problems and assisted voters on the spot at more than 3,500 predominantly African-American and Latino precincts with a history of disenfranchisement in at least 17 states; and (4) civil rights lawyers and advocates represented voters in lawsuits, preserved access to the polls, exposed and prevented voter intimidation, worked with election officials to identify and solve problems with new voting machines, technology and ballot forms, and protected voter rights in advance and on Election Day.

Voter Intimidation and Suppression Stories (Abridged):

- An Associated Press story noted Election Protection's exposure of reported voter suppression tactics in Colorado: Officials with the Election Protection Coalition, a voter-rights group, also said some voters in a predominantly black neighborhood north of Denver found papers on their doorsteps giving them the wrong address for their precinct.
- Election Protection received a report from Boulder County, Colorado that a poll worker made racist comments to Asian American voter and then told her she was not on the list and turned her away. The voter saw others filling out provisional ballots and asked for one but was denied. Another Asian American woman behind her in line was also given trouble by the same poll worker (he questioned her nationality and also turned her away).
- Election Protection received a report from Florissant County, Missouri from a voter who lives in predominantly white neighborhood. While waiting in line to vote, a Republican challenger challenged the black voters by requesting more proof of identification, residence, and signature match, while asking nothing from white voters. Also, the same voter reportedly asked a few questions about voting but an election officials refused to provide any meaningful answer, insisting that "it's very simple", but provided white voters with information when requested. There was one other black voter in line who was also singled out for same treatment while white voters were not.
- The Election Protection hotline received reports from Pinellas County, Florida that individuals purporting to be from the Kerry campaign are going door-to-door handing out absentee ballots, and asking voters to fill them out, and then taking the ballots from them, saying "Vote here for Kerry. Don't bother going to the polls."
- The Election Protection Coalition received a report from a woman whose sister lives in Milwaukee and is on government assistance. Her sister was reportedly told by her "case manager" that if she voted for Kerry, she would stop receiving her checks.
- An illiterate, older and disabled voter in Miami-Dade asked for assistance reading the ballot and reported that a poll worker yelled at him and refused to assist him and also refused to allow him to bring a friend into the booth in order to read the ballot to him.
- The Election Protection Coalition have gathered reports that flyers are circulating in a black community in Lexington, South Carolina claiming they those who are behind on child support payments will be arrested as the polls.
- Minority voters from Palm Beach County, Florida reported to the hotline that they received middle-of-the-night, live harassing phone calls warning them away from the polls.
- A volunteer for Rock the Vote reported that two illiterate voters in Michigan requested assistance with their ballots but were refused and reportedly mocked by poll workers.
- The hotline received a call from a radio DJ in Hillsborough County, Florida, who stated that he has received many calls (most of which were from African-Americans) claiming that poll workers were turning voters away and not "letting" them vote.
• The hotline received a call from Pima County, Arizona, indicating that Democratic voters received calls throughout Monday evening, providing incorrect information about the precinct location. Voters have had to be transported en masse in order to correct the problem.
• A caller from Alabama claims that he was told at his polling place that he could vote there for everything but the President and that he would have to go elsewhere in order to vote for a presidential candidate.
• Poll monitors in Philadelphia reports groups of lawyers, traveling in threes, who pull voters out of line and challenge them to provide ID, but when challenged themselves, they hop into waiting cars or vans and leave. Similar activity by Republican lawyers in Philadelphia was reported in the 2002 election.
• In Cuyahoga, Ohio, a caller reported that all black voters are being asked to show ID, while white voters are not. Caller report that he is black and had to show ID while his girlfriend is white and did not have to show ID.
• Two months ago, suspicious phone calls to newly registered Democrats —telling them they weren’t, in fact, registered to vote — were traced to the Republican headquarters in the Eastern Panhandle. On Monday, Democrats there said the calls have started again, even after the Berkeley County Clerk — a Republican — sent the party a cease-and-desist letter. The Berkeley prosecutor, who also is county Democratic chairman, has called on the U.S. attorney to investigate.
• In Tuscon, Arizona a misleading call informing voters that they should vote on November 3 has been traced back to the state GOP headquarters. The FBI is investigating.
• A man driving around in a big van covered in American flags and a big picture of a policeman was reportedly parked in front of a polling place; he then got out and moved within the 75 ft limit, until he was asked to leave; he then was found inside the polling place and was again asked to leave. Election Protection volunteers contacted officials and the man was eventually removed.
• The Election Protection hotline has received a report from individuals who claim to have received recorded telephone message coming from Bill Clinton and ACT and reminding them to vote on Nov. 3rd.
• In Massachusetts, the EP Hotline has received a report that a radio station (WILD) is broadcasting that voters will be arrested on the spot if they have outstanding parking tickets.
• In Richland, South Carolina Election Protection has received a report of a poll manager turning away individuals who do not have photo ID issued to the county or a driver’s license; an EP lawyer spoke with the Poll Manager at 8:20 am and told her that people with other forms of ID should be allowed to vote by provisional ballot.
• In Greenville, a caller reported that a white poll worker was asking Blacks for multiple form of I.D. Fortunately, the voter who reported the problem did have a second I.D. but reported that some others were turned away. Election Protection attorneys have alerted election officials.
• In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, an official looking flyer advises Democratic voters to “create a peaceful voting environment” by voting on Wednesday, November 3.
• The week before the election, flyers were circulated in Milwaukee under the heading "Milwaukee Black Voters League" with some "warnings for election time." The flyer listed false reasons for which you would be barred from voting (such as a traffic ticket) and then warned that "If you violate any of these laws you can get ten years in prison and your children will get taken away from you."
• There is a Jefferson County flyer which tells voters "See you at the Poles![sic]"... on November 4.


[NO SUMMARY FOUND] This is summary of federal role in prosecuting election crimes.

General Accounting Office, "Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote,"

[SUMMARY FAILS TO NOTE ELECTION OFFICIALS’ RESPONSEs THAT LITTLE VOTING FRAUD OR VOTER INTIMIDATION WAS DETECTED. DETECTED VOTING FRAUD WAS RELATED TO SUBMISSION OF FALSE/MATERIALLY INCORRECT VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATIONS AND TO ABSENTEE BALLOT FRAUD. VOTER SUPPRESSION EFFORTS OCCUR.] This Report focuses on the efforts of local election officials in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states to manage the registration process, maintain accurate voter registration lists, and ensure that eligible citizens in those jurisdictions had the opportunity to cast ballots during the 2004 election. the Report concentrates on election officials' characterization of their experiences with regard to (1) managing the voter registration process and any challenges related to receiving voter registration applications; checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering information into voter registration lists; (2) removing voters' names from voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing HAVA provisional voting and identification requirements and addressing any challenges encountered related to these requirements. The Report also provides information on motor vehicle agency (MVA) officials' characterization of their experiences assisting citizens who apply to register to vote at MVA offices and forwarding voter registration applications to election offices. The Report analyzed information collected from elections and motor vehicle agency offices in seven states—Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The 14 jurisdictions we selected were Gila and Maricopa Counties, Arizona; Los Angeles and Yolo Counties, California; City of Detroit and Delta Township, Michigan; New York City and Rensselaer County, New York; Bexar and Webb Counties, Texas; Albemarle and Arlington Counties, Virginia; and the cities of Franklin and Madison, Wisconsin.

Election officials representing all but one of the jurisdictions surveyed following the November 2004 election said they faced some challenges managing the voter registration process, including (1) receiving voter registration applications; (2) checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and (3) entering information into voter registration lists; when challenges occurred, election officials reported they took various steps to address them. All but 1 of the jurisdictions reported removing names from registration lists during 2004 for various reasons, including that voters requested that their names be removed from the voter registration list; information from the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) showing that voters had moved outside the jurisdiction; felony records received from federal, state, or local governments identifying voters as ineligible due to felony convictions; and death records received from state or local vital statistics offices. All of the jurisdictions reported that they permitted citizens to cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. In addition, 12 of the 14 jurisdictions to which this was applicable reported that they offered certain first-time voters who registered by mail the opportunity to cast provisional ballots. Local election officials in 12 of the 13 jurisdictions 13 we surveyed reported that they set up mechanisms to inform voters—without cost—about the outcome of their provisional votes during the November 2004 election. These mechanisms included toll-free telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the voters who cast provisional ballots. Election officials representing 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported facing challenges implementing provisional voting for various reasons, including some poll workers not being familiar with provisional voting or, in one jurisdiction representing a large number of precincts, staff not having sufficient time to process provisional ballots.


A comprehensive survey and analysis of vote fraud in the United States. The methodology included doing nexis searches for all 50 states and surveying existing research and reports. In addition, Minnite did a more in-depth study of 12 diverse states by doing nexis searches, studying statutory and case law, and conducting interviews with election officials and attorneys general. Finally, the study includes an analysis of a few of the most high profile cases of alleged fraud in the last 10 years, including the Miami mayoral election (1997), Orange County congressional race (1996), and the general election in Missouri (2000). In these cases, Minnite shows that many allegations of fraud do not end up being meritorious. Minnite finds that available evidence suggests that the incidence of election fraud is minimal and rarely affects election outcomes. Election officials generally do a very good job of protecting against fraud. Conditions that give rise to election fraud have steadily declined over the last century as a result of weakened political parties, strengthened election administration, and improved voting technology. There is little available evidence that election reforms such as the National Voter Registration Act, election day registration, and mail-in voting have resulted in increases in election fraud. Election
fraud appears also to be very rare in the 12 states examined more in-depth. Legal and news records turned up little evidence of significant fraud in these states or any indication that fraud is more than a minor problem. Interviews with state officials further confirmed this impression. Minnite found that, overall, the absentee mail-in ballot process is the feature most vulnerable to voter fraud. There is not a lot of evidence of absentee ballot fraud but the potential for fraud is greatest in this area because of a lack of uniformly strong security measures in place in all states to prevent fraud.

Suggested reforms to prevent what voter fraud does take place:
1. effective use of new statewide voter registration databases;
2. identification requirements for first time voters who register by mail should be modified to expand the list of acceptable identifying documents;
3. fill important election administration positions with nonpartisan professionals;
4. strengthen enforcement through adequate funding and authority for offices responsible for detecting and prosecuting fraud; and
5. establish Election Day Registration because it usually requires voter identification and authorization in person before a trained election worker, which reduces the opportunity for registration error or fraud.


A description and analysis of the complaints and allegations of voting irregularities gathered by the Election Protection program during the 2004 presidential election. Election Protection received more than a thousand complaints of voter suppression or intimidation. Complaints ranged from intimidating experiences at polling places to coordinated suppression tactics. For example:

- Police stationed outside a Cook County, Illinois, polling place were requesting photo ID and telling voters if they had been convicted of a felony that they could not vote.
- In Pima, Arizona, voters at multiple polls were confronted by an individual, wearing a black tee shirt with “US Constitution Enforcer” and a military-style belt that gave the appearance he was armed. He asked voters if they were citizens, accompanied by a cameraman who filmed the encounters.
- There were numerous incidents of intimidation by partisan challengers at predominately low income and minority precincts.
- Voters repeatedly complained about misinformation campaigns via flyers or phone calls encouraging them to vote on a day other than November 2, 2004 or of false information regarding their right to vote. In Polk County, Florida, for example, a voter received a call telling her to vote on November 3. Similar complaints were also reported in other counties throughout Florida. In Wisconsin and elsewhere voters received flyers that said:
  o "If you already voted in any election this year, you can't vote in the Presidential Election."
  o "If anybody in your family has ever been found guilty of anything you can't vote in the Presidential Election."
  o "If you violate any of these laws, you can get 10 years in prison and your children will be taken away from you."

There were also numerous reports of poll workers refusing to give voters provisional ballots.

The following is a summary of the types of acts of suppression and intimidation included in the report and a list of the states in which they took place. All instances of irregularities that were more administrative in nature have been omitted:

2. Individuals at the polls posing as some sort of law enforcement authority and intimidating and harassing voters: Arizona, Missouri.
3. Intimidating and harassing challengers at the polls: Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, Minnesota.
4. Deceptive practices and disinformation campaigns, such as the use of flyers with intentional misinformation about voting rights or voting procedures, often directed at minority communities; the use of phone calls giving people misinformation about polling sites and
other procedures; and providing verbal misinformation at the polls in a way that appears to have been intentionally misleading: Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, North Carolina, Arkansas, Texas

5. **Refusal to provide provisional ballots to certain voters:** Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Missouri, Texas, Georgia, Louisiana

6. **Registration applications submitted through third parties that were not processed:** Arizona, Michigan, Nevada (registration forms destroyed by Sproul Associates)

7. **Improper removal from the voter registration list:** Arizona

8. **Individuals questioning voters' citizenship:** Arizona

9. **Police officers at the polls intimidating voters:** Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, North Carolina

The report does not provide corroborating evidence for the allegations it describes. However, especially in the absence of a log of complaints received by the Department of Justice, this report provides a very useful overview of the types of experiences some voters more than likely endured on Election Day in 2004.

### Books


Focuses almost entirely on alleged transgressions by Democrats. Fund’s accusations, if credible, would indicate that fraud such as voter registration fraud, absentee ballot fraud, dead people voting, and felon voting is prevalent throughout the country. However, due to its possible biases, lack of specific footnoting, and insufficient identification of primary source material, caution is strongly urged with respect to utilizing this book for assessing the amount and types of voter fraud and voter intimidation occurring.

Fund says that “Election fraud, whether its phony voter registrations, illegal absentee ballots, shady recounts or old-fashioned ballot-box stuffing, can be found in every part of the United States, although it is probably spreading because of the ever-so-tight divisions that have polarized the country and created so many close elections lately. Fund argues that fraud has been made easier by the passage of the National Voting Rights Act because it allows ineligible voters to remain on the voter rolls, allowing a voter to vote in the name of someone else. He claims dead people, people who have moved, and people in jail remain on the voting list. He believes because of NVRA illegal aliens have been allowed to vote.

**Absentee balloting makes it even worse:** someone can register under false names and then use absentee ballots to cast multiple votes. Groups can get absentee ballots for the poor and elderly and then manipulate their choices.

Provides a number of examples of alleged voter fraud, mostly perpetrated by Democrats. For example, he claims much fraud in St. Louis in 2000, including illegal court orders allowing people to vote, felons voting, people voting twice, dead people voting, voters were registered to vacant lots, election judges were not registered and evidence of false registrations. Another case he pays a great deal of attention to are the alleged transgressions by Democrats in Indian Country in South Dakota 2002, including voter registration fraud, suspicious absentee ballot requests, vote hauling, possible polling place fraud, abusive lawyers at polling sites, and possible vote buying.


Bulk of the book comprises stories from United States electoral history outside the scope of this project; however, tales are instructive in showing how far back irregular and illegal voting practices go. Focuses almost entirely on alleged transgressions by Republican, although at times it does include complaints about Democratic tactics. Gumbel’s accusations, if credible, especially in the Bush-Gore election, would indicate there were a number of problems in key states in such areas as intimidation, vote counting, and absentee ballots. However, due to its possible biases, lack of specific footnoting, and insufficient identification of primary source material, caution is strongly urged with respect to utilizing this book for assessing the amount
### EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

and types of voter fraud and voter intimidation occurring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tracy Campbell</td>
<td>Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004, Carroll &amp; Graf Publishers, 2005.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Traces the historical persistence of voter fraud from colonial times through the 2004 Bush-Kerry election. From the textual information, it quickly becomes obvious that voter fraud was not limited to certain types of people or to certain political parties. [SKIMPY SUMMARY—DOES NOT SAY MUCH.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson</td>
<td>A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House: Foolhardiness, Folly, and Fraud in the Presidential Elections, from Andrew Jackson to George W. Bush, Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adds almost nothing to the present study. It contains no footnotes and no references to primary source material, save what may be able to be gleaned from the bibliography. Takes a historical look at United States Presidential elections from Andrew Jackson to George Bush by providing interesting stories and other historical information. There are only three pages out of the entire book that touches on vote fraud in the first Bush election. The authors assert that the exit polls in Florida were probably correct. The problem was the pollsters had no way of knowing that thousands of votes would be invalidated. But the authors do not believe that fraud was the cause of the tabulation inaccuracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Crispin Miller</td>
<td>Fooled Again, Basic Books, 2005.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sets out to show that the 2004 election was won by Bush through nefarious means, and indict the news media for not taking anomalies, irregularities, and alleged malfeasance in the process seriously enough. However, book is well sourced, and individual instances of alleged malfeasance discussed may be worth looking at. He accuses Republicans of committing crimes and improprieties throughout the country, including: 1. deliberate disparities in voting machine distribution and long lines in Democratic jurisdictions; 2. misinterpretation of voting laws by elections officials to the detriment of Democratic voters; 3. dirty tricks and deceptive practices to mislead Democratic and minority voters about voting times, places and conditions; 4. machine irregularities in Democratic jurisdictions; 5. relocating polling sites in Democratic and minority areas; 6. suspicious mishandling of absentee ballots; 7. refusing to dispense voter registration forms to certain voter registration groups; 8. intimidation of students; 9. suspicious ballot spoilage rates in certain jurisdictions; 10. “strategic distribution of provisional ballots,” and trashing of provisional ballots; 11. harassment of Native American voters; 12. a Republican backed organization engaging in voter registration efforts throughout the country that allegedly destroyed the voter registration forms of Democrats; 13. illegitimate challenges at the polls by Republican poll watchers; 14. improper demands for identification in certain areas; 15. Republican challenges to the voter registration status of thousands of voters before the election, and the creation of lists of voters to challenge at the polls; 16. wrongful purging of eligible voters from voting rolls; 17. partisan harassment; 18. the selective placement of early voting sites; and 19. failure to send out absentee ballots in time for people to vote. Details what he says was the inappropriate use of the Federal Voter Assistance Program that made voting for the military easy while throwing up obstacles.</td>
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for civilians overseas in their efforts to vote by absentee ballot, leading many of them to be disenfranchised.

**Legal**

*Indiana Democratic Party vs. Rokita*, U.S. District Court Southern District of Indiana (Indianapolis) 1:05-cv-00634, U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 06-2218

Although the proponents of SEA 483 asserted that the law was intended to combat voter fraud, no evidence of the existence of such fraud has ever been provided. No voter has been convicted of or even charged with the offense of misrepresenting his identity for purposes of casting a fraudulent ballot in person, King Dep. 95-96; Mahern Aff. ¶ 2-3, though there have been documented instances of absentee ballot fraud. King Dep. 120. Indeed, no evidence of in person, on-site voting fraud was presented to the General Assembly during the legislative process leading up to the enactment of the Photo ID Law. Mahern Aff. ¶ 2-

The State cannot show any compelling justification for subjecting only voters in person to the new requirements of the Photo ID Law, while exempting absentee voters who vote by mail or persons who live in state-certified residential facilities. On the other hand, absentee ballots are peculiarly vulnerable to coercion and vote tampering since there is no election official or independent election observer available to ensure that there is no illegal coercion by family members, employers, churches, union officials, nursing home administrators, and others.

Law gives virtually unbridled discretion to partisan precinct workers and challengers to make subjective determinations such as (a) whether a form of photo identification produced by a voter conforms to what is required by the Law, and (b) whether the voter presenting himself or herself at the polls is in fact the voter depicted in the photo Robertson Dep. 29-34, 45; King Dep. 86, 89. This is significant because any voter who is challenged under this Law will be required to vote by provisional ballot and to make a special trip to the election board's office in order to have his vote counted. Robertson Dep. 37; King Dep. 58.

The Photo ID Law confers substantial discretion, not on law enforcement officials, but on partisan precinct poll workers and challengers appointed by partisan political officials, to determine both whether a voter has presented a form of identification which conforms to that required by the Law and whether the person presenting the identification is the person depicted on it. Conferring this degree of discretion upon partisan precinct officials and members of election boards to enforce the facially neutral requirements of the Law has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view.

The State arguably might be justified in imposing uniform, narrowly-tailored and not overly-burdensome voter identification requirements if the State were able to show that there is an intolerably high incidence of fraud among voters misidentifying themselves at the polls for the purpose of casting a fraudulent ballot. But here, the State has utterly failed to show that this genre of fraud is rampant or even that it has ever occurred in the context of on-site, in-person voting (as opposed to absentee voting by mail) so as to justify these extra burdens, which will fall disproportionately on the poor and elderly.

And where the State has already provided a mechanism for matching signatures, has made it a crime to misrepresent one's identity for purposes of voting, and requires the swearing out of an affidavit if the voter's identity is challenged, it already has provisions more than adequate to prevent or minimize fraud in the context of in-person voting, particularly in the absence of any evidence that the problem the Law seeks to address is anything more than the product of hypothesis, speculation and fantasy.

In-person voter-identity fraud is notoriously difficult to detect and investigate. In his book *Stealing Elections*, John Fund observes that actual in-person voter fraud is nearly undetectable without a voter photo-identification requirement because anybody who provides a name that is on the rolls may vote and then walk away with no record of the person's actual identity. The problem is only exacerbated by the increasingly transient nature of society. Documentation of in-person voter fraud often occurs only when a legitimate voter at the polls hears a fraudulent voter trying to use her name, as happened to a woman in California in 1994. See Larry J. Sabato & Glenn R. Simpson, *Dirty Little Secrets* 292 (1996).

Regardless of the lack of extensive evidence of in-person voter fraud, the Commission on
Federal Election Reform (known as the Baker-Carter Commission) recently concluded that "there is no doubt that it occurs." State Ex. 1, p. 18.1 Legal cases as well as newspaper and other reports confirm that in-person voter-identity fraud, including voter impersonation, double votes, dead votes, and fake addresses, plague federal and state elections. [The memorandum details several specific cases of various types of alleged voting fraud from the past several years]

Though they are largely unable to study verifiable data concerning in-person voter fraud, scholars are well aware of the conditions that foster fraudulent voting. See Fund, supra; Sabato & Simpson, supra, 321. In particular, fraud has become ever more likely as "it has become more difficult to keep the voting rolls clean of 'deadwood' voters who have moved or died" because such an environment makes "fraudulent voting easier and therefore more tempting for those so inclined." Sabato & Simpson, supra, 321. "In general, experts believe that one in five names on the rolls in Indiana do not belong there." State Ex. 25.

For this case, Clark Benson, a nationally recognized expert in the collection and analysis of voter-registration and population data, conducted his own examination of Indiana's voter registration lists and concluded that they are among the most highly inflated in the nation. The Crawford Plaintiffs cite the concessions by Indiana Election Division Co-Director King and the Intervenor-State that they are unaware of any historical in-person incidence of voter fraud occurring at the polling place (Crawford Brief, p. 23) as conclusive evidence that in-person voter fraud does not exist in Indiana. They also seek to support this conclusion with the testimony of two "veteran poll watchers," Plaintiff Crawford and former president of the Plaintiff NAACP, Indianapolis Chapter, Roderick E. Bohannon, who testified that they had never seen any instances of in-person voter fraud.

While common sense, the experiences of many other states, and the findings of the Baker-Carter Commission alone lead to the reasonable inferences that (a) in-person polling place fraud likely exists, but (b) is nearly impossible to detect without requiring photo identification, the State can cite to no confirmed instances of such fraud. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs have no proof that it does not occur.

At the level of logic, moreover, it is just reasonable to conclude that the lack of confirmed incidents of in-person voting fraud in Indiana is the result of an ineffective identification security system as it is to conclude there is no in-person voting fraud in Indiana. So while it is undisputed that the state has no proof that in-person polling place fraud has occurred in Indiana, there does in fact remain a dispute over the existence vel non of in-person polling place fraud.

It is also important to understand that the nature of in-person election fraud is such that is nearly impossible to detect or investigate. Unless a voter stumbles across someone else trying to use her identity, see Sabato & Simpson, supra, 292, or unless the over-taxed poll worker happens to notice that the voter's signature is different from her registration signature State Ext. 37, ¶ 9, the chances of detecting such in-person voter fraud are extremely small. Yet, inflated voter-registration rolls provide ample opportunity for those who wish to commit in-person voter fraud. See Fund, supra, 24, 65, 69, 138; Sabato & Simpson, supra, 321. And there is concrete evidence that the names of dead people have been used to cast fraudulent ballots. See Fund, supra, 64. Particularly in light of Indiana's highly inflated voter rolls State Ex. 27, p. 9, Plaintiffs' repeated claims that there has never been any in-person voter fraud in Indiana can hardly be plausible, even if the state is unable to prove that such fraud has in fact occurred.

Common Cause of Georgia vs. Billups, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia (Rome) 4:05-cv-00201-HLM U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 05-15784

The Secretary of State, as the Chief Election Officer in Georgia, informed the General Assembly before the passage of Act 53 in a letter (attached hereto as Exhibit A), and also informed the Governor in a letter (attached hereto as Exhibit B) before he signed the bill into law, that there had been no documented cases of fraudulent voting by persons who obtained ballots unlawfully by misrepresenting their identities as registered voters to poll workers reported to her office during her nine years as Secretary of State.

Although the Secretary of State had informed the members of the General Assembly and the Governor prior to the enactment of Act 53, that her office had
received many complaints of voter fraud involving absentee ballots and no documented complaints of fraud that involve ballots that were cast in person at the polls, the General Assembly ignored this information and arbitrarily chose instead to require only those registered voters who vote in person to present a Photo ID as a condition of voting, but deliberately refused to impose the same requirement on absentee voters.

The Stated Purpose Of The Photo ID Requirement Fraud Is A Pretext.

According to a press release prepared by the Communications Office of the Georgia House of Representatives, the purpose of Act 53 is: to address the issue of voter fraud by placing tighter restrictions on voter identification procedures. Those casting ballots will now be required to bring a photo ID with them before they will be allowed to vote.

Al Marks, Vice Chairman for Public Affairs and Communication of the Hall County GOP told the Gainesville Times: I don't think we need it for voting, because I don't think there's a voter fraud problem. Gainesville Times, "States Voters Must Present Picture IDs" (September 15, 2005) (www.gainesvilletimes.com).

There is no evidence that the existing provisions of Georgia law have not been effective in deterring and preventing imposters from fraudulently obtaining and casting ballots at the polls by misrepresenting their true identities to election officials and passing themselves off as registered voters whose names appear on the official voter registration list.

The pretextural nature of the purported justification for the burden which the Photo ID requirement imposes on the right to vote is shown by the following facts:

(a) Fraudulent voting was already prohibited by existing Georgia law without unduly burdening the right of a citizen to vote.
   (i) Fraudulent voting was already prohibited as a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-561, 21-2-562, 21-2-566, 21-2-571, 21-2-572 and 21-2-600, punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to ten years, or both.
   (ii) Voter registration records are updated periodically by the Secretary of State and local election officials to eliminate people who have died, have moved, or are no longer eligible to vote in Georgia for some other reason.
   (iii) Existing Georgia law also required election officials in each precinct to maintain a list of names and addresses of registered voters residing in that precinct, and to check off the names of each person from that official list as they cast their ballots.
   (iv) Registered voters were also required by existing Georgia law to present at least one of the seventeen forms of documentary identification to election officials who were required, before issuing the voter a ballot, to match the name and address shown on the document to the name and address on the official roll of registered voters residing in the particular precinct. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.

(b) There is no evidence that the existing Georgia law has not been effective in deterring or preventing fraudulent in-person voting by impersonators - the only kind of fraudulent voting that might be prevented by the Photo ID requirement. To the contrary, the Secretary of State, who, as the Superintendent of Elections, is the highest election official in Georgia, informed both the General Assembly (Exhibit A) and the Governor (Exhibit B) in writing that there had been no documented cases of fraudulent in-person voting by imposters reported to her during her nine years in office.

(c) If the true intention of the General Assembly had been to prevent fraudulent voting by imposters, the General Assembly would have imposed the same restrictions on the casting of absentee ballots - particularly after the Secretary of State had called to their attention the fact that there had been many documented instances of fraudulent casting of absentee ballots reported to her office.

(d) Fraudulent in-person voting is unlikely, would be easily detected if it had occurred in significant numbers, and would not be likely to have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election:
   (i) Many people vote at a local neighborhood polling place where they are likely to be known to and recognized by neighbors or poll workers.
   (ii) Voters were required by existing Georgia law (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417), to provide one of the seventeen means of identification to election officials.
   (iii) Election officials are required, before issuing the ballot to the voter, to check off the name of either voter from an up-to-date list of the names and addresses of every registered voter residing in the precinct. If an imposter arrived at a poll and was successful in fraudulently obtaining a ballot before
the registered voter arrived at the poll, a registered voter, who having taken the time to go to the polls to vote, would undoubtedly complain to elections officials if he or she were refused a ballot and not allowed to vote because his or her name had already been checked off the list of registered voters as having voted. Likewise, if an imposter arrived at the polls after the registered voter had voted and attempted to pass himself off as someone he was not, the election official would instantly know of the attempted fraud, would not issue the imposter a ballot or allow him to vote, and presumably would have the imposter arrested or at least investigate the attempted fraud and report the attempt to the Secretary of State as Superintendent of Elections.


Overview: Five career attorneys with the civil rights department investigated and analyzed Georgia’s election reform law. Four of those attorneys recommended objecting to Section 59, the voter identification requirement. The provision required all voters to present government issued photo identification in order to vote. The objection was based on the attorneys’ findings that there was little to no evidence of polling place fraud, the only kind of fraud an ID requirement would address, and that the measure would disenfranchise many voters, predominantly minority voters, in violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Factual Analysis: The sponsor of the measure in the state legislature said she was motivated by the fact that she is aware of vote buying in certain districts; she read John Fund’s book; and that “if there are fewer black voters because of this bill, it will only be because there is less opportunity for fraud. She said that when black voters in her black precincts are not paid to vote, they do not go to the polls.”

A member of the Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections said that prior to November 2004, Fulton County received 8,112 applications containing “missing or irregular” information. Only 55 of those registrants responded to BOE letters. The member concluded that the rest must be “bogus” as a result. He also stated that 15,237 of 105,553 precinct cards came back as undeliverable, as did 3,071 cards sent to 45,907 new voters. Of these 3,071, 921 voted.

Secretary of State Cathy Cox submitted a letter testifying to the absence of any complaints of voter fraud via impersonation during her tenure. In the legal analysis, the attorneys state that if they determine that Georgia could have fulfilled its stated purpose of election fraud, while preventing or ameliorating the retrogression, an objection is appropriate. They conclude that the state could have avoided retrogression by retaining various forms of currently accepted voter ID for which no substantiated security concerns were raised. Another non-retrogressive alternative would have been to maintain the affidavit alternative for those without ID, since “There is no evidence that penalty of law is an insufficient deterrent to falsely signing an affidavit of identity.” The attorneys point out that the state’s recitation of a case upholding voter fraud in Dodge County does not support the purpose of the Act because that case involved vote buying and selling, not impersonation or voting under a false identity.
Election Official Misconduct:
- A person commits Election Official misconduct if while an election official the person:
  - Intentionally fails to perform an election duty, or knowingly does an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election.
  - Knowingly permits, makes, or attempts to make a false count of election returns.
  - Intentionally conceals, withholds, or destroys election returns or attempts to do so.
  - Opens a ballot received from a voter at an election, unless otherwise permitted.
  - Marks a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time.
  - Otherwise attempts to learn how a voter marked a ballot.
  - Distributes or attempts to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent.
  - Knowingly refuses to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction.

Petition Subscription:
- A person commits a crime of improper subscription to a petition or referendum if:
  - He sings a name other than his own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office.
  - Knowingly signs more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate at one election.
  - Signs a petition proposing an initiative or referendum while knowingly not being a qualified voter.
  - Solicits, accepts, or agress to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative.

Campaign misconduct:
- A person commits a crime of campaign misconduct if he knowingly makes a communication:
  - Containing false factual information relating to a candidate for an election that the person knows to be false and that a person could reasonably construe as damaging to the candidate’s reputation for honesty or integrity, or to the candidate’s qualifications to serve if elected to office.
  - Knowingly removes, alters, defaces or covers any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election.

Unlawful Interference with Voting:
- A person commits the crime of unlawful interference with voting when the person:
Uses, threatens to use, or causes to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicts, threatens to inflict, or causes to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting.

Knowingly pays, offers to pay, or causes to be paid money or other valuable thing to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate at an election or for an election proposition or question.

Has an official ballot in possession outside the voting room, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance.

Makes, or knowingly has in possession, a counterfeit of an official election ballot.

Knowingly solicits or encourages a registered voter who is no longer qualified to vote in an election.

Fraudulently alters or changes the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as he intended.

Knowingly causes to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mails or distributes, literature that includes a designation of the voter's precinct polling place other than a precinct polling place listed for that voter in an official precinct polling list that constituted the latest official precinct polling list.

Knowingly challenges a person's right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or who engages in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or delay the process of voting.

As an employer, attempts by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself or another of an employee's ballot.

Removes or destroys any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments for the purpose of enabling the voter to prepare his or her ballot.

Removes, tears down, or defaces the cards printed for the instruction of voters.

Removes, tears down, marks or otherwise defaces any voter index with the intent to falsify or prevent others from readily ascertaining the name, address, or political affiliation of an voter, or the fact that a voter has or has not voted.

Voter Misconduct

A voter commits voter misconduct if the person:

Votes or attempts to vote in the name of another person or in a name other than person's own.

Votes or attempts to vote more than once at the same election with the intent that the person's vote be counted more than once.

Intentionally makes a false affidavit, swears falsely, or falsely affirms under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status.

Knowingly solicits a person to vote after the polls are closed with the intent that the vote be counted.
- Registers to vote without being entitled to register.
- Knowingly makes a material false statement while applying for voter registration or reregistration.
- Voters or attempts to vote in an election after being disqualified.

**Unlawful Interference With an Election**
- A person commits the crime of unlawful interference with an election if the person:
  - Induces or attempts to induce an election official to fail in the official’s duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward.
  - Intentionally changes, attempts to change, or causes to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns.
  - Intentionally delays, attempts to delay, or causes to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.
  - Directly or though any other person advances, pays, solicits, or receives or causes to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office.
Julie:

I just remembered that there was one other DOJ objection. It was about the way the consultants described the Election Crimes Branch focus on cases. In the interview with Donsanto (the only interview I attended), he made reference to the fact that the Election Crimes Branch used to only go after conspiracies, not individuals. Now, however, they had begun prosecuting individuals for noncitizen and felon voting. The consultants heard an unexpressed "instead", which would mean that DOJ had dropped pursuing conspiracies in favor of going after individuals. Based on my previous experience, I heard and unexpressed "in addition", meaning that DOJ was not just prosecuting conspiracies, the department also had begun to prosecute individuals.

I had lengthy discussions with the consultants over this issue as well. Donsanto confirmed that he meant "in addition", and the lists of cases he provided indicates that the department continues to pursue conspiracies. (It doesn't make sense any other way, unless you believe that the government is out to get the little guy.) --- Peggy
OK, I will get started on the interview summaries today.

DOJ (Donsanto and Tanner) raised objections to the consultants’ description of their interviews, which state that DOJ officials agreed they were bringing fewer intimidation and suppression cases. An advocacy group is going after DOJ, accusing the agency of doing just that for political reasons, so this is something DOJ wants corrected.

Apart from the consultants pre-existing bias that "the feds aren't doing enough", a big part of the problem appears to have been a misunderstanding over terminology. When our consultants used the term "intimidation", they included all sorts of suppression activities. When Craig Donsanto used the term "intimidation", he was using the definition under federal criminal vote fraud statutes, which requires the action be accompanied by threat of physical or economic harm. (He told me he has had only one such case in 30 years.) His office is actively pursuing voter suppression activities under statutes other than federal voter intimidation laws (e.g.; the recent case in NH where a campaign operative conspired to block election day GOTV telephone lines of the opposing party). A copy of Tanner’s comments on the interview summary in the status report for the Standards and Advisory Boards meetings is attached.

I had many long discussions with Tova and Job about this. I was able to get them to soften their description (see 4th bullet on page 7 of the draft report), but not entirely to my satisfaction. Also, at the Working Group meeting, it was agreed that the consultants would add a note to their definition to clarify that the working definition for purposes of the research includes activities that do not meet the federal definition of voter intimidation. The resulting note on page 5 of the draft report is too vague.

DOJ has not seen everything the consultants put in the draft final report, so they may have additional concerns. For example, the consultants' recommendations include the following:

- Attend the Department of Justice’s Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. The consultants also believe it would be useful for any further activity in this area to include attendance at the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. According to the Department, DEOs are required to attend annual training conferences centered on combating election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, feature presentations by civil rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. According to the Department, DEOs are required to attend annual training conferences centered on combating election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, feature presentations by civil rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.

Footnote:
By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following:
How DEOs are trained, e.g. what they are taught to focus their resources on; How they are instructed to respond to various types of complaints; How information about previous elections and voting issues is presented; and, How the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

DOJ has stated that this is an internal meeting, involving only DOJ officials, US Attorneys and FBI. EAC researchers cannot be admitted without opening the meeting to other outsiders. DOJ does not want to do this, probably for two reasons: (1) confidential information on current enforcement cases may be
discussed; and (2) making enforcement strategies public could give unscrupulous individuals a virtual "how to" manual for circumventing such strategies when committing election crimes.

We may also have a hard time gaining access to the DOE reports and the Voting Section records of complaints, as they probably aren't considered public documents.

--- Peggy

Juliet E. Hodgkins/EAC/GOV

that would be great. I am also interested in identifying the points of contention between DOJ and the consultants.

Juliet Thompson Hodgkins
General Counsel
United States Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW, Ste 1100
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 566-3100
Margaret Sims/EAC/GOV

Margaret Sims/EAC/GOV

Yes (at T:\RESEARCH IN PROGRESS\VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION\Interviews\Interview Summaries). Do you want me to do the same with those as I did with the literature summaries? --- Peggy

Juliet E. Hodgkins/EAC/GOV
Did Tova and Job provide us with summaries or notes of their interviews?

Juliet Thompson Hodgkins  
General Counsel  
United States Election Assistance Commission  
1225 New York Ave., NW, Ste 1100  
Washington, DC 20005  
(202) 566-3100
To: Members of the United States Election Assistance Commission
Cc: Thomas Wilkey, Executive Director, and Julie Thompson Hodgkins, General Counsel, Election Assistance Commission
From: Tova Andrea Wang
Re: Project on Voter Fraud and Intimidation
Date: December 7, 2006

As one of the consultants and authors of the report on voter fraud and intimidation released by the Election Assistance Commission today, I am writing to request that the EAC restore the information that has been altered and removed from the research report we submitted to the EAC in July, 2006.

Job Serebrov and I spent over a year and hundreds of hours working on the report on voter fraud and voter intimidation in a bipartisan and highly effective manner. The report we wrote was a reflection of the detailed and laborious research we did over these many months. Unfortunately, the report the EAC released today does not fully reflect our research and the report of our findings submitted to the EAC in July, 2006.

After being unable to get any action taken on the report for months, I learned very recently that the General Counsel of the EAC would be taking responsibility for “revising” the report. On November 15 of this year I requested that Job Serebrov and I be permitted to review any revisions or changes made by EAC staff to the draft we submitted. We both offered to work collaboratively and cooperatively with EAC staff to ensure that the document produced was the most informative and useful product possible. This request was denied. Again, on November 29, 2006, upon learning that the report was to become public at an upcoming EAC meeting, I requested in writing that Job Serebrov and I be at least allowed to see embargoed copies of the report to be released before that December 7, 2006 meeting. That request was denied. On December 4, 2006 I offered to sign a confidentiality agreement whereby I would agree not to discuss the report before its public release. That request was also denied.

It is my understanding that with other research reports for which the EAC has contracted consultants there has been a process of give and take between the consultants and the EAC staff and commissioners prior to public release of the report. The consultants in this instance were repeatedly denied that opportunity, leading to today’s result.

The issues around voter fraud and intimidation are controversial, making it all the more necessary that the research around it be as free from politics as possible. That is why the EAC made this project a bipartisan effort, with a bipartisan team of consultants and a bipartisan working group to inform and advise us on our work.

The EAC has a statutory obligation to provide the Congress and the American public the best research, data and guidance it can. Knowledge about the extent and nature of voter fraud and intimidation is fundamental to ensuring the right of every eligible American to vote and that every legitimate vote is counted.

Deliberative Process Privilege

016597
I hope the EAC will reconsider its actions of today and release the report that was written by the consultants so that the Congress and the voters can engage in an informed and honest discussion about one of the most serious issues confronting our democracy today.

Please respond to this request by Monday, December 11. Thank you for your timely consideration.
Connecticut

Delaware
Political Material

* No Employer shall put into the Employee's pay envelope
* Every person who knowingly challenges a person's right to vote, voids, or on fraudulent grounds or malice, or advise someone fraudulently that they are ineligible to vote, shall be guilty of a crime
* Any person in possession of a firearm, or any firearm, peace officer, guard, or security personnel stationed in the immediate vicinity of the polling place, shall be guilty of a crime
* Any person having charge of a completed absent voter ballot who willfully interferes or causes interference with its return to the local election officials

Colorado

* No name shall be added to the registration book of any precinct after close of registration. Any election official who causes a name to be added is guilty of a crime
* Can't mutilate, or erase any name, figure, or word in registration book, registration list, or poll book
* Election judge cannot willfully or maliciously refuse or neglect to receive the ballot of a registered elector. Can't cause through deceit a person to submit a defective ballot. Can't knowingly vote in wrong precinct
* Registers To Vote W/O Being Entitled To
* Makes False Statement While Registering

**Arizona**
* Controlling a Ballot or Altering a Confidential Ballot
* Interference w/ Election officials' Duties (Resulting)
* Attempt to Fix an Election
* Coercion or Intimidation (Same as Alaska)
* Knowingly remove, alter, before or after an
  Political Sign of My Candidate for Public
  Office for Prescribed Period

**Arkansas**
* Can't Tamper w/ Voting Machines

**California**
* Persons in Charge of Registering Voters May Not
  Knowingly Register a False Person or a Person They Know To
  Be Fraudulently Registering
* Misuse of Voter Registration Information or
  Obtaining Into Other Than as Permitted by Law
* Can't Pay To Get Someone To Become a Candidate
  or Withdraw As A Candidate
* Can't Send Voters False Info About Their Polling
  Place
* No Person Shall Destroy, Tear Down or Remove Polling Booth,
  Things in Polling Booth...
Alabama
* Vote more than once or vote when not entitled
* False impersonation
* Requisition or attempting to be done, influence
* Buy or offer to buy a vote
* Sell vote
* Altering or changing someone's vote
* Disturb, prevent or attempt to prevent a vote
* Compelled by an employer over employee
* Provide false info to vote or register to vote

Alaska - Anything new?
* Election official 1) Fails to perform (non-fraud)
  2) False count 3) Conceals, withholds, destroys, attempts election returns
  4) Opens a ballot received by permission 5) Marks a ballot to identify it 6) Attempts to learn how a
  voter marked
* Petition subscription - signs wrong name, paid, signs twice.
* Knowingly disseminate info that is false that hurts candidate's reputation
* Uses, threatens to use or causes to be used force, coercion, violence or restraint to compel or influence
  a vote or refraining a vote
* Has official ballot outside of voting room unless authorized
* Counterfeit ballots
STATE VOTING LAWS - CRIMINAL OFFENSES

1. Buying Votes
2. Selling Votes
3. Altering or Changing Vote on Election Day
4. Providing False Info to Register or Vote
5. Counterfeiting or Distributing Unlawful Ballots
6. False Endorsement, Distraction or Delay in Delivery of Ballot
7. Interference w/ or Corruption of Election Officer
8. Coercion or Intimidation of Voter
9. Tampering w/ Political Signs
10. Willful Registration of Fictitious Person

- Trying to get a Comped List of Vote Crimes throughout the States,
  *Get Comped List - Use Comped Terms
ALABAMA

Miscellaneous Offences include:

1. Illegal voting or attempting to vote
2. Illegal voting at municipal elections
3. Bribing or attempting to influence voter
4. Buying votes
5. Selling votes
6. Candidate barred by bribery
7. Altering or changing vote of elector
8. Disturbing elector on election day
9. Employer intimidating employee
10. Coercion of employees of corporations
11. Providing false information to register or vote

(ALa.Code 1975 § 17-23)

ALASKA

Election Offenses, Corrupt Practices, and Penalties include:

1. Election official misconduct in the first degree
2. Election official misconduct in the second degree
3. Improper subscription to petition
4. Campaign misconduct in the first degree
5. Campaign misconduct in the second degree
6. Campaign misconduct in the third degree
7. Applicability of campaign misconduct provisions
8. Telephone campaign misconduct
9. Unlawful interference with voting in the first degree
10. Unlawful interference with voting in the second degree
11. Voter misconduct in the first degree
12. Voter misconduct in the second degree
13. Unlawful interference with an election
14. Refusal to allow employees time off
15. Effect of certain convictions
16. Disposition of cases involving corrupt practice
17. Time limitations
18. Definitions

(AD ST § 15.56)

ARIZONA


1. Applicability of penal provisions
2. Counterfeiting or distributing unlawful ballots; classification
3. False endorsement, knowing destruction or delay in delivery of ballot; classifications
4. Interference with or corruption of election officer; interference with voting equipment; classification
5. Early ballot abuse; classification
6. Changing vote of elector by corrupt means or inducement; classification
7. Election officer ascertaining or disclosing elector's vote; classification
8. Election officer changing vote of elector by menace or reward; classification
9. Failure or refusal to perform duty by election officer; classification
10. Refusal by election officer to perform duty; violation of election law; classification
11. Counterfeiting election returns; classification
12. Intimidation of elector by employer; classification
13. Coercion or intimidation of elector; classification
14. Corruption of electors; classification
15. Election wagers; classification
16. Illegal voting; pollution of ballot box; removal or destruction of ballot box, poll lists or ballots; classification
17. Unlawful acts by voters with respect to voting; classification
18. Additional unlawful acts by persons with respect to voting; classification
19. Political signs; tampering; classification
20. Signing of petitions; violation; classification

(A.R.S. T. 16, Ch. 7)

ARKANSAS
General Provisions
1. Misdemeanors
2. Felonies

(C.A.C. § 7-1-103, 104)

CALIFORNIA
Penal Provisions
A. General Provisions
1. Scope of division
2. General fine
3. Failure to perform or violation of duty; general penalty
B. Voter Registration
1. Violations; imprisonment
2. Willful registration of fictitious person or person not requesting registration; violations; imprisonment
3. Deputy or registration elections official; violations; imprisonment
4. Interference with transfer of completed affidavits of registration; unauthorized retention or denial of right to return registration cards; misdemeanor
5. Deputy registrars; failure to return affidavits of registration; misdemeanor; report; civil or criminal action
6. Affidavit of registration or voter registration card; statement in support or opposition of candidates by other than registrant; misdemeanor
7. Tampering with party affiliation declaration
8. Voter registration cards; distribution; violations; infraction
Electronic submission of absentee ballot application for another registered voter; violation; offense; penalty
Registration assistance for consideration; failure to comply with statutory requirements; misdemeanor; penalties; exemptions
Affidavit records; notice of non-complying affidavits; failure to comply with statutory requirements; offense; penalties; exemptions
Misuse of voter registration information; violation
Disclosure of home address or telephone number on voter registration card; violations

C. Nomination of Candidates
Subscription of false names to petitions; felony; imprisonment
Nomination papers; false making, defacement or destruction; penalty
Failure to properly file nomination papers or declaration of candidacy; misdemeanor
False nomination papers or declaration of candidacy; filing or submission; penalty
Suppression of nomination papers or declarations of candidacy; penalty
Payment of consideration to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate; imprisonment

D. Election Campaigns
Campaign literature
Simulated ballot or sample ballot; printing or duplication; statement, official seal or insignia violations; misdemeanor
False precinct information
Mass mailing; penal provisions
Reproduction or facsimile of seal of county or seal of local government agency in campaign literature or mass mailing with intent to deceive voters; offense

Political Party Caucuses
Consideration for voting or agreeing to vote for or against nominees or candidates; penalty
Bribes; giving or receiving; penalty

Deceptive Online Activities
Short title; political cyberfraud; definitions
Application to domain name registrar, registry, or registration authority
Transfer of domain name as remedy
Jurisdiction

Political Meetings
Prevention of electors from assembling; misdemeanor

Misrepresentation by Candidates
Implication that candidate is incumbent or acting in capacity of public officer; misdemeanor; injunction
Candidates' statements; false statement of material fact with intent to mislead; punishment
6. Solicitation of Funds
   a. Solicitation without required consent; violations; misdemeanor
   b. Solicitation not authorized by candidate or committee; use of name; notice; misdemeanor
7. Electioneering
   a. Electioneering where voters may be casting votes; misdemeanor
   b. Absentee voters; solicitation in the residence on the immediate presence of absentee voter; misdemeanor
8. Vandalism at Polling Places
   a. Violations; misdemeanor
9. Misuse of State Publications
   a. State agencies and departments; misuse of publications

E. Ballots
   1. Use or furnishing of imitation ballot paper or punchcards; penalties
   2. Printing or circulation of nonconforming ballots
   3. Knowing distribution of unauthorized application for absent voter's ballot
   4. Receipt or examination of, or solicitation of voter to show voted ballot; penalty

F. Corruption of the Voting Process
      a. Fraud; casting of votes; felony; imprisonment
      b. Public officials; aiding illegal casting of votes; fraud; disqualification from holding office in state; imprisonment
      c. Interference with officers or voters; imprisonment
   2. Corruption of Voters
      a. Offer or promise of office, place or employment; to induce other to vote or refrain from voting; penalties
      b. Gift or other consideration to induce person to vote or refrain from voting; penalties
      c. Payment or offer to pay, lend or contribute to induce person to vote or refrain from voting
      d. Bribery; payment of consideration with intent to bribe; penalties
      e. Boarding, lodging or maintaining persons with intent to secure vote or to induce voting
   3. Intimidation of Voters
      a. Use of force, violence, tactic of coercion or intimidation; penalties
      b. Prohibited activities in proximity of polling place relating to the intent of dissuading others from voting; penalties
      c. Political material in pay envelopes
      d. Challenging right to vote without probable cause; conspiracies; penalty
Persons in possession of a firearm or uniformed peace officers or security guards stationed near polling place without authorization; penalty; application

Hiring or arranging for another in possession of firearm or uniformed peace officer or security guard to be stationed near polling place; penalty

Elections official; immediate vicinity

4. Corruption of Voting
   a. Fraudulent voting; crime
   b. Procuring or advising vote of unqualified persons; aiding or abetting offenses
   c. Rejected
   d. Precinct board members; ballot violations; misdemeanor
   e. Precinct board members; disclosure of vote without consent; misdemeanor
   f. § 18564. Tampering with or damaging voting machines; interference with secrecy of voting; unauthorized making or possession of keys; willful substitution of forged source codes
   g. Civil action for offenses
   h. Aiding and abetting offenses; penalty
   i. Forging or counterfeiting election returns
   j. Altering returns
   k. Offenses at the polls; penalties
   l. Aiding or abetting offenses
   m. Voting results; offenses; misdemeanor
   n. Counting board members; failure to obey lawful orders
   o. Counting board members; liabilities and penalties
   p. Deceiving voter unable to read; causing voter to vote for different person than intended through fraud; felony
   q. Refusal of person required to be sworn or to answer questions; misdemeanor
   r. Unlawfully acting as election officers; acting in unauthorized capacity; misdemeanor
   s. Absent voter ballot; willful interference with delivery, retention beyond time limits or denial of right to return completed ballot; misdemeanor
   t. Willful interference or cause of interference with return to local elections official by person in charge of completed absent voter ballot
   u. Absent voter ballot; fraudulent signature

G. Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
   1. Improper Signature – Gathering Tactics
      a. Misrepresentation or false statement concerning petitions
      b. Refusal to show text of measure or petition; misdemeanor
c. Obscuring summary of initiative or referendum measure; misdemeanor

d. Payment for signatures; offense

2. False of Ineligible Signatures on Petition
   a. Solicitation of circulators to affix or permit false or forged signatures; penalty
   b. Circulation with false, forged or fictitious names; penalties
   c. Signing more than once or while disqualified; penalty
   d. Fictitious names or signing name of another; penalty
   e. Filing with false signatures; penalties

3. Improper Payments to Prevent Petition Circulation and Filing
   a. Soliciting or obtaining money or thing of value for inducing proponents to abandon petitions
   b. Receipt by proponent of consideration for abandoning petitions; penalties
   c. Buying of petitions from circulators; misdemeanor

4. Threats and Theft to Prevent Petition Circulation and Filing
   a. Threat to commit assault or battery or to damage property; misdemeanor
   b. Taking petitions from circulators by force or stealth; misdemeanor

5. Refusal of Circulators to Turn in Petitions
   a. Failure to surrender petitions to proponents; penalties

6. Misuse of Signatures on Petition
   a. Use of signatures for other than qualification for ballot; misdemeanor

7. False Affidavits Concerning Petitions
   a. False affidavits; penalties
   b. Public officers; false returns, certifications or affidavits

8. Filing Petitions to Defeat an Initiative or Referendum
   a. Misdemeanor
   b. Void petitions; filing with intent to defeat expression of public will

9. Misuse of Campaign Funds
   a. Misappropriation; expenses within due and lawful execution of the trust; penalties

H. Obligations of Precinct Board
   1. Failure to fulfill duties; misdemeanor

(Cal.Elec.Code § 18000)
15. Disclosing or identifying vote
16. Intimidation
17. Electioneering--removing and return of ballot
18. Liquor in or near polling place
19. Destroying, removing, or delaying delivery of election records
20. Penalty for destruction of supplies
21. Release of information concerning count
22. Employer's unlawful acts
23. Unlawfully giving or promising money or employment
24. Receipt of money or jobs
25. Defacing or removing abstract of votes
26. Penalty for neglect of duty--destruction of ballots--breaking seal

G. Absentee Voting and Voting by New Residents
   1. Mailing other materials with absentee voter's ballot
   2. Absentee voter applications and deliveries outside county clerk and
      recorder's office
   3. Offenses relating to absentee voting

(C.R.S.A. § 1-13)

CONNECTICUT
Prohibited Acts and Penalties
   A. Failure to warn election
   B. Delay in counting or declaring vote
   C. Tampering with machine by election official
   D. False return
   E. Improper printing of ballot label
   F. Official neglect or fraud
   G. Fraudulent registration
   H. False swearing before registrar, moderator, board or State Elections
      Enforcement Commission
   I. Absentee ballots
   J. False statement in absentee balloting. Class D felony
   K. Fraudulent voting
   L. Primary or enrollment violations
   M. Decision of election officials no bar to prosecution
   N. Circulation of misleading instructions
   O. Influencing elector to refrain from voting
   P. Acts prohibited in elections, primaries, referenda, caucuses and conventions.
      Penalties
   Q. Employers' threats
   R. Interference with electors in voting
   S. Tampering with voting machine
   T. Arrest of accused
   U. Misrepresentation of contents of a petition

(C.G.S.A § 9. Ch. 151)
4. Perjury
5. False certificates by officers
6. Forgery
7. Violation of duty
8. False statements relating to candidates or questions related to electors—penalties—definitions
9. Wagers with electors
10. Penalties for election offenses
11. Offenses relating to mail ballots
12. Interference with distribution of election material
13. Failure to comply with requirements of secretary of state

B. Qualification and Registration of Electors
1. Interfering with or impeding registration
2. Unlawful qualification as taxpaying elector
3. Procuring false registration
4. Adding names after registration closed
5. County clerk and recorder signing wrongful registration
6. Signature on registration record is proof of oath
7. Deputy county clerk and recorder— Influencing party affiliation
8. High school deputy registrar— Influencing party affiliation

C. Political Party Organization
1. Fraud at precinct caucus, assembly, or convention
2. Fraudulent voting in precinct caucus, assembly, or convention
3. Offenses at precinct caucus, assembly, or convention

D. Access to Ballot by Candidate
1. Bribery of petition signers
2. Tampering with nomination papers—nomination petitions
3. Defacing of petitions other than nominating petitions

E. Notice and Preparation for Elections
1. Tampering with notices or supplies

F. Conduct of Elections
1. Interference with election official
2. Interfering with watcher
3. Tampering with registration book, registration list, or pollbook
4. Unlawfully refusing ballot or permitting to vote
5. Voting by persons not entitled to vote—penalty
6. Personating elector
7. Delivering and receiving ballots at polls
8. Inducing defective ballot
9. Tampering with voting equipment
10. Elected official not to handle electronic or electromechanical voting equipment or devices
11. Voting in wrong precinct
12. Residence—false information—penalty
13. Voting twice—penalty
14. Interference with voter while voting
DELAWARE
Penal and Enforcement Provisions
A. Neglect of duty; corrupt or fraudulent conduct; penalty
B. Wrongful registration; assault; riot; breach of peace; penalty
C. Registration records; fraudulent entries; alterations, obliterations or omissions; loss; destruction; mutilation; secretion; false copies; ...
D. Alcoholic liquor in registration places; penalty
E. Intimidation of registration officers; penalty
F. Notice to Attorney General of violations of registration laws
G. Unauthorized entering of registration area; interference with registration; penalty

(CR ST TI 15 Ch. 23)
Criminal Offences
A. General Provisions
   1. Jurisdiction of Court
   2. Prosecution by Attorney General; duty to report violations
   3. Irregularities or defects in election as a defense
   4. Honest belief as a defense
   5. Application to school elections
B. Particular Offenses
   1. Neglect of duty by department member; corrupt or fraudulent conduct; penalty
   2. Refusal of inspector or judge of election to serve; penalty
   3. Refusal of clerk of election to qualify or serve; penalty
   4. Improper conduct of printer of ballots and ballot envelopes; penalty
   5. Improper use of ballot or envelope; penalty
   6. Tampering with voting machines; penalties
   7. Unauthorized entering of voting room; penalties
   8. Interference with election; penalties
   9. Feigning a physical disability to obtain assistance in voting; penalty
  10. Secreteing person in election room; penalty
  11. Removal or destruction of election supplies or equipment or voting machines; penalty
  12. Disclosures by election officers; penalty
  13. Intimidation, persuasion or bribery by election officer; penalty
  14. Inducing the making of distinguishing mark on ballot; penalty
  15. Inducing election officers to violate election laws; penalty
  16. Violations by officials; penalty
  17. Bribery of person expecting to be election or registration officer; penalty
  18. Fraudulent voting; penalty
  19. False entries by clerk of election
  20. Failure of election officer to perform duties
  21. False count or certification by election officer
  22. Fraudulent deposit or alteration of ballots or entering voting machine booth or casting vote; penalty
23. Willful neglect of duty by election officers
24. Stealing, destroying or secreting records; penalty
25. Perjury; subornation of perjury
26. Tampering with ballots or deceiving voters; penalty
27. Disobeying election officers; penalty
28. Breach of peace or violence on election day; penalty
29. Interference with election officer or challenger; penalty
30. Failure of inspector to preserve order
31. Stealing or destroying ballot box, ballot, poll list; penalty
32. Requiring unauthorized oath; penalty
33. Candidate for General Assembly not to make written pledge; penalty
34. Unauthorized release of absentee vote information; penalty

C. Offenses Carrying Civil Liability
   1. Intimidation of election officers; penalty
   2. Intimidation of electors; penalty
   3. Liability of corporation or officers
   4. Liability of stakeholder for paying election bet

(DE ST TI 15 Ch. 51)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Regulation of Elections
   A. Interference with registration and voting
   B. Corrupt election practices
   C. Candidacy for more than 1 office prohibited; multiple nominations; candidacy of officeholder for another office restricted

(DC ST § 1-1001.12, 1001.14-15)

FLORIDA
Violations; Penalties
   A. False swearing; submission of false voter registration information
   B. Consideration for registration; interference with registration; soliciting registrations for compensation; alteration of registration application
   C. Unauthorized use, possession, or destruction of voter information card
   D. False declaration to secure assistance in preparing ballot
   E. Fraud in connection with casting vote
   F. Vote selling
   G. Absentee ballots and voting; violations
   H. Violations; neglect of duty; corrupt practices
   I. Voting rights; deprivation of, or interference with, prohibited; penalty
   J. Corruptly influencing voting
   K. Voter intimidation or suppression prohibited; criminal penalties
   L. Absentee ballots and voting; violations
   M. Remuneration by candidate for services, support, etc.; penalty
   N. Threats of employers to control votes of employees
   O. Aiding, abetting, advising, or conspiring in violation of the code
   P. Failure to assist officers at polls
   Q. Neglect of duty by sheriff or other officer
R. Intermingling ballots
S. Unqualified electors willfully voting
T. Voting fraudulent ballot
U. Voting in person after casting absentee ballot
V. Casting more than one ballot at any election
W. Petitions; knowingly signing more than once; signing another person's name or a fictitious name
X. Using stickers or rubber stamps or carrying certain items in voting booth; penalty
Y. Ballot not to be seen, and other offenses
Z. Changing electors' ballots
AA. Stealing and destroying records, etc., of election
BB. Disclosing how elector votes
CC. Penalty for assuming name
DD. Penalty for destroying ballot or booth, etc.
EE. False or malicious charges against, or false statements about, opposing candidates; penalty
FF. Inspectors refusing to allow watchers while ballots are counted
GG. Voting system; unlawful possession; tampering
HH. Political activities of state, county, and municipal officers and employees
II. Supervisor of elections; delivery of books to successor
JJ. Witnesses as to violations
KK. Violations not otherwise provided for
LL. Fraudulent registration and illegal voting; investigation
MM. Grand juries; special investigation

(F.S.A. § 104)

GEORGIA
Miscellaneous Offenses
A. False statements
B. False registration
C. Insertion and alteration of entries in documents; removal; refusal to deliver
D. False signatures and statements in nomination petitions
E. Nomination petitions; certificates and papers; destruction; fraudulent filing; suppression
F. False statement in connection with notices of candidacy and qualifying for party nomination
G. Interference with primaries and elections
H. Intimidation of electors
I. Giving unlawful assistance in voting
J. Interfering with poll officers
K. Giving or receiving money or gifts for purpose of registering as voter, voting, or voting for particular candidate
L. Unlawful voting
M. Repeat voting at primaries and elections
N. Unlawful absentee voting
O. Unlawful possession of ballots
P. Counterfeit and facsimile ballots, ballot cards or ballot labels
Q. Destroying or delaying delivery of ballots
R. Removing ballots
S. Prying into ballots and ballot cards
T. Receiving unlawful assistance in voting
U. Tampering with voting machines
V. Unauthorized possession of voting machine key
W. Tampering with vote recorders or tabulating machines
X. Altering, modifying, or changing voting equipment
Y. Destroying, defacing or removing notices, et cetera
Z. Refusal to administer oath; acting without being sworn
AA. Refusal to permit inspection of papers; destruction or removal; superintendents
BB. Refusal to permit inspection of papers; destruction or removal; Secretary of State
CC. Frauds by poll officers
DD. Count and return of votes
EE. Omissions by poll officers
FF. Poll officers permitting unregistered persons to vote; refusing to permit qualified electors to vote; permitting unauthorized assistance of elector
GG. Poll officers permitting unlawful assistance
HH. Failure to keep and return record of assisted voters
II. Law enforcement officer; failure to quell disturbances at polls; hindering or delaying poll officers and others
JJ. Offenses by printers of ballots
KK. Failure to perform duty
LL. Hindering or delaying performance of duty
MM. Punishment for misdemeanors
NN. Punishment for felonies
OO. Use of list of electors for commercial purposes
PP. Soliciting persons to register to vote
QQ. Compensation for soliciting persons to register to vote based upon number of persons registered
RR. Conspiracy to commit election fraud; violations

(Ga. Code Ann., § 21 Ch. 2 Art.15)

HAWAII
Election Offenses
A. Classes of offenses
B. Election frauds
C. Voter fraud
D. Penalties; disqualification for, removal from office; reports of conviction to chief election officer
E. Misdemeanors

(HI ST § 19)
IDAHO

ILLINOIS
Offenses

A. Campaign Violations
1. Defacing, falsifying, or destroying declarations, requests, petitions, or certificates
2. Printing, publishing or distribution of slate during primary campaign without authority
3. Circulation or publication of anonymous campaign material
4. Solicitation, challenge, or performance of election function by state police department civilian employee, police officer or firefighter
5. Collection, receipt or disbursement of money or property by committee without appointment of treasurer
6. Excess contributions by corporation or labor organization
7. Acceptance of contributions in excess of permitted amounts by certain judges
8. Contributions in the name of another person
9. Filing fraudulent reports
10. Failure to file required report
11. Commingling committee funds with personal funds
12. Personal use of committee funds

B. Vote Fraud
1. Conspiracy to submit false application for registration or to vote illegally; paying individual to vote
2. Fraudulent application for registration or procurement of registration
3. Absentee ballot fraud
4. Fraudulent subscription of another person's name to affidavit of registration or absentee ballot
5. Registering to vote more than once
6. Destruction or failure to file or deliver absentee ballot application or registration affidavit or form after execution
7. Unauthorized release or removal of registration materials from circuit court office
8. Withholding information or furnishing false information to poll taker; return of false names or names of deceased persons
9. Return of ineligible person, fictitious or deceased's names by poll taker
10. Unregistered or unauthorized voting
11. Voting by ineligible persons
12. Voting in other precincts
13. Voting or applying to vote in false name and own name
14. Hiring or soliciting person to vote in precinct where person is not voter
15. Precinct officer or public official allowing ineligible voters or unauthorized procedure
16. Unauthorized delivery of ballots
17. Ballots; fraudulent application, showing, examination, receipt, delivery, possession, or completion or signing
18. Marking ballot to indicate to another person how voter has voted
19. Disclosure of vote
20. Forgery of official ballot endorsement; printing or circulating imitation ballot
21. Deceptive registration of vote
22. Fraudulent inducement to vote other than as intended
23. False representation of ballot to non-English speaking voter
24. Opening, destruction or unauthorized delivery of ballots by custodian of ballots
25. Removal or destruction of ballots; false entries in poll book; false tallying
26. Marking or defacing ballots by precinct election board member or authorized election personnel
27. Tampering with ballot container or contents
28. Causing vote to be incorrectly taken down; false statement, certificate, or return
29. Fraudulent alteration of election return; intentional destruction of poll book or tally; fraudulent alteration of vote as returned
30. Inspecting voting system without authorization
31. Voting at multiple town conventions

C. Interference with Free and Equal Elections
1. False, fictitious, or fraudulent registration applications or ballots
2. Failure to cast or return ballot in authorized manner
3. Interference with watcher's duties
4. Obstruction of, interference with, or injury of election officer or voter
5. Tampering with voting system
6. Allowing inaccurately adjusted voting system to be used
7. Removal, change, or mutilation of voting system for purpose of deceiving voter
8. Damaging, disarranging, or tampering with voting system
9. Failure to receive vote of legal voter
10. Removal, defacing or destruction of supplies, instruction cards from voting booth; removal or destruction of voting booth
11. Tampering with marking device, ballot or record or equipment; interference with operation or secrecy of voting
12. Leaving poll with ballot or ballot marking device
13. Removal of ballot or marking device from polls; possession outside polls
14. Printers; unauthorized printing or delivery of ballots
15. Unauthorized entries at polls
16. Electioneering
17. Inducement of votes by board member or precinct election officer prohibited
18. Actions to unlawfully influence voter or candidate
19. Inducing votes by gift or offer to compensate
20. Acceptance or solicitation of compensation to induce or procure votes
21. False or fraudulent absentee ballot applications or voter registration applications
22. Influencing political opinions or actions of employees in the workplace
23. Voter intimidation
24. Poll list maintenance violations
25. Poll list use violations

D. Procedural Violations by Election Officers
   1. Unlawfully serving as precinct election board member
   2. Inspectors; negligent or knowing failure to appear at election board's office
   3. Omission in performance of required duties
   4. Voter registration information violations
   5. Allowing observance of voter preparing ballot
   6. Deposit of ballots not initialed or ballots externally defaced
   7. Disclosure of how voter voted or information regarding appearance of ballot voted
   8. Opening or marking ballot or ascertaining how voter voted
   9. Disclosure of votes or electioneering
  10. Provision of information concerning absentee vote count before closing of polls

E. Enforcement Provisions
   1. Affidavit against illegal voter
   2. Affidavits; packaging, sealing, endorsing and delivery to grand jury; inquiry by grand jury
   3. Duty to report violations to prosecuting attorney and violator; presentation to grand jury
   4. Prosecution of violators
   5. Indictment or information; allegations
   6. Criminal prosecutions; self-incrimination defense not available to witness
   7. Informants; immunity
   8. Employment of persons convicted of vote fraud; reemployment; injunctions and civil penalties

F. Election Profiteering
   1. Grant of request for voter information to be used in prohibited manner; violations
   2. Use of voter registration information for solicitation; infraction; misdemeanor

(IN ST 3-14)

IOWA
Election Misconduct

A. Title and purpose--election officials defined
B. Election misconduct in the first degree
C. Election misconduct in the second degree
D. Election misconduct in the third degree
E. Election misconduct in the fourth degree
F. Technical infractions—notice

(I.C.A. § 39A)

KANSAS
Election Crimes
A. Corrupt political advertising; penalty
B. Definitions
C. Election bribery
D. Bribery to induce signing of nomination papers
E. Election perjury
F. Election forgery
G. Disorderly election conduct.
H. Possessing false or forged election supplies
I. Intimidation of voters
J. Voting without being qualified
K. Bribery of an election official
L. Bribe acceptance by an election official
M. Misconduct of an election officer
N. Election fraud by an election officer
O. Election suppression
P. Voter registration suppression
Q. Unauthorized voting disclosure
R. Election tampering
S. False impersonation as party officer
T. Voting machine fraud
U. Printing and circulating imitation ballots
V. Marking ballots to identify
W. Destruction of election supplies
X. Destruction of election papers
Y. Electioneering
Z. False impersonation of a voter
AA. Forfeiture of office or employment upon conviction

(K.S.A. § 25-24)

KENTUCKY
Election Offenses and Prosecutions
A. Definitions
B. Clerk making or permitting wrongful registration, or failing or refusing to deliver copies of registration records
C. Wrongful registration
D. Alteration, suppression, mutilation, or destruction of registration record; making or using false or fraudulent record
E. Interfering with registration
F. Alteration, mutilation, or suppression of nomination papers
G. Forgery of nomination papers
H. Clerk's failure to place candidate's name on ballot
I. Printer's violation of duty in printing ballots
J. Removal or destruction of election supplies or booths
K. Unauthorized possession of key to voting machine; tampering with, injuring, or destroying ballot labels or voting machines
L. Sheriff's failure to hold election or perform other election duties
M. Election officer's refusal to admit challenger
N. Preventing voter from casting ballot; interfering with election
O. False personation of a voter; nonresident or unqualified person voting
P. Receipt of illegal vote or rejection of legal vote by election officer
Q. Disobeying election officer's command
R. Removing or tampering with ballots
S. Making or receiving expenditures for vote, for withholding of vote, or for signing a petition to have public question on ballot; definition of "expenditure"; procedures for paying for transportation of voters; applicability of KRS 502.020
T. Prohibition against paying compensation based upon number or characteristics of voters registered
U. Providing another with intoxicants on election day
V. Denial of rights of inspectors by county board of elections
W. Alteration, suppression, or destruction of stub book, return, or certificate of election
X. Violation of law or failure to perform duty by member of board of elections
Y. Intimidation of election officer or board of elections
Z. Violation of duties for which no other penalty provided
AA. Advising or assisting violation of election laws
BB. Prohibitions against holding elective office
CC. Irregularity or defect in conduct of election no defense
DD. Applicability of penalties for regular elections to primaries and to elections for United States Senator
EE. Report by election officers of violations; arrest of offenders
FF. Report to grand jury on election officials inexcusably absent; subject to prosecution
GG. Grand jury may compel testimony as to violation of election laws
HH. Refusal to produce evidence of corrupt practices when summoned by grand jury a Class A misdemeanor
II. Evidence required to support conviction for violation of election laws
JJ. Witness not exempted from giving incriminating testimony; immunity except from perjury charge
KK. Limitation of prosecutions

(KRS § 119)

LOUISIANA
MAINE

SOUTH DAKOTA

TENNESSEE

Prohibited Practices Generally
1. Nominating meetings and elections; interference
2. Violation of title
3. Interference with person’s duties or rights
4. Misrepresentations
5. Perjury
6. Violations; procurement or inducement
7. Improper registration of voting
8. Improper possession of electronic supplies
9. False entries on election documents
10. Unlawful assistance of voter
11. Interference with marked ballots
12. Display of campaign materials within posted boundaries
13. Campaign communications; identification of sponsor
14. Candidate making exchange for support
15. Demanding candidates support in exchange for support
16. Exchanges with candidates; penalties
17. Candidate’s exchanges; permissible expenditures
18. Bribery; election officials
19. Bribery; voters
20. Bribery; acceptance by voter
21. Bribery; penalty
22. Betting; on election
23. Betting; candidate betting with a voter
24. Betting; to procure challenge or to prevent voting
25. Corporate funds; campaign contributions
26. Directing employees on voting
27. Threatening employees
28. Grand jury witness; immunity
29. Defenses; irregularities
30. Expenditures permitted
31. Corporations; penalties
32. Fines; school fund
33. False campaign literature
34. Suffrage for persons convicted of infamous crimes
35. Advertising material; public utility property

Offense by Public Officers
1. Interference with election or nomination
2. Soliciting contributions from recipients of government benefits
3. Promises of government benefits
4. Deprivation of government benefits
5. State-owned property used for political purposes
6. Political activities interfering with state business
(Constitution, Art 2. § 19-01)

TEXAS
Nothing in statutes regarding election crimes.

UTAH
Offenses Involving Election Administration
1. Willful neglect of duty or corrupt conduct
2. Destroying or concealing ballots
3. Neglect of refusal to deliver ballots or returns
4. Officer or watcher revealing vote
5. Damage, alteration or theft of election equipment
(U.C.A. § 20A-400.5)

VERMONT
Offenses Against the Purity of Elections
1. Presiding officer receiving illegal vote
2. Counting and turning ballot boxes before proper time
3. Nonperformance of duty by public officer
4. Casting more than one ballot
5. Voting in one or more place
6. Voter omitted from list; voting in another town
7. Perjury before board
8. Producing change in list wrongfully
9. False answer as to right to vote
10. Unqualified person voting
11. Fraudulent voting
12. Aiding unqualified voter to vote
13. Undue influence
14. Using intoxicating liquor to influence voters
15. Destroying lists; hindering voting
16. Offenses applying to primary elections
17. Destroying certificates of nomination
(VT Statute 35 § 1931)

VIRGINIA
Election Offenses and Penalties
1. Bribery, intimidation of election officers
2. Willful neglect or corrupt conduct
3. Interference with registration
4. Destruction of, or failure to mail or deliver voter registration application
5. Unlawful disclosure or use of social security number
6. Campaigning at registration locations
7. Illegal voting and registrations
8. Bribery, intimidation of person receiving ballot
9. Advice or assistance in ballot casting
10. Soliciting or accepting bribe to influence or procure vote
11. Selling, giving away or counterfeiting ballots
12. Stealing or tampering with ballot containers
13. Unauthorized duplication or possession of voting equipment key or electronic activation device.
14. Ballot not to be carried away
15. Offenses as to absent voters
16. False statements and penalties
17. Immunity of witnesses
18. Complaints and allegations of election law offenses

(WA ST T. 24-1000 to 1019)

WASHINGTON
Crimes and Penalties
1. Voting, registration irregularities
2. Violations by officers
3. Penalty
4. Political advertising, removing or defacing
5. Tampering with registration form, absentee or provisional ballots
6. Registration officials’ violations
7. Disenfranchisement discrimination
8. Voter violations
9. Unqualified registration
10. Misuse, alteration of registration data base

Petitions and Signatures
11. Violations by officers
12. Violations—corrupt practices
13. Violations by signers
14. Petitions—improperly signing
15. Duplication of names
16. Paid petition solicitors

(WA ST T. 24-1000 to 1019)

WEST VIRGINIA
Offenses and Penalties
1. Unlawful printing, possession or delivery of ballots
2. False swearing
3. Commissioner’s failure to procure or return supplies
4. Destruction or removal of election supplies
5. Unauthorized presence in election room; three hundred foot limit
6. Wrongful refusal or allowance of votes; malicious or frivolous challenges
7. Distinguishing marks on ballots
8. Other unlawful acts at polling places

(WV Code 29A.84.0101-84.740)
9. Disorder at polls; failure to assist in preventing disorder
10. Failure to make returns
11. Improper influence and bribery by candidates
12. Buying or selling vote unlawful
13. Unlawful acts by corporations
14. Receiving or soliciting bribes by voters
15. Illegal voting; deceiving voters
16. Unlawful voting in primary elections
17. Violations concerning absent voters' ballots
18. Obstructing employees' freedom to vote
19. Wagering or betting on elections
20. Punishment where penalty not described or where failure to perform duty not
specifically made an offense

(WV ST Ch. 3, Art 9)

WISCONSIN
Prohibited election practices include:
1. Campaigning restrictions
2. Posting and distributing of election-related material
3. Communication of political messages
4. False representation affecting elections
5. Election restrictions on employers
6. Denial of government benefits
7. Election threats
8. Election bribery
9. Election fraud

(W.S.A. 12)

WYOMING
Felony offenses include:
1. Registration offenses
2. Unlawful opening of a ballot box
3. Unlawful opening of a voting machine
4. Unlawful possession of a key
5. False voting
6. Falsifying election documents
7. False swearing
8. Offering a bribe
9. Accepting a bribe
10. Intimidation

(Laws 1973, ch. 251, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 22.1-406.)
October 19, 2006

Ralph G. Neas
President, People for the American Way Foundation
2000 M Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

RE: October 18, 2006 Letter

Dear Mr. Neas:

Your letter of October 18, 2006 requests the release of EAC’s Voter Fraud and Intimidation Report. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify the purpose and status of this study.

In late 2005, EAC hired two consultants for the purpose of assisting EAC with two things: 1) developing a uniform definition of the phrase voter fraud, and 2) making recommendations on how to further study the existence, prosecution, and means of deterring such voter fraud. In May 2006, a status report on this study was given to the EAC Standards Board and EAC Board of Advisors during their public meetings. During the same week, a working group convened to react to and provide comment on the progress and potential conclusions that could be reached from the work of the two consultants.

The conversation at the working group meeting was lively on the very points that we were trying to accomplish as a part of this study, namely what is voter fraud and how do we pursue studying it. Many of the proposed conclusions that were suggested by the consultants were challenged by the working group members. As such, the consultants were tasked with reviewing the concerns expressed at the working group meeting, conducting additional research as necessary, and providing a draft report to EAC that took into account the working group’s concerns and issues.

That draft report is currently being vetted by EAC staff. EAC will release a final report from this study after it has conducted a review of the draft provided by the consultants. However, it is important to remember the purpose of this study – finding a uniform definition of voter fraud and making recommendations on how to study the existence, prosecution and deterrence of voter fraud -- as it will serve as the basis of the EAC report on this study.

Thank you for your letter. You can be assured that as soon as a final report on the fraud and intimidation study is available, a copy will be made available to the public.

Sincerely,

Paul S. DeGregorio
Chairman
October 18, 2006

Chairman Paul DeGregorio
Commissioner Donetta L. Davidson
Commissioner Gracia M. Hillman
United States Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue N.W., Suite - 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Fax: (202) 566-3127

Dear Commissioners,

On October 11th, USA Today published an article describing the report commissioned by the EAC on voter fraud. We write today to urge the EAC to release this report.

As a 25 year old civil rights and civil liberties organization, People For the American Way Foundation (PFAWF) and our sister organization, People For the American Way (PFAW) have long been dedicated to ensuring the integrity of our elections. In particular in the years since the 2000 election, PFAWF and other principle partners such as the NAACP and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, have carried out a program called Election Protection to ensure that all eligible voters are able to vote and have that vote counted as cast.

We know that voter fraud and intimidation occur— we’ve seen the long lines, the erroneous purges, the misleading flyers and phone calls. And yet there seems to be little attention to these matters on the state and federal level.

Instead, a disproportionate amount of time and energy are spent on measures that purport to curb voter fraud by requiring voters to produce proof of citizenship and identity to vote. In actuality, these measures do little to secure the elections and much to disenfranchise otherwise eligible voters. Indeed we are weeks away from an election where thousands of eligible voters may be disenfranchised by overly restrictive voter identification laws. That presents a real threat to the integrity of our elections and the health of our democracy.

The report that the EAC commissioned from voting experts would make a vitally important contribution to the national discourse on the reality of voter fraud. In light of the numerous claims regarding the prevalence of voter fraud, this report provides a much
needed analysis about the state of our electoral process. While media reports indicate that this tax-payer funded report is final, even if there are outstanding concerns within the EAC, we implore you to move forward with releasing the report as is, and to hold a public hearing to address any potential issues. Again, the importance of the information in this report is paramount and the public deserves such full disclosure. The report should be released immediately so that those who are concerned about ensuring the integrity of elections can benefit from its findings.

Sincerely,

Ralph G. Neas
President, People For the American Way Foundation

Cc: Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist
Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid
Senator Trent Lott, Chair, Senate Rules and Administration
Senator Chris Dodd, Ranking Member, Senate Rules and Administration
House Majority Leader John Boehner
House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi
Representative Vernon Ehlers, Chair, House Administration
Representative Juanita Millender-McDonald, Ranking Member, House Administration
October 17, 2006

The Honorable Gerald Reynolds  
Chair, United States Commission on Civil Rights  
624 9th Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20425

RE: Elections Assistance Commission Report  
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to urge you and my fellow Commissioners to exercise our Congressionally-authorized subpoena power to compel the production of the report on voting fraud that the United States Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") refuses to release. It was clearly evident during our briefing last week on Voter Fraud and Intimidation that the results of the EAC report could have a significant impact on the quality and quantitative analysis of any briefing report that might be issued by the Commission.

According to an article in the October 11th edition of USA Today, "the bipartisan report by two consultants to the election commission casts doubt on the problem those laws are intended to address." Indeed, "there is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling-place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, 'dead' voters, non-citizen voting and felon voters" according to the article. Further, the USA Today article states that the report, "prepared by Tova Wang, an elections expert at the Century Foundation think tank, and Job Serebrov, an Arkansas attorney, says most fraud occurs in the absentee ballot process, such as through coercion or forgery."

Just based on this news article, the report has information clearly germane to our briefing and subsequent analysis of the testimony provided. I believe that in carrying out our Congressional mandate, the need to have access to and analyze the Election Assistance Commission report is a necessary prerequisite to an unbiased and informed report on Voter Fraud.

It is my understanding that the Chair has the authority under law to sign a subpoena on his own accord or, alternatively to seek a vote of the Commission to issue said subpoena. I believe the subpoena would be very short and direct: the production of the suppressed report.
I respectfully request that the Chair immediately issue a subpoena or, in the alternative, conduct an immediate notational vote on the matter of issuing a subpoena to compel production of the report.

Thank you for your time and attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL YAKI
Commissioner
United States Commission on Civil Rights
October 19, 2006

Ralph G. Neas
President, People for the American Way Foundation
2000 M Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

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The conversation at the working group meeting was lively on the very points that we were trying to accomplish as a part of this study, namely what is voter fraud and how do we pursue studying it. Many of the proposed conclusions that were suggested by the consultants were challenged by the working group members. As such, the consultants were tasked with reviewing the concerns expressed at the working group meeting, conducting additional research as necessary, and providing a draft report to EAC that took into account the working group’s concerns and issues.

That draft report is currently being vetted by EAC staff. EAC will release a final report from this study after it has conducted a review of the draft provided by the consultants. However, it is important to remember the purpose of this study – finding a uniform definition of voter fraud and making recommendations on how to study the existence, prosecution and deterrence of voter fraud – as it will serve as the basis of the EAC report on this study.

Thank you for your letter. You can be assured that as soon as a final report on the fraud and intimidation study is available, a copy will be made available to the public.

Sincerely,

Paul S. DeGregorio
Chairman

Tel: (202) 566-3100      www.eac.gov      Fax: (202) 566-3189
Toll free: 1 (866) 747-1471
VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION WORKING GROUP MEETING

Thursday, May 18, 2006
1:00 PM - 5:30 PM
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue, N.W., 11th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

AGENDA

1:00 PM - 1:30 PM  Introduction
                  EAC Authority
                  Overview and Purpose of Current Project
                  Purpose and Members of the Working Group
                  Related EAC Research

1:30 PM - 2:00 PM  Review of Preliminary Research
                  Literature & Reports
                  Interviews
                  News Articles
                  Court Cases

2:00 PM - 3:15 PM  Definition & Findings from Current Project Research

3:15 PM - 3:30 PM  Break

3:30 PM - 5:00 PM  Ideas for Future EAC Activities
                  Recommended Research Methodologies
                  Consultant Recommendations
                  Working Group Ideas

5:00 PM - 5:30 PM  EAC Next Steps
Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Working Group

The Honorable Todd Rokita
Indiana Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board

J.R. Perez
Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, TX

Barbara Arnwine
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Leader of Election Protection Coalition
(To be represented at May 18, 2006 meeting by Jon M. Greenbaum, Director of the Voting Rights Project for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law)

Robert Bauer
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, DC
National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

Benjamin L. Ginsberg
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP
Counsel to national Republican campaign committees and Republican candidates

Mark (Thor) Hearne II
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, MO
National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

Barry Weinberg
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

EAC Invited Technical Advisor:

Craig Donsanto
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice
Defining Election Fraud

Election fraud is any intentional action, or intentional failure to act when there is a duty to do so, that corrupts the election process in a manner that can impact on election outcomes. This includes interfering in the process by which persons register to vote; the way in which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; and the process by which election results are canvassed and certified.

Examples include the following:

- falsifying voter registration information pertinent to eligibility to cast a vote, (e.g. residence, criminal status, etc);
- altering completed voter registration applications by entering false information;
- knowingly destroying completed voter registration applications (other than spoiled applications) before they can be submitted to the proper election authority;
- knowingly removing eligible voters from voter registration lists, in violation of HAVA, NVRA, or state election laws;
- intentional destruction by election officials of voter registration records or balloting records, in violation of records retention laws, to remove evidence of election fraud;
- vote buying;
- voting in the name of another;
- voting more than once;
- coercing a voter's choice on an absentee ballot;
- using a false name and/or signature on an absentee ballot;
- destroying or misappropriating an absentee ballot;
- felons, or in some states ex-felons, who vote when they know they are ineligible to do so;
- misleading an ex-felon about his or her right to vote;
- voting by non-citizens who know they are ineligible to do so;
- intimidating practices aimed at vote suppression or deterrence, including the abuse of challenge laws;
- deceiving voters with false information (e.g.; deliberately directing voters to the wrong polling place or providing false information on polling hours and dates);
- knowingly failing to accept voter registration applications, to provide ballots, or to accept and count voted ballots in accordance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act;
- intentional miscounting of ballots by election officials;
- intentional misrepresentation of vote tallies by election officials;
- acting in any other manner with the intention of suppressing voter registration or voting, or interfering with vote counting and the certification of the vote.

Voting fraud does not include mistakes made in the course of voter registration, balloting, or tabulating ballots and certifying results. For purposes of the EAC study, it also does not include violations of campaign finance laws.
Existing Literature Reviewed

Reports

The Long Shadow of Jim Crow, People for the American Way and the NAACP

The New Poll Tax, Laughlin McDonald

Wisconsin Audit Report, Voter Registration Elections Board

Preliminary Findings, Milwaukee Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud

Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, National Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter/Baker Report)

Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter/Baker Report), The Brennan Center and Professor Spencer Overton

Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?, Chandler Davidson

A Crazy Quilt of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Law, Alec Ewald

Vote Fraud, Intimidation and Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election, American Center for Voting Rights

America’s Modern Poll Tax, The Advancement Project

Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voter Fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General, The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald

Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio, Democratic National Committee

Department of Justice Public Integrity Reports 2002, 2003, 2004

Prosecution of Election Fraud under United States Federal Law, Craig Donsanto

Election Protection 2004, Election Protection Coalition

The Federal Crime of Election Fraud, Craig Donsanto

Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, General Accounting Office
Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud, Lori Minnite

Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections, People for the American Way, NAACP, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights

Books

Stealing Elections, John Fund

Steal this Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in American, Andrew Gumbel

Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004, Tracey Campbell

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House, David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson

Fooled Again, Mark Crispin Miller

Legal

Indiana Democratic Party vs. Rokita

Common Cause of Georgia vs. Billup

U.S. Department of Justice Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum (Georgia voter identification)
Interviews

Common Themes

- There is virtually universal agreement that absentee ballot fraud is the biggest problem, with vote buying and registration fraud coming in after that. The vote buying often comes in the form of payment for absentee ballots, although not always. Some absentee ballot fraud is part of an organized effort; some is by individuals, who sometimes are not even aware that what they are doing is illegal. Voter registration fraud seems to take the form of people signing up with false names. Registration fraud seems to be most common where people doing the registration were paid by the signature.

- There is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, “dead” voters, non-citizen voting and felon voters. Those few who believe it occurs often enough to be a concern say that it is impossible to show the extent to which it happens, but do point to instances in the press of such incidents. Most people believe that false registration forms have not resulted in polling place fraud, although it may create the perception that vote fraud is possible. Those who believe there is more polling place fraud than reported/investigated/prosecuted believe that registration fraud does lead to fraudulent votes. Jason Torchinsky from the American Center for Voting Rights is the only interviewee who believes that polling place fraud is widespread and among the most significant problems in the system.

- Abuse of challenger laws and abusive challengers seem to be the biggest intimidation/suppression concerns, and many of those interviewed assert that the new identification requirements are the modern version of voter intimidation and suppression. However, there is evidence of some continued outright intimidation and suppression, especially in some Native American communities. A number of people also raise the problem of poll workers engaging in harassment of minority voters. Other activities commonly raised were the issue of polling places being moved at the last moment, unequal distribution of voting machines, videotaping of voters at the polls, and targeted misinformation campaigns.

- Several people indicate -- including representatives from DOJ -- that for various reasons, the Department of Justice is bringing fewer voter intimidation and suppression cases now and is focusing on matters such as non-citizen voting, double voting and felon voting. While the civil rights section continues to focus on systemic patterns of malfeasance, the public integrity section is focusing now on individuals, on isolated instances of fraud.

- The problem of badly kept voter registration lists, with both ineligible voters remaining on the rolls and eligible voters being taken off, remains a common concern. A few people are also troubled by voters being on registration lists in two states. They said that there was no evidence that this had led to double voting, but it opens the door to the possibility. There is great hope that full implementation of the new requirements of HAVA -- done well, a major caveat -- will reduce this problem dramatically.
Common Recommendations:

- Many of those interviewed recommend better poll worker training as the best way to improve the process; a few also recommended longer voting times or voting on days other than election day (such as weekends) but fewer polling places so only the best poll workers would be employed.
- Many interviewed support stronger criminal laws and increased enforcement of existing laws with respect to both fraud and intimidation. Advocates from across the spectrum expressed frustration with the failure of the Department of Justice to pursue complaints.
  - With respect to the civil rights section, John Tanner indicated that fewer cases are being brought because fewer are warranted — it has become increasingly difficult to know when allegations of intimidation and suppression are credible since it depends on one’s definition of intimidation, and because both parties are doing it. Moreover, prior enforcement of the laws has now changed the entire landscape — race-based problems are rare now. Although challenges based on race and unequal implementation of identification rules would be actionable, Mr. Tanner was unaware of such situations actually occurring and the section has not pursued any such cases.
  - Craig Donsanto of the public integrity section says that while the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate claims of fraud, the number of cases the department is investigating and the number of indictments the section is pursuing are both up dramatically. Since 2002, the department has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters and double voters than ever before. Mr. Donsanto would like more resources so it can do more and would like to have laws that make it easier for the federal government to assume jurisdiction over voter fraud cases.
- A couple of interviewees recommend a new law that would make it easier to criminally prosecute people for intimidation even when there is not racial animus.
- Several advocate expanded monitoring of the polls, including some associated with the Department of Justice.
- Almost everyone hopes that administrators will maximize the potential of statewide voter registration databases to prevent fraud.
- Challenge laws, both with respect to pre-election day challenges and challengers at the polls, need to be revised by all states to ensure they are not used for purposes of wrongful disenfranchisement and harassment.
- Several people advocate passage of Senator Barak Obama’s “deceptive practices” bill.
- There is a split on whether it would be helpful to have nonpartisan election officials — some indicated they thought even if elections officials are elected nonpartisanly they will carry out their duties in biased ways nonetheless. However, most agree that elections officials pursuing partisan agendas is a problem that must be addressed in some fashion. Suggestions included moving...
election responsibilities out of the secretary of states' office; increasing transparency in the process; and enacting conflict of interest rules.

- A few recommend returning to allowing use of absentee ballots "for cause" only if it were politically feasible.
- A few recommend enacting a national identification card, including Pat Rogers, an attorney in New Mexico, and Jason Torchinsky from ACVR, who advocates the scheme contemplated in the Carter-Baker Commission Report.
- A couple of interviewees indicated the need for clear standards for the distribution of voting machines.
List of Experts Interviewed

Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser, Deputy Director, Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

William Groth, attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite, Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley, ACLU Voting Rights Project

Nina Perales, Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

Pat Rogers, attorney, New Mexico

Rebecca Vigil-Giron, Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobohere, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson, Rice University

Tracey Campbell, author, Deliver the Vote

Douglas Webber, Assistant Attorney General, Indiana, (defendant in the Indiana voter identification litigation)

Heather Dawn Thompson, Director of Government Relations, National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky, Assistant General Counsel, American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette, Executive Director, American Center for Voting Rights

Joseph Rich, former Director of the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Joseph Sandler, Counsel to the Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz, Executive Director, New York City Board of Elections

John Tanner, Director, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Wisconsin
Evelyn Stratton, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio

Tony Sirvello, Executive Director, International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers

Harry Van Sickle, Commissioner of Elections, Pennsylvania

Craig Donsanto, Director, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice

Sharon Priest, former Secretary of State, Arkansas
Nexis Articles Analysis

Note: The search terms used were ones agreed upon by both Job Serebrov and Tova Wang and are available upon request. A more systematic, numerical analysis of the data contained in the Nexis charts is currently being undertaken. What follows is an overview.

Recommendation: In phase 2, consultants should conduct a Nexis search that specifically attempts to follow up on the cases for which no resolution is evident from this particular initial search.

Overview of the Articles

Absentee Ballots

According to press reports, absentee ballots are abused in a variety of ways:

1. Campaign workers, candidates and others coerce the voting choices of vulnerable populations, usually elderly voters
2. Workers for groups and individuals have attempted to vote absentee in the names of the deceased
3. Workers for groups, campaign workers and individuals have attempted to forge the names of other voters on absentee ballot requests and absentee ballots and thus vote multiple times

It is unclear how often actual convictions result from these activities (a handful of articles indicate convictions and guilty pleas), but this is an area in which there have been a substantial number of official investigations and actual charges filed, according to news reports where such information is available. A few of the allegations became part of civil court proceedings contesting the outcome of the election.

While absentee fraud allegations turn up throughout the country, a few states have had several such cases. Especially of note are Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, and most particularly, Texas. Interestingly, there were no articles regarding Oregon, where the entire system is vote by mail.

Voter Registration Fraud

According to press reports, the following types of allegations of voter registration fraud are most common:

1. Registering in the name of dead people
2. Fake names and other information on voter registration forms
3. Illegitimate addresses used on voter registration forms
4. Voters being tricked into registering for a particular party under false pretenses
5. Destruction of voter registration forms depending on the party the voter registered with

There was only one self evident instance of a noncitizen registering to vote. Many of the instances reported on included official investigations and charges filed, but few actual convictions, at least from the news reporting. There have been multiple reports of registration fraud in California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.

Voter Intimidation and Suppression

This is the area which had the most articles in part because there were so many allegations of intimidation and suppression during the 2004 election. Most of these remained allegations and no criminal investigation or prosecution ensued. Some of the cases did end up in civil litigation.

This is not to say that these alleged activities were confined to 2004 – there were several allegations made during every year studied. Most notable were the high number of allegations of voter intimidation and harassment reported during the 2003 Philadelphia mayoral race.

A very high number of the articles were about the issue of challenges to voters' registration status and challengers at the polling places. There were many allegations that planned challenge activities were targeted at minority communities. Some of the challenges were concentrated in immigrant communities.

However, the tactics alleged varied greatly. The types of activities discussed also include the following:

- Photographing or videotaping voters coming out of polling places.
- Improper demands for identification
- Poll watchers harassing voters
- Poll workers being hostile to or aggressively challenging voters
- Disproportionate police presence
- Poll watchers wearing clothes with messages that seemed intended to intimidate
- Insufficient voting machines and unmanageably long lines

Although the incidents reported on occurred everywhere, not surprisingly, many came from “battleground” states. There were several such reports out of Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

“Dead Voters and Multiple Voting”

There were a high number of articles about people voting in the names of the dead and voting more than once. Many of these articles were marked by allegations of big numbers of people committing these frauds, and relatively few of these allegations
turning out to be accurate according to investigations by the newspapers themselves, elections officials and criminal investigators. Often the problem turned out to be a result of administrative error, poll workers mis-marking of voter lists, a flawed registration list and/or errors made in the attempt to match names of voters on the list with the names of the people who voted. In a good number of cases, there were allegations that charges of double voting by political leaders were an effort to scare people away from the voting process.

Nonetheless there were a few cases of people actually being charged and/or convicted for these kinds of activities. Most of the cases involved a person voting both by absentee ballot and in person. A few instances involved people voting both during early voting and on Election Day, which calls into question the proper marking and maintenance of the voting lists. In many instances, the person charged claimed not to have voted twice on purpose. A very small handful of cases involved a voter voting in more than one county and there was one substantiated case involving a person voting in more than one state. Other instances in which such efforts were alleged were disproved by officials.

In the case of voting in the name of a dead person, the problem lay in the voter registration list not being properly maintained, i.e. the person was still on the registration list as eligible to vote, and a person taking criminal advantage of that. In total, the San Francisco Chronicle found 5 such cases in March 2004; the AP cited a newspaper analysis of five such persons in an Indiana primary in May 2004; and a senate committee found two people to have voted in the names of the dead in 2005.

As usual, there were a disproportionate number of such articles coming out of Florida. Notably, there were three articles out of Oregon, which has one hundred percent vote-by-mail.

*Vote Buying*

There were a surprising number of articles about vote buying cases. A few of these instances involved long-time investigations in three particular jurisdictions as detailed in the vote buying summary. There were more official investigations, indictments and convictions/pleas in this area. All of these cases are concentrated in the Midwest and South.

*Deceptive Practices*

In 2004 there were numerous reports of intentional disinformation about voting eligibility and the voting process meant to confuse voters about their rights and when and where to vote. Misinformation came in the form of flyers, phone calls, letters, and even people going door to door. Many of the efforts were reportedly targeted at minority communities. A disproportionate number of them came from key battleground states, particularly Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. From the news reports found, only one of these instances was officially investigated, the case in Oregon involving the destruction
of voter registration forms. There were no reports of prosecutions or any other legal proceeding.

**Non-citizen Voting**

There were surprisingly few articles regarding noncitizen registration and voting – just seven all together, in seven different states across the country. They were also evenly split between allegations of noncitizens registering and noncitizens voting. In one case charges were filed against ten individuals. In one case a judge in a civil suit found there was illegal noncitizen voting. Three instances prompted official investigations. Two cases, from this nexis search, remained just allegations of noncitizen voting.

**Felon Voting**

Although there were only thirteen cases of felon voting, some of them involved large numbers of voters. Most notably, of course, are the cases that came to light in the Washington gubernatorial election contest (see Washington summary) and in Wisconsin (see Wisconsin summary). In several states, the main problem has the large number of ineligible felons that remained on the voting list.

**Election Official Fraud**

In most of the cases in which fraud by elections officials is suspected or alleged, it is difficult to determine whether it is incompetence or a crime. There are several cases of ballots gone missing, ballots unaccounted for and ballots ending up in a worker’s possession. In two cases workers were said to have changed peoples’ votes. The one instance in which widespread ballot box stuffing by elections workers was alleged was in Washington State. The judge in the civil trial of that election contest did not find that elections workers had committed fraud. Four of the cases are from Texas.
Rough Summary of Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section Activities, October 2002-January 2006*

Prosecutions and Convictions-- Individuals
Noncitizen voting: 20
Vote buying: 49
Double voting: 12
Registration fraud: 13
Civil Rights: 4
Voter Intimidation: 2
Unclear: 1

Open Investigations (note: a few cases overlap with prosecutions and convictions)
Noncitizen voting: 3
Vote buying: 25
Double voting: 15
Registration fraud: 29
Absentee ballot fraud: 9
Official: 8
Ineligibles: 4
Deceptive Practices: 1
Civil Rights: 14
Intimidation: 6
Other: 2

Cases and Investigations Closed for Lack of Evidence
Civil Rights: 8
Official: 12
Registration Fraud: 12
Absentee Ballot Fraud: 14
Ineligible Voting: 3
Intimidation: 8
Double Voting: 5
Ballot Box Stuffing: 1
Vote Buying: 14
Ballot/machine tampering: 2
Other: 8
Unclear: 3

*Based upon information available as of January 2006
Case Summaries

After reviewing over 40,000 cases, the majority of which came from appeals courts, I have found comparatively very few which are applicable to this study. Of those that are applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerges. However, it seems that the greatest areas of fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility. But because so few cases provided a picture of these current problems, I suggest that case research for the second phase of this project concentrate on state trial-level decisions.

Job Serebrov
May 2006
Determining a Methodology for Measuring Voter Fraud and Intimidation: Recommendations of Political Scientists

The following is a summary of interviews conducted with a number of political scientists and experts in the field as to how one might undertake a comprehensive examination of voter fraud and intimidation. A list of the individuals interviewed and their ideas are available, and all of the individuals welcome any further questions or explanations of their recommended procedures.

1) In analyzing instances of alleged fraud and intimidation, we should look to criminology as a model. In criminology, experts use two sources: the Uniform Crime Reports, which are all reports made to the police, and the Victimization Survey, which asks the general public whether a particular incident has happened to them. After surveying what the most common allegations are, we should conduct a survey of the general public that ask whether they have committed certain acts or been subjected to any incidents of fraud or intimidation. This would require using a very large sample, and we would need to employ the services of an expert in survey data collection. (Stephen Ansolobohere, MIT)

2) Several political scientists with expertise in these types of studies recommended a methodology that includes interviews, focus groups, and a limited survey. In determining who to interview and where the focus groups should be drawn from, they recommend the following procedure:

- Pick a number of places that have historically had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation; from that pool pick 10 that are geographically and demographically diverse, and have had a diversity of problems
- Pick a number of places that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation; from that pool pick 10 places that match the geographic and demographic make-up of the previous ten above (and, if possible, have comparable elections practices)
- Assess the resulting overall reports and impressions resulting from these interviews and focus groups, and examine comparisons and differences among the states and what may give rise to them.

In conducting a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, district election officers, they recommend that:

- The survey sample be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets
- The survey must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations

(Allan Lichtman, American University; Thad Hall, University of Utah; Bernard Grofman, UC – Irvine)
3) Another political scientist recommended employing a methodology that relies on qualitative data drawn from in-depth interviews with key critics and experts on all sides of the debate on fraud; quantitative data collected through a survey of state and local elections and law enforcement officials; and case studies. Case studies should focus on the five or ten states, regions or cities where there has been a history of election fraud to examine past and present problems. The survey should be mailed to each state's attorney general and secretary of state, each county district attorney's office and each county board of elections in the 50 states. (Lorraine Minnite, Barnard College)

4) The research should be a two-step process. Using LexisNexis and other research tools, a search should be conducted of news media accounts over the past decade. Second, interviews with a systematic sample of election officials nationwide and in selected states should be conducted. (Chandler Davidson, Rice University)

5) One expert in the field posits that we can never come up with a number that accurately represents either the incidence of fraud or the incidence of voter intimidation. Therefore, the better approach is to do an assessment of what is most likely to happen, what election violations are most likely to be committed – in other words, a risk analysis. This would include an analysis of what it would actually take to commit various acts, e.g. the cost/benefit of each kind of violation. From there we could rank the likely prevalence of each type of activity and examine what measures are or could be effective in combating them. (Wendy Weiser, Brennan Center of New York University)

6) Replicate a study in the United States done abroad by Susan Hyde of the University of California- San Diego examining the impact of impartial poll site observers on the incidence of election fraud. Doing this retrospectively would require the following steps:
   - Find out where there were federal observers
   - Get precinct level voting information for those places
   - Analyze whether there was any difference in election outcomes in those places with and without observers, and whether any of these results seem anomalous.

Despite the tremendous differences in the political landscapes of the countries examined by Hyde in previous studies and the U.S., Hyde believes this study could be effectively replicated in this country by sending observers to a random sample of precincts. Rather than compare the incumbent’s vote share, such factors such as voter complaints, voter turnout, number of provisional ballots used, composition of the electorate, as well as any anomalous voting results could be compared between sites with and without monitors.

For example, if intimidation is occurring, and if reputable monitors make intimidation less likely or voters more confident, then turnout should be higher on average in monitored precincts than in unmonitored precincts. If polling station officials are intentionally refusing to issue provisional ballots, and the polling station officials are
more likely to adhere to regulations while being monitored, the average number of provisional ballots should be higher in monitored precincts than in unmonitored precincts. If monitors cause polling station officials to adhere more closely to regulations, then there should be fewer complaints (in general) about monitored than unmonitored precincts (this could also be reversed if monitors made voters more likely to complain).

Again, random assignment controls for all of the other factors that otherwise influence these variables.

One of the downsides of this approach is it does not get at some forms of fraud, e.g. absentee ballot fraud; those would have to be analyzed separately.

7) Another political scientist recommends conducting an analysis of vote fraud claims and purging of registration rolls by list matching. Allegations of illegal voting often are based on matching of names and birth dates. Alleged instances of double voting are based on matching the names and birth dates of persons found on voting records. Allegations of ineligible felon (depending on state law), deceased, and of non-citizen voting are based on matching lists of names, birth dates, and sometimes addresses of such people against a voting records. Anyone with basic relational database skills can perform such matching in a matter of minutes.

However, there are a number of pitfalls for the unwary that can lead to grossly overestimating the number of fraudulent votes, such as missing or ignored middle names and suffixes or matching on missing birth dates. Furthermore, there is a surprising statistical fact that a group of about three hundred people with the same first and last name are almost assured to share the exact same birth date, including year. In a large state, it is not uncommon for hundreds of Robert Smiths (and other common names) to have voted. Thus, allegations of vote fraud or purging of voter registration rolls by list matching almost assuredly will find a large proportion of false positives: people who voted legally or are registered to vote legally.

Statistics can be rigorously applied to determine how many names would be expected to be matched by chance. A simulation approach is best applied here: randomly assign a birth date to an arbitrary number of people and observe how many match within the list or across lists. The simulation is repeated many times to average out the variation due to chance. The results can then be matched back to actual voting records and purge lists, for example, in the hotly contested states of Ohio or Florida, or in states with Election Day registration where there are concerns that easy access to voting permits double voting. This analysis will rigorously identify the magnitude alleged voter fraud, and may very well find instances of alleged fraud that exceed what might have otherwise happened by chance.

This same political scientist also recommends another way to examine the problem: look at statistics on provisional voting: the number cast might provide indications of intimidation (people being challenged at the polls) and the number of those not counted.
would be indications of "vote fraud." One could look at those jurisdictions in the Election Day Survey with a disproportionate number of provisional ballots cast and cross reference it with demographics and number of provisional ballots discarded. (Michael McDonald, George Mason University)

8) Spencer Overton, in a forthcoming law review article entitled *Voter Identification*, suggests a methodology that employs three approaches—investigations of voter fraud, random surveys of voters who purported to vote, and an examination of death rolls provide a better understanding of the frequency of fraud. He says all three approaches have strengths and weaknesses, and thus the best studies would employ all three to assess the extent of voter fraud. An excerpt follows:

1. **Investigations and Prosecutions of Voter Fraud**

Policymakers should develop databases that record all investigations, allegations, charges, trials, convictions, acquittals, and plea bargains regarding voter fraud. Existing studies are incomplete but provide some insight. For example, a statewide survey of each of Ohio’s 88 county boards of elections found only four instances of ineligible persons attempting to vote out of a total of 9,078,728 votes cast in the state’s 2002 and 2004 general elections. This is a fraud rate of 0.00000045 percent. The Carter-Baker Commission’s Report noted that since October 2002, federal officials had charged 89 individuals with casting multiple votes, providing false information about their felon status, buying votes, submitting false voter registration information, and voting improperly as a non-citizen. Examined in the context of the 196,139,871 ballots cast between October 2002 and August 2005, this represents a fraud rate of 0.0000005 percent (note also that not all of the activities charged would have been prevented by a photo identification requirement).

A more comprehensive study should distinguish voter fraud that could be prevented by a photo identification requirement from other types of fraud — such as absentee voting and stuffing ballot boxes — and obtain statistics on the factors that led law enforcement to prosecute fraud. The study would demand significant resources because it would require that researchers interview and pour over the records of local district attorneys and election boards.

Hard data on investigations, allegations, charges, pleas, and prosecutions is important because it quantifies the amount of fraud officials detect. Even if prosecutors vigorously pursue voter fraud, however, the number of fraud cases charged probably does not capture the total amount of voter fraud. Information on official investigations, charges, and prosecutions should be supplemented by surveys of voters and a comparison of voting rolls to death rolls.

2. **Random Surveys of Voters**


Random surveys could give insight about the percentage of votes cast fraudulently. For example, political scientists could contact a statistically representative sampling of 1,000 people who purportedly voted at the polls in the last election, ask them if they actually voted, and confirm the percentage who are valid voters. Researchers should conduct the survey soon after an election to locate as many legitimate voters as possible with fresh memories.

Because many respondents would perceive voting as a social good, some who did not vote might claim that they did, which may underestimate the extent of fraud. A surveyor might mitigate this skew through the framing of the question ("I've got a record that you voted. Is that true?").

Further, some voters will not be located by researchers and others will refuse to talk to researchers. Photo identification proponents might construe these non-respondents as improper registrations that were used to commit voter fraud.

Instead of surveying all voters to determine the amount of fraud, researchers might reduce the margin of error by focusing on a random sampling of voters who signed affidavits in the three states that request photo identification but also allow voters to establish their identity through affidavit—Florida, Louisiana, and South Dakota. In South Dakota, for example, only two percent of voters signed affidavits to establish their identity. If the survey indicates that 95 percent of those who signed affidavits are legitimate voters (and the other 5 percent were shown to be either fraudulent or were non-responsive), this suggests that voter fraud accounts for, at the maximum, 0.1 percent of ballots cast.

The affidavit study, however, is limited to three states, and it is unclear whether this sample is representative of other states (the difficulty may be magnified in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of hundreds of thousands of voters). Further, the affidavit study reveals information about the amount of fraud in a photo identification state with an affidavit exception—more voter fraud may exist in a state that does not request photo identification.

3. **Examining Death Rolls**

A comparison of death rolls to voting rolls might also provide an estimate of fraud.

Imagine that one million people live in state A, which has no documentary identification requirement. Death records show that 20,000 people passed away in state A in 2003. A cross-referencing of this list to the voter rolls shows that 10,000 of those who died were registered voters, and these names remained on the voter rolls during the November 2004 election. Researchers would look at what percentage of the 10,000 dead-but-registered people who “voted” in the November 2004 election. A researcher should distinguish the votes cast in the name of the dead at the polls from those cast
absentee (which a photo identification requirement would not prevent). This number would be extrapolated to the electorate as a whole.

This methodology also has its strengths and weaknesses. If fraudulent voters target the dead, the study might overestimate the fraud that exists among living voters (although a low incidence of fraud among deceased voters might suggest that fraud among all voters is low). The appearance of fraud also might be inflated by false positives produced by a computer match of different people with the same name. Photo identification advocates would likely assert that the rate of voter fraud could be higher among fictitious names registered, and that the death record survey would not capture that type of fraud because fictitious names registered would not show up in the death records. Nevertheless, this study, combined with the other two, would provide important insight into the magnitude of fraud likely to exist in the absence of a photo identification requirement.
May 12, 2006

MEMORANDUM

TO: EAC Commissioners

FROM: Peggy Sims, Election Research Specialist

SUBJECT: Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Working Group Meeting

The first meeting of the Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Working Group will take place from 1:00 PM to 5:30 PM on Thursday, May 18th, 2006 at the offices of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), 1225 New York Avenue, NW, 11th Floor, Washington, DC.

As you know, Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires EAC to conduct research on election administration issues. Among the tasks listed in the statute is the development of:

- nationwide statistics and methods of identifying, deterring, and investigating voting fraud in elections for Federal office [section 241(b)(6)]; and
- ways of identifying, deterring, and investigating methods of voter intimidation [section 241(b)(7)].

EAC's Board of Advisors recommended that the agency make research on these matters a high priority. Consequently, in September 2005, EAC contracted with two consultants (Job Serebrov and Tova Wang) to:

- develop a comprehensive description of what constitutes voting fraud and voter intimidation in the context of Federal elections;
- perform background research (including Federal and State administrative and case law review), identify current activities of key government agencies, civic and advocacy organizations regarding these topics, and deliver a summary of this research and all source documentation;
establish a project working group, in consultation with EAC, composed of key individuals and representatives of organizations knowledgeable about the topics of voting fraud and voter intimidation;

provide the description of what constitutes voting fraud and voter intimidation and the results of the preliminary research to the working group, and convene the working group to discuss potential avenues for future EAC research on this topic; and

produce a report to EAC summarizing the findings of the preliminary research effort and working group deliberations that includes recommendations for future research, if any;

For your information, the folder accompanying this letter includes a number of items related to our consultants’ preliminary research and the upcoming meeting:

- a meeting agenda;
- a list of Working Group members;
- a draft definition of election fraud;
- a list of reports and literature reviewed;
- a summary of interviews conducted and a list of experts interviewed;
- a list of experts interviewed;
- an analysis of news articles researched through Nexis;
- a summary of Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section cases, October 2002-January 2006;
- an analysis of case law review;
- a summary of research methodology recommendations from political scientists and experts in the field; and
- a CD with summaries of individual reports and literature reviewed, summaries of individual interviews, charts and summaries of news articles, and case law summary charts.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Enclosures

cc: Tom Wilkey, Executive Director
    Julie Thompson-Hodgkins, General Counsel
    Gavin Gilmour, Associate General Counsel