

End-to-End (E2E) Verifiable Protocols for Voting Systems

Andy Regenscheid – Voting Security Team, NIST

E2E Verifiability in the VVSG 2.0




Principle 9: AUDITABLE

The voting system is auditable and enables evidence-based elections.

- Two paths for software independence (9.1.1-A):
 - Paper-based System architectures
 - E2E Verifiable System Architectures
- E2E Systems must use approved cryptographic protocols (9.1.6-A)
- E2E Systems must undergo an independent evaluation of its implementation of an approved protocol (9.1.6-B)

***Goal:* Establishing a public process to solicit, evaluate, and approve E2E verifiable voting protocols that could be implemented in voting systems.**

What is E2E Verifiability?




Voter Verifiability: Voters can check their ballot was correctly cast/recorded

Universal Verifiability: Anyone can verify cast ballots were correctly counted

Simple E2E Verifiability



Raising Hands in a Group: Verifiable, but not private




E2E-V Properties




- Cryptographically auditable voting protocols
 - ***Cast as Intended***: Voters have confidence that their cast vote selections reflect intent
 - ***Recorded as Cast***: Voters can confirm their cast ballot was included in the results
 - ***Tallied as Recorded***: Vote counts are publicly verifiable
- Software Independent by design
 - *Paper-Based Systems*: Auditability achieved through voter-verifiable paper records and election procedures
 - *E2E Systems*: Auditability achieved through mathematical proofs; may **also** use paper records
- E2E protocols must provide these properties while also supporting usability, accessibility, security, privacy and functional requirements

What is E2E Verifiability?



What is E2E Verifiability?



Evaluation Challenges



- **Lack of Standards**
 - E2E protocols are application-specific
 - Use non-standard cryptographic algorithms
- **Security Analysis**
 - Protocol and algorithm evaluations require careful review by subject matter experts
- **Accessibility**
 - New voter verification/auditing processes present unique accessibility challenges
- **Testing Implementation in Voting Systems**
 - Systems must properly implement protocols to be software independent
 - Protocols must be securely implemented to avoid errors and preserve ballot secrecy



The Path to E2E Verifiable Protocols for Voting Systems

Purpose: Bring stakeholders together to begin the process of:

- Building a community of interest
- Identifying what is needed from E2E verifiable voting protocols and systems
- Establishing a public evaluation process for protocols
- Discussing requirements and evaluation criteria for a call for proposals

Oct. 6-7, 2022

Agenda

Opening Remarks: Chairman Hicks, EAC

Keynote- E2E Verifiability- Ben Adida, VotingWorks

Overview Of E2E Eval. Process- Andy Regenscheid, NIST

Panel 1: Integrity and Voter Confidence

Panel 2: Security

Panel 3: Accessibility and Human Factors

Panel 4: Implementation and Testing

Next Steps- Jon Panek, EAC

Closing Remarks: Chairman Hicks, EAC

E2E-V Workshop Feedback



- **E2E-V Voting Systems have unique and valuable characteristics**
 - Improve voter confidence/trust
 - Facilitate development of new voting system architectures
- **Significant challenges remain**
 - Complexity may reduce voter acceptance and trust – communication will be key
 - Technical evaluation of protocols and systems is difficult
 - Accessibility of voting and verification methods is critical
- **Move deliberately and thoughtfully**
 - “Nothing erodes trust more than getting it wrong with voter”
- **Open and transparent processes are critical**
 - Involve a diverse group of stakeholders
 - Allow public to see, analyze, and contribute to the process, provide open documentation
- **Learn through incremental progress**
 - Consider encouraging/facilitating pilot projects to learn from real-world systems

Takeaways



- **More research and community engagement is needed before initiating a call for proposals**
- **Protocols and system designs continue to change to support new properties and features, e.g.,**
 - Support different voting variations
 - Back-end optimizations
 - Quantum resistance
- **Stability needed to make evaluation/certification practical and cost-effective**
 - E2E verified voting protocol evaluation
 - Protocol implementation evaluation
 - System-level certification
- **NIST continues to believe an open and public process should be used to evaluate protocols**

Previously-Proposed Plan



Needed Research Areas



- **Accessibility and usability of E2E verifiable voting systems**
 - For voters, pollworkers, and election officials using these systems
 - Address full process – system setup, voting, verification, and auditing
- **Impact on election management and pollworker responsibilities**
 - E2E verifiable voting systems introduce new steps to the process
 - New system components, e.g., verification website
- **Public transparency and trust in E2E verifiable voting protocols**
 - Study perceptions and trust in E2E verified voting protocols and systems
 - Communicating E2E verifiability to the public/voters
- **New methods/designs for E2E verifiable voting systems**
 - Front-end: Different protocols/designs to support different interfaces and voter interaction-
 - Back-end: New cryptographic protocol/designs to support voting variations and quantum resistance
- **Use of E2E verifiable protocols as an incremental tool**
 - Consider different usage scenarios where E2E verifiability could add to the voting process

Questions



- **Are there other research areas or questions that NIST and the EAC should investigate?**
- **How can NIST and the EAC facilitate incremental progress in E2E verifiable systems?**
 - What pilot projects or studies could be done?
 - How could/should we address usage of E2E verifiable voting protocols in otherwise software independent systems?
- **How and where can we bring the election officials, technologists, manufacturers, and advocates together to discuss challenges, needs, and solutions?**



Q&A/Discussion

Jon Panek – EAC Testing and Certification Director
Andrew Regenscheid - NIST


Email: Andrew.Regenscheid@nist.gov

Background: *Crypto Standards Processes*




- NIST has been developing cryptographic standards since the Data Encryption Standard in the 1970s
- Similar challenges to vetting E2E protocols:
 - Difficult, multi-layered security evaluation process
 - Need to build confidence and trust to facilitate adoption
- Public evaluation processes valuing openness and transparency
 - Establish a community of interest with researchers, industry and practitioners
 - Develop open Calls for Proposals with clear requirements and evaluation criteria
 - Submissions open for public view, typically over multiple rounds
 - Rationale for decisions are publicly documented

Example: PQC Selection Process




Previously-Proposed Process




What is E2E Verifiability?



Vote Marking



Casting



Counting

