| Date                                  | From                     | Comments<br>We need a ban on wireless modems and<br>Internet connectivity in federally certified voting<br>systems. connectivity to the public Internet |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|
| 5/23/2019 6:15 Dessertshore@gmail.com |                          | through modems or other means compromises   |
| 5/25/2019 12:22                       | 2 pat.r.leahy@gmail.com  | I love the VVSG 2.0!!   |
|                                       |                          | I am appalled that 20 states do not require   |
|                                       |                          | federal certification/verification of their voting  |
|                                       |                          | systems. In my opinion all systems should have a  |
|                                       |                          | paper audit trail. The US is big on talk about  |
| 5/25/2019 13:24                       | williams.wm.sk@gmail.com | democracy but can't verify the accuracy of  |
|                                       |                          | I advise no connections to the internet, by any   |
|                                       |                          | methods, for election Voting and Tallying equipment. The only possible exception to this  |
|                                       |                          | would be for the poll books to ensure that each   |
|                                       |                          | voter has but one vote. All modems must be  |
|                                       |                          | removed from Voting and Tallying Equipment.   |
|                                       |                          | Because of the cyber security issues,   |
| 5/26/2019 9:08                        | annecnettles@gmail.com   | Handmarked Paper Ballots should be the  |
|                                       |                          | The guidelines should discourage or prohibit any  |
|                                       |                          | device from connection to a modem and or the  |
|                                       |                          | internet. The guidelines should strongly  |
|                                       |                          | encourage using hand-marked paper ballots for   |
| 5/26/2019 9:22                        | Blair.haney@outlook.com  | all votes: absentee, mail-in, at polling location,  |
|                                       |                          | Please ensure that all voting systems are   |
|                                       |                          | unconnected to the Internet and rely upon hand-   |
|                                       |                          | marked paper ballots without barcodes. Our  |
| F /2C /2010 0 2                       |                          | democracy cannot afford further interference in   |
|                                       | 5 kristin6028@yahoo.com  | our elections by bad actors.  |

Paper ballots for ELECTION SECURITY!!

5/26/2019 9:26 kristin6028@yahoo.com 5/26/2019 9:49 pamelahoward9@gmail.com

# 5/27/2019 14:37 gtimriley@gmail.com

Digital systems are inherently NOT secure and they are made even less secure if they are connected to any network. Because digital collection of votes is desirable for other reasons, I urge you to ensure election integrity and validation using voter verified paper records as a requirement for all digital balloting systems. Printing the voter's selections on a receipt like roll, scrolled into view under glass so it can be inspected for accuracy by the voter prior to casting the ballot ensures that voter's selections have been logged accurately in the event that the digital count must be verified, spot checked, and validated as true and correct. Elections are the heart of our constitutional republic and their integrity is worth the highest standards we can impose on election system vendors. Voter verified PAPER ballots are the only way that I support the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) and robust principles and guidelines for software security, integrity, auditability and ballot secrecy, and request the addition of an update to further protect against cyber intrusions The FBI and Department of Homeland Security have confirmed that adversaries have targeted our election systems with cyber-attacks, it is imperative that the VVSG prohibit any connectivity to the Internet through wireless modems or other means. As The EAC writes its guidelines for voting machine security, every measure of security must be taken into account. I strongly urge the Commission to add the following to the guideline under Principle 13: DATA PROTECTION: "The voting system does not use wireless technology or connect to any public telecommunications infrastructure." Indeed, eliminating wireless modems and internet connectivity will not guarantee our voting machines canâ€<sup>™</sup>t be manipulated or hacked through corrupted USB sticks, insider attacks or supply chain corruption. That is why ultimately all votes should be cast on paper ballots and all elections should be audited by manually counting paper ballots, but this guideline is essential while we still use voting

Commission 1335 East-West Highway, Suite 4300 Silver Spring, MD 20910 RE: Public **Comments on Voluntary Voting System** Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines Dear Members of the Commission: The Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0. Principles and Guidelines. ADAP is the federallyfunded Protection and Advocacy (P&A) system for individuals with disabilities for the state of Alabama. P&As were established by the United States Congress to protect the rights of people with disabilities and their families through legal support, advocacy, referral, and education. P&As are in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands), and there is a P&A affiliated with the Native American Consortium which includes the Hopi, Navaho and San Juan Southern Paiute Nations in the Four Corners region of the Southwest. Collectively, the P&A Network is the largest provider of legally based advocacy services to people with disabilities in the United States. Through the Protection and Advocacy for Voter Access (PAVA) program, created by the Help America Vote Act, the P&As

### 5/28/2019 9:12 jtucker@adap.ua.edu

U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1335 East-West Highway, Suite 4300 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Public Comments on Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines The National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0. Principles and Guidelines. NDRN is the non-profit membership organization for the federally mandated Protection and Advocacy (P&A) agencies for individuals with disabilities. The P&As were established by the United States Congress to protect the rights of people with disabilities and their families through legal support, advocacy, referral, and education. P&As are in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands), and there is a P&A affiliated with the Native American Consortium which includes the Hopi, Navaho and San Juan Southern Paiute Nations in the Four Corners region of the Southwest. Collectively, the P&A Network is the largest provider of legally based advocacy services to people with disabilities in the United States. Through the Protection and Advocacy for Voter Access (PAVA) program, created by the Help America Vote Act, the P&As

5/28/2019 10:34 michelle.bishop@ndrn.org

. . the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 Principles and Guidelines. Disability Rights Pennsylvania is the designated Protection and Advocacy system in Pennsylvania. DRP was established by the U.S. Congress to protect and advocate for the rights of people with disabilities to be free from abuse, neglect, discrimination, and segregation. Through the Protection and Advocacy for Voter Access Program (PAVA), created by HAVA, DRP has a federal mandate to "ensure the full participation in the electoral process for individuals with disabilities, including registering to vote, casting a vote and accessing polling places" and are a leading voice on access to the vote for people with disabilities in Pennsylvania. Voting access and will be an issue beyond the 2020 election. DRP is concerned that the only voting systems capable of meeting VVSG 2.0'x requirements will be reliant on a marked paper ballot as the ballot of record. It is important to acknowledge that the promise of fully accessible, paper-based voting systems is as old as the passage of HAVA itself. Yet, the reality that paper ballots will be made accessible, private and able to be cast independently, for people with disabilities is not now, and may never be, a reality. DRP is also concerned with the adherence to the concept of "one accessible

5/28/2019 10:56 pradecic@disabilityrightspa.org

#### 5/28/2019 11:10 PTRIBBLE@DRMS.MS

5/28/2019 11:10 kpmueller@gmail.com

Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines Disability Rights Mississippi (DRMS) is the protection and advocacy system for the state of Mississippi. We are part of the National Disability Rights Network. While DRMS is thrilled to find that the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is attempting the complex task of balancing election security with federal elections accessibility requirements under law, we are concerned that the only voting systems capable of meeting VVSG 2.0â€<sup>™</sup>s requirements will be reliant on a marked paper ballot as the ballot of record. Paper based voting systems are outdated. The hope that paper ballots will be made accessible, private and able to be cast independently for people with disabilities is not a reality. Widespread implementation of marketready, fully accessible paper ballot voting systems is simply not achievable within the foreseeable future especially in Mississippi. Increasingly, voters with disabilities and their non-disabled peers are leveraging opportunities to vote by mail, vote absentee, and may be receiving their ballots electronically. Yet, VVSG 2.0 denies these voters the guarantee of an accessible ballot by limiting the extent of the VVSGâ€<sup>™</sup>s reach into non-traditional voting systems. DRMS believes that the failure of VVSG EAC Commissioners, I strongly support the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 draft, but urge the Commission to add the following under Principle 13: Data Protection: "The voting system does not use wireless technology or connect to any public telecommunication infrastructure". Given the fact that our election systems are being targeted via cyberattacks, it is imperative the VVSG prohibit connectivity to the public Internet through wireless modems or other means. Thank you for your consideration

5/28/2019 14:04 Jenniferscohn@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:04 lynn.shumake@gmail.com

5/28/2019 14:05 steinman.kristina@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:06 Marcia.Rector@gmail.com

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COMMENT PERIOD ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure

5/28/2019 14:06 bryan.bradsby@gmail.com

5/28/2019 14:08 Kevin@kevshouse.us

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5/28/2019 14:08 lisaes32@comcast.net

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5/28/2019 14:09 Pjscello@gmail.com

5/28/2019 14:09 craig.bozman62@gmail.com 5/28/2019 14:09 Ingridbond5@gmail.com welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an Use paper ballots that are verifiable!

5/28/2019 14:10 Jmaldonado822@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:13 susanfgn5@gmail.com

5/28/2019 14:13 dorothymbrowne@aol.com

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### 5/28/2019 14:14 Jwash232@comcast.net

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5/28/2019 14:15 keithawade.kw@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:15 chowenhill@comcast.net

5/28/2019 14:16 ivoriesinred@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:17 philip.bernick@gmail.com

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# 5/28/2019 14:23 grrrl100@aol.com

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5/28/2019 14:24 Drsbagby@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:24 juliecarson@earthlink.net
5/28/2019 14:26 cathy.mcdonald@verizon.net

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5/28/2019 14:31 merlinjernigan@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 14:31 glennw444@yahoo.com

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5/28/2019 14:32 triciaisenstein@me.com

the new VVSG 2.0 is an improvement to the current voting system guidelines, the VVSG 2.0 does not provide adequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM SHALL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an accurate hand-counted audit. 9. … create a l'm very concerned about the protection of our democracy & voting. We need secure elections with paper ballots. We need bipartisan oversight from voter to counter. l'm concerned of the number of machines that are easily hacked & manipulated - & not made in America. I implore our legislators to take all

welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system

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ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure

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happy about thee new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. HOWEVER, I have serious concerns..... as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal

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consider the following with the utmost concern: I agree and welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you PLEASE make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal

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my city, Grosse Pointe Woods. Our system was not the latest high-end tech, nor was it the least tech. It was, however, capable of ensuring votes were recorded accurately, and the voters' trust was intact. The VVSG 2.0 is said to be a significant improvement to current voting system guidelines. But as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process is flawed because it is too reliant on input of voting system vendors. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL: \*record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. \*have a modem or allow remote access. \*allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. \*be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. \*encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL \* allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a

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TAKE ACTION More Home WRITE THE EAC TODAY TAKE ACTION ABOUT LEARN MORE MAY 29TH 4PM - PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant

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(MPAS) is a private, non-profit, and nonpartisan disability rights organization that advocates for people with disabilities in Michigan. MPAS is pleased to offer written comments to the revised Voluntary Voter System Guidelines version 2.0. These comments were prepared by Noah Walker and Mark McWilliams of MPAS' Public Policy and Media Relations (PPMR) office. For more information, please contact Mark McWilliams at (517) 487-1755 or mmcwilliams@mpas.org. One of the major focuses in MPASâ€<sup>™</sup> public policy advocacy is on voting rights. Under the Help America Vote Act of 2002, people with disabilities have the right to vote privately and independently, have full physical access to the polls, and have full rights to accessing voting machines. However, in practice, people with disabilities have a 6.5% less turnout rate than people without disabilities. Most of the issues involve the issues of guardianship, the lack of access to voting machines, the lack of poll worker training on privacy and on the machines, and the issues involving stigma. The voluntary voter system guidelines 2.0 include good principles, emphasizing high quality design and implementation, transparency, system interoperability, equivalent and consistent voter

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hundred percent of independent election experts have come to the conclusion (not hard to understand) that only hand-marked paper ballots, which are human-readable and humanauditable, can close the many vulnerabilities that have been found with barcoded schemes. Your first priority should be making sure that elections are fair, and that they can be audited in a fair process. Hand marked paper ballots are the ONLY way to accomplish this. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the

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All systems approved the VVSG. 2.0 should meet the following standards: no approved voting system will 1) record votes directly without the voter reviewing a paper ballot 2) have a modem or remote access 3) allow the technical opportunity for a to machine change a ballot after voter has cast it 4) be a hybrid machine with printer and scanner in same path 5) encode votes using barcodes, QR codes or any other form that is Not readable by voter without technical assistance. All systems approved by the VVSG.2.0 will allow: 1) Hand marked paper ballots, not just a paper trail created by a machine. 2) Use durable paper not thermal 3) support the ability to have an accurate hand counted audit. 4) create a digital ballot image that is identical to the paper ballot. 5) create a panel of Election Security Experts made of academics and technical experts with no relationship to vendors and no vested interest in emerging systems. EAC must stop consulting vendors and their Representatives for technical

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5/28/2019 15:52 buell@acm.org

5/28/2019 15:54 jlj1198@gmail.com 5/28/2019 15:55 Meme2frmfl@aol.com welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an

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5/28/2019 16:53 Joann.m.santiago@gmail.com

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US election process, about my ability as a voter to verify that my votes will be counted as I intended, and the ability of elections officials to audit election results. I am glad that EAC is attempting to improve VVSG. The new VVSG 2.0 presents a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. This leaves the process flawed and could present concerns for voters. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow any remote access, to guard against potential hacking or other manipulation from remote locations. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine  $\hat{a} \in \hat{w}$  with a printer and a scanner in the same As a voter I oppose the use of technology for voting in any form. Voting technology is too easily hacked. Votes aren't verifiable. Even scanning of paper ballots can be hacked. I'm completely in favor of paper, No Tech voting. Please regulate voting appropriately. Protect our most fundamental right. Thank you

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welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an

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COMMENT PERIOD ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure l'd like any voting system we use to be audited. I think we need hand marked paper ballots in all instances.

th te W pa m

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10. Ballot Secrecy should be refined to discriminate between the concept of privacy and ballot anonymity. The voter should be able to vote privately and without any coercion. The ballots, once voted, should not be possible to link to which voter cast the ballot. However, beyond that limitation, ballots should not contain voter-identifiable information by which the voter can be identified, and therefore, ballots can be -- as much as possible -- be considered public documents so that the public can independently confirm the result of the election. If a voter adds voter-identifiable data that would otherwise not be required, that should not obviate public disclosure. 2. Although there were many notices of how to submit comments, rarely was there any link to the actual documents. Every notice for comments should also provide the link to the document(s) being reviewed. 3. The document being reviewed is only a very high level set of goals and is hardly what is expected in terms of detailed requirements for voting systems. As a result, people are word-smithing at a very fine granularity hoping that minor changes will cause some larger result based on the subtle meaning of those very few words. I believe this is a bad practice and instead larger definitions and **#BanDRE Voting Machines #BanBarcodeVoting** #BanHybridVoting

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5/28/2019 19:41 Laurieadrian@gmail.com

5/28/2019 19:41 julie@shannondale.com

5/28/2019 19:43 Lindsaymargaretf@gmail.com

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## 5/28/2019 19:59 jsluka@msn.com

5/28/2019 20:01 marthops2@sonic.net

5/28/2019 20:04 Akoonce53@yahoo.com

welcome your call for comments. As we have seen the last few years, America needs a secure voting system, and paper ballots are the best. Alameda County, where I live, uses hand-marked paper ballots, with electroni backup - they are scanned by hand - in case an election needs to be replicate. And the internal CA voting system is not connected to the internet, per the CA Secretary of STATe. The new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine â€" with a printer and a Addition needed for the VVSG-2.0 No approved vote system will; 1.) record votes directly to a computer memory 2.) have a modem or allow access 3.) be a hybrid machine 4) encode votes using barcodes, codes or any format boter cant read. Yes-All approved vote systems will: 1.) Hand marked paper ballots 2.) Durable oaper not thermal 3.) Hand counted audit animity 4.) Create digital ballot image \*EAC must creat a panel of election security experts (no shenanigans like relationship to vendor). EAC must stop consulting vendors & reps. for tech guidance. Its unethical and of course a conflict of

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5/28/2019 20:08 Jeepgirl9179@gmail.com

COMMENT PERIOD ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure

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happy to Hear that voting guides are being revised to keep safeguard the integrity of our elections. I have recently learned though that the new draft of the VVSG 2.0 does not provide adequate security and will not be able to assure

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5/28/2019 21:54 paulg2@pgacreative.com

5/28/2019 21:54 Dede 35@hotmail.com

NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a modem or computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine â€" with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an accurate hand-counted audit. 9. … create a digital ballot image that is identical to the paper ballot. • The EAC must create a panel of election security experts made of academics and technical experts with no relationship to vendors and no vested interest in emerging systems. The EAC needs to take input on the VVSG 2.0 from this panel - and other non-vested security experts on an ongoing basis. • The EAC must stop consulting vendors and their representatives for technical guidance. Vendors 5/28/2019 21:54 smarshroberts-shop74@yahoo.com have in their best interest cost containment, not

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5/28/2019 21:56 Irthomp@mindspring.com

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5/28/2019 22:03 Jpeery59@gmail.com

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5/28/2019 22:19 Credo@wwagallery.com

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**Guidelines 2.0 Principles and Guidelines** Comments U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1335 East-West Highway, Suite 4300 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 Subject: Please strengthen Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Dear Members of the Election Assistance Commission: I strongly support the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) and commend the robust principles and guidelines for software independence, auditability and ballot secrecy. Given the fact that our election systems are being targeted for interference through cyberattacks, it is imperative that the VVSG also prohibit connectivity to the public Internet through wireless modems or other means. I strongly urge the Commission to ban modems in vote counting machines both to protect data and to prevent manipulation and urge the Commission to add the following to the guideline under Principle 13: DATA PROTECTION: "The voting system does not use wireless technology or connect to any public telecommunications infrastructure." Granted, eliminating wireless modems and internet connectivity will not guarantee our voting machines canâ€<sup>™</sup>t be manipulated or hacked through corrupted USB sticks, insider attacks, or supply chain corruption. That is why, ultimately,

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improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an

welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant

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country see the rise of corruption happening all around us. The corruption has seeped into every corner of our politics and the highest level of our government. Please use these guidelines to insure that we can trust our election process in this new age of technology where elections are at risk to foreign attacks and greed of corruption. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes

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Secure our voting machines from hacking I strongly support the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) and commend the robust principles and guidelines for software independence, auditability and ballot secrecy. Given the fact that our election systems are being targeted for interference through cyberattacks, it is imperative the VVSG also prohibit connectivity to the public Internet through wireless modems or other means. We should want to ban modems in vote counting machines both to protect data and to prevent manipulation. Therefore, I urge the Commission to add the following to the guideline under Principle 13: DATA PROTECTION: "The voting system does not use wireless technology or connect to any public telecommunications infrastructure." Indeed, eliminating wireless modems and internet connectivity will not guarantee our voting machines can't be manipulated or hacked through corrupted USB sticks, insider attacks or supply chain corruption. That is why ultimately all votes should be cast on paper ballots and all elections should be audited by manually counting a sample of the paper ballots, but this guideline is essential while we still use voting machines. Thank you for your

to election security. My county has approved funds to purchase BMDs, which are unacceptable because the votes are tabulated through proprietary barcodes that voters cannot read. The elections conducted on such machines are unverifiable, despite there being a "paper trail.†ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in \{$ be a hybrid machine  $\hat{a} {\ensuremath{\varepsilon}}^{\ensuremath{\prime}}$  with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format

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you for creating the new VVSG 2.0. It is a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However, as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. In addition, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I irge you to you ensure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine with a printer and a scanner on the same ballot path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an

5/29/2019 0:14 Jweiner123@optonline.net

As an engineer with years of software and technology experience, I write to support the following: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$ use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$ support the ability to have an accurate handcounted audit. 9. … create a digital ballot

## 5/29/2019 0:27 Vikrmada1@hotmail.com

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5/29/2019 0:28 Juanita.e@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 0:42 Maffeomedia@icloud.com

5/29/2019 0:44 abcdw5@aol.com

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5/29/2019 0:57 brookenortonlais@gmail.com

Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not readable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal

5/29/2019 1:01 aimeedearmon@yahoo.com

5/29/2019 1:02 valsaichek@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 1:16 stephenspencer@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 2:23 joe.kasper@gmail.com

the Trace Research and Development Center at the University of Maryland, in response to the call for public comments on VVSG 2.0, which is posted at: https://www.eac.gov/votingequipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines/. The Trace Center, founded in 1971, is the nationâ€<sup>™</sup>s oldest research center on Disability and Information and Communication Technologies. The Trace Center has been researching and developing voting prototypes and guidelines since 1998. Elements of Traceâ€<sup>™</sup>s research can be found in many voting systems today and Traceâ€<sup>™</sup>s early Web guidelines were used as the basis for WCAG 1.0 and 2.0 which Trace also provided the co-chair for, as well as 3 of the WCAG editors. We are specifically commenting on two of the guidelines from VVSG 2.0: Guideline 8.2 and Guideline 10.2 Comments on Guideline 8.2 Guideline 8.2 states that the voting system must meet "currently accepted federal standards for accessibility." We think that this approach (of incorporating other standards) is a good approach in general, but care will need to be taken in crafting the provision(s) underneath this general guideline. Incorporating other standards is good because it avoids the temptation to re-word provisions slightly. Re-wording perfectly good provisions

#### 5/29/2019 2:33 jlazar@umd.edu

Commission: My name is Jeanette Hines. I go by "JC" Hines. I am a retired Paralegal. I take a serious interests in our government but more of my attention has been directed towards voting issues due to the horrendous scandals surrounding our voting systems throughout our Nation. I urge you to take note of the following notations and suggestions as I feel they are imperative in assisting in resolving some serious issues. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$ 

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5/29/2019 5:26 rawsaturn@hotmail.com

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5/29/2019 6:02 Carlothrow@gmail.com

welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an

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5/29/2019 6:47 atudzin@gmail.com

5/29/2019 7:16 yobusiness@outlook.com

VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an

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to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting

the following standards: NO APPROVED

process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet

5/29/2019 7:21 johnegan42@gmail.com

5/29/2019 7:22 zzbennett@hotmail.com

5/29/2019 7:22 tthomas8398@yahoo.com

ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure

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# 5/29/2019 7:33 dany0120@gmail.com

5/29/2019 7:36 stwykle1@gmail.com

5/29/2019 7:37 kathryn.e.barker@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 7:43 mandra@gmail.com

5/29/2019 7:55 tiger\_woody2003@yahoo.com

5/29/2019 7:58 pegasuspix@yahoo.com

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#### 5/29/2019 8:05 Twofleas@gmail.com

5/29/2019 8:14 mcfarrenc@denison.edu

ALL electronic voting machines, including electronic vote counting machines have been found to be easily hackable. I, as well as many of my friends and colleagues, no longer trust the results of our elections. We want what the experts in this field recommend: publicly counted and audited, HAND MARKED paper ballots, not hybrid systems (BMDâ€<sup>™</sup>s should only be used for persons with disabilities). Hand marked paper ballots, coupled with rules that uncles a strict chain of custody are critical for election security. Secure, trustworthy elections are the cornerstone of any democracy. Please restore trust in our voting systems by requiring ALL states use HAND MARKED paper ballots.

welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines, as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. In light of the 2016 election tampering, this is unacceptable! Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. This, I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in \{$ be a hybrid machine â€" with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal

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marking computers that the state of Georgia is considering purchasing. Officials have not made public their final decision, but it appears that the ES&S ExpressVote system is most favored. Dominion ImageCast is also being considered. Both models embed voter selections in problematic barcodes (ES&S) and QR codes (Dominion). Voters cannot read barcodes or QR codes, so when their votes are embedded in codes, voters have no idea if what they intended to cast was accurately recorded. When those same barcodes or OR codes are tabulatedâ€"not human readable marksâ€"the voter has absolutely no reassurance that their votes were counted as cast. If audits are attempted, they are meaningless because the data on which they are being audited is questionable. Voter chain of custody of the vote is a bedrock requirement in democratic elections. Ballot marking computers that embed votes in barcodes or OR codes remove any notion whatsoever that voters are in charge. The nationâ€<sup>™</sup>s top IT experts agree that security is compromised with all voting computers. Hand marking on paper is the most secure method to record votes. There is nothing to come between the voter and his recorded vote, and that authentic ballot becomes the ballot of record for audits. Reviewing the

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concerned about the security of our elections and have been reading information about possible upgrades. From what I understand, the new VVSG 2.0 is a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However, l'm concerned from what I have read that, as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. It is very important to me that I know my vote will be counted as I intended for it to be. Additionally, I am concerned that the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the input of voting system vendors,. They would have motivation to provide biased information in order to promote their own products and historically may not have shown a commitment to election security. So that U.S. elections will be a model for secure and valid elections, I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †¦ record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in \{$ 

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5/29/2019 8:42 shelleycampaign18@gmail.com

5/29/2019 8:42 jmuehle1@gmail.com

drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an accurate hand-counted audit. 9. … create a digital ballot image that is identical to the paper We must have hand-marked paper ballots countrywide in time for the 2020 election AND no machines that are hooked up to the internet. Our Democracy depends upon that happening.
5/29/2019 8:47 hdbooth@yahoo.com

5/29/2019 8:49 jeanfoster@carolina.rr.com

writing to you as a citizen who has a PhD in Computer Science and is very concerned about the likelihood that electronic voting machines can and will be tampered with. Vote totals could easily be falsified. There is some statistical, circumstantial evidence that this has already happened. But the nature of the e-voting machines means that there is literally no way to check. This should be stopped. The integrity of our vote is too important. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the Please use only hand marked paper ballots so that we can ensure each vote is not tampered with!!! Please preserve this sacred American right!!! Please do not use voting machines that are easily manipulated after votes are cast!!!

5/29/2019 9:08 dianatippitcasella@earthlink.net

5/29/2019 9:08 Calegraham@comcast.net

5/29/2019 9:11 214blumen@gmail.com 5/29/2019 9:13 edwin.smith@smartmatic.com welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †¦ record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an I worry about the integrity of our elections and admire the Netherlands' choice to return to paper ballots (I think using special pencils as well). I believe any electronic system is vulnerable, if only but vendors in some cases who lack accountability and might be corrupted/compromised. At a minimum,, require paper ballots that \*must\* be audited Thank you for the opportunity to provide

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5/29/2019 9:25 craig.genmail@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 9:40 tashalang925@msn.com 5/29/2019 9:47 sjones@eac.gov

5/29/2019 9:52 corye.dunn@disabilityrightsnc.org

welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: Â NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a}$ €¦ be a hybrid machine  $\hat{a}$ €" with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{A} = \hat{e}^{\dagger}_{i}$  support the ability to have an test pdf size

Please find comments of Disability Rights NC on VVSG 2.0 attached.

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5/29/2019 10:01 publicwondering@gmail.com

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I welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL: 1. record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing and verifying their selections on a paper ballot. The choices that are verified by the voter will be the choices used for tallying the votes. 2. have a modem, allow remote access or connect even incidentally to any computer, network, or network element that has been connected to a public network. 3. allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot, after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same physical cabinet. 5. encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive

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to your request for public comment as published in Federal Register:

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/20 19/02/28/2019-03453/proposed-voluntaryvoting-system-guidelines-20-principles-andguidelines our PDF document was uploaded to the following site:

https://www.regulations.gov/comment?D=EAC\_ FRDOC\_0001-0077 Comment Tracking Number: 1k3-9a6f-q6mg and also at

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/20 19/02/28/2019-03453/proposed-voluntaryvoting-system-guidelines-20-principles-andguidelines Comment Tracking Number: 1k3-9a6fw7s6 shortly after 11:00 AM Eastern on 5/29/2019. Please excuse the duplication if that causes any problem. Unfortunately we could not find a way to upload our carefully formatted comments into this web form and have used the means allowed in the notice to the Federal Register. Members of the State Audit Working Group: •Parvie Branscomb, Colorado Election Watcher, electionguality.com, harvie@electionquality.com •Duncan Buell, Commissioner, Board of Elections and Voter Registration, Richland County, South Carolina (affiliation for information purposes only) •Sean Flaherty, Chair, Iowans for Voting

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welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system

5/29/2019 10:22 ginnyturne@gmail.com

Commission FROM: Republican National Lawyers Association DATE: May 29, 2019 Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines. The Republican National Lawyers Association (RNLA) is the home of Republican lawyers in the Republican Party. The missions of the RNLA are advancing professionalism; advancing open, fair, and honest elections; advancing career opportunities; and advancing Republican ideals. Since 1985, RNLA has worked to ensure elections are open, fair, and honest so that every eligible voterâ€<sup>™</sup>s vote is counted and ineligible votes are not counted. The United States has the finest election system in the world and enjoys a proud position as the leading, longest lasting representative democracy in the world. Yet, there is always work to be done to improve the election system, and updating the VVSG is an important step for the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to take to bring the certification standards for many voting systems used in America up to date with modern technological standards. The EAC should be commended for undertaking to update the VVSG quickly after a quorum of commissioners was reestablished and for providing ample opportunity

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who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †¦ record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an

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5/29/2019 11:01 sooze1177@yahoo.com 5/29/2019 11:02 Billnorhome@yahoo.com

Please, please, please protect our elections! Please implement these voting systems that will keep our democracy safe. l'm begging. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8. … support the ability to have an accurate handcounted audit. 9. … create a digital ballot image that is identical to the paper ballot.  $\hat{a} \in c$ The EAC must create a panel of election security experts made of academics and techinical experts with no relationship to vendors and no vested interest in emerging systems. The EAC needs to take input on the VVSG 2.0 from this panel - and other non-vested security experts on an ongoing basis. • The EAC must stop consulting vendors and their representatives for technical guidance. This is a conflict of interest, is unethical and is preventing security

## 5/29/2019 11:15 bradenrosec@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 11:18 Roger@sopris.net

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5/29/2019 11:45 nursekatie@live.com

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from Russia & other groups for a while now. We need the best election security nationwide. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †¦ record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in {}^{l}$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in \{$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a We deserve the confidence in our elections that only hand marked paper ballots would provide. There is such an obvious effort to consolidate power against opposition, be it with gerrymandering, doctored videos or election meddling. My vote is my free speech. It needs l'm an advocate for the banning of: Barcode Voting DRE Voting Hybrid Voting Modems and Remote Access We need hand marked paper ballots and a audit-able result Thank you, Sean
welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †¦ record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an

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5/29/2019 11:48 Melaniekd@aol.com

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5/29/2019 11:50 seancprevost@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 11:53 Bizbea@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 11:55 Msgjackson77@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 11:57 lefcarrolliv@gmail.com

5/29/2019 11:58 KEmery@TheWalkerGroup.com

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## 5/29/2019 12:02 js022205@gmail.com

5/29/2019 12:03 jenniferplusplus@gmail.com

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To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format

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5/29/2019 12:09 vreilly84@gmail.com

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## 5/29/2019 12:12 eggfamily@bellsouth.net

5/29/2019 12:12 Wynnealanwynne@aol.com

Because voters should be able to know without guestion that their votes are counted and tallied accurately as cast, you should be talking and consulting with election security experts and computer scientists, not the voting machine venders trying to sell their systems. All voting should be done using handmarked paper ballots and with the exception of those with disabilities requiring assistance, absolutely no machines should be used to mark ballots. There should be no barcodes because voters cannot read the barcodes to know if they are actually accurate. All vote counting machines should produce a digital ballot image that is public record. All paper ballots need to be on durable paper so that risk limiting audits can be performed. Because pretesting does nothing to assure that votes are actually counted and tallied accurately as cast, there must be a way to verify election results with stringent audits. This will increase voter confidence in elections. Please do what is right for the voters and create a voting system where voters can have confidence that their Your job is to keep our elections safe. Any computer can be hacked. All our election systems should be on paper or they can be hacked. Do you want our republic to stand on a foundation of loose electrons? Bad foundations lead to structural collapse. If America is to continue as a republic we need something more secure than computer stored data. DO YOUR

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5/29/2019 12:13 geniuslrg@cox.net

5/29/2019 12:17 tennis@consolidated.net

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5/29/2019 12:20 barbzz1953@gmail.com

5/29/2019 12:20 thomas.mumey@protonmail.com 5/29/2019 12:22 cherylj2@equipforequality.org welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in$  support the ability to have an

5/29/2019 12:24 khimbalee@yahoo.com

5/29/2019 12:24 annemariemarti@yahoo.com

thoughts here: democracy depends on free and fair elections. Our votes must be secure, audits must be possible. I can not imagine a more fundamental necessity. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive To save democracy and make it stronger, the EAC must issue guidelines that: #BanDREVotingMachines #BanBarcodeVoting #BanHybridVoting

5/29/2019 12:27 inahajek@hotmail.com

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Electronic equipment cannot be trusted to verifiably record each person's vote accurately. Computers have proven to easy to hack, and Russia (and others) have proven to have the capability to interfere in US elections. Every ballot needs to be a hand marked paper ballot. The paper for these hand marked ballots needs to be durable enough to allow recounts as necessary. These ballots need to clearly show who the voter is voting for without the need for the voter to use an electronic scanning device. Fair and ACCURATE elections are the backbone of democracy (or democratic republics). The US needs to make sure that all elections, local to national, are both fair and ACCURATE. The use of technology can jeopardize this accuracy and I am VERY concerned with the integrity of our voting machines. NO machine is I hackable! The VVSG2.0 provides security and will NOT be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast! PLEASE make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG2.0 NOT record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot, have a modem or allow remote access, allow the opportunity for a machine to CHANGE a ballot after the voter has cast it, be a hybrid machine, or encode using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. All APPROVED voting systems should allow for use of HAND-MARKED PAPER BALLOTS - NOT just a paper trail created by a machine, use durable paper NOT thermal paper, support the ability to have a accurate HAND COUNTED audit, and create a digital ballot image that is IDENTICAL to the paper ballot! PLEASE STOP consulting vendors and their representatives for technical guidance. That is a conflict of interest and is UNETHICAL! In light of the fact that just today we have been told that Russia DID interfere with our 2016

5/29/2019 12:50 mari@marireed.com

5/29/2019 12:57 sderheimer@hartic.com

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protect our democracy. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal

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voter in McHenry County, Illinois. Over the last 3 elections, I have become acutely aware of the fragility of our voting system. In our county, as recently as the last election, we have had candidates left off ballots or the same candidate shown in two separate races. We have had voters in newer subdivisions with missing races on their ballot. We have had referendum questions missing entire paragraphs of language. And we have had votes not counted due to software glitches. Many of these issues are related to human error by our County Clerk's office. However, it has highlighted to me the importance of an informed voter, and the need for a voter to be able to confirm their votes. I understand that the new VVSG 2.0 is a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. Voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security, have had too much input. The following standards must be incorporated into VVSG 2.0: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL: • ∎ecord votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. •∎ave a modem or allow remote access. •@llow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the

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the black box into a transparent box, ensuring that the results match and accurately represent the will of the voters. We are a nonpartisan organization whose mission for the last 15 years is to restore public ownership and oversight of elections, to work to ensure the fundamental right of every American citizen to vote and to have each vote counted as intended in a secure, transparent, impartial, and independently audited election process. We at AUDIT Elections USA are finding that many states have switched from the optical scanners to digital scanners. By the 2020 presidential election, about 75% of all hand-marked paper ballots are now counted by digital scanners that produce a public record called ballot images which are an exact copy front and back of the ballot. That good news! However, many jurisdictions that have digital scanners claim that they are preserving the ballot images when in reality they are only preserving the write-in ballot images only. As to the illegal destruction of ballot images, expert witness Dr. Thomas W. Ryan, who holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and has over 30-yearsâ€<sup>™</sup> experience in digital image creation, processing and interpretation, said in his affidavit in our Arizona ballot images case: "In Summary, deleting ballot images

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I support paper ballots for the Election. Hacking into our computer systems is easy for people who are good with technology. Protect our vote

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feedback on VVSG 2.0 and making the adoption of VVSG 2.0 a priority. As you may have already heard during the public hearings, VVSG 2.0 presents opportunity to increase the standards for voting systems ensuring the integrity, usability and accessibility of the next generation of voting systems. We support the structure of having the high-level principles and guidelines in the VVSG 2.0 standards and keeping the requirements and test assertions separate. We believe that this structure of separating guidelines and principles from details will allow the standard to be always "currentâ€by allowing the guidelines to be very high level and requirements and test assertions to be detailed and more efficiently modified to meet the changing landscape. We believe a clear process must be defined regarding how the modifications should be completed and published. For example, it would be beneficial to: •Define processes on what requires a vote from Commissioners and what can be modified using a different process by which only "administrative approvalâ€is necessary. It might also be beneficial to keep requirements and test assertions open to public comment/appeal at all times. If anyone has comments on any requirements and test Please protect our vote by only using hand marked ballots. Do not use machines that a 12 vear old can hack and change votes. Do not use anything that is connected via modem and could be hacked by a foreign government or our current corrupt administration.

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on VVSG 2.0 Principles & Guidelines 1. Adoption of the VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelines should be collectively evaluated with the upcoming Requirements and Test Assertions to allow for a comprehensive and thorough review of the proposed program in its totality. The VVSG 2.0 Principles & Guidelines are a highlevel set of principles with descriptions of voting system functions and qualities. The VVSG must now be supplemented by documents that detail functional requirements for how systems can meet the new guidelines and obtain certification. This includes test assertions to be used by accredited laboratories (VSTLs) to validate that a system complies with the requirements. Manufacturers cannot move forward with substantive development and certification efforts without such information. These details represent important benchmarks for usability, accessibility, security and interoperability, amongst others, based on input from experts and stakeholders. Along with election officials, we aim to ensure that such outputs are anchored to the real world and can be useful for equipment use in live elections. What may at first seem an innocuous principle or guideline can end up being construed into an egregious requirement and/or test assertion.

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5/29/2019 13:40 sguiffrida@hotmail.com 5/29/2019 13:42 susan@electiondefense.org welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an Comments are attached via upload.

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welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant

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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1335 East-West Highway, Suite 4300 Silver Spring, MD 20910 Public Comments on Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines The Disability Rights New Mexico (DRNM) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0. Principles and Guidelines. DRNM is a private, non-profit organization whose mission is to protect, promote and expand the rights of persons with disabilities. We are the designated protection and advocacy (P&A) program for New Mexico, and as such we have authority under federal law to pursue legal, administrative and other remedies on behalf of persons with disabilities. The P&As were established by the United States Congress to protect the rights of people with disabilities and their families through legal support, advocacy, referral, and education. P&As are in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands), and there is a P&A affiliated with the Native American Consortium which includes the Hopi, Navaho and San Juan Southern Paiute Nations in the Four Corners region of the Southwest. Collectively, the P&A Network is the

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comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 Principles and Guidelines. The CERT Coordination Center, part of the Software Engineering Institute, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center operated by Carnegie Mellon University, has been advising and working on computer security since 1988. Based on our experience with vulnerability management, we have the following two toplevel recommendations: 1) The Principles and Guidelines should contain a principle for supplier or vendor practices, perhaps under a heading "maintainability." At a minimum, such a principle should include that the supplier support: a. Vulnerability management, including coordination and remediation of vulnerabilities in voting systems. **D**. Each vendor form a **Product Security Incident Response Team** (PSIRT), according to the FIRST PSIRT service framework

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(https://www.first.org/education/FIRST\_PSIRT\_S ervice\_Framework\_v1.0). 2)The Principles and Guidelines should recommend that anyone who finds a vulnerability in a voting system report them to the Department of Homeland Security, specifically the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Vulnerability Management and Coordination team. We also have the following

5/29/2019 14:04 jspring@cert.org

regulations.gov as PDF] Verified Voting is pleased to see the VVSG 2.0 principles and guidelines finally moving forward. We are enthusiastic about the VVSG 2.0 structure and, with some reservations, about the content of the principles and guidelines. Full implementation of the VVSG 2.0 will, in time, help bring about voting systems that set new standards for universal usability, security, and verifiability. All these properties – backed by sound procedures – are essential to enable officials to run resilient elections, and to reassure voters that their votes have been cast as intended and counted as cast. We urge the EAC to allow the technical requirements and test assertions to be approved and revised without a vote of the commissioners. We agree with the TGDC, the NASED executive council, and others that for several reasons, these documents are best managed by technical staff, adhering to a well-defined process with broad consultation and opportunity for public comment. Verification and the VVSG Verified Voting especially welcomes Principle 9, which stipulates that a voting system "is auditable and enables evidence-based elections,â€and the associated guidelines. No matter how otherwise usable and reliable a voting system may be, it is

5/29/2019 14:08 mark@verifiedvoting.org

Principle 8: Robust, Safe, Usable, and Accessible In guideline 8.3, "measuring… for effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction†2 seems vaguely defined. We recommend language that evokes a rigorous performance standard, such as "for effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction accuracy, efficiency, and satisfaction in marking, verifying, and casting their ballots.â€<sup>®</sup>Principle 9: Auditable We recommend revising guideline 9.2 to underscore that vote records used to verify outcomes should also be voter-verified. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, we would require these records to be physical. Also, a "correct� election outcome is undefined. We suggest: "The voting system produces readily available physical records that voters could verify. These records provide the ability to check whether the election outcome corresponds with votersâ€<sup>™</sup> contest selections and, to the extent possible, identify the root cause of any irregularities.â€⊡In guideline 9.4, audit efficiency is desirable, but audit validity is paramount. We recommend expanding the guideline: "The voting system supports efficient, valid audits carried out with best practices.†Principle 10: Ballot Secrecy We agree with the comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)

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welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7.  $\hat{a} \in$  use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an

See pdf for full and complete comments from Joseph Lorenzo Hall, PhD and Maurice Turner of the Center for Democracy & Technology.

in the Computer Service Business. I worked with IBM Engineers designing Computer Systems, I understand hardware and software code. I ran for office, paid for a manual recount when the Early Voting was 20% different. The Handcount was 2% different than the ES&S DS/200 Count, resulting in a full handcount. When I asked how the ballot code comes into the County Election Clerk, the memory sticks arrived via UPS, in a "Baggieâ€for each of the machines. The Secretary of State and the County Clerk had no clue what Code was on those sticks from ES&S. I reviewed the DS/200 History, It has a history of 2% error. The Hand Count was 100 to 62. The machine count changed to 104 to 59. I could understand 102 to 58, but how did the vote add 4 votes? I noticed the "Undervotesâ€⊡did Not stop the machine, giving the option to the Voter to retrieve his ballot. I and another IBM retiree with over 70 years of Computer training surmised the Undervotes could be used to Add Votes. Done in Firmware aka hardware code imbedded in the Memory Sticks from ES&S. The bottom line is the ES&S and other computer based ballot counting machines are callable and easily manipulated. DEFCON and a Michigan College professor confirmed the ballot counting machines are easily hacked and code modified

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5/29/2019 14:36 harvie@electionquality.com 5/29/2019 14:36 a.mullaney@verizon.net PDF (all 7 parts) at federalregister.gov (apparently same as regulations.gov) Comment tracking number 1k3-9a6j-g9ch Public Comment on the VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelines part 1 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionquality.com Major topics: 1) Need for VVSG 2) Pransition strategy from 1.0 to 2.0 3) Relationship of P&G to Requirements 4) Relationship of requirements to test assertions or test procedures 5) Need for balancing of Principles 6)Scope of VVSG – need for clarity and eventual expansion of scope 7) Bole of Glossary 8) Process to create P&G and Requirements 9) Process to coordinate Glossary 10) Process to create test plans 11)Decentralization of testing 12)Role of Commissioners in requirements and future P&G 13) Need for broad based review and input for update of requirements 14)Discovery, appeal methods for updating requirements 15)Defects and strong points of principles 16) Missed opportunities- effects of input from existing legacy vendors 17) Need for realistic interpretation of Guidelines 18) Relative need to support future v. existing technologies and methods 19) Inconsistencies with usage of "castâ€20) Bhadequate and restrictive usage of the singular phrase "ballotâ€221)Potential No Bar codes! Paper ballots!

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improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0

## 5/29/2019 14:37 De181623@gmail.com

Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines **Disability Rights Nebraska Disability Rights** Nebraska is the designated Protection and Advocacy agency for individuals with disabilities in Nebraska and our agency was created to assist individuals with disabilities and their families in protecting and advocating for their rights. We employ a combination of advocacy strategies, including public policy education and advocacy, so that Nebraskans with disabilities can exercise the same rights, opportunities and choices available to all citizens. We promote the principles of equality, self-determination, and dignity of persons with disabilities. Because we have a history of advocacy within the electoral process under the federal Protection and Advocacy for Voter Access program, Disability Rights Nebraska appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 Principles and Guidelines. While we agree with the laudable intent of the VVSG 2.0 and recognize that balancing a secure yet open, easy, and transparent election process is complex, we must raise a concern that VVSG 2.0â€<sup>™</sup>s requirements will force compliant voting systems to rely exclusively on a marked paper ballot as the ballot of record. Paper ballot systems are not fully accessible to people with

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PDF (all 7 parts) at federalregister.gov (apparently same as regulations.gov) Comment tracking number 1k3-9a6j-g9ch Public Comment on the VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelines part 2 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionguality.com Major topics in this document: 6) Need for VVSG 7) Pransition strategy from 1.0 to 2.0 8) ∎elationship of P&G to Requirements 9) Relationship of requirements to test assertions or test procedures 10) Need for balancing of Principles 11)Scope of VVSG – need for clarity and eventual expansion of scope 6) Scope of VVSG – need for clarity and eventual expansion of scope The current understanding is that VVSG scope is limited to "voting system†Band that is arguably limited to ballot design, ballot creation and contest option presentation, capture of selections by voters, interpretation and adjudication, recording of cast vote records, tabulation, reporting of results and auditing. It is a fact that this set of functions does not describe the election system. Nor does the quality achieved in these functions necessarily result in a credibly correct election. Remote voting options and central count scenarios have caused the above list to be sadly insufficient. Questions remain about the applicability of the VVSG to the

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to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 6. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine. 7. … use durable paper, not thermal paper. 8.  $\hat{a} \in \frac{1}{2}$  support the ability to have an

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Guidelines part 3 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionguality.com Major topics: 12) Role of Commissioners in requirements and future P&G 13) Meed for broad based review and input for update of requirements 14) Discovery, appeal methods for updating requirements 15)Defects and strong points of principles 12) Role of Commissioners in requirements and future P&G I believe it is a mistake to remove the Commissioners entirely from the path to decide the requirements and the test plans. This is because inevitably policy decisions must be made – even decisions that appear to be substantially technical in nature. Without a stable administrative decision-making capability, some requirements may end up crippled by excess influence by some faction of stakeholders such as the vendors who have existing investments and may exert pressure for retaining the status quo. 13) Need for broad based review and input for update of requirements What is obvious in the requirements that are in the draft today is that they are already inadequate to test devices and processes already being sold to election jurisdictions. And there are limitations built into the requirements that will cause problems for jurisdictions that are faced with the need to use

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5/29/2019 14:41 harvie@electionquality.com

Guidelines part 4 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionguality.com Major topics: 16) Missed opportunities- effects of input from existing legacy vendors 17) Meed for realistic interpretation of Guidelines 18) Relative need to support future v. existing technologies and methods 16) Missed opportunities- effects of input from existing legacy vendors A read through the requirements suggests to me that there is already an embedded bias towards electronic voter intent capture in place of preprinted ballots that are intended to be hand marked. This seems odd considering that preprinted hand marked ballots are the standard voting method in many if not most states and all mail ballot states. Vendors who sell ballot marking devices have recently been effectively marketing their electronic capture devices as a substitute for hand marked paper (e.g. Georgia) and this direction seems to be already perhaps too much reflected in the writing of many of the guidelines and the requirements as well. An example is 7.1 - The default voting system settings for displaying the ballot work for the widest range of voters, and voters can adjust settings and preferences to meet their needs. The original text of guideline 7.1 is obviously focused entirely on an electronic vote capture

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Guidelines part 5 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionguality.com Major topics: 19) Inconsistencies with usage of "cast� 20) Inadequate and restrictive usage of the singular phrase "ballotâ€221)Potential risk of nebulous definition of E2E 22)Potential risk of failure to fully support MMPB 19) Inconsistencies with usage of "cast� Inconsistent usage of the key word "cast" creates ambiguity. "Castâ€⊡according to the Glossary is voter - centric, an action taken by voter. This is very sensible and should be retained. But usage in the VVSG 2.0 draft requirements in probably twenty other places refers instead to a system-centric action that ought to be referred to as "accepted" e.g. "accepted ballotâ€⊡n place of "cast ballot.â€IDther possible words to use to replace the system-centric meanings of the verb cast are: to "read" or to "count" or to "tabulate". In some places "cast" is clearly used to refer to the step that creates the CVR. This step is definitely not a voter action and not consistent with the Glossary definition. The appearance of "cast" within the three word phrase "CVRâ€⊡s also sadly inconsistent, but by now unavoidable. I recommend to use the word "castâ€i]noun and adjective) to refer to the voter centric event

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improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. 6. ... allow weighted election functions that use decimal counting methods. Votes must be counted as whole numbers. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 7. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail created by a machine, except

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5/29/2019 14:43 kbarnick@cfl.rr.com

Guidelines part 6 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionguality.com Major topics: 23) ∎uge benefit of election record transparency 24) I laims that stand as obstacles to ballot transparency 25) Meed to define substantive, not absolute ballot anonymity 23) Buge benefit of election record transparency Another sometimes overlooked potential value to be obtained from future voting systems is a fabulous opportunity recent scanner technology is already delivering but some state laws have yet to catch up. Modern tabulation devices produce both scanned copies of ballots and the associated cast vote records for purposes of review and comparison. Risk limiting audits conducted by officials require comparison directly to the physical paper ballot for very good reasons. In addition to election judges required to do the auditing, a few members of the public may be able to attend to verify the audit quality. But with current technology now being sold, after appropriate ballot secrecy safeguards are in place, and subject to local laws about access to records, any interested party could perform a virtual manual post election review to their own satisfaction at home – recognizing that there may be some misrepresentation of the paper by the images.

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5/29/2019 14:45 Purcell.cathy@gmail.com

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Guidelines part 7 of 7 by Harvie Branscomb, http://electionguality.com Major topics: 26) Separation of systematic against selfidentified risks to anonymity 27) Value in reduction of styles 28) Means to reduce styles 29)Potential risk of failure to fully support public transparency of records 30) Removing the fear of multiple sheet ballots 31) Conclusionwill we achieve the evidence based public election? 26) Separation of systematic against self-identified risks to anonymity Requirements related to Ballot Secrecy should distinguish between means of substantive self-identification as opposed to any means of self-identification that is unreasonable to expect the voting system to remedy. At the same time the requirements should differentiate between risks of selfidentification from systematic risks to anonymity that are entirely the responsibility of the election system and its designers and operators. Systematic forms of association of voter with a ballot sheet (out of control of the voter) deserve to be remedied in the design of the voting system as well as in its operation. Systematic risks to anonymity are applicable to solution via the VVSG requirements even though much of the risk is added by decisions to add special district elections to ballots. Rare styles are

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5/29/2019 14:48 a.willow.in.the.wind@gmail.com

computerized vote counting and the exploitation of those vulnerabilities. The EAC has an opportunity to lead here and by leading to make a difference as profound as any an observer of American politics could imagine. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a

which I am in full agreement, as well as a pdf of

my book relating to the vulnerabilities of

5/29/2019 14:48 verifiedvote2004@aol.com

5/29/2019 14:49 Jschiller75@hotmail.com 5/29/2019 14:50 Stanmeers@twc.com welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. 6. ... allow weighted election functions that use decimal counting methods. Votes must be counted as whole numbers. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 7. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not Please secure our elections.

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## 5/29/2019 14:51 susantolin@gmail.com

5/29/2019 14:51 susanpynchon@gmail.com 5/29/2019 14:52 Lindsey\_Kerr@Rules.Senate.gov concerned about the definition of "ballot image" in the definitions found in the Glossary of VVSG 2.0. The definition states: ballot image Electronically produced record of all votes cast by a single voter. A ballot image might be a transient logical representation of the votes or an archival record (a cast vote record). This definition is inaccurate for several reasons. The old description of a ballot image was the computer printout produced by a DRE. But now all digital scan voting systems such as the ES&S DS200 automatically create a true ballot image, which is essentially a photograph of the ballot. The votes are counted from the image, NOT from the paper ballot itself. This is the way the system works. A digital image is ALWAYS created in order to count the votes. A digital image, called a ballot image, is part of the chainof-custody of each vote. It is what has actually been used to count the votes and must be retained for 22 months according to federal law. It is NOT correct to say that a ballot image may be a "transient" logical representation. Ballot images must be preserved and maintained. Ballot images are invaluable for forensic examination of problems in an election, such as, for example, what caused abnormally high overvotes or undervotes. They are also vitally

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may concern: Ballot images are not transient itâ€<sup>™</sup>s what the scanner counts In the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Overview Summary: The VVSG Principles and Guidelines The following needs clarification, regarding ballot images. As written in Principles and Guidelines. ----- "ballot image†î "Electronically produced record of all votes cast by a single voter. A ballot image might be a transient logical representation of the votes or an archival record (a cast vote record).†3----- We at AUDIT Elections USA are finding that many states have switched from the optical scanners to digital scanners. By the 2020 presidential election, about 75% of all hand-marked paper ballots are now counted by digital scanners that produce a public record called ballot images which are an exact copy front and back of the ballot. That good news! However, many jurisdictions that have digital scanners claim that they are preserving the ballot images when in reality they are only preserving the write-in ballot images only. As to the illegal destruction of ballot images, expert witness Dr. Thomas W. Ryan, who holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and has over 30-yearsâ€<sup>™</sup> experience in digital image creation, processing and interpretation, said in his affidavit in our Arizona ballot images case: As you consider the new VVSG 2.0, please further bolster US election security by specifying the exclusive use of hand-marked paper ballots as the only way to assure accuracy of our US vote and elections. The digital systems currently used or under consideration are too often vulnerable to manipulation, either by a "permission to cheat" (!) option, or modem use, which opens the system to hacking. The major companies behind these machines have a partisan agenda. Hand marked paper ballots, as well as post-election audits, are essential to assure that our representative democracy is truly representing the will of America's voters. Thank you. For further information, please see the research of Jennifer Cohn, either via her writing in Medium or her Twitter feed @jennycohn1 - she is attorney and concerned

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The only proven secure voting system is with Hand Marked Paper Ballots coupled with secure handling, storage and proper audits. Anything less invites tomfoolery. Please Ban Barcode Voting Please Ban DRE Voting Please Ban Hybrid Voting Please Ban Modems And Remote Access Hand marked ballots are the only way to have a fair elections.

very well aware that the rest of these comments are a 'form letter.' However, I am very interested in/involved with various organizations that focus on ensuring that our voting systems are secure and replicable. And thus, the comments below, especially those that speak to a paper ballot for EVERYONE except perhaps those with certain disabilities AND over reliance on vendors are two issues that I can speak about with knowledge and passion. Making sure that the EAC's guidance clearly addresses these two issues is critical to helping rebuilt voters' confidence in elections and this is the bedrock of our democracy. We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. †record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a

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5/29/2019 14:56 delphiniabee@aol.com

5/29/2019 14:58 Lotus212@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 14:59 susanpynchon@gmail.com

5/29/2019 14:59 shugah@shugahworks.com

We hope you will extend the comment period because you were sending out the wrong link to this Comment section. In brief, we at Florida Fair Elections Coalition are completely opposed to ballot-marking devices for all voters. BMDs are a civil rights issue. Just as voters and minority voters were targeted in certain jurisdictions by placing too few DREs in a precinct or early voting site, the same thing will inevitably happen with BMDs. There is no reason to use anything other than hand-marked paper ballots, which only require a pen and an inexpensive voting booth. A BMD such as the AutoMark for voters with disabilities provides the same ballot as is being voted on by everyone else. But the vendors want the new expensive BMDs which will end up creating long lines and suppressing the vote. Thank you, Susan Pynchon This letter was approved by Rich DeMillo -Professor of Computing Georgia Tech Bennie Smith - Election Commissioner Memphis TN Jan BenDor, Statewide Coordinator, Michigan Election Reform Alliance Virginia Martin -**Election Commissioner - Columbia County NY** 

significant step forward in improving voting equipment. We particularly applaud the separation of principles and implementation details, because technology moves too fast for rules to keep up, while strong design principles are long lasting enough to merit enshrining. We also applaud the focus on both security and accessibility, as we believe both are critical to conducting free and fair elections. In that vein, we humbly propose three points to make the VVSG recommendations even more effective: 1/ make it easier to innovate safely by focusing on measured outcomes over prescribed mechanisms. Specifically: - 1.1 could leave more open the possibility of new/improved election processes, as long as they allow voters to easily cast paper ballots and election officials to tally those ballots. - 6.2 prescribes that preparation and casting of ballots should be doable without any assistance, for voters of all abilities. This constraint, similar to a VVSG1.1 clause, is known to significantly raise equipment cost and reduce reliability. The outcome here could be more focused on ballot privacy. Assistance, rather than banned altogether, should be acceptable as long as it is simple to provide and doesn't endanger voter privacy. 2/ encourage even more transparency. - 3.1 mandates that equipment

## 5/29/2019 14:59 ben@voting.works

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5/29/2019 15:00 klane418@gmail.com

are my further comments on VVSG 2.0 guidelines. Most important, and key to future elections: The guidelines must ensure evidencebased elections. The best technical way to do that given today's technology is to mandate true auditability by requiring hand marked paper ballots be made available to all voters, and for mandatory meaningful audits to actually be performed before certifying results. (I am unclear if VVSG 2.0's scope permits these requirements, as it seems to be intentionally limited only to the actual equipment used to directly record votes. However, it is fundamentally impossible to recommend security practices with such limitations, so I am ignoring them and so should the EAC. At minimum, to avoid doing harm, the VVSG 2.0 guidelines must warn that they must be used in the context of a fully auditable overall system.) The use of Ballot Marking Devices is of course necessary in some circumstances for some people, and they should be provided for all who opt for them. The majority, however, should not be forced to use them. This is not, as some have stated, a "separate but equal" policy, any more than having both elevators and stairs is. It is key to ensure full participation that BMD's be made as secure as possible, and the rest of the We need more oversight regarding big contracts to election machine vendors with their proprietary software & closed door meetings with DHS. Who makes the decisions about which machines are purchased? This should be

welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. 6. ... allow weighted election functions that use decimal counting methods. Votes must be counted as whole numbers. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 7. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not

## 5/29/2019 15:01 rebkatrip@yahoo.com

5/29/2019 15:01 yvettedube@gmail.com

5/29/2019 15:02 dvmcmahon@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 15:03 jmoor628@gmail.com 5/29/2019 15:04 snewton@disabilitylawcenter.org welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and does not assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5. … encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. 6. ... allow weighted election functions that use decimal counting methods. Votes must be counted as whole numbers. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 7. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not

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5/29/2019 15:05 steveasumner@protonmail.com

along time election protection volunteer working to improve election security in New York. We currently use auditable scanners and handmarked paper ballots, but that system is under threat from the Dominion ICE and ESS Expressvote,, combining printers and scanners in the same machine. This can contaminate the paper trail and render audits unreliable. I welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2. … have a modem or allow remote access. 3. … allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4. … be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a

5/29/2019 15:05 allegrad@aol.com

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5/29/2019 15:05 Tfantasia@sda-architects.com

5/29/2019 15:05 joanwharran@outlook.com

TAKE ACTION ABOUT LEARN MORE MAY 29TH 4PM - PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/20/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment

TV just showed that 46 of the 50 states have out of date voting machines, that can not be updated with security updates. We need machines that 1) will require that every electronic vote be verified by a paper ballot counter before going into database 2) machines that cannot be electronically accessed 3) corrections are marked in the machine and the paper ballot, so a larger count is not made -During Bush and Gore election I used an electronic machine that was not working correctly. I pushed the button for Gore and it registered as Bush. I complained and wound up voting 3 more times before Gore came up. After the 2016 election, I am not sure the 3 votes for Bush were erased. I voted under the instruction of the election monitor 4) use regular printer paper 5) be able to audit the electronic version and match to the paper trail 6) be able to vote on paper ballots that are counted by an electronic counting machine 7) have enough voting locations for the voters of the precinct. They do not need all electronic machines, you could have counters for paper machines which is less expensive than electronic machines in precincts. Here is an article about a new machine that has been created in California that looks

## 5/29/2019 15:22 pjw2748@yahoo.com

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5/29/2019 15:35 thenecessarythrowaway@gmail.com marked paper ballots - not just a paper trail

5/29/2019 15:47 todd.williams@m3eg.com

5/29/2019 15:51 carl@cartertaxassociates.com

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VVSG 2.0: 1.2-B.14 – Recallable ballots. The voting system must be capable of gathering and recording votes within a voting process that allows the decision of whether to count a particular ballot to be deferred until after election day. Discussion Unique identification of each recallable ballot is needed; security-related requirements dealing with this identification are in TBD. This is language designed to deceive! What it is really saying is that YOU HAVE LOST YOUR SECRET VOTE. It means that your ballot can be tracked and connected back to you in case they need to recall your ballot for some reason after the election. The secret vote, or secret ballot, is one of the foundations of elections in our nation. The EAC cannot allow itself to get so caught up in technology that it forgets the basic principles of a free and fair election. I'm serious when I say that you need some political science or civics professors on your committees in addition to technical people to remind you of some important basic elements of an election. The ability to recall a ballot is being done in North Carolina and it is a DISASTER. The state is tracking the ballot of every voter in Early Voting and vote-by-mail, with the ability to tie each ballot back to an

concerned about the following section in the

5/29/2019 15:57 susanpynchon@gmail.com

5/29/2019 16:02 johnbrakey@gmail.com

5/29/2019 16:03 raylutz@citizensoversight.org

may concern: Voting is a secret process: counting is a public process. Please do not allow our ballot to become a "Recallable ballots.â€2 We live in the age of big data; we now have to be concerned about being micro-targeted. In the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines **Overview Summary: The VVSG Principles and** Guidelines The following needs clarification, regarding "Recallable ballots.â€⊡As written in Principles and Guidelines. ----- "1.2-B.14 – Recallable ballots†2"The voting system must be capable of gathering and recording votes within a voting process that allows the decision of whether to count a particular ballot to be deferred until after election day. Discussion Unique identification of each recallable ballot is needed; security-related requirements dealing with this identification are in TBD�----- In most states, voters have a unique voter identification number. This helps the election office keep track of voters in a voter registration database and allows voters to check to see if their ballot has been counted. This process is normal and acceptable. However, in North Carolina, they take this a step further by putting the unique voter identification number on the ballot itself, for all early voted, and absentee ballots, which account for at least 50% After listening to the video, I have to say I agree with the first public speaker, who spoke in OPPOSITION to the approval of VVSG 2.0. This is too high level, with far too many "quishy" words like "ballot", "best practices", does not deal sufficiently with paper ballot systems, which are becoming the most standard approach, rather than electronic. THIS NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED. This contains glaring gaps and does not define the process to fill the gaps and how the public can be involved in the process. This is a VERY important topic. We need to get our elections under control. But this is an almost worthless document and is a step backwards. Passing the buck and not actually coming up with legitimate standards is not what this group should be
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5/29/2019 16:12 fred.nisen@disabilityrightsca.org

5/29/2019 16:14 griffin@conceptfarm.com

Why are we hearing about this less than an hour b4 deadline? Ive been trying for more than a year to get info on how we are updating & protecting our elections. Nothing has been done! Registration & Old voting methods should be abandoned, there has been plenty of time to recruit software techs & develop modern methods. Nothing. maybe every voter could receive a new voter 'chip' card that xreferences & verifies prev voter info. That card would then match the ballot code w the voter card. It could be done by voter choice either by in person at polling booth, by mail or online. There must be thousands of software geniuses who could Resending my comment after removing hyphens from filename, per email from Cliff Tatum. No Barcodes No Hybrid Voting No DRE Voting Paper Ballots EVERYWHERE.

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## 5/29/2019 16:20 ckgl168@yahoo.com

5/29/2019 16:27 donnamayo@alum.mit.edu

We need secure elections and paper ballots. As much as it feels like a step backwards, paper can not be hacked.

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5/29/2019 16:30 allymeers@twc.com

5/29/2019 16:34 Lmorgenstern@comcast.net

5/29/2019 16:36 sramachand@pa.gov

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5/29/2019 16:41 wwjeca@gmail.com 5/29/2019 16:50 mark@verifiedvoting.org 5/29/2019 17:00 mstroh@dr-wa.org welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you make sure that all systems approved by the VVSG 2.0 meet the following standards: NO APPROVED VOTING SYSTEM WILL : 1. … record votes directly to a computer memory without the voter reviewing a paper ballot. 2.  $\hat{a} \in$  have a modem or allow remote access. 3.  $\hat{a} \in$  allow the technical opportunity for a machine to change a ballot after the voter has cast it – even if the machine is under the control of malware. 4.  $\hat{a} \in$ be a hybrid machine – with a printer and a scanner in the same path. 5.  $\hat{a} \in$  encode votes using barcodes, QR codes, or any other format that is not verifiable by a voter without assistive technology. 6. ... allow weighted election functions that use decimal counting methods. Votes must be counted as whole numbers. ALL APPROVED VOTING SYSTEMS WILL 7. … allow for the use of hand-marked paper ballots - not [resubmission of comments PDF]

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5/29/2019 18:04 mikeal.beland@gmail.com

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5/29/2019 18:12 heidiescobar1@gmail.com 5/29/2019 18:24 nlunarose@azdisabilitylaw.org

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5/29/2019 19:08 pperlo@ix.netcom.com

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the VVSG 2.0 Cybersecurity Working Group. It is essential that the VVSG 2.0 prohibits voting systems from using wireless and public telecommunications infrastructure. Network communication over public channels uses a chain of technologies which introduce dozens of vulnerable points, most beyond the control of election officials. Threats start with simple problems like misconfiguration and failure to update hardware and software promptly when new vulnerabilities are discovered. At the other end of the spectrum are attacks in which Stingrays/IMSI-catchers (cell-site simulators) hijack cellular communications and Border Gateway Protocol hijacking reroutes communication traffic through adversarial countries. Potential malicious activity includes denial of service, eavesdropping, data manipulation, data exfiltration, malware infection, and remote access. These are real and present threats that the VVSG must address. The EAC-certified components of a voting system should not communicate with each other through uncertified hardware and software. We would be putting significant trust in external systems that are not sufficiently trustworthy. I urge the EAC to include the following guideline under Principle 13 (Data Protection): "The voting

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someone who has worked in election integrity groups for years, locally as well as nationally, all I can say is that it is high time that elections be returned to the commons. The people should not be removed from the process. I have friends in Spain who have a community approach to voting that employees the people of the community to run elections as well as take part in the counting of ballots at each precinct. It's orderly and it's working. The computerized voting machines being foisted on American cities and towns are expensive for one and offer no transparency. Plus they are ALL run on proprietary software which means ONLY corporations know how are votes are being counted. How much more suspect could elections become with corporations having that much control over and access to our vote counting. Yikes. The voting machine vendors have too much control in our voting systems and offer no assurances of giving even the voting officials a peak at the software running the machines. I have seen first hand how easily someone can right a voting machine and we now know that anything run on software is hackable, from within or from without (man in the middle attack) Let's be sensible to all these issues! I think that the new VVSG 2.0 is a significant Please protect the integrity of our elections. We the people must be able to vote for the person that we want to govern our nation without interference from foreign adversaries who want to put someone in office who is easily corrupted. Thank you in advance for protecting our

Voting Systems Guidelines 2.0. I am a Judge of Election in Pittsburgh, PA. By educational background, I hold a BS in Electrical & Computer Engineering, an MS in Computation, Organizations, & Society, and a PhD in Societal Computing, from Lafayette College and Carnegie Mellon University respectively. I have also served as an observer for some of the election security procedures in Allegheny County, PA, and done very well in a national hackathon contest regarding social impact of certain technology, with a focus on systems related to elections. I believe that having free, fair, and trustworthy elections is of utmost importance for the future of our democracy. I am also a member of VoteAllegheny, a small nonprofit of other individuals concerned with election integrity, though my comments are my own and were not developed in direct coordination with that organization. As an important background point, I would like to note that local officials in charge of selecting election equipment often look to EAC guidelines and requirements for setting standards regarding that equipment, and are not necessarily willing to raise the bar any higher to address issues that may be unique to local law or history, especially when receiving trips and other gifts from the vendors of a

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COMMENT PERIOD ENDS How to make a comment to the Election Assistance Commission The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for setting the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines that determine many factors in how we vote. They are currently approving the new guidelines called the VVSG 2.0. Although these guidelines are an improvement, they have serious omissions that will undermine their ability to guarantee that all votes are counted as cast. We ask that you send this letter, or your own version of it to the EAC by 4pm on 5/29/19. 1) Use this form - the link is case sensitive. https://www.eac.gov/vvsg-form/ 2) Copy and paste this letter into the form and send it. 3) Send a copy to SMART Elections.us here: https://smartelections.us/contact-us We will publish your letters. To the Election Assistance Commission: We welcome the new VVSG 2.0 as a significant improvement to the current voting system guidelines. However as drafted, the VVSG 2.0 provides inadequate security and will not be able to assure voters that their votes are being counted as cast. Additionally, the drafting process has been flawed because it is too reliant on the biased input of voting system vendors, who have not historically shown a commitment to election security. I ask that you

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