



Test Report of EAC 2005 VVSG Certification Testing Performed on Unisyn Voting Solutions OVS 1.3

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



U.S. Election Assistance Commission


VSTL


EAC Lab Code 0704

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REVISIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Unisyn Voting Solutions submitted the OpenElect Release 1.3 voting system to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), application number UNS1401, for certification testing to the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Standards (2005 VVSG). The modifications submitted were tested by NTS Huntsville (NTS) based on the “modified system” requirements set forth in section 4.4.2.3 of the EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual. The OpenElect Voting System Release 1.3 is a modification to the previously certified OpenElect Voting System Release 1.2 (Certification number: UNS10121966-OE-1.2). This National Certification Test Report (hereafter referred to as Test Report) presents the test results for testing of the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System.

1.1 Testing Scope

The focus of this test campaign was to test the submitted modifications to the OpenElect Release 1.3 voting system. This report is valid only for the system identified in section 2.0, System Identification and Overview. **In addition, the modifications in this scope** section represent the only changes that were reviewed by NTS. Any changes, revisions, or corrections not listed in this report or made to the system after this evaluation are required to be submitted to the EAC for assessment.

The modifications submitted as part of the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System are listed in Table 1-1 below:

Table 1-1 OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System Modifications

Item Number	Module Affected	Modification
E-01	ALL	Cross Party Endorsement - All candidates to be assigned to more than one party affiliation. Straight ticket selection for any assigned party will select if all other conditions are met.
E-02	OCS, OVCS	Updated OS to CentOS 6.5 to support the new OCS hardware (Dell Latitude 5540 and Dell OptiPlex XE2)
E-03	BLM, OVO, OVCS, OVI	Increase number of digits in barcode for ballot style ID from 3 to 4. The 3 digit ballot style ID is no longer supported. This feature allows the system to support more ballot styles per election.
E-04	BLM, OVO, OVI, OVCS	Increase number of precinct ID digits from 4 to 5 on screen entry and in the barcode. The 4 digit precinct ID is no longer supported. This feature allows greater flexibility in precinct ID assignment.
E-05	EM	Add new options for OVI font size selection (Large and Small) and OVO show percentages on tally. This modification allows the user to set the options in EM.
E-06	OVI	Use EM option of Large or Small Font for the top of the OVI ballot (See E-05)
E-07	OVO	Use EM option ‘Show percentages’ to know if percentage values should be shown on the tally reports (See E-05)
E-08	TC, OVCS	Added the ability to hide/re-enable sessions

1.0 INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED)

1.1 Testing Scope (continued)

Table 1-1 OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System Modifications (Continued)

Item Number	Module Affected	Modification
E-09	OVI	Changed the write-in character entry limit from 40 to 30 characters
E-10	OVI	Change Write-In Information format on Top of OVI Ballot to be designated by ** symbols to help with write-in extraction (via OCR) for the OVO write-in report.
E-11	OVO	Change Recount session to be contest specific.
E-12	OVO	Change Write-In Report to show Write-Ins extracted from OVI ballots.
E-13	OVO	After printing the Zero Count report for Pre-Init Precincts, a screen displays allowing the user to print an additional copy of the Zero Count report.
E-14	OVO	If election title is more than 3 lines, the title lines will be concatenated and wrapped as needed to display.
E-15	OVO	Add Party Designation for Primary Contests in Write In Report
E-16	OVO	During OVO close process, display screen requiring a Yes/No response from the user to print the Write-in Report.
E-17	OVO	Add OVO Write-in report defaulting to compressed images.
E-18	BLM, OVO, OVCS	Add second barcode on the back side of two sided ballots. Added this feature to provide a validation that ballot style and page match.
E-19	BLM	Modified the "Keep Together" function which tries to keep all contests in a group in a single column to automatically move all contests in a group to the next column if necessary. This is a conditional column break, only moves to next column if necessary.
E-20	BLM, OVI	Allow multiple contests headers per contest.
E-21	OVO	Change shape of the blade on the back side of the gate to enhance return of ballots
E-22	OVCS	A stop command has been introduced for the OVCS which allows the user to halt the scanning of ballots based upon any combination of invalid, no selection, write-in, overvote, and undervote ballots.
E-23	OVO,OVCS, EM, Tabulator, TR	Added the capability to count the number of blank ballots by a precinct and add the total to the tally. This count may be optionally printed on the OVO summary and/or printed on all reports that display the ballot count value.

1.0 INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED)
1.1 Testing Scope (continued)

Table 1-1 OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System Modifications (Continued)

Item Number	Module Affected	Modification
E-24	TR	Added columns to the Statement of Votes Cast Report to show overvote/undervote counts by precinct and by contest.
E-25	OVI	On the OVI Summary Screen, if a contest is under voted, the background of the box containing the word “Undervote” is colored red to provide a color visual indicator of an undervote.
E-26	OVO/OVI	Software and election version information has been added to the machine info tape/screen as a standard part of the Open and Close tapes.
E-27	BLM	In a primary election, if a party specific ballot style is the functional equivalent of the Non-Partisan ballot style (All partisan contests are “NO CANDIDATES FILED” for ballot style), the ballot style should not be created/saved for the election and the party not included for that precinct when parties are selected on the OVI.
E-28	TR	An option has been added to allow data exported by CSV to be exported by Split instead of consolidating the data by “parent” ballot style.
HW-01	OVI	Introduced a new hinge to the OVI-VC which allows for adjustment of the viewing angle of the OVI-VC display.
HW-02	OVO	Introduced a new motherboard for use on OVO units to replace the current motherboard which has reached End of Life status.
HW-03	OVO	Introduced a new display for use on the OVO units to replace the current display which has reached End of Life Status.
HW-04	OVO	A new plastic ballot box, the OpenElect Ballot Box Version 1.3 was introduced for use with the OVO units.
HW-05	OVO	New power supplies were introduced for the Citizen Printer and the PDI Scanner to replace parts which have reached End Of Life Status.
HW-06	OVI-VC	New power supplies were introduced for the Star Printer and the GVision touch screen to replace parts which have reached End Of Life Status.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED)

1.2 Objective

The objective of the OpenElect Release 1.3 test program was to determine if the modifications to the previously certified system were compliant with the EAC 2005 VVSG requirements. The scope of the compliance review was derived from the system modifications detailed in the application submitted to the EAC by Unisyn Voting Solutions.

1.3 Customer

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Vista, CA 92018

1.4 References

- Election Assistance Commission 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Volume I, Version 1.0, "Voting System Performance Guidelines," and Volume II, Version 1.0, "National Certification Testing Guidelines," dated December 2005
- Election Assistance Commission Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0, expires July 2017
- Election Assistance Commission Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual, Version 1.0, expires July 2017
- National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NIST Handbook 150, 2006 Edition, "NVLAP Procedures and General Requirements (NIST Handbook 150)," dated February 2006
- National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NIST Handbook 150-22, 2008 Edition, "Voting System Testing (NIST Handbook 150-22)," dated May 2008
- United States 107th Congress Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (Public Law 107-252), dated October 2002
- Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 5
- ANSI/NCSL Z540-1, "Calibration Laboratories and Measuring and Test Equipment, General Requirements"
- ISO 10012-1, "Quality Assurance Requirements for Measuring Equipment"
- EAC Requests for Interpretation and Notices of Clarification (listed on www.eac.gov)
- EAC Quality Monitoring Program residing on:
http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/quality_monitoring_program.aspx
- Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc., OpenElect Voting System Version 1.0 VSTL Certification Test Report Revision B (listed on www.eac.gov)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc., OpenElect Voting System Version 1.0.1 VSTL Certification Test Report Revision A (listed on www.eac.gov)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc., OpenElect Voting System Version 1.1 VSTL Certification Test Report Revision A (listed on www.eac.gov)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc., OpenElect Voting System Version 1.2 VSTL Certification Test Report Revision B (listed on www.eac.gov)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc., Open Elect Voting System Version 1.2 Technical Data Package

1.0 INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED)

1.4 References (Continued)

- Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc., Open Elect Voting System Release 1.3 Technical Data Package

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW

2.1 System Overview

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System is a paper-ballot based, optical scan voting system. The Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System consists of four major components:

1. The OpenElect Central Suite (OCS)
2. OpenElect Voting Optical Scan (OVO)
3. OpenElect Voting Interface (OVI-7 or OVI-VC)
4. OpenElect Voting Central Scan (OVCS)

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 voting system Technical Data Package (TDP) was utilized for the summary information that follows in this section.

1. Election Management System: OpenElect Central Suite (OCS)

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 EMS consists of eight components running as either a front-end/client application or as a back-end/server application. Below is a list and brief description of each:

- Ballot Layout Manager (BLM) – uses a database to create and store precinct and district information and an interface to create, check, translate, and produce the ballot styles needed by a jurisdiction for an election.
- Election Manager (EM) – converts the Unisyn election definition file to a Unisyn-specific XML format and prepares compressed, encrypted election files for output to CD-ROM.
- Election Server (ES) – loads the correct system time on the voting devices and uses the Election CD created by the EM to download new election data, via a closed and secure network, to OVS voting devices.
- Tabulator Client (TC) – retrieves vote files from Transport Media (TM) devices, stores them on its disk, and transfers the files to the Tabulator and notifies the Tabulator that a new file is present.
- Tabulator – receives and validates uploaded voting data and provides a status of uploaded files as well as handling Rank Choice Voting (RCV) functionality.
- Adjudicator – accesses ballot images and data from the OVCS and TC PCs to allow jurisdiction personnel to evaluate and change questionable or erroneous marks on ballot in accordance to the voter's perceived intent.
- Tabulator Reports (TR) – accesses data from the Tabulator database to generate the necessary reports.
- Software Server (SS) – updates and validates voting device client software.

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.1 System Overview (Continued)

2. Precinct Ballot Tabulator: OpenElect Voting Optical Scan (OVO)

The OVO device is a precinct-level, optical scan, ballot counter (tabulator) designed to perform the following major functions:

- Ballot scanning
- Tabulation
- Second chance voting

The Unisyn OpenElect Voting Optical (OVO) is a full-page, dual-sided optical scan ballot system which scans and validates voter ballots and provides a summary of all ballots cast. The election is loaded from the OVS Election Server over a secure local network or via a USB thumb drive. On Election Day, an OVO at each polling location scans and validates voters' ballots, and provides precinct tabulation and reporting. The OVO unit is also paired with the OVI for early voting to scan and tabulate early voting ballots. OVO units can also be used at election headquarters to read absentee, provisional, or recount ballots in smaller jurisdictions.



Figure No. 1
OVO on Plastic Ballot Box



Figure No. 2
OVO on Portable Ballot Box



Figure No.3
OVO on OpenElect Ballot Box
Version 3

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)
2.1 System Overview (Continued)

3. Precinct Voting Device: OpenElect Voting Interface (OVI)

The OVI supports both ADA and Early Voting requirements. The OVI enables voters during early voting to cast regional ballots and voters with special needs to prepare their ballots independently and privately on Election Day. The OVI unit features a 7-inch or optional 15-inch full-color touch-screen display. The OVI will present each contest on the correct ballot to the voter in visual and (optionally) audio formats. The voter with limited vision navigates through the ballot using the audio ballot and the ADA keypad or touchscreen input to make their selections. The voter validates his or her selections by listening to the audio summary, printing the ballot, and inserting it into the OVO. Two OVI models are included in the OVS 1.3 voting system, the OVI-7 which has a 7" LCD screen and the OVI-VC which has a 15" LCD screen.

The OVI facilitates special needs voters through a variety of methods including wheelchair access, sip & puff, zoom-in ballot function, and audio assistance for the visually impaired. The OVI provides for write-in candidates when authorized by the jurisdiction. Voters input candidates' names via the ADA keypad, touchscreen or sip & puff device. Each OVI can support multiple languages for both visual and audio ballots, allowing the voter to choose their preferred language.



Figure No. 4
OVI-7 with 7 Inch Screen



Figure No. 5
OVI-VC with 15 Inch Screen

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)
2.1 System Overview (Continued)

4. Central Tabulator: OpenElect Voting Central Scanner (OVCS)

The Unisyn OpenElect Voting Central Scanner (OVCS) resides at election headquarters designated to read absentee, provisional, or recount ballots in large jurisdictions, or read the entire election's ballots at a central count location in smaller jurisdictions. The OVCS also captures write-in data images and produces a write-in image report for manual processing upon request. The OVCS system consists of the following components:

- OVCS Workstation: a COTS computer used for ballot image and election rules processing and results transfer to the EMS.
- Canon DR-X10C Scanner: a COTS scanner used to provide ballot scanning and image transfers to the local OVCS Workstation.




Figure No. 6
Canon DR-X10C Scanner and OVCS Workstation

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)
2.1 System Overview (Continued)




Figure No. 7
System Overview Diagram

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.2 System Limits

The system limits of the OpenElect Release 1.3 System are identified in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1 Unisyn OVS 1.3 System Limits

Limit (Max No. of)	Value
Elections	8
Precincts	2000
Splits per Precinct	9
Districts	400
Contest per District	20
Parties	24
Parties in Primary	12
Parties w/ Straight Ticket	12
District types	25
Languages	15
Ballot styles per Election	400
Contests per Election	150
Measures per Election	30
Instruction Blocks per Election	5
Headers per Election	50
Candidates per Contest	120
Ballot Pages	3
Vote for N of M	25
Ballots sheets per OVO	5000
Units simultaneously loading	20
Precincts initialized per OVO on Election Day	30
Precincts initialized per OVI/OVI-VC on Election Day	2000
Precincts initialized per OVO/OVI/OVI-VC in early voting	2000

Table 2-2 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Ballot Target Limits

Ballot Length	Maximum Positions (Row x Column)
11 inch	38 x 3
14 inch	50 x 3
17 inch	62 x 3
19 inch	70 x 3

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.3 Hardware

The hardware components identified in Tables 2-3 – 2-6 were utilized for certification testing of the OpenElect Release 1.3 System.

Table 2-3 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OVO Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer	Model	Serial Number
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. A	UNI000018
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. A	UNI000024
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000029
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000036
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000039
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000049
OVO Ballot Box 1	Unisyn	Plastic Rolling	BB-58650-001
OVO Ballot Box 2	Unisyn	Plastic Rolling	UVSCOV001675 UVSBOT001685
OVO Ballot Box 3	Unisyn	Plastic Rolling	UVSCOV001738 UVSBOT001618
OVO Ballot Box 4	Unisyn	Portable (collapsible corrugated plastic)	CBB001 CBB002
OVO Ballot Box 5	Unisyn	OpenElect Ballot Box Version 3	OEBBV3-001
OVO Ballot Box 6	Unisyn	OpenElect Ballot Box Version 3	OEBBV3-002

Table 2-4 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OVI Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer	Model	Serial Number
OVI 7"	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Interface, Rev. F	UNI150041
OVI 7"	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Interface, Rev. F	UNI150049
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. A	UNI202111
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. B	UNI203050
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. A	UNI203118
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. A	UNI203232

Table 2-5 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OVCS Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer	Model	Serial Number
OVCS	Canon	ImageFORMULA DR-X10C	ED300631

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.3 Hardware (Continued)

Table 2-6 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OCS Configurations

Equipment	Manufacturer / Model	Hardware Specifications	Service Tag	Software Configuration
PC 1	Dell Precision T3600	Processor: Intel Xeon E5-1620 3.6GHz Memory: 4x 4GB 1600MHz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB (Mirrored)	CP7GGX1	OVCS/ All OCS applications
PC 2	Dell OptiPlex 7010	Processor: Intel Core i7-3770 3.4GHz Memory: 4x 4GB 1600MHz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB	2Y7BGX1	All OCS applications
PC 3	Dell D075	Processor: Intel Core i7-4770S 3.1GHz Memory: 2x 8GB 1600MHz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB	H407GZ1	All OCS applications
Laptop 1	Dell Latitude E5540	Processor: Intel Core i7-4600U 2.1GHz Memory: 2x 4GB 1600MHz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB	CH78VZ1	All OCS applications
Laptop 2	HP 2000 Notebook PC	Processor: AMD Dual-Core E1-1500 1.48GHz Memory: 1x 4GB DDR3 SDRAM Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	2C32NR	All OCS applications

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.4 Software

The software components identified in Tables 2-7 – 2-12 were utilized for certification testing of the OpenElect Release 1.3 System.

Table 2-7 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Software Submitted for Testing

Software Required For Testing	Software Version
Proprietary Software	
Adjudicator	1.3.0
Ballot Layout Manager	1.3.0
Common (Library)	1.3.0
Election Manager	1.3.0
Election Server	1.3.0
OCS Installer	1.3.0
Regkey Builder	1.3.0
Software Server	1.3.0
Tabulator	1.3.0
Tabulator Client	1.3.0
Tabulator Reports	1.3.0
OVCS Application	1.3.0
OVI Firmware	1.3.0
OVO Firmware	1.3.0
Scripter	1.3.0
Validator	1.3.0
Logger (Library)	1.3.0

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.4 Software (Continued)

Table 2-8 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OCS and OVCS COTS Software Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Java SE Development Kit	Development Kit 6 Update 2 for Linux	jdk-6u2-linux-i586.bin	6a488cb0a161a1c3a541a66e3b076f8e
Java SE Runtime Environment	Runtime Environment 6 Update 2	jre-6u2-linux-i586.bin	0d30636b5cd23e161da5eda9409f02d5
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
Apache Tomcat	6.0.13	apache-tomcat-6.0.13.tar.gz	50442a96332f0ec0cc1fba354f733ad6
PDI Scanner Driver and Libraries for OVCS	2.1.4	PS3_Canon_libraries_2014Jan06A.zip	6b28a3c6dccab539261ca96bd94dd1e5

Table 2-9 Unisyn OVS 1.3 COTS Operating System Software Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Linux CentOS Distribution for OVS 1.3 (used for the OVO/OVI with old motherboard)	5.0	CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-1of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-2of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-3of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-4of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-5of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-6of6.iso	f749d7e17fa01604b9956304efba2333; 963258ceafda5c5e6f79be86028b6b3d; a08ec9ccfdc89c24f3d6567219f90c42; b31c239009b780d1c89c311c192e43be ; 0c3990be2271bf44c1495aa0003b5552; 9e6f91a5292f46b02777133765fc03fe
Linux CentOS Distribution (used for the OCS and OVCS)	5.7	CentOS-5.2-i386-bin-DVD.iso	c89db7f5294465d593e7b02c232e0e9070111487
Linux CentOS Distribution (used for the OVO/OVI with new motherboard)	6.3	CentOS-6.3-i386-bin-DVD1.iso	0285160d8ba3cfc720ea55e98e464eac

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.4 Software (Continued)

Table 2-10 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OVO Third-Party Software (COTS) Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Common Files			
Java SE Runtime Environment	Runtime Environment 6 Update 2	jre-6u2-linux-i586.bin	0d30636b5cd23e161da5eda9409f02d5
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
Apache Tomcat	6.0.13	apache-tomcat-6.0.13.tar.gz	50442a96332f0ec0cc1fba354f733ad6
PDI Scanner Driver and Libraries for OVO	6.3.32	PS3_Canon_libraries_2014Jan06A.zip	6b28a3c6dccab539261ca96bd94dd1e5
Citizen Printer for OVO	1.11.2.7	CSA_JPOS11127_setupEN.bin	d150d08693bf7dbe758adfdab94f655d
OpenCSV	2.3	opencsv-2.3-src-with-libs.tar.gz	d3423d8e3b0ae5c899cee32baa17a36f
Jetway J7F2			
openChrome Video Driver	0.2.900-7.el5	xf86-video-openchrome-0.2.900.tar.gz	3e36895eb4b4d61e21aa27d370f151c8
eGalax Touchscreen Driver	3.00.3719	eGalaxTouch-3.00.3719-32b-k26.tar.gz	51c835408093ccfc4055a9eab9537998
FVWM Desktop Window Manager	2.4.19	fvwm-2.4.19.tar.gz	a2fd2c07061303883d6bf89eb2b259ff
Jetway 2550			
Xenarc Touchscreen Driver	2.5.2107	eGTouch_v2.5.2107.L-x.tar.gz	cfb148b3997257ed0e4a8eb3fa6b3932
Linux Kernel	3.4.13	linux-3.4.13.tar.bz2	9c850d00c898ba792f29eb6a5973961c
Bash	4.1.2-15.el6	bash-4.1.2-15.el6_5.2.i686.rpm	3f85b5595b60f655f646aee702398a93

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.4 Software (Continued)

Table 2-11 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OVI-7/OVI-VC Third-Party Software (COTS) Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Common Files			
Java SE Development Kit	Development Kit 6 Update 2 for Linux	jdk-6u2-linux-i586.bin	6a488cb0a161a1c3a541a66e3b076f8e
Java SE Runtime Environment	Runtime Environment 6 Update 2	jre-6u2-linux-i586.bin	0d30636b5cd23e161da5eda9409f02d5
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
RXTX - Library and Jar	2.1-7r2	rxtx-2.1-7-bins-r2.zip	5f21ae633602a24fd3cdd096951476c2
Jetway J7F2			
openChrome Video Driver	0.2.900-7.e15	xf86-video-openchrome-0.2.900.tar.gz	3e36895eb4b4d61e21aa27d370f151c8
eGalax Touchscreen Driver	3.00.3719	eGalaxTouch-3.00.3719-32b-k26.tar.gz	51c835408093ccfc4055a9eab9537998
FVWM Desktop Window Manager	2.4.19	fvwm-2.4.19.tar.gz	a2fd2c07061303883d6bf89eb2b259ff
Jetway 2550			
Xenarc Touchscreen Driver	2.5.2107	eGTouch_v2.5.2107.L-x.tar.gz	cfb148b3997257ed0e4a8eb3fa6b3932
Linux Kernel	3.4.13	linux-3.4.13.tar.bz2	9c850d00c898ba792f29eb6a5973961c

Table 2-12 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Linux Build Machine Third-Party (COTS) Software Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Java SE Development Kit	Development Kit 6 Update 2 for Linux	jdk-6u2-linux-i586.bin	6a488cb0a161a1c3a541a66e3b076f8e
Java 2 Enterprise Edition	1.3.01	j2sdkee-1_3_01-linux.tar.gz	224e9687c73ba48f1186e434368ec9b3
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
Apache Ant	1.7.0	apache-ant-1.7.0-bin.zip	ac30ce5b07b0018d65203fbc680968f5
Jasper Reports	2.0.5	jasperreports-2.0.5-project.zip	b80bd29e4f95f18bd15da65cfd45d1d2
SQL Connector	5.1.7	mysql-connector-java-5.1.7.zip	f9a8008367f5b25bdec045c54100d5b0
Apache Axis	1.4	axis-bin-1_4.zip	9eda42bf82a274349f18c5affdd93608
Apache Commons Codec	1.3	commons-codec-current.zip	c30c769e07339390862907504ff4b300
Apache Commons Http	3.0	commons-httpclient-3.0.zip	42d96b0c7d627a2170fd57280476c8fe

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.4 Software (Continued)

Table 2-12 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Linux Build Machine Third-Party (COTS) Software Descriptions (Continued)

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Apache Commons File Upload	1.2	commons-fileupload-1.2-bin.zip	6fbe6112ebb87a9087da8ca1f8d8fd6a
Apache Commons IO	1.3.2	commons-io-1.3.2-bin.zip	ba31cc4a0d85842e4b0bdfd2472382ba
Apache Tag Library	1.1.2	jakarta-taglibs-standard-current.zip	f75c964f1b276b022c24a677ccc17d4d
PDF Help	4.92b23	pdfhelp.jar	f2542f332e5be4549a48f876d63ac915
Javazoom MP3	1.9.4	mp3spi1.9.4.zip	e259e7674d9b19e76f005cee2810e7f5
Citizen Printer for OVO	1.11.2.7	CSA_JPOS11127_setu pEN.bin	d150d08693bf7dbe758adfdab94f655d
PDI Scanner Driver and Libraries for OVO and OVCS	2.1.4, 6.3.32	PS3_Canon_libraries_2014Jan06A.zip	6b28a3c6dccab539261ca96bd94dd1e5
RXTX - Library and Jar	2.1-7r2	rxtx-2.1-7-bins-r2.zip	5f21ae633602a24fd3cdd096951476c2
PDI Tool For Verification of Binary File	1.0	VisionX_11202008.EXE	af8905f015c7d7ff730b9f8b0811134b
Fonts for OCS	None	arial.zip; ARIALBD.zip; arialbi.zip; ariali.zip	c7f4d931da264bee5855cbf69630c81d; 589a0d88320f8a33dbcd4f2c1929ebce; b868660de8a00fe20f70970cca275038; 7968209fd0c62466a27fcde0f4104fec
Star 700II Printer	1.4.2_11-b06	starjavapos_linux_20070317.zip	172b1fcfecae654b00463be74efc7fbb

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.5 Test Tools/Materials

This subsection identifies all test tools and test materials required to perform voting system testing.

The test materials listed in Tables 2-13 – 2-15 were required to support the OpenElect Release 1.3 certification testing:

Table 2-13 Unisyn OVS 1.3 COTS OVS Accessory Equipment

COTS Equipment	Make	Model	Serial Number
Headphones	Koss	KPH5	T70987-HP-001
Headphones	Koss	KPH5	T70987-HP-002
Headphones	Koss	KPH5	HP-T58650-002
Sip & Puff	Origin Instruments	AirVoter	00594
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE580906PA106
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE580906PA114
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE58090500284
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE58090500278
20 x Transport Media	STEC	Thumb Drive (UFD) 1GB Capacity	TM001-TM0020
2x Thumb Drives	PNY	USB 16 GB	PNY1, PNY2
Network Switch	Linksys	SR2024 Business Series 24-Port 10/100/1000 Gigabit Switch	REM30H600558 GGR1807 JJ
External DVD-RW Drive	Pioneer	DVR-X162Q	IDFW002121UC
External DVD-RW Drive	Samsung	SE-S084	R8816GAZA19986
ADA Voting Booth	American Made Election Equipment (AMEE)	Model 2000	T70987-VB01

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.5 Test Tools/Materials (Continued)

Table 2-14 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OCS Software Build Machines

Equipment and Operating System	Manufacturer	Version/Model	Serial Number	COTS /Non-COTS
Application Build Machine	Jetway	Processor: VIA Nano-BGA 1.5GHz Memory: 1GB Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	T70987-SBB-001	COTS
OVO Linux OS Build Machine	Jetway	Processor: VIA Nano-BGA 1.5GHz Memory: 1GB Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	T70987-SBB-002	COTS
OVI Linux OS Build Machine	Jetway	Processor: VIA Nano-BGA 1.5GHz Memory: 1GB Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	T70987-SBB-003	COTS
Extra Hard Drives x 3	Western Digital	WD3200AAJA	N/A	COTS

Table 2-15 Unisyn OVS 1.3 OCS Test Support Materials

Test Material
50 CD-R Spindle
25 DVD-R Spindle
Box of OVI Paper Rolls
Box of OVO Paper Rolls
Security zip ties
Security seals

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2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.6 Vendor Technical Data Package

The Technical Data Package (TDP) contains information about requirements, design, configuration management, quality assurance, and system operations. The EAC 2005 VVSG requirements state that, at a minimum, the TDP shall contain the following documentation: system configuration overview, system functionality description, system hardware specifications, software design and specifications, system test and verification specifications, system security specifications, user/system operations procedures, system maintenance procedures, personnel deployment and training requirements, configuration management plan, quality assurance program, and system change notes.

The documents listed in Table 2-16 comprise the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System TDP. These documents are considered an addition to the OpenElect Release 1.2 voting system’s TDP, certified by the EAC on December 23, 2013 (UNS10121966-OE-1.2).

Table 2-16 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System TDP

Document Title	Version	Date	Document Number
System Overview	1.1	06/30/14	04-00446
System Security Specification	1.0	08/10/14	04-00447
Configuration Management Plan	1.1	09/24/14	04-00448
Quality Assurance Plan	1.1	08/26/14	04-00454
System Test and Verification Plan	1.0	08/08/14	04-00453
Personnel Training and Deployment Requirements	1.0	08/26/14	04-00445
Software and Design Specification	1.0	10/10/11	04-00464
Final Quality Assurance Report	1.0	06/20/13	04-00469
OVS Acronyms	1.0	08/10/14	04-00494
System Functionality Description	1.1	08/26/14	04-00444
System Maintenance Procedures	1.0	08/08/14	04-00459
System Hardware Specification	1.0	07/27/14	04-00458
Ballot Layout Manager User Guide	1.0	08/06/14	04-00428
Election Manager User Guide	1.1	10/05/14	04-00427
Election Server User Guide	1.0	08/08/14	04-00429
Software Server User Guide	1.0	08/08/14	04-00430
Tabulator Client User Guide	1.0	08/07/14	04-00431
Tabulator User Guide	1.1	09/24/14	04-00432
Tabulator Reports User Guide	1.0	08/07/14	04-00433
OVCS User Guide	1.2	09/30/14	04-00495
SOP: Election Day Poll worker’s Guide	1.0	08/06/14	04-00463
SOP: Election Day Troubleshooter’s Guide OVO and OVI	1.0	08/10/14	04-00462
System Operations Procedures: Warehouse Technician’s Guide	1.4	10/29/14	04-00460
Ballot Paper Specification	1.0	08/11/14	04-00503
System HW Verification	1.1	10/22/13	04-00513
Adjudicator User Guide	1.0	08/07/14	04-00530

2.0 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)

2.7 Deliverable Materials

The materials listed in Table 2-17 are identified by Unisyn Voting Solutions to be delivered as part of the Unisyn OVS Release 1.3 Voting System to the end users.

Table 2-17 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System Deliverables

Deliverable Material	Version	Description
OCS	1.3	EMS software suite
OVO	1.3	Precinct ballot scanner
OVI	1.3	Accessible voting station
OVCS	1.3	Central Count scanner
Ballot Box	---	OVO ballot receptacle
Transport media	STEC 1 & 4 GB	USB Flash Drive
Minuteman UPS	ETR1500	UPS
Headphones (optional)	Koss KPH5	Stereo headphones
Sip and Puff (optional)	AirVoter	Binary input device
04-00444 OVS System Functionality	1.1	TDP Document
04-00446 System Overview	1.1	TDP Document
04-00459 System Maintenance Procedures	1.0	TDP Document
04-00454 Quality Assurance Plan	1.1	TDP Document
04-00494 OVS Acronyms	1.0	TDP Document
04-00428 Ballot Layout Manager User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00427 Election Manager User Guide	1.1	TDP Document
04-00429 Election Server User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00430 Software Server User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00431 Tabulator Client User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00432 Tabulator User Guide	1.1	TDP Document
04-00433 Tabulator Reports User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00495 OVCS User Guide	1.2	TDP Document
04-00448 OVS Configuration Management Plan	1.1	TDP Document
04-00460 OVS System Operations Guide Warehouse Technician's Guide	1.4	TDP Document
04-00462 OVS System Operations Guide EDay Troubleshooters	1.0	TDP Document
04-00463 OVS System Operations Guide EDay Pollworkers	1.0	TDP Document
04-00464 Software Design and Specification	1.0	TDP Document
04-00503 OVS Paper Specification	1.0	TDP Document
04-00513 System HW Verification	1.1	TDP Document
04-00530 Adjudicator User Guide	1.0	TDP Document

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3.0 TEST BACKGROUND

NTS Huntsville is an independent testing laboratory for systems and components under harsh environments, including dynamic and climatic extremes as well as the testing of electronic voting systems. NTS Huntsville holds the following accreditations:

- ISO-9001:2000
- NVLAP Accredited ISO 17025:2005
- EAC Accredited VSTL, NIST 150,150-22
- A2LA Accredited (Certification No.'s 845.01, 845.02, and 845.03)
- FCC Approved Contractor Test Site (Part 15, 18)

3.1 General Information

All testing performed as part of the test effort was performed at the NTS Huntsville and NTS Plano facilities. Qualification/Certification testing was limited to the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System which includes the items listed in Section 2.0 of this test report.

3.2 Certification Testing Scope

To evaluate the system test requirements and the scope of the test campaign, each section of the EAC 2005 VVSG was analyzed to determine the applicable tests. The EAC 2005 VVSG Volume I Sections, along with the strategy for evaluation, are described below:

- **Section 2: Functional Requirements** – The requirements in this section were tested during the FCA and System Integration tests utilizing the “NTS Baseline Test Cases” along with test cases specially designed for the Unisyn OVS 1.3.
- **Section 3: Usability and Accessibility** – The requirements in this section not tested because no changes were included in this modification which affected the Usability and Accessibility features and capabilities of the **EAC Certified Unisyn OVS Version 1.2** voting system.
- **Section 4: Hardware Requirements** – The requirements in this section were tested and/or evaluated by trained NTS personnel per section 4.4 and table 4-1. **Evaluation applies only to hardware which is not affected by this voting system modification**
- **Section 5: Software Requirements** – The requirements in this section were tested during source code review, TDP review, and FCA. A combination of review and functional testing were performed to ensure these requirements were met.
- **Section 6: Telecommunication** – The requirements in this section were not tested during this test campaign because no changes were included in this modification to the Standard Networking Configuration from the **original Unisyn OVS Version 1.0** EAC-certified system.
- **Section 7: Security Requirements** – The requirements in this section were reviewed to determine the impact of the modification. It was determined that a physical security review of the new OVO ballot box and an SCAP review of the updated operating system were required.
- **Section 8: Quality Assurance (QA) Requirements** – The QA requirements were spot checked and limited to only the changes included within this modification. The following documents were utilized during the limited review process:
 - 04-00454 Quality Assurance Plan

3.0 TEST BACKGROUND (CONTINUED)

3.2 Certification Testing Scope (Continued)

- **Section 9: Configuration Management (CM) Requirements** – The CM requirements were spot checked and limited to only the changes included within this modification. The following documents were utilized during the limited review process:
 - 04-00448 Configuration Management Plan

The Unisyn OVS Version 1.3 Voting System is a paper-based precinct counting system; therefore, all EAC 2005 VVSG requirements pertaining to DRE's were excluded from this test campaign. Additionally, the following requirements were also excluded from the campaign:

- Volume I Section 6 (Telecommunication Requirements)
- Volume I Section 7.5.2-7.5.4 (Telecommunications and Data Transmission)
- Volume I Section 7.6 (Use of Public Communication Networks)
- Volume I Section 7.7 (Wireless Communications)
- Volume I Section 7.9 (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail Requirements)

The rationale for not evaluating the Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System to the requirements contained in the indicated sections of the EAC 2005 VVSG is described in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1 Not Applicable Requirements

EAC 2005 VVSG Volume I Section	Rationale for 'Not Applicable'
6, 7.5.2-7.5.4	These requirements are written for use on public networks. The Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System does not use public networks.
7.6	This section pertains to "Voting systems that transmit data over public telecommunications..." The Unisyn OVS 1.3 as configured for this certification does not permit transmission over public networks.
7.7	No wireless technology is present in the Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System.
7.9	The Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System is a paper based system.

3.3 NTS Quality Assurance

All work performed on this test campaign was in accordance with the NTS Huntsville and NTS Plano Quality Assurance Programs and the NTS Huntsville Quality Program Manual, which conforms to the applicable portions of International Standard Organization (ISO) Guide 17025.

The NTS Huntsville Facility Quality Management System is registered in compliance with the ISO-9001 International Quality Standard. Registration has been completed by Quality Management Institute (QMI), a Division of Canadian Standards Association (CSA).

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3.0 TEST BACKGROUND (CONTINUED)

3.4 Test Equipment and Instrumentation

All instrumentation, measuring, and test equipment used in the performance of this test program were calibrated in accordance with NTS Huntsville’s and NTS Plano’s Quality Assurance Program, which complies with the requirements of ANSI/NCSL 2540-1, ISO 10012-1, and ISO/IEC 17025. Standards used in performing all calibrations are traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) by report number and date. When no national standards exist, the standards are traceable to international standards, or the basis for calibration is otherwise documented.

3.5 Terms and Abbreviations

Table 3-2 defines all terms and abbreviations applicable to this Test Report.

Table 3-2 Terms and Abbreviations

Term	Abbreviation	Definition
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Amended 2008)	ADA	ADA is a wide-ranging civil rights law that prohibits, under certain circumstances, discrimination based on disability.
Audio Tactile Interface	ATI	Voter interface designed to not require visual reading of a ballot. The same ATI is utilized for both the OVI-7 and the OVI-VC.
Configuration Management	CM	---
Commercial Off the Shelf	COTS	Commercial, readily available hardware devices (such as card readers, printers or personal computers) or software products (such as operating systems, programming language compilers, or database management systems)
Direct Record Electronic	DRE	An electronic voting system that utilizes electronic components for the functions of ballot presentation, vote capture, vote recording, and tabulation which are logically and physically integrated into a single unit. A DRE produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and in printed hardcopy.
United States Election Assistance Commission	EAC	Commission created per the Help America Vote Act of 2002, assigned the responsibility for setting voting system standards and providing for the voluntary testing and certification of voting systems.
Election Management System	EMS	An umbrella term for the software application used to define and report election projects.
Federal Communications Commission	FCC	---
Functional Configuration Audit	FCA	Exhaustive verification of every system function and combination of functions cited in the manufacturer’s documentation.

3.0 TEST BACKGROUND (CONTINUED)

3.5 Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)

Table 3-2 Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)

Term	Abbreviation	Definition
Help America Vote Act	HAVA	Act created by United States Congress in 2002.
National Institute of Standards and Technology	NIST	Government organization created to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhances economic security and improves our quality of life.
National Technical Systems, Inc.	NTS	---
OpenElect Central Suite	OCS	Unisyn’s Election Management System
OpenElect Voting Central Scanner	OVCS	High-speed central ballot scan tabulator.
OpenElect Voting Optical	OVO	Precinct-level optical scanner and tabulator
OpenElect Voting Interface	OVI	Precinct-level voting device that prints Voter Assisted ballots using a variety of input devices (touchscreen, ATI, Sip and Puff)
Operating Procedure	OP	NTS Test Method or Test Procedure.
Physical Configuration Audit	PCA	Review by accredited test laboratory to compare voting system components submitted for certification testing to the manufacturer’s technical documentation, and confirmation the documentation meets national certification requirements.
Quality Assurance	QA	---
Technical Data Package	TDP	Manufacturer documentation related to the voting system required to be submitted as a precondition of certification testing.
Trusted Build	---	Final build of source code performed by a trusted source and overseen by the manufacturer which is delivered to the EAC designated repository; also referred to as a “Witness Build”.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc.	UL	---
Uninterruptible Power Supply	UPS	---
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines	EAC 2005 VVSG	Published by the EAC, the third iteration of national level voting system standards.
Voting System Test Laboratory	VSTL	An independent, non-federal laboratory qualified to test voting systems to Federal standards.

4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System, as identified in Section 2.0 of this report, was subjected to the tests as summarized in this section.

4.1 Source Code Review

As part of the testing activities, the Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System received a 100% source code review to the EAC 2005 VVSG coding standards and the manufacturer supplied coding standards (Unisyn Software Design and Specification). Unisyn uses the “Code Conventions for the Java™ Programming Language Revised April 20, 1999” coding convention. The manufacturer-supplied coding standards can be found within the vendor provided TDP under Software Design and Specification. The review was conducted per the guidelines described in this section.

As the source code was received, a SHA1 hash value was created for each source code file. The source code team then conducted automated source code reviews using Eclipse and Checkstyle because the source code is written entirely in JAVA. In addition to the automated source code review, NTS Huntsville also performed a 10% manual review of the headers and quality of comments. This was done to identify any violation of EAC 2005 VVSG coding standards or manufacturer-supplied coding standards. Each identified violation was recorded by making notes of the standards violation along with directory name, file name, and line number.

Summary Findings

A total of three software suites were examined: OpenElect Central Suite (OCS), OpenElect Voting Optical (OVO), and OpenElect Voting Interface (OVI). A total of seven issues were discovered during Automated Source Code Review using Checkstyle. All seven issues were discovered in the OCS software suite and consisted of six issues regarding Whitespace and one issue regarding Magic Numbers.

All identified source code issues were resolved prior to the conclusion of the source code review process.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.2 Trusted Builds

Trusted builds of the OpenElect Release 1.3 software were performed by utilizing Unisyn Voting Solutions' trusted build documentation.

The following steps were performed in the order listed by NTS Huntsville to complete the trusted builds:

- Clear hard drive of existing data
- Retrieve the compliant source code
- Retrieve the installation media for OS, compilers, and build software
- Construct the build environment
- Create disk image of the build environment
- Load the compliant source code into the build environment
- Create a disk image of the pre-build environment
- Create a digital signature of the pre-build environment
- Build executable code
- Create a disk image of the post-build environment
- Create a digital signature of executable code
- Create installation media
- Create a digital signature of the installation media
- Install executable code onto the system and validate the software/firmware
- Deliver source code with digital signature, disk image of pre-build environment with digital signatures, disk image of post-build environment with digital signatures, executable code with digital signatures, and installation media to the EAC Repository.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.2 Trusted Builds (Continued)

The Trusted Builds for the OpenElect Release 1.3 System included source code, data, and script files in clear text form. The builds included COTS software provided to NTS Huntsville on commercially available media, COTS software downloaded and verified by the VSTL, COTS software verified by SHA1 from the software supplier, and picture and sound files in binary format provided by Unisyn Voting Solutions. Each component required for the Trusted Build was verified by NTS Huntsville prior to performing the Trusted Build.

Prior to performing the Trusted Builds, the PC hard drive was cleared of any existing data by writing data to every hard drive sector. The operating system identified for the Trusted Build was installed, followed by all prerequisite software, data files, and configurations identified in the build documentation. Lastly, the software was built by performing the process provided by Unisyn Voting Solutions.

Summary Findings

NTS Huntsville performed Trusted Builds for all components of the OpenElect Release 1.3 System on November 18, 2014. The **Unisyn technical representatives** for the Trusted Builds were McDermot Coutts, Dan Alto, Chris Ortiz, and Gina Roesch.

The software products resulting from the Trusted Builds shall be supplied to the EAC at the conclusion of the certification effort. No deficiencies were noted during the performance of the Trusted Builds.

4.3 Technical Data Package Review

The OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System Technical Data Package (TDP) was reviewed to the 2005 VVSG. This review was performed as part of the testing activities. The TDP review only included the revised and new documents submitted for this testing campaign. The documents were reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and compliance to the 2005 VVSG.

Summary Findings

The review results were recorded in a worksheet that provided the pass/fail compliance to each applicable VVSG requirement. There were 20 discrepancies reported to Unisyn and internally tracked by NTS Huntsville as test exceptions until verified that the applicable documents had been corrected. Unisyn corrected nonconformance observations and resubmitted the associated documents for review. This process continued until the TDP complied with the applicable TDP standards in the EAC 2005 VVSG.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.3 Technical Data Package Review (Continued)

A summary of the TDP issues encountered is provided below:

- Some TDP documents contained incorrect information in their Revision History.
- Descriptions of system enhancements and added functionality were not present in the TDP documents.
- Some of the individual user guides included information which conflicted with the actual information utilized during the testing process.

All identified TDP issues were resolved prior to the conclusion of the TDP review process. The Technical Data Package Review Report that summarizes the 20 discrepancies noted is included in Appendix B of this report.

4.4 Hardware Testing

As part of the OpenElect Release 1.3 campaign, Unisyn submitted six hardware changes. The changes affecting OVO units consist of a new motherboard, new display, and new power supplies for the Citizen Printer and the PDI Scanner to replace current hardware which has reached End Of Life Status. In addition a new plastic ballot box was introduced for use with OVO units.

The changes affecting OVI-7 and OVI-VC units consist of the introduction of new power supplies for the GVision touch screen (OVI-VC Only) and the Star Printer (OVI-7 and OVI-VC). A new hinge for the OVI-VC which allows for adjusting the viewing angle of the display was introduced, however, this change was previously ruled a De Minimis change which does not require hardware testing.

All other voting system components were examined during the PCA and verified by NTS as unmodified. Thus, only the new COTS components and the new ballot box were subject to hardware testing.

The submitted COTS hardware was unmodified. Table 4-1 details the 2005 VVSG hardware requirements that each component were required to have met. NTS Huntsville used Volume II section 4.6.1 of the VVSG and EAC RFI 2008-01 to make this determination.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

Table 4-1 Hardware Test Examination Results

Test/EAC 2005 VVSG Section	Procedure/Description	OVO Mother-Board/Display	OVO Power Supplies	OVI Power Supplies	Ballot Box
<i>Electrical Power Disturbance/ 4.1.2.5</i>	IEC 61000-4-11 (1994-06) power surges and dips	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Electromagnetic Radiation/4.1.2.9</i>	FCC Part 15 Class B for both radiated and conducted emissions	Tested	Tested	Tested	Tested
<i>Electrostatic Disruption/4.1.2.8</i>	IEC 61000-4-2 (1995-01) 15kV air discharge and 8kV contact discharge	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Electromagnetic Susceptibility/ 4.1.2.10</i>	IEC 61000-4-3 (2006) electromagnetic field of 10V/m modulated by a 1kHz, 80% AM modulation at 80MHz to 1000MHz frequency	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Conducted RF Immunity/4.1.2.11</i>	IEC 61000-4-6 (1996-04) conducted radio frequency energy	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Lightning Surge/4.1.2.7</i>	IEC 61000-4-5 (1995-02)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Magnetic Fields Immunity/4.1.2.12</i>	IEC 61000-4-8 (1993-06) AC magnetic fields of 30 A/m at 60Hz	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Electrical Fast Transient/4.1.2.6</i>	IEC 61000-4-4 (2004)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Bench Handling</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 516.3 Procedure VI six 4" drops on each edge totaling 24 drops	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Vibration/4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 514.3 physical shock and vibration during handling and transport	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Low Temperature/ 4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D minimum temperature shall be -4 degrees F	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>High Temperature/ 4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2 maximum temperature shall be 140 degrees F	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)

4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

Table 4-1 Hardware Test Examination Results (Continued)

Test/EAC 2005 VVSG Section	Procedure/Description	OVO Mother-Board/Display	OVO Power Supplies	OVI Power Supplies	Ballot Box
<i>Humidity Test/4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2 ten 24 hour humidity cycles	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Temperature/Power Variation/4.1.2.13</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 502.2 and Method 501.2 163 hours at 50 degrees to 95 degrees	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Security/7</i>	Tests the ability of the system to detect, prevent, log, and recover from a broad range of security risks identified.	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Tested
<i>Electrical Supply/4.1.2.4</i>	Meets voltage and power requirements of EAC 2005 VVSG Vol. 1 Section 4.1.2.4	Tested	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)
<i>Safety/4.3.8</i>	UL 60950-1 product safety review	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)	Accept (Reuse)

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.1 Electromagnetic Radiation Test (FCC Part 15 Emissions)

Electromagnetic Radiation emissions measurements were performed in accordance with Section 4.8 of Volume II of the VVSG. This testing was performed to ensure that emissions emanating from the OVO, OVI-7, and OVI-VC do not exceed the limits of FCC Part 15, Class B emissions. The OVO was configured to run in an automated ballot casting mode, where continual ballot processing would occur during the testing without operator intervention. The OVI-7 and OVI-VC units were configured to continually output audio to the attached headphones.

Summary Findings

Three Electromagnetic Radiation tests were performed during the test campaign. In the first Electromagnetic Radiation test the OVO was found to exceed the limits¹ of FCC Part 15, Class B emissions. **Details regarding this issue are presented in Appendix C of this document as ID # 32.** After mitigation of the issue a second Electromagnetic Radiation test was performed at the NTS Plano facility. During this test the OVO was found not to exceed the limits of FCC Part 15, Class B emissions. Later in the test campaign new power supplies for the OVO, the OVI-7, and the OVI-VC were introduced along with a new ballot box. These changes necessitated a third Electromagnetic Radiation test which was performed on the OVO (mounted on the new ballot box), OVI-7, and OVI-VC units. The OVO, OVI-7, and OVI-VC units were found not to exceed the limits of FCC Part 15, Class B emissions. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

¹Agencies governing the electromagnetic interference (EMI) from commercial products require quasi-peak detection to be used. Even if the emission from a device is over a test limit when measured with peak detection, the device will be considered to pass if the quasi-peak level is below the test limit.

Quasi-peak detection is a form of detection where the result of a quasi-peak measurement depends on the repetition rate of the signal. Signals can be classified into two general categories based upon their repetition rate: narrowband or broadband. A narrowband signal is a signal that can be resolved by the spectrum analyzer. An example of a narrowband signal is a continuous wave (CW) signal. A CW signal is one signal at a fixed frequency. A broadband signal is a signal that cannot be resolved by the spectrum analyzer. An example of a broadband signal is a pulse signal. Peak, quasi-peak, and average detection will yield the same amplitude level for a narrowband signal. A broadband signal will yield a quasi-peak level lower than the peak level. The weighting (accounted for through specific charge and discharge time constants in the quasi-peak detector circuit), is a function of the repetition frequency of the signal being measured. The lower the repetition frequency, the lower the quasi-peak level.

4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.2 Conducted RF Immunity

Conducted RF Immunity Testing was performed in accordance with Sections 4.1.2.11 (a) of Volume I and 4.8 of Volume II of the 2005 VVSG. Section 4.1.2.11 (b) of Volume I is not applicable because there are no signal/control lines greater than three meters. This testing was performed to ensure that the OVO was able to withstand conducted RF energy onto its power lines without disruption of normal operation or loss of data.

The OVO was configured to run in an automated ballot casting mode, where continual ballot processing would occur during the testing without operator intervention. The component was then subjected to conducted RF energy of 10 V rms applied to its power lines over a frequency range of 150 kHz to 80 MHz.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Conducted RF Immunity Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

4.4.3 Electromagnetic Susceptibility Test

Electromagnetic Susceptibility Testing was performed at the NTS Plano facility. Testing was supervised by NTS Huntsville VSTL personnel and was performed in accordance with Sections 4.1.2.10 of Volume I and 4.8 of Volume II of the 2005 VVSG.

The OVO was configured to run in an automated ballot casting mode, where continual ballot processing would occur during the testing without operator intervention. The component was then subjected to ambient electromagnetic fields at 10 V/m over a range of 80 MHz to 1000 MHz. Testing was conducted utilizing both horizontally and vertically polarized waves. The limits were measured with a maximum scan rate of 1% of the fundamental frequency and the dwell duration was three seconds.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Electromagnetic Susceptibility Test. The Test Data Sheet is in Appendix D.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.4 Electrostatic Disruption Test

Electrostatic Disruption Testing was performed in accordance with sections 4.1.2.8 of Volume I and 4.8 of Volume II of the VVSG to ensure that should an electrostatic discharge event occur during equipment setup and/or ballot counting, that the component would continue to operate normally.

The OVO was configured to run in an automated ballot casting mode, where continual ballot processing would occur during the testing without operator intervention. The OVO was then subjected to electrostatic discharges of +/- 8 kV contact and +/- 15 kV air. Discharges were focused on areas most frequently touched during normal operation, including the touch screen, user buttons, cables, connectors and other points of contact used by the voter or poll worker. EAC RFI 2010-01 was used in the determination of the proper voltage levels to be used during ESD testing.

Table 4-2 Electrostatic Discharge Test Levels

Requirements			
Characteristic	Capacitance	Resistance	Value
Pulse Wave Shape (RC Network)	150 pf	330 Ω	pf / Ω
Test Levels	Discharge Types		Value
	Air	Direct	
	±15	±8	kV
Rise Time	≤1		nanosecond
Pulse Decay Time	≈30 at 50% height		nanosecond
Pulse Repetition	≥1		per second
Total Injected Pulse at each Test Point	10		per polarity (±)
Temperature	≥15 to ≤35		°C
Relative Humidity	≥30 to ≤60		%

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Electrostatic Disruption Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.5 Temperature Power Variation Test

The OVO was subjected to a Temperature and Power Variation Test in accordance with section 4.7.1 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of this test was to evaluate system operation under various environmental conditions. The cumulative duration of at least 163 hours was achieved by utilizing two units for a period of 85 hours based on the EAC RFI 2008-01, with 48 hours in the environmental test chamber. For the remaining hours, the equipment was operated at room temperature. This test is similar to the low temperature and high temperature tests of MIL-STD-810-D, Method 502.2 and Method 501.2.

To perform the test, both components were placed inside an environmental walk-in test chamber and connected to a variable voltage power source. The temperature inside the chamber and the voltage supplied to the hardware varied from 50°F to 95°F and from 105 VAC to 129 VAC. During test performance, the operational functions were continuously exercised by the scanning of ballots.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Temperature/Power Variation Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.6 Electrical Supply Test

Electrical Supply Testing was performed in accordance with Section 4.1.2.4 of Volume I of the EAC 2005 VVSG. This test was performed to ensure that the OVO will continue to provide the capability for any voter who is voting at the time of a failure of the main power supply external to the voting system, to complete the casting of a ballot. Additionally, it is required that the voting system perform a successful shutdown without loss or degradation of the voting and audit data, and allow voters to resume voting once the voting system has reverted to back-up power.

To perform the test, the OVO was configured for normal operation. The OVO was then operated as designed for fifteen minutes prior to the removal of the AC input power. Once AC power was interrupted, the OVO was continuously operated for a minimum period of two hours until backup power was exhausted. Following the exhaustion of backup power the AC power was restored and the system was operated for an additional fifteen minutes. A total of 100 ballots were cast during the 2 hour period of backup power.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Electrical Supply Test. The Instrumentation Equipment Sheet is in Appendix D.

4.4.7 Vibration Test

The OVO was subjected to a Vibration Test in accordance with Section 4.6.3 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of this test was to simulate stresses faced during transport of voting machines and ballot counters between storage locations and polling places. This test is equivalent to the procedure of MIL-STD-810D, Method 514.3, Category 1- Basic Transportation, Common Carrier.

Prior to test initiation, the OVO was subjected to a baseline operability checkout to verify system readiness. Upon completion, the OVO unit was placed in its original packaging and was then secured to an electrodynamic shaker. One control accelerometer was affixed to the shaker table. The unit was then subjected to the Basic Transportation, Common Carrier profile as depicted in Mil-Std-810D, Method 514.3, Category I, with a frequency range from 10 Hz to 500 Hz and an overall rms level of 1.04, 0.74, and 0.20 G for duration of 30 minutes in each orthogonal axis. Upon test completion, the OVO was inspected for any obvious signs of degradation and/or damage. None were observed. Post-test operability checkouts were also performed on the OVO and continued operability verified.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Vibration Test. The Test Data Sheets and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.8 Bench Handling Test

The OVO was subjected to a Bench Handling Test in accordance with section 4.6.2 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of this test is to simulate stresses faced during maintenance and repair of voting machines and ballot counters. This test is equivalent to the procedure of MIL-STD-810D, Method 516.3, Procedure VI.

Prior to performance of the test, the OVO was subjected to a baseline operability checkout. Following the checkout, each edge of the base of the machine was raised to a height of four inches above the surface and allowed to drop freely. This was performed six times per edge, for a total of 24 drops. Upon test completion, the OVO was inspected for any obvious signs of degradation and/or damage. None were observed. The EUT was subjected to a post-test operability checkout and continued operability verified.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Bench Handling Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

4.4.9 Low Temperature Test

The OVO was subjected to a Low Temperature Test in accordance with section 4.6.2 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of this test is to simulate stresses associated with the storage of voting machines and ballot counters. This test is equivalent to the procedure of MIL-STD-810D, Method 502.2, Procedure I-Storage, with a minimum temperature of -4°F.

Prior to performance of the test, the OVO was subjected to a baseline operability checkout to verify system readiness. The OVO was then placed in an environmental test chamber and the chamber temperature was lowered to -4°F and allowed to stabilize. Upon temperature stabilization, the temperature was maintained for an additional four hours. The temperature was then returned to standard laboratory ambient conditions at a rate not exceeding 10°F per minute.

The OVO was removed from the chamber and inspected for any obvious signs of degradation and/or damage. None were observed. The OVO was successfully subjected to a post-test operability checkout.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Low Temperature Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.10 High Temperature Test

The OVO was subjected to a High Temperature Test in accordance with section 4.6.5 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of this test is to simulate stresses associated with the storage of voting machines and ballot counters. This test is equivalent to the procedure of MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2, Procedure I-Storage, with a maximum temperature of 140°F.

Prior to test initiation, the OVO was subjected to a baseline operability checkout to verify system readiness. The OVO was then placed in an environmental test chamber and the chamber temperature was raised to 140°F and allowed to stabilize. Upon temperature stabilization, the temperature was maintained for an additional four hours. The temperature was then returned to standard laboratory ambient conditions at a rate not exceeding 10°F per minute.

The OVO was removed from the chamber and inspected for any obvious signs of degradation and/or damage. None were observed. The OVO was successfully subjected to a post-test operability checkout.

Summary Findings

The EUT successfully met the requirements of the High Temperature Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

4.4.11 Humidity Test

The OVO was subjected to a Humidity Test in accordance with section 4.6.6 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of the test is to simulate stresses encountered during storage of voting machines and ballot counters. This test is similar to the procedure of MIL-STD-810D, Method 507.2, Procedure I-Natural Hot-Humid.

The OVO was subjected to a baseline operability checkout to verify system readiness. Upon completion, the OVO was placed in an environmental test chamber and was subjected to a 10-day humidity cycle in accordance with the 24-hour cycle values. Upon test completion, the OVO was inspected for any obvious signs of degradation and/or damage. None were observed. The OVO was successfully subjected to a post-test operability checkout.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Humidity Test. The Test Data Sheet and Instrumentation Equipment Sheets are in Appendix D.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.4 Hardware Testing (Continued)

4.4.12 Maintainability

Maintainability Testing was performed in accordance with Section 4.7.2 of Volume II of the VVSG. This test was performed to evaluate the ease with which preventive and corrective maintenance actions can be performed. This test factored in design characteristics of equipment: software processes the vendor and election officials have in place for preventing failures, and procedures for addressing failures. The test includes the ability of equipment and software to self-diagnose problems and make non-technical election workers aware of a problem. Maintainability addresses all scheduled and unscheduled events which are performed to determine operational status and make component adjustments or repairs.

The OVO was evaluated with the appropriate vendor documentation. Maintainability was determined based on the presence of specific physical attributes that aid system maintenance activities and the ease with which system maintenance tasks were able to be performed.

Summary Findings

The OVO successfully met the requirements of the Maintainability Test.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.5 System Level Testing

System Level Testing was performed to evaluate the integrated operation of the voting system hardware and software. The suite of tests that comprise the System level Testing includes Security Testing, System Integration Test, Data Accuracy, Availability, as well as the Physical and Functional Configuration Audits.

4.5.1 Security Testing

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 was subjected to Security Testing in accordance with the requirements of Section 7.0 of Volume I and Section 6.4 of Volume II of the VVSG. OpenElect Release 1.3 was subjected to a SCAP Security review which was conducted to verify that the operating environment is configured to match industry recognized security profiles. The Unisyn TDP was utilized during this portion of testing to ensure the proper configuration of the operating environment. The "USGCB-RHEL5-Desktop-Settings-Version-1 2 5 0-Report-EOS-OVO-OVI-2.0-CentOS-6X" document was utilized during the performance of the SCAP Security review.

The purpose of the Hardware portion of the Security Test was to verify the tamper evident security ties and seals of the newly introduced OpenElect Ballot Box Version 3 meet the requirements of the VVSG, and to confirm the ballot storage device is secure. All other previously certified components of the Unisyn OVS 1.3 system were unmodified and therefore accepted for the current test campaign.

Summary Findings:

The initial SCAP Security review found the OpenElect Release 1.3 voting system non-compliant with the security requirements Unisyn claimed to conform to which is the VISA Version 1 Release 4. Unisyn addressed the non-compliances and a second SCAP Security review found the OpenElect Release 1.3 voting system to be compliant to the VISA Version 1 Release 4 security requirements.

A hardware security review was performed on the OpenElect Ballot Box Version 3. The security tie straps/tamper evident seals and their documented installation were analyzed and found to be adequate.

NTS determined the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System to be compliant with the security requirements of the EAC 2005 VVSG.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.5 System Level Testing (Continued)

4.5.2 System Integration Test

System Integration Testing was performed to test all system hardware, software, and peripherals. System Integration Testing focused on the complete system, including all proprietary and COTS software, hardware, and peripherals configured as described in the TDP for the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System.

In order to further verify that compatibility between voting system components has not been affected by this modification, ballots were presented across the voting system as a whole and all results were verified against the expected results matrix. The created test deck for system integration included hand marked ballots and ADA generated ballots.

The five election definitions exercised during the System Integration Testing are listed below:

- GEN-01
- GEN-02
- GEN-03
- PRIM-01
- PRIM-03

Summary Findings

Through System Integration Testing, it was demonstrated that the system performed as documented with all components performing their intended functions. The OpenElect Release 1.3 voting system successfully met the requirements of the System Integration Test.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.5 System Level Testing (Continued)

4.5.3 Data Accuracy Test

The OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System was subjected to a Data Accuracy Test in accordance with the requirements of Section 4.7.1.1 of Volume II of the VVSG.

Per the VVSG, data accuracy is defined in terms of ballot position error rate. This rate applies to the voting functions and supporting equipment that capture, record, store, consolidate, and report the selections (or absence thereof) made by the voter for each ballot position. To meet the requirements of this test, the voting system must be subjected to the casting of a large number of ballots to verify vote recording accuracy, i.e. at least 1,549,703 ballot positions correctly read and recorded.

Summary Findings

OVO - For the data accuracy test, three OVOs were set up to cast 1,592,100 ballot positions via multiple ballot sizes that are supported by the system. The OVO cast and recorded 1,592,100 ballot positions accurately.

Table 4-3 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Accuracy OVO

Ballot Size	No. of Ballots	No. of Machine Marked	No. of Hand Marked	No. Ballot Positions per Ballot	No. of Machines in Test	No. of Times Voted	Total Ballot Positions	Oval Position
11 inch	100	30	70	219	3	5	328,500	L
14 inch	100	30	70	291	3	4	349,200	L
17 inch	100	30	70	357	3	4	428,400	R
19 inch	100	30	70	405	3	4	486,000	R
Total	400	120	280	N/A	N/A	17	1,592,100	---

OVCS - For the data accuracy test, one OVCS was set up to cast 1,570,200 ballot positions via multiple ballot sizes that are supported by the system. The OVCS cast and recorded 1,570,200 ballot positions accurately.

Table 4-4 Unisyn OVS 1.3 Accuracy OVCS

Ballot Size	No. of Ballots	No. of Machine Marked	No. of Hand Marked	No. Ballot Positions per Ballot	No. of Machines in Test	No. of Times Voted	Total Ballot Positions	Oval Position
11 inch	200	60	140	219	1	7	306600	L
14 inch	200	60	140	291	1	6	349200	L
17 inch	200	60	140	357	1	6	428400	R
19 inch	200	60	140	405	1	6	486000	R
Total	800	240	560	N/A	N/A	25	1570200	---

4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.5 System Level Testing (Continued)

4.5.4 Physical Configuration Audit

A Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) of the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System was performed as part of the testing activities in accordance with Volume II, Section 6.6 of Volume II of the EAC 2005 VVSG. The PCA compares the voting system components submitted for certification with the vendor's technical documentation and confirms that the documentation submitted meets the requirements of the Guidelines. The PCA included the following activities:

- Establishing a configuration baseline of software and hardware to be tested; confirm whether manufacturer's documentation is sufficient for the user to install, validate, operate, and maintain the voting system;
- Verifying software conforms to the manufacturer's specifications; inspect all records of manufacturer's release control system; if changes have been made to the baseline version, verify manufacturer's engineering and test data are for the software version submitted for certification;
- Reviewing drawings, specifications, technical data, and test data associated with system hardware, and to establish system baseline;
- Reviewing manufacturer's documents of user acceptance test procedures and data against system's functional specifications; resolve any discrepancy or inadequacy in manufacturer's **acceptance test procedures and data** prior to beginning system integration, functional and performance tests;
- Subsequent changes to baseline software configuration made during testing, as well as system hardware changes that may produce a change in software operation are subject to re-examination.

The PCA performed on the Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System consisted of inspecting the following:

- The OpenElect Central Suite (OCS) software
- The OpenElect Voting Optical Scan unit (OVO) Precinct Count Optical Scanner
- The OpenElect Voting Interface (OVI-7, OVI-VC), Ballot Marking, ADA, and Early Voting Device
- The OpenElect Voting Central Scan (OVCS) Optical Central Count High Speed Scanner
- All accessories, equipment and documentation used with the Unisyn OVS 1.3 Voting System

Summary Findings

A PCA was performed to baseline the system's hardware and software components that were used during the test campaign. No discrepancies were noted during the PCA.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.5 System Level Testing (Continued)

4.5.5 Functional Configuration Audit (FCA)

A Functional Configuration Audit of the OpenElect Release 1.3 voting system was performed in accordance with Section 6.7 of Volume II of the VVSG. The purpose of the FCA was to verify that the OpenElect Release 1.3 system under scope performed as documented in the TDP during pre-voting, voting, and post-voting activities and validated that the OpenElect Release 1.3 meets the requirements of the EAC 2005 VVSG. The FCA for the OpenElect Release 1.3 campaign included the OCS, OVO, OVI-7, OVI-VC, and the OVCS. To perform the FCA, tests were designed to ensure compatibility of voting machine functions using the referenced firmware. During the FCA, both normal and abnormal data was input into the system to attempt to introduce errors and test for error recovery.

Summary Findings

A Functional Configuration Audit was performed on the OpenElect Release 1.3 system. A total of five discrepancies were documented during the FCA (Discrepancy ID numbers: 25 - 29). The discrepancies discovered during the FCA and their resolutions are in the Discrepancy Report located in Appendix C of this report. All discrepancies were corrected and retested prior to the conclusion of the test campaign. Upon retest, it was found that all requirements of the FCA were met.

4.5.6 Availability

The voting system achieved at least 99 percent availability during normal operation for the applicable functions of the system.

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4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.6 Quality Assurance/Configuration Management Test

As part of the modification, NTS Huntsville personnel conducted a QA/CM review to verify that the manufacturer correctly followed their documented processes for a modified system. The QA/CM requirements were spot checked and limited to only the changes included within this modification. NTS Huntsville provided Unisyn Voting Solutions with a quality assurance audit list which Unisyn Voting Solutions was required to complete and deliver within 24 hours. The quality assurance audit utilized the following guidelines as the focus of the review:

The basis of this examination is to ensure:

- Conformance with the requirements to provide information on vendor practices required by these Guidelines.
- Conformance of system documentation and other information provided by the vendor with the documented practices for quality assurance and configuration management.

The focus of this examination is to assess whether the vendor's quality assurance program provide:

- Clearly measurable quality standards.
- An effective testing program throughout the system development life cycle.
- Application of quality assurance program to external providers of the system components and supplies.
- Comprehensive monitoring of system performance in the field and diagnosis of system failures
- Effective record keeping of system failures to support analysis of failure patterns and potential causes
- Effective processes for notifying customers of system failures and corrective measures are taken

Summary Findings

Unisyn Voting Solutions supplied NTS Huntsville with the requested documentation and answers within the allowed 24 hour window. NTS Huntsville reviewed the provided information and deemed it acceptable to satisfy the requirements of this section in conjunction with the NTS Huntsville TDP review.

4.7 Discrepancies and Resolutions

A total of **seven** discrepancies were discovered during testing of the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System. NTS defines a discrepancy as any issue (functional, physical, test error, etc.) encountered during testing that was not the expected result as defined by the test case. Discrepancies are placed into the NTS discrepancy tracking system (Mantis) for disposition and resolution.

All discrepancies encountered during testing were successfully resolved prior to test completion. The discrepancies generated are summarized in the summary findings below their respected section of the test report and their resolutions are presented in their entirety in Appendix C of this report.

4.0 TEST FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

4.8 Recommendation for Certification

NTS Huntsville performed conformance testing on the Unisyn OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System to the EAC 2005 VVSG (Version 1.0). NTS determined that the modifications met the requirements of the EAC 2005 VVSG and the manufacturer's technical documentation. As such, NTS Huntsville recommends the EAC grant the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System certification to the EAC 2005 VVSG.

This report is valid only for the equipment identified in Section 2 of this report. Due to the varying requirements of individual jurisdictions, it is recommended by the EAC 2005 VVSG that local jurisdictions perform acceptance tests on all systems prior to their implementation within their jurisdiction.

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APPENDIX A - NTS CERTIFICATION AS RUN TEST PLAN NO. PR030407-01



As Run Test Plan of
EAC 2005 VVSG Certification Testing
Performed on Unisyn OVS 1.3

Issue Date: 11/21/2014

Prepared for: **Unisyn Voting Solutions, INC**
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Prepared by: **National Technical Systems**
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REVISIONS

Revision	Reason for Revision	Date
NR	Initial Release	08/12/14
A	Address EAC Comments	09/26/14
B	Update Test Plan to "As Run"	11/21/14



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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this National Certification Test Plan (Test Plan) is to document the procedures that National Technical Systems (NTS) will follow to perform certification testing of the Unisyn Voting Solutions (Unisyn) OpenElect Voting System Release 1.3 (OVS 1.3) to the requirements set forth for voting systems in the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (EAC 2005 VVSG). Prior to submitting the system for certification testing, Unisyn submitted an application to the EAC for certification of the OVS 1.3 voting system modification to the previously certified OVS 1.0 Voting System (Certification number: UNS10121966-OE), OVS 1.0.1 Voting System (Certification number: UNS10121966-OE-WI), OVS 1.1 Voting System (Certification number: UNS10121966-OE-1.1), and OVS 1.2 (Certification number: UNS10121966-OE-1.2) voting systems. This test plan follows Notice of Clarification 09-005: Development and Submission of Test Plans for Modifications to EAC Certified Systems and Notice of Clarification 13-02: Detailed Description of Changes for Modifications.

At test conclusion, the results of all testing performed as part of this test campaign will be submitted to the EAC in the form of a final report.

1.1 Established Baseline System

The baseline system for this modification is the OpenElect Release 1.2 voting system. Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 describe the certified equipment and firmware versions. For full details about the OpenElect Release 1.2 system, refer to the Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Release 1.2 Modification's Final Test Report (Rev B) located on the EAC's website at <http://www.eac.gov>.

Table 1-1 OpenElect Release 1.2 Voting System Hardware Components

Component	Hardware Version	Software/Firmware Version
OVO – Precinct ballot scanner	Rev. E	1.2.0
OVO – Plastic Ballot box	N/A	N/A
OVO – Portable Ballot box	N/A	N/A
OVI 7" – Ballot Marking Device	Rev. G	1.2.0
OVI-VC (15") – Ballot Marking Device	Rev. B	1.2.0
OVCS – Ballot scanner	Canon DR-X10C	N/A

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1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.1 Established Baseline System (Continued)

Table 1-2 OpenElect Release 1.2 Voting System Software Components

Component	Version
Adjudicator	1.2.0
Ballot Layout Manager (BLM)	1.2.0
Election Manager (EM)	1.2.0
Election Server (ES)	1.2.0
OpenElect Central Suite (OCS) Installer	1.2.0
Software Server (SS)	1.2.0
Tabulator Monitor	1.2.0
Tabulator Client (TC)	1.2.0
Tabulator Reports (TR)	1.2.0
OpenElect Voting Central Scan (OVCS) Application	1.2.0

Table 1-3 OpenElect Release 1.2 Voting System EMS Components

Equipment	Description	Serial Number
EMS PC 1	Dell Precision T3600	CP7GGX1
EMS PC 2	Dell OptiPlex 7010	2Y7BGX1
EMS LAPTOP	HP 2000 Notebook PC	2C32NR

1.2 Scope of Modification

The purpose of this modification is to address End of Life (EOL) hardware components, state test campaign updates, customer requested functionality, and operating system updates to the previously certified Open Elect 1.2 (Certification number: UNS10121966-OE-1.2) voting system.

The system changes submitted to the EAC in the Application for Certification (UNS1401) include functional and hardware modifications to the EMS, OVO, OVI, and OVCS. These modifications are presented in their entirety in Appendix B.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.3 Initial Assessment

After analyzing the scope of changes to the submitted EMS, OVO, and OVI software, NTS personnel determined that accuracy, system integration, and a limited Functional Configuration Audit will be required to verify that the voting system still meets the 2005 VVSG requirements. Limited in this instance refers to only functional changes that were made in this modification (new features, changes to functions, etc.) or functions that have not changed but may be impacted by the modification. All source code will be compared to the EAC certified OVS 1.2 version to determine the extent of the source code review required. Based on this examination, NTS personnel will perform software code review to ensure that all applicable VVSG requirements are met and changes to the software do not introduce any new functions or features outside of the modifications in Appendix B.

NTS determined that the hardware changes to the OVO, hardware revision 1.3 will require all hardware testing except electrical power disturbance, electrical fast transient, lightning surge, and product safety. OVO hardware revision 1.2 will not require any hardware testing based on the changes submitted. NTS determined that the hardware changes to the OVI, hardware revision 1.3 will require an electromagnetic radiation test to be performed. The details of this analysis can be found in section 2.1 and 4.4.1.

An initial assessment has been performed on the TDP submitted by Unisyn for OVS 1.3. The TDP is constructed with the OVS 1.2 certified TDP and the OVS 1.3 changes to the certified documents. The submitted TDP will be reviewed to ensure that all OVS 1.3 changes are properly documented and comply with the 2005 VVSG.

1.4 References

The documents listed below were used in the development of the Test Plan and are utilized to perform certification testing.

- Election Assistance Commission 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Volume I, Version 1.0, "Voting System Performance Guidelines," and Volume II, Version 1.0, "National Certification Testing Guidelines," dated December 2005
- Election Assistance Commission Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0, expires July 2017
- Election Assistance Commission Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual, Version 1.0, expires July 2017
- National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NIST Handbook 150, 2006 Edition, "NVLAP Procedures and General Requirements (NIST Handbook 150)," dated February 2006
- National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NIST Handbook 150-22, 2008 Edition, "Voting System Testing (NIST Handbook 150-22)," dated May 2008

1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)**1.4 References (Continued)**

- United States 107th Congress Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (Public Law 107-252), dated October 2002
- NTS Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 5
- ANSI/NCSL Z540-1, "Calibration Laboratories and Measuring and Test Equipment, General Requirements"
- ISO 10012-1, "Quality Assurance Requirements for Measuring Equipment"
- EAC Requests for Interpretation (listed on <http://www.eac.gov>)
- EAC Notices of Clarification (listed on <http://www.eac.gov>)
- EAC Quality Monitoring Program residing at:
http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/quality_monitoring_program.aspx
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.0 VSTL Certification Test Report Rev. B (listed on <http://www.eac.gov>)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.0 Technical Data Package
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.0.1 Modification VSTL Certification Test Report Rev. A (listed on <http://www.eac.gov>)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.0.1 Technical Data Package
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.1 Modification VSTL Certification Test Report Rev. A (listed on <http://www.eac.gov>)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.1 Technical Data Package
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.2 Modification VSTL Certification Test Report Rev. B (listed on <http://www.eac.gov>)
- Unisyn Voting Solutions OpenElect Ver. 1.2 Technical Data Package

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1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.5 Terms and Abbreviations

Table 1-4 defines all terms and abbreviations applicable to the development of this Test Plan.

Table 1-4 Terms and Abbreviations

Term	Abbreviation	Definition
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Amended 2008)	ADA	ADA is a wide-ranging civil rights law that prohibits, under certain circumstances, discrimination based on disability.
Audio Tactile Interface	ATI	Electronic voter interface that does not require visual reading of a ballot. Audio is used to convey information to the voter and sensitive tactile controls allow the voter to convey information to the system.
Configuration Management	CM	---
Commercial Off the Shelf	COTS	Commercial, readily available hardware or software.
Direct Record Electronic	DRE	An electronic voting system that utilizes electronic components for the functions of ballot presentation, vote capture, vote recording, and tabulation which are logically and physically integrated into a single unit. A DRE produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and in printed hardcopy.
United States Election Assistance Commission	EAC	Commission created per the Help America Vote Act of 2002, assigned the responsibility for setting voting system standards and providing for the voluntary testing and certification of voting systems.
Election Management System	EMS	An umbrella term for the software application used to define and report election projects
Equipment Under Test	EUT	---
Functional Configuration Audit	FCA	Exhaustive verification of every system function and combination of functions cited in the manufacturer's documentation.
Federal Communications Commission	FCC	---
Help America Vote Act	HAVA	Act created by United States Congress in 2002.
National Institute of Standards and Technology	NIST	Government organization created to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhances economic security and improves our quality of life.
National Technical Systems, Inc.	NTS	---
NTS Operating Procedure	OP	NTS Test Method or Test Procedure.
System Under Test	SUT	---
OpenElect Central Suite	OCS	Unisyn's Election Management System
OpenElect Voting Central Scanner	OVCS	High-speed central ballot scan tabulator.
OpenElect Voting Optical	OVO	Precinct-level optical scanner and tabulator
OpenElect Voting Interface	OVI	Precinct-level voting device that prints Voter Assisted ballots using a variety of input devices (touchscreen, ATI, Sip and Puff)
Physical Configuration Audit	PCA	Review by accredited test laboratory to compare voting system components submitted for certification testing to the manufacturer's technical documentation, and confirmation the documentation meets national certification requirements.
Quality Assurance	QA	---
System Under Test	SUT	Refers to the system as a whole (all components)



1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.5 Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)

Table 1-4 Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)

Term	Abbreviation	Definition
Test Case Procedure Specifications	TCPS	NTS-developed document that specifies test items, input specifications, output specifications, environmental needs, special procedural requirements, inter-case dependencies, and all validated test cases that will be executed during the area under test.
Technical Data Package	TDP	Manufacturer documentation related to the voting system required to be submitted as a precondition of certification testing.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc.	UL	---
Uninterruptible Power Supply	UPS	---
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines	EAC 2005 VVSG	Published by the EAC, the third iteration of national level voting system standards.

1.6 Testing Responsibilities

Prior to the development of this test plan, NTS evaluated test results from the previous test campaigns performed by Wyle Laboratories: OVS 1.0, OVS 1.0.1, OVS 1.1, and OVS 1.2. The purpose of this evaluation was to determine the scope of testing required for system certification. Based on this evaluation, NTS determined that testing from previous test campaigns could be utilized to satisfy some requirements of this test campaign. Sections 2.1 and 4.4.1 contain additional details of this evaluation. All other core and non-core software and hardware certification testing shall be conducted under the guidance of qualified NTS personnel.

1.6.1 Project Schedule

This information is contained in a NTS-generated Microsoft Project schedule. This schedule is presented in Appendix A, "Unisyn Project Schedule." The dates on the schedule are not firm dates but planned estimates presented for informational purposes.

1.6.2 Test Case Development

NTS will utilize the "NTS Baseline Test Cases" for the Functional and System Integration Tests. These will be augmented with specially designed test cases tailored to the Unisyn OVS 1.3 system.

1.6.3 Test Procedure Development and Validation

NTS will utilize the NTS Operating Procedures (OPs) during the duration of this test program.

1.6.4 Third-Party Tests

NTS will not utilize any 3rd party testing during performance of the OVS 1.3 test campaign.

1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.7 Target of Evaluation Description

The following sections address the design methodology and product description of the OpenElect Release 1.3 Voting System, as taken from the Unisyn Voting Solutions technical documentation.

1.7.1 System Overview

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 System is a paper ballot voting system using touch screen and optical scan technology to scan and validate ballots, provide voter assisted ballots to accommodate voters with special needs, and tabulate results. The OVS consists of the OpenElect Central Suite (OCS), OpenElect Voting Optical (OVO), OpenElect Voting Interface (OVI), and Open Elect Voting Central Scan (OVCS).

Election Management System: OpenElect Central Suite (OCS)

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 EMS consists of eight components running as either a front-end/client application or as a back-end/server application. Below is a list and brief description of each.

- Ballot Layout Manager (BLM) - uses a database to create and store precinct and district information and an interface to create, check, translate, and produce the ballot styles needed by a jurisdiction for an election.
- Election Manager (EM) - converts the Unisyn election definition file to a Unisyn-specific XML format and prepares compressed, encrypted election files for output to CD-ROM.
- Election Server (ES) - loads the correct system time on the voting devices and uses the Election CD created by the EM to download new election data, via a closed and secure network, to OVS voting devices.
- Tabulator Client (TC) - retrieves vote files from Transport Media (TM) devices, stores them on its disk, and transfers the files to the Tabulator and notifies the Tabulator that a new file is present.
- Tabulator - receives and validates uploaded voting data and provides a status of uploaded files as well as handling Rank Choice Voting (RCV) functionality.
- Adjudicator - accesses ballot images and data from the OVCS and TC PCs to allow jurisdiction personnel to evaluate and change questionable or erroneous marks on ballot in accordance to the voter's perceived intent.
- Tabulator Reports (TR) - accesses data from the Tabulator database to generate the necessary reports.
- Software Server (SS) - updates and validates voting device client software.

1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.7 Target of Evaluation Description (Continued)

1.7.1 System Overview (Continued)

Precinct Ballot Tabulator: OpenElect Voting Optical (OVO)

The OVO device is a precinct-level, optical scan, ballot counter (tabulator) designed to perform the following major functions:

- Ballot scanning
- Tabulation
- Second chance voting

The Unisyn OpenElect Voting Optical (OVO) is a full-page, dual-sided optical scan ballot system which scans and validates voter ballots and provides a summary of all ballots cast. The election is loaded from the OVS Election Server over a secure local network or via a USB thumb drive. On Election Day, an OVO at each polling location scans and validates voters' ballots, and provides precinct tabulation and reporting. The OVO unit is also paired with the OVI for early voting to scan and tabulate early voting ballots. OVO units can also be used at election headquarters to read absentee, provisional, or recount ballots in smaller jurisdictions.



Figure 1-1
OVO on Plastic Ballot Box



Figure 1-2
OVO on Portable Ballot Box



Figure 1-3
OVO on OpenElect Ballot
Box Version 3

- 1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)
- 1.7 Target of Evaluation Description (Continued)
- 1.7.1 System Overview (Continued)

Precinct Voting Device: OpenElect Voting Interface (OVI)

The OVI supports both ADA and Early Voting requirements. The OVI enables voters during early voting to cast regional ballots and voters with special needs to prepare their ballots independently and privately on Election Day. The OVI unit features a 7-inch or optional 15-inch full-color touch screen display that is easy to read, making voting simple and error free. The OVI will present each contest on the correct ballot to the voter in visual and (optionally) audio formats. The voter with limited vision navigates through the ballot using the audio ballot and the ADA keypad or touchscreen input to make their selections. The voter validates his or her selections by listening to the audio summary, printing the ballot, and inserting it into the OVO.

The OVI facilitates special needs voters through a variety of methods including wheelchair access, sip & puff, zoom-in ballot function, and audio assistance for the visually impaired. The OVI provides for write-in candidates when authorized by the jurisdiction. Voters input candidates' names via the ADA keypad, touchscreen or sip & puff device. Each OVI can support multiple languages for both visual and audio ballots, allowing the voter to choose their preferred language.



Figure 1-4 OVI with 7 Inch Screen



Figure 1-5 OVI with 15 Inch Screen

1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)

1.7 Target of Evaluation Description (Continued)

1.7.1 System Overview (Continued)

Central Tabulator: OpenElect Voting Central Scanner (OVCS)

The Unisyn OpenElect Voting Central Scanner (OVCS) resides at election headquarters designated to read absentee, provisional, or recount ballots in large jurisdictions, or read the entire election's ballots at a central count location in smaller jurisdictions. The OVCS also captures write-in data images and produces a write-in image report for manual processing upon request. The OVCS system consists of the following components:

- OVCS Workstation: a COTS computer used for ballot image and election rules processing and results transfer to the EMS.
- Canon DR-X10C Scanner: a COTS scanner used to provide ballot scanning and image transfers to the local OVCS Workstation.




Figure 1-6
Canon DR-X10C Scanner and OVCS Workstation

- 1.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)
- 1.7 Target of Evaluation Description (Continued)
- 1.7.2 System Operational Concept

The entire system diagram is presented in Figure 1-7.




Figure 1-7
System Overview Diagram



2.0 PRE-CERTIFICATION TESTING AND ISSUES

NTS has conducted a pre-certification review, and findings indicate that all system changes are consistent with the change items documented in the EAC Application UNS-1401.

2.1 Evaluation of Prior VSTL Testing

NTS will reutilize all testing from the previously-certified systems submitted by Unisyn Voting Solutions. The testing of these systems was conducted by Wyle Laboratories in accordance with the EAC 2005 VVSG, and the EAC Certification Numbers are UNS10121966-OE, UNS10121966-OE-WI, UNS10121966-OE-1.1, and UNS10121966-OE-1.2.

Unisyn submitted the following test reports to NTS for reuse consideration. The reports and items requested for reuse are as follows:

- Wyle Test Report No. T56285.01-01 (National Certification Test Report for OVS 1.0)
 - Electrical Power Disturbance
 - Electromagnetic Radiation
 - Electrostatic Disruption
 - Electromagnetic Susceptibility
 - Electrical Fast Transient
 - Lightning Surge
 - Conducted RF Immunity
 - Magnetic Fields Immunity
 - Bench Handling
 - Vibration
 - High/Low Temperature
 - Humidity
 - Temperature/Power Variation
 - Product Safety Review, UL60950-1
 - Maintainability
 - Availability
 - Electrical Supply
 - Security Tests
 - Usability
 - Accessibility

- Wyle Test Report No. T58650.01-01 (National Certification Test Report for OVS 1.1)
 - Electromagnetic Radiation
 - Electrostatic Disruption
 - Electromagnetic Susceptibility
 - Conducted RF Immunity
 - Vibration
 - Security Tests
 - Usability
 - Accessibility



2.0 PRE-CERTIFICATION TESTING AND ISSUES (Continued)

2.1 Evaluation of Prior VSTL Testing (Continued)

- Wyle Test Report No. T70987.01-01 (National Certification Test Report for OVS 1.2)
 - Electromagnetic Radiation
 - Electrostatic Disruption
 - Electromagnetic Susceptibility
 - Conducted RF Immunity
 - Magnetic Fields Immunity
 - Availability
 - Security Tests
 - Usability
 - Accessibility

For details of the acceptance of the above items, refer to Section 4.4.1 of this test plan.

2.2 Known Field Issues

This system is a modification to previously certified systems. There were no systemic or significant issues traceable to any of the previously certified systems.

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3.0 MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR TESTING

The materials required for certification testing of the OVS 1.3 Voting System include software, hardware, test materials, and deliverable materials. These items were shipped directly to NTS by Unisyn Voting Solutions to enable the test campaign to occur.

3.1 Software

Table 3-1 lists the software the manufacturer must submit for testing. This section lists all software required for operation and testing of the voting system being certified. This includes the software used for testing accuracy and system integration as well as supporting software required for the test environment. All COTS software is listed in Appendix C.

Table 3-1 Software Utilized for Testing

Software Required For Testing	Software Version
Adjudicator	1.3.0
Ballot Layout Manager	1.3.0
Common (Library)	1.3.0
Election Manager	1.3.0
Election Server	1.3.0
OCS Installer	1.3.0
Regkey Builder	1.3.0
Software Server	1.3.0
Tabulator	1.3.0
Tabulator Client	1.3.0
Tabulator Reports	1.3.0
OVCS Application	1.3.0
OVI Firmware	1.3.0
OVO Firmware	1.3.0

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3.0 MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR TESTING (Continued)

3.1 Software (Continued)

Table 3-1 Software Utilized for Testing (Continued)

Software Required For Testing	Software Version
Scripter	1.3.0
Validator	1.3.0
Logger (Library)	1.3.0

3.2 Equipment

This subsection categorizes the equipment the manufacturer submitted for testing listed in Tables 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, and 3-7. Each test element is included in the list of equipment required for testing of that element, including system hardware, general purpose data processing and communications equipment, and any required test instrumentation.

Table 3-2 OVO Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer	Model	Serial Number
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. A	UNI000018
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. A	UNI000024
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000029
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000036
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000039
OVO	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Optical, Rev. E	UNI000049
OVO Ballot Box 1	Unisyn	Plastic Rolling	BB-58650-001
OVO Ballot Box 2	Unisyn	Plastic Rolling	UVSCOV001675 UVSBOT001685
OVO Ballot Box 3	Unisyn	Plastic Rolling	UVSCOV001738 UVSBOT001618
OVO Ballot Box 4	Unisyn	Portable (collapsible corrugated plastic)	CBB001 CBB002
OVO Ballot Box 5	Unisyn	OpenElect Ballot Box Version 3	OEBBV3-001
OVO Ballot Box 6	Unisyn	OpenElect Ballot Box Version 3	OEBBV3-002

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3.0 MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR TESTING (Continued)

3.2 Equipment (Continued)

Table 3-3 OVI Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer	Model	Serial Number
OVI 7"	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Interface, Rev. F	UNI150041
OVI 7"	Unisyn	OpenElect Voting Interface, Rev. F	UNI150049
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. A	UNI202111
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. B	UNI203050
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. A	UNI203118
OVI 15"	Unisyn	OVI-VC, Rev. A	UNI203232

Table 3-4 OVCS Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer	Model	Serial Number
OVCS	Canon	ImageFORMULA DR-X10C	ED300631

Table 3-5 OCS COTS Equipment

Equipment	Manufacturer / Model	Hardware Specifications	Service Tag	COTS/ Non-COTS
PC 1	Dell Precision T3600	Processor: Intel Xeon E5-1620 3.6Ghz Memory: 4x 4GB 1600Mhz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB (Mirrored)	CP7GGX1	COTS
PC 2	Dell OptiPlex 7010	Processor: Intel Core i7-3770 3.4Ghz Memory: 4x 4GB 1600Mhz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB	2Y7BGX1	COTS
PC 3	Dell OptiPlex XE2	Processor: Intel Core i7-4770S 3.1Ghz Memory: 2x 8GB 1600Mhz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB	H407GZ1	COTS
Laptop 1	Dell Latitude E5540	Processor: Intel Core i7-4600U 2.1Ghz Memory: 2x 4GB 1600Mhz RAM Hard Drive Capacity: 500GB	CH78VZ1	COTS
Laptop 2	HP 2000 Notebook PC	Processor: AMD Dual-Core E1-1500 1.48GHz Memory: 1x 4GB DDR3 SDRAM Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	2C32NR	COTS

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3.0 MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR TESTING (Continued)

3.2 Equipment (Continued)

Table 3-6 OVS 1.3 COTS Equipment

COTS Equipment	Make	Model	Serial Number
Headphones	Koss	KPH5	T70987-HP-001
Headphones	Koss	KPH5	T70987-HP-002
Headphones	Koss	KPH5	HP-T58650-002
Sip & Puff	Origin Instruments	AirVoter	00594
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE580906PA106
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE580906PA114
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE58090500284
UPS	Minuteman	Entrust Series ETR1500	AE58090500278
20 x Transport Media	STEC	Thumb Drive (UFD) 1GB Capacity	TM001-TM0020
2x Thumb Drives	PNY	USB 16 GB	PNY1, PNY2
Network Switch	Linksys	SR2024 Business Series 24-Port 10/100/1000 Gigabit Switch	REM30H600558 GGR1807 JJ
External DVD-RW Drive	Pioneer	DVR-X162Q	IDFW002121UC
External DVD-RW Drive	Samsung	SE-S084	R8816GAZA19986
ADA Voting Booth	American Made Election Equipment (AMEE)	Model 2000	T70987-VB01

Table 3-7 OVS 1.3 Build Equipment

Equipment and Operating System	Manufacturer	Version/Model	Serial Number	COTS /Non-COTS
Application Build Machine	Jetway	Processor: VIA Nano-BGA 1.5GHz Memory: 1GB Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	T70987-SBB-001	COTS
OVO Linux OS Build Machine	Jetway	Processor: VIA Nano-BGA 1.5GHz Memory: 1GB Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	T70987-SBB-002	COTS
OVI Linux OS Build Machine	Jetway	Processor: VIA Nano-BGA 1.5GHz Memory: 1GB Hard Drive Capacity: 320GB	T70987-SBB-003	COTS
Extra Hard Drives x 3	Western Digital	WD3200AAJA	N/A	COTS



3.0 MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR TESTING (Continued)

3.3 Test Tools/Materials

This subsection lists any and all test materials needed to perform voting system testing in Table 3-8. The scope of testing determines the quantity of a specific material required.

Table 3-8 Test Tools/Material

Test Tool/Material	Quantity
50 CD-R Spindle	as required
25 DVD-R Spindle	as required
Box of OVI Paper Rolls	as required
Box of OVO Paper Rolls	as required
Security zip ties	as required
Security seals	as required

3.4 Deliverable Materials

The materials listed in Table 3-9 are to be delivered as part of the OVS 1.3 voting system to the end users unless otherwise noted:

Table 3-9 Deliverable Materials

Deliverable Material	Version	Description
OCS	1.3	EMS software suite
OVO	1.3	Precinct ballot scanner
OVI	1.3	Accessible voting station
OVCS	1.3	Central Count scanner
Ballot Box	---	OVO ballot receptacle
Transport media	STEC 1 & 4 GB	USB Flash Drive
Minuteman UPS	ETR1500	UPS
Headphones (optional)	Koss KPH5	Stereo headphones
Sip and Puff (optional)	AirVoter	Binary input device
04-00444 OVS System Functionality	1.1	TDP Document
04-00446 System Overview	1.1	TDP Document
04-00459 System Maintenance Procedures	1.0	TDP Document
04-00454 Quality Assurance Plan	1.1	TDP Document



3.0 MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR TESTING (Continued)

3.4 Deliverable Materials (Continued)

Table 3-9 Deliverable Materials (Continued)

Deliverable Material	Version	Description
04-00494 OVS Acronyms	1.0	TDP Document
04-00428 Ballot Layout Manager User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00427 Election Manager User Guide	1.1	TDP Document
04-00429 Election Server User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00430 Software Server User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00431 Tabulator Client User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00432 Tabulator User Guide	1.1	TDP Document
04-00433 Tabulator Reports User Guide	1.0	TDP Document
04-00495 OVCS User Guide	1.2	TDP Document
04-00448 OVS Configuration Management Plan	1.1	TDP Document
04-00460 OVS System Operations Guide Warehouse Technician's Guide	1.4	TDP Document
04-00462 OVS System Operations Guide EDay Troubleshooters	1.0	TDP Document
04-00463 OVS System Operations Guide EDay Pollworkers	1.0	TDP Document
04-00464 Software Design and Specification	1.0	TDP Document
04-00503 OVS Paper Specification	1.0	TDP Document
04-00513 System HW Verification	1.1	TDP Document
04-00530 Adjudicator User Guide	1.0	TDP Document

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS

Modification testing of the OVS 1.3 will be performed on the configuration submitted in the EAC application UNS1401. NTS qualified personnel will ensure that all certification testing performed on the manufacturer's voting system follows NTS procedures for testing, and the specific test cases developed for this campaign meet the requirements of the EAC 2005 VVSG and EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual.

All Requests for Interpretation (RFIs) and Notices of Clarification (NOCs) applicable as of the date of this document shall apply to this test campaign unless otherwise noted.

4.1 Requirements (Strategy of Evaluation)

To evaluate the system test requirements, each section of the EAC 2005 VVSG will be analyzed to determine the applicable tests. The EAC 2005 VVSG requirements, along with the strategy for evaluation, are described below:

Section 2: Functional Requirements – The requirements in this section will be tested during the FCA and System Integration tests utilizing the “NTS Baseline Test Cases” along with test cases specially designed for the Unisyn OVS 1.3 per sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4.

Section 3: Usability and Accessibility – The requirements in this section will not be tested during this test campaign because no changes were included for the usability and accessibility portion of the voting system.

Section 4: Hardware Requirements – The requirements in this section will be tested and/or evaluated by trained NTS personnel per sections 4.4.2 and Table 6-1.

Section 5: Software Requirements – The requirements in this section will be tested during source code review, TDP review, and FCA. A combination of review and functional testing will be performed to ensure these requirements are met.

Section 6: Telecommunication – The requirements in this section will not be tested during this test campaign because no changes were included in this modification to the Standard Networking Configuration from the original Unisyn OVS, Version 1.0 EAC certified system.

Section 7: Security Requirements – The requirements in this section will only be tested in regards to the physical security of the new OVO ballot box, and an SCAP review of the updated operating system.

Section 8: Quality Assurance (QA) Requirements – The QA Requirements will be spot checked and limited to only the changes included within this modification. The following documents will be utilized during the limited review process:

- 04-00454 Quality Assurance Plan



4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.1 Requirements (Strategy of Evaluation) (Continued)

Section 9: Configuration Management (CM) Requirements – The CM requirements will be spot checked and limited to only the changes included within this modification. The following documents will be utilized during the limited review process:

- 04-00448 Configuration Management Plan

NTS personnel shall maintain a test log of the procedure(s) employed. This log identifies the system and equipment by model and serial number. In the event that the project engineer deems it necessary to deviate from NTS Test Cases or NTS Operating Procedures (OP) pertaining to the test environment, the equipment arrangement and method of operation, the specified test procedure, or the provision of test instrumentation and facilities the deviation shall be recorded in the test log. A discussion of the reasons for the deviation and the effect of the deviation on the validity of the test procedure shall also be completed by the Project Engineer and Program Manager.

NTS personnel utilize an internal bug tracking system in order to capture and track all issues and discrepancies found during the testing campaign. This allows for all issues and discrepancies to be monitored for reoccurrence, tracks the root cause analysis, and provides a resolution status. NTS personnel shall verify all items logged into the bug tracking system are resolved prior to the completion of testing and before any recommendation may be made for certification.

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.1 Requirements (Strategy of Evaluation) (Continued)

The specific NTS OPs to be used during testing include the following:

- | | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| OP 1 Operations Status Checks | OP 17 Vibration |
| OP 2 Receipt Inspection | OP 18 Low Temperature |
| OP 3 Technical Data Package Review | OP 19 High Temperature |
| OP 4 Test Plan Preparation (<i>This document</i>) | OP 20 Humidity |
| OP 5a-d Source Code Review | OP 21 Temperature Power Variation |
| OP 6a-d Security | OP 25 Physical Configuration Audit |
| OP 7 & 7a Trusted Build | OP 26 Functional Requirements |
| OP 7b & 7c Compliance Build | OP 27 Maintainability |
| OP 9 Electromagnetic Emissions | OP 29 Electrical Supply |
| OP 10 Electrostatic Disruption | OP 30 System Integration Test |
| OP 11 Electromagnetic Susceptibility | OP 34 Test Report |
| OP 14 Conducted RF Immunity | OP 41 Logic and Accuracy |
| OP 16 Bench Handling | |

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.2 Hardware Configuration and Design

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 voting system is a paper-based optical scan voting system. The OVS 1.3 voting system consists of four major components: the OCS, OVO precinct scanner, OVI precinct voting interface, and OVCS central count scanner. The OVS 1.3 is comprised of two proprietary pieces of hardware (OVO and OVI) and one piece of COTS hardware (OVCS). All OCS functions are handled by proprietary software running on COTS PC/laptops/servers. NTS has determined that these COTS PC/laptops/servers are not subject to hardware testing per the EAC 2005 VVSG. The provided PC/laptops/servers documented in Section 3, Materials Required for Testing, all contained CE, UL, and FCC labeling.

The hardware modifications submitted for this test campaign include the introduction of a new motherboard, new monitor, and new power supplies for the Citizen printer and the PDI scanner for use in OVO units to replace hardware which has reached End Of Life. A new ballot box was introduced for use with the OVO. Hardware modifications to the OVI-7 and OVI-VC include new power supplies for the Star printer used in both the OVI-7 and OVI-VC and a new power supply for use with the GVision touch screen on the OVI-VC. The new power supplies have been introduced to replace hardware which has reached End Of Life. NTS personnel performed an engineering analysis of the Unisyn documentation, as well as a visual inspection of the changes, and determined that the modifications to the previously certified hardware require testing to confirm that these changes do not affect the system's functional operation. No modifications to the OVO hardware involve power providing or conversion components. As such, it was determined that the only potential areas of impact are environmental and electromagnetic interference (EMI). See section 4.4.1 of this report for the assessment results.

Each unit will be loaded with the Operational Status Check election definition configured for early voting. This will allow all the data generated for the Pre-operational, Operational, and Post-operational test to be further analyzed.

4.3 Software System Functions

The Unisyn OVS 1.3 System software is written in the JAVA programming language. The system software is broken into three areas: EMS, Precinct tabulator/interface software acting as firmware, and central count application running on a COTS workstation.

The OVS 1.3 EMS (OCS) software consists of the eight components listed below:

- Ballot Layout Manager (BLM)
- Election Manager (EM)
- Election Server (ES)
- Tabulator Client (TC)
- Tabulator

4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.3 Software System Functions (Continued)

- Adjudicator
- Tabulator Reports (TR)
- Software Server (SS)

The OVS 1.3 contains two precinct devices and one central count device. The two precinct devices are the OVO and OVI. The OVS 1.3 has an independent workstation running proprietary software. The OVCS application provides the central tabulation function for the system.

4.4 Test Case Design

NTS uses the V-Model Life Cycle as defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The IEEE definition of the V-Model Life Cycle uses two concepts “Verification” and “Validation.” NTS’ test approach is to incorporate the use of both “Verification” and “Validation”. There are four basic levels of testing in the V-Model Life Cycle: Component, Integration, System, and Acceptance. NTS will be evaluating the Unisyn OVS 1.3 to all four levels.

4.4.1 Hardware Qualitative Examination Design

Unisyn submitted the results of previous testing in the form of the following test reports:

- Certification Testing of the Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc. OpenElect Voting System Version 1.0, Wyle Test Report No. T56285-01
- Certification Testing of the Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc. OpenElect Voting System Version 1.0.1, Wyle Test Report No. T58440.01-01
- Certification Testing of the Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc. OpenElect Voting System Version 1.1, Wyle Test Report No. T58650.01-01
- Certification Testing of the Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc. OpenElect Voting System Version 1.2, Wyle Test Report No. T70987.01-01

NTS personnel performed a hardware qualitative examination to 1) assess if the testing was performed under the guidelines of the EAC program, 2) assess if the tests were performed per the EAC 2005 VVSG, and 3) determine if the scope of the engineering changes were implemented since test performance. The results from this examination deemed that the hardware testing performed under the OVS 1.0, OVS 1.0.1, OVS 1.1, and OVS 1.2 campaigns were tested to the EAC 2005 VVSG and in accordance with the EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual. NTS recommends that reuse be approved for all test requirements in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 labeled as “Accept” underneath the component being tested.

4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.4 Test Case Design (Continued)

4.4.1 Hardware Qualitative Examination Design (Continued)

NTS will verify all hardware during the PCA and those results will determine if the hardware is compliant with the previously tested versions. All testing that is deemed to require a “Re-Test” shall be performed by NTS personnel under this test campaign. The details of those tests are presented in Section 6.0.

Table 4-1 OVO and OVI Test Examination Results

Test/EAC 2005 VVSG Section	Procedure/Description	OVS 1.3 Voting System Component	
		OVO	OVI
<i>Electrical Power Disturbance/4.1.2.5</i>	IEC 61000-4-11 (1994-06) power surges and dips	Accept	Accept
<i>Electromagnetic Radiation/4.1.2.9</i>	FCC Part 15 Class B for both radiated and conducted emissions	Re-Test	Re-Test
<i>Electrostatic Disruption/4.1.2.8</i>	IEC 61000-4-2 (1995-01) 15kV air discharge and 8kV contact discharge	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Electromagnetic Susceptibility/4.1.2.10</i>	IEC 61000-4-3 (2006) electromagnetic field of 10V/m modulated by a 1kHz, 80% AM modulation at 80MHz to 1000MHz frequency	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Conducted RF Immunity/4.1.2.11</i>	IEC 61000-4-6 (1996-04) conducted radio frequency energy	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Lightning Surge/4.1.2.7</i>	IEC 61000-4-5 (1995-02)	Accept	Accept
<i>Magnetic Fields Immunity/4.1.2.12</i>	IEC 61000-4-8 (1993-06) AC magnetic fields of 30 A/m at 60Hz	Accept	Accept
<i>Electrical Fast Transient/4.1.2.6</i>	IEC 61000-4-4 (2004)	Accept	Accept
<i>Bench Handling</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 516.3 Procedure VI six 4” drops on each edge totaling 24 drops	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Vibration/4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 514.3 physical shock and vibration during handling and transport	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Low Temperature/4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D minimum temperature shall be -4 degrees F	Re-Test	Accept
<i>High Temperature/4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2 maximum temperature shall be 140 degrees F	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Humidity Test/4.1.2.14</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2 ten 24 hour humidity cycles	Re-Test	Accept



- 4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)
- 4.4 Test Case Design (Continued)
- 4.4.1 Hardware Qualitative Examination Design (Continued)

Table 4-1 OVO and OVI Test Examination Results (Continued)

Test/EAC 2005 VVSG Section	Procedure/Description	OVS 1.3 Voting System Component	
		OVO	OVI
<i>Temperature/Power Variation/4.1.2.13</i>	MIL-STD-810D, Method 502.2 and Method 501.2 163 hours at 50 degrees to 95 degrees	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Usability/3.1</i>	Measure of the effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction achieved by a specified set of users	Accept	Accept
<i>Accessibility/3.2</i>	Tests the voting system to ensure accessibility for individuals with disabilities to include, but not limited to visually impaired voters by providing the same access and participation opportunity.	Accept	Accept
<i>Security/7</i>	Tests the ability of the system to detect, prevent, log, and recover from a broad range of security risks identified.	Re-Test (New Ballot Box Only)	Accept
<i>Maintainability/4.3.4</i>	Tests the ease in which preventative and corrective maintenance actions can be performed based on design, software, and documentation.	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Availability/4.3.5</i>	Tests the voting system to help ensure the probability that the equipment will be operational and accomplish set functions. This shall be calculated using the following formula at a 99% availability rate: $A_i = (MTBF) / (MTBF + MTTR)$	Accept	Accept
<i>Electrical Supply/4.1.2.4</i>	Meets voltage and power requirements of EAC 2005 VVSG Vol. 1 Section 4.1.2.4	Re-Test	Accept
<i>Safety/4.3.8</i>	UL 60950-1 product safety review	Accept	Accept

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- 4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)
- 4.4 Test Case Design (Continued)
- 4.4.1 Hardware Qualitative Examination Design (Continued)

Table 4-2 OVCS Test Examination Results

Test/EAC 2005 VVSG Section	Procedure/Description	Configuration Tested	Status
<i>Maintainability/4.3.4</i>	Tests the ease in which preventative and corrective maintenance actions can be performed based on design, software, and documentation.	OVCS	Accept
<i>Electrical Supply/4.1.2.4</i>	Meets voltage and power requirements of EAC 2005 VVSG Vol. 1 Section 4.1.2.4	OVCS	Accept
<i>Availability/4.3.5</i>	Tests the voting system to help ensure the probability that the equipment will be operational and accomplish set functions. This shall be calculated using the following formula at a 99% availability rate: $A_i = (MTBF) / (MTBF + MTTR)$	OVCS	Accept

Support Equipment

NTS has determined that the COTS PC/Laptops and Servers are not subject to the hardware test requirements per the EAC 2005 VVSG per “2007-05 Decision on Testing Focus and Applicability.” The provided PC/Laptops documented in Section 3, Materials Required for Testing, all contain CE, UL, and FCC labeling.

4.4.2 Hardware Environmental Test Case Design

The OVS 1.3 voting system hardware shall be tested by NTS’ EMI, Dynamics, and Environmental test facilities for testing to the hardware requirements in accordance with NTS’ A2LA certifications 845.01-03. All EMI testing was performed, per the following NTS Test Guidelines Documents: EMI-001A, “NTS’ Test Guidelines for Performing Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Testing,” and EMI-002A, “Test Procedure for Testing and Documentation of Radiated and Conducted Emissions Performed on Commercial Products.” All hardware testing was per the guidelines of ANSI/NCSS Z540-1, “Calibration Laboratories and Measuring and Test Equipment, General Requirements,” and ISO 10012-1, “Quality Assurance Requirements for Measuring Equipment”, and the governing MIL-STD. All pre/post tests were conducted by qualified NTS personnel at the NTS Huntsville, AL, facility.

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.4 Test Case Design (Continued)

4.4.3 Software Module Test Case Design and Data

NTS personnel implements Component Level Testing during the FCA for each component and subcomponent exercising the functionality of each as designed and documented. NTS will utilize limited structural-based techniques (white-box testing) mainly in the area of Source Code Review, Compliance Builds, and Security Testing and Review. NTS will depend heavily on specification-based techniques (black-box testing) for the individual software components. The most common specification-based techniques applied to the Unisyn OVS 1.3 during software testing will be “equivalence partitioning” and “boundary value testing.”

- “Equivalence partitioning” will be used to evaluate specific software functions and data entry points of the OVS 1.3 for valid and invalid data during the FCA. For software functions and data entry points, an entry will be made for a valid data requirement and at least one invalid data requirement to test for normal and abnormal conditions.
- “Boundary value testing” will be used to evaluate specific software functions and data entry points for minimums and maximums during the FCA. For software functions and data entry points, an entry will be made for all minimum and all maximum documented requirements to test for normal and abnormal conditions. This technique will be used for numeric ranges as well as non-numeric ranges.

NTS personnel will develop an expected result for each test. The PASS/FAIL criteria at the Component Level will be based on the expected result. If the System Under Test (SUT) meets the expected results, the test will be considered passed. If the SUT does not perform as expected, the test will be evaluated for tester errors, test procedure errors, or test equipment errors. If it is determined there was no tester error, the test will be repeated in an attempt to reproduce the results. If the results can be reproduced and the expected results are not met, the SUT will have failed the test. If the results cannot be reproduced, the manufacturer will be responsible for determining the root cause of the error. Upon correction of the failure a regression test will be performed. If the issue is found to be resolved, then the test will be considered passed, else the test will be considered failed until regression testing finds the issue resolved.

NTS personnel will document the error and track the error through resolution. NTS personnel will not move to the next level of testing until all documented errors are resolved to try and minimize errors that might occur farther along in the test campaign. Engineering analysis will be performed to determine what effect the resolution has on the component. A determination will be made whether regression testing will be sufficient or a complete re-test is necessary.

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.4 Test Case Design (Continued)

4.4.4 Software Functional Test Case Design and Data

The test approach to be used for the Unisyn OVS 1.3 will be a bottom-up approach where the lower-level components will be tested first and then used to facilitate the testing of higher-level components. The specification-based technique used by NTS personnel at the Integration Level is "Use Case." The actors that have been identified to use the Unisyn OVS 1.3 are:

- Election Administrator – The actor with responsibility of entering the election definition with translation and audio. This actor is also responsible for maintaining EMS users and the election database.
- Warehouse Technician-The actor responsible for loading the election definition onto the OVO and OVI units. This actor also runs diagnostic tests and maintains the units.
- Poll Worker-The actor at the precinct location to set up and close down the OVO and OVI units on election day.
- Voter-The actor who physically casts the ballot on election day.
- ADA Voter-The actor with special needs who has to vote unassisted on election day.
- Election Official-The actor who reports and audits the election result post-election day.

"Use Case" will be utilized during the FCA with a single pass through each component using only valid data. This pass will be considered the "Master Copy" of data to be passed between interfacing points of applications during integration level testing. If a component downstream in the test process needs data from previous processes, the "Master Copy" of data can be used or altered to accelerate the test process. Known tests that will utilize the "Master Copy" of data at the Integration Level are Security and Usability. Where applicable, NTS testers will introduce negative testing to ensure that submitted system either prevents the negative actions or handles the action in an appropriate manner.

If an error occurs between data interfaces or in the process flow, an engineering analysis will be performed to determine if the error is data, process, or tester error. The ACCEPT/REJECT criteria for integration level testing is whether the components and applications interface using the documented process for each actor. If there is an error interfacing between components, the error shall be documented and tracked through resolution. Engineering analysis shall be performed to determine what effect the resolution has on the component. A determination will be made whether regression testing will be sufficient or a complete re-test is necessary.

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.4 Test Case Design (Continued)

4.4.5 System Level Test Case Design

During system level testing, NTS personnel will test the ability of proprietary software, hardware, and peripherals in addition to the COTS software, hardware, and peripherals as a complete system in a configuration of the systems for intended use. The OVS 1.3 voting system is intended to support both large and small jurisdictions. NTS personnel's approach for the OVS 1.3 voting system will be to execute System Level Testing with a variety of elections that include various combinations of jurisdictions, parties, and ballot styles.

The ACCEPT/REJECT criteria for system level testing is whether the system can continue in testing. The two scenarios are: ACCEPT or REJECT. ACCEPT is either 1) no errors are found or 2) an error is encountered but the system continues to operate and engineering analysis determines that the root cause does not affect system testing. REJECT is when an error is encountered and the system is too unstable to continue or engineering analysis determines the root cause could affect further testing. If an error occurs during system level testing, the error shall be documented. If the OVS 1.3 voting system is able to recover and continue, the test will continue. If the error causes the system to become unstable, the test shall be halted. All errors documented during System Level Testing shall be tracked through resolution.

An engineering analysis shall be performed to determine what effect the resolution has on the system. A determination shall be made by NTS senior level engineers whether regression testing shall be sufficient or a complete re-test is necessary.

NTS personnel will implement acceptance level testing focusing on all the data collected during the entire test campaign along with performing the "Trusted Build" for the system. All data from hardware testing, software testing, functional testing, security testing, and reliability testing activities will be combined to ensure all functions supported by the OVS 1.3 voting system have been tested. The EAC 2005 VVSG requirements will be checked against the test data to ensure all applicable requirements are met. Items not supported by the OVS 1.3 voting system will be documented. Any issues documented during testing will be resolved or annotated in the test report.

NTS personnel will test every EAC 2005 VVSG requirement impacted by the OVS 1.3 voting System modification. NTS personnel will report all issues discovered during this test campaign to Unisyn and the EAC. If NTS determines there is not enough data to ensure a requirement was met, the test plan will be altered and further testing will be done. The EAC has the final decision as to whether the system meets all the requirements for an EAC-certified system. NTS will either recommend approval, if the system meets all applicable sections of the VVSG, or recommend disapproval if the system does not meet all applicable sections of the VVSG.



4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.5 TDP Evaluation

NTS qualified personnel will perform a comprehensive review of the Unisyn TDP to determine compliance to the EAC 2005 VVSG requirements and Unisyn specific requirements.

NTS qualified personnel utilize a TDP Review Matrix which lists every EAC 2005 VVSG requirement pertaining to TDP review. NTS qualified personnel will record the results of the review of each document to the applicable requirements listed in the TDP Review Matrix.

During the TDP review process, each document will be reviewed for completeness, clarity, correctness, and continuity. The review results will be formally reported to Unisyn. If a revised document is received, it will be re-reviewed as discussed in this section. The TDP will be continued to be reviewed during the entire testing process as these documents will be utilized to set up the systems, verify correct operational results, and numerous other tests. At the end of the TDP review process, a discrepancy report will be issued listing the non-compliant items on a document-by-document basis, if applicable. A listing of all documents contained in the OVS 1.3 voting system TDP is provided in Table 4-3.

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.5 TDP Evaluation (Continued)

Table 4-3 OVS 1.3 TDP Documents

OVS Release 1.3 Voting System TDP Documents	Version	Date	Document Number
System Overview	1.1	06/30/2014	04-00446
System Security Specification	1.0	08/10/2014	04-00447
Configuration Management Plan	1.1	09/24/2014	04-00448
Quality Assurance Plan	1.1	08/26/2013	04-00454
System Test and Verification Plan	1.0	08/08/2014	04-00453
Personnel Training and Deployment Requirements	1.0	08/26/2014	04-00445
Software and Design Specification	1.0	10/10/2011	04-00464
Final Quality Assurance Report	1.0	06/20/2013	04-00469
OVS Acronyms	1.0	08/10/2014	04-00494
System Functionality Description	1.1	08/26/2014	04-00444
System Maintenance Procedures	1.0	08/08/2014	04-00459
System Hardware Specification	1.0	07/27/2014	04-00458
Ballot Layout Manager User Guide	1.0	08/06/2014	04-00428
Election Manager User Guide	1.1	10/05/2014	04-00427
Election Server User Guide	1.0	08/08/2014	04-00429
Software Server User Guide	1.0	08/08/2014	04-00430
Tabulator Client User Guide	1.0	08/07/2014	04-00431
Tabulator User Guide	1.1	09/24/2014	04-00432
Tabulator Reports User Guide	1.0	08/07/2014	04-00433
OVCS User Guide	1.2	09/30/2014	04-00495
SOP: Election Day Poll worker's Guide	1.0	08/06/2014	04-00463
SOP: Election Day Troubleshooter's Guide OVO and OVI	1.0	08/10/2014	04-00462
System Operations Procedures: Warehouse Technician's Guide	1.4	10/29/2014	04-00460
Ballot Paper Specification	1.0	08/11/2014	04-00503
System HW Verification	1.1	10/22/2013	04-00513
Adjudicator User Guide	1.0	08/07/2014	04-00530

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4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.6 Source Code Review

The strategy for evaluating OVS 1.3 will be based on the source code of the previously identified modifications to the system. All code changes from OVS 1.2 will be reviewed to the EAC 2005 VVSG coding standards and the manufacturer supplied coding standards. Unisyn uses the "Code Conventions for the Java™ Programming Language Revised April 20, 1999" coding convention. The review will be conducted per the guidelines described in the following paragraphs.

As the source code is received, a SHA1 hash value will be created for each source code file. The source code team will then conduct automated source code review using Eclipse and Checkstyle because the source code is written entirely in JAVA. In addition to the automated source code review, NTS will also perform a 10% manual review of the headers and quality of comments. This is done to verify compliance of EAC 2005 VVSG coding standards and manufacturer supplied coding standards. Each identified violation shall be recorded by making notes of the standards violation along with directory name, file name, and line number.

A technical report of all identified violations will be sent to Unisyn for resolution on a regular basis. All revised source code will be checked for corrections until the final issue is resolved. At the end of the Source Code review process, a discrepancy report will be issued listing all non-compliances, to the EAC and Unisyn. The results will be included in the final test report.

A "Compliance Build" shall be performed by NTS qualified personnel from the reviewed source code using the Compliance Build Procedure throughout the test campaign. This process follows the documented procedures of a "Trusted Build" in the EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0, but differs from a Trusted Build with two exceptions: the image products will not be submitted to the EAC and no manufacturer representative shall be required to be present or on-site for these builds. The final step in the source code review shall be to create a Trusted Build from the reviewed source code. The Trusted Build will be performed by completing the following tasks in the order listed:

1. Clean the build machine of existing software
2. Retrieve the compliant source code
3. Construct the build environment
4. Create digital signatures of the build environment
5. Load the compliant source code into the build environment
6. Create a digital signature of the pre build environment
7. Create a disk image of the pre-build environment
8. Build executable code
9. Create a digital signature of executable code
10. Create a disk image of the post-build environment
11. Build installation media
12. Create a digital signature of the installation media
13. Install executable code onto the system and validate the software/firmware
14. Deliver source code with digital signature, disk image of pre-build environment with digital signatures, disk image of post-build environment with digital signatures, executable code with digital signatures, and installation media with signatures to the EAC Approved Repository.



4.0 TEST SPECIFICATIONS (Continued)

4.6 Source Code Review (Continued)

The “Trusted Build” for the Unisyn OVS 1.3 includes source code, data, and script files, in clear text form. The build also includes COTS software on commercially available media, COTS software downloaded by the VSTL, COTS software verified by SHA256 from the software supplier, and picture and sound files in binary format provided by Unisyn. The first step of the process is to clean the hard drives by writing data to every spot on the hard drive, so the drive is cleared of existing data. The appropriate operating system will then be loaded and the applications from the VSTL reviewed source files along with the VSTL verified COTS software will be built. The final step is installing the applications on the hardware.

4.7 QA and CM System Review

Both the Unisyn QA Plan and CM Plan will be reviewed. The review will be limited to only the changes within this modification to determine compliance with EAC 2005 VVSG Volume II Section 2, and Volume I Sections 8 and 9, EAC stated requirements, and with the requirements of the internal Unisyn documentation. Also, the Unisyn TDP documentation package will be reviewed to determine if the Unisyn QA Plan and the CM Plan are being followed. The results of the TDP review shall be entered on a spreadsheet as previously described in Section 4.5 of this test plan. The results of the TDP review, including the QA and CM compliance results of the Technical Data Package Review, will be included in the final test report.

5.0 TEST DATA

5.1 Test Data Recording

All equipment utilized for test data recording shall be identified in the test data package. For hardware environmental and operational testing, the equipment shall be listed on the Instrumentation Equipment Sheet for each test. The output test data shall be recorded in an appropriate manner as to allow for data analysis. For source code and TDP reviews, results shall be compiled in output reports and submitted to Unisyn for resolution. The resolution shall be returned to NTS for review and verification of compliance.

Additionally, all test results, including functional test data, will be recorded on the relevant NTS Operating Procedure and Test Cases. Results will also be recorded real-time in engineering log books. Incremental reports will be submitted to Unisyn and the EAC at the completion of major test areas to communicate progress and results as deemed necessary by the stakeholders.

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5.0 TEST DATA (Continued)

5.2 Test Data Criteria

NTS personnel will evaluate all test results against the Unisyn provided technical documentation for OVS 1.3 and the requirements set forth in the EAC 2005 VVSG. The acceptable range for system performance and the expected results for each test case shall be derived from the OVS 1.3 documentation. Per the EAC 2005 VVSG, these parameters shall encompass the test tolerances and samples to define the minimum number of combinations or alternatives of input and output conditions that can be exercised to constitute an acceptable test of the parameters involved. The parameters will also include events with criteria defining the maximum number of interrupts, halts, or other system breaks that may occur due to non-test conditions (excluding events from which recovery occurs automatically or where a relevant status message is displayed).

5.3 Test Data Reduction

Test data shall be processed and recorded in the relevant NTS Operating Procedures and Test Cases. Results will also be recorded real-time in engineering log books.

6.0 TEST PROCEDURE AND CONDITIONS

The following subsections describe test procedures and a statement of the criteria by which readiness and successful completion shall be indicated and measured.

6.1 Facility Requirements

All testing will be conducted at NTS Laboratories Huntsville, AL facility unless otherwise annotated. Environmental non-operating (storage) and operating hardware testing will be conducted utilizing an adequately sized environmental test chamber or dynamic vibration (shaker) system equipped with the required data gathering support equipment. All remaining operating hardware tests will be conducted at the appropriate test site with the required support equipment. All instrumentation, measuring, and test equipment used in the performance of this test program will be listed on the Instrumentation Equipment Sheet for each test and shall be calibrated in accordance with NTS Laboratories' Quality Assurance Program, which complies with the requirements of ANSI/NCSL Z540-1 and ISO 10012-1.

Standards used in performing all calibrations are traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) by report number and date. When no national standards exist, the standards are traceable to international standards or the basis for calibration is otherwise documented.

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURE AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.1 Facility Requirements (Continued)

Unless otherwise specified herein, all remaining tests, including system level functional testing, shall be performed at standard ambient conditions:

- Temperature: 68 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit ($\pm 4^{\circ}\text{F}$)
- Relative Humidity: 20 to 90%
- Atmospheric Pressure: Local Site Pressure

Unless otherwise specified herein, the following tolerances shall be used:

- Time $\pm 5\%$
- Temperature $\pm 3.6^{\circ}\text{F}$ (2°C)
- Vibration Amplitude $\pm 10\%$
- Vibration Frequency $\pm 2\%$
- Random Vibration Acceleration
 - 20 to 500 Hertz ± 1.5 dB
 - 500 to 2000 Hertz ± 3.0 dB
- Random Overall grms ± 1.5 dB
- Acoustic Overall Sound Pressure Level $+4/-2$ dB

Deviations to the above tolerances may be submitted by the responsible test laboratory with sufficient engineering information to substantiate the deviation request, but only when best effort technique and system limitations indicate the need for a deviation.

6.2 Test Set-Up

All voting machine equipment (hardware and software), shall be received and documented utilizing NTS' Receiving Ticket (WL-218, Nov. 1985) and proper QA procedures. When voting system hardware is received, NTS personnel will notify NTS QA personnel. With NTS QA personnel present, each test article will be unpacked and inspected for obvious signs of degradation and/or damage that may have occurred during transit. Noticeable degradation and/or damage, if present, shall be recorded, photographed, and the Unisyn representative shall be notified. NTS QA personnel shall record the serial numbers and part numbers. Comparison shall be made between those numbers recorded and those listed on the shipper's manifest. Any discrepancies noted shall be brought to the attention of the Unisyn representative for resolution. All TDP and source code modules received will be inventoried and maintained by the NTS Project Engineer assigned to testing.

For test setup, the system will be configured as it would for normal field use. This includes connecting all supporting equipment and peripherals. NTS personnel will properly configure and initialize the system and verify that it is ready to be tested by following the procedures detailed in the OVS 1.3 voting system technical documentation. NTS personnel will develop an Operational Status Check to be performed prior to and immediately following each hardware test. NTS personnel will develop the system performance levels to be measured during operational tests.



6.0 TEST PROCEDURE AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.2 Test Set-Up (Continued)

NTS personnel have developed seven election definitions that shall be used during this test campaign:

Operational Status Check

This election definition will exercise the operational status of the equipment during the operational tests and prior to and immediately following the non-operational hardware tests.

Accuracy

The accuracy test ensures that each component of the voting system can process 1,549,703 consecutive ballot positions correctly within the allowable target error rate. The accuracy test is designed to test the ability of the system to capture, record, store, consolidate, and report specific selections and absences of a selection. The required accuracy is measured as an error rate. This rate is the maximum number of errors allowed while processing a specified volume of data. For paper-based voting systems, the ballot positions on a paper ballot must be scanned to detect selections for individual candidates and contests and the conversion of those selections detected on the paper ballot converted into digital data.

General Election: GEN-01

The Gen-01 is a basic election held in four precincts, one of which is a split precinct, containing nineteen contests compiled into four ballot styles. Five of the contests are in all four ballot styles. The other fourteen contests are split between at least two of the precincts with a maximum of four different contests spread across the four precincts. This election was designed to functionally test the handling of multiple ballot styles, support for at least two languages, support for common voting variations, and audio support for at least two languages.

The parameters of this election are listed below:

- Closed Primary: No
- Open Primary: No
- Partisan offices: Yes
- Non-Partisan offices: Yes
- Write-in voting: Yes
- Primary presidential delegation nominations: No
- Ballot Rotation: Yes
- Straight Party voting: Yes
- Cross-party endorsement: No
- Split Precincts: Yes
- Vote for N of M: Yes
- Recall issues, with options: No



6.0 TEST PROCEDURE AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.2 Test Set-Up (Continued)

General Election: GEN-01 (Continued)

- Cumulative voting: No
- Ranked order voting: No
- Provisional or challenged ballots: Yes
- Early Voting: No

In addition to the parameters listed above, the following will also be tested:

- Audio input in an alternative language for basic voting pattern using an ADA device
- Audio input for write-in voting using an ADA device
- Spanish language input for a basic voting pattern
- Input for write-in voting using Spanish language

General Election: GEN-02

The Gen-02 is a basic election held in three precincts. This election contains fifteen contests compiled into three ballot styles. Ten of the contests are in all three ballot styles with the other five split across the three precincts. This election was designed to functionally test the handling of multiple ballot styles, support for ballot rotation, support for two languages, support for complex voting variations, and audio support for multiple languages.

The parameters of this election are listed below:

- Closed Primary: No
- Open Primary: No
- Partisan offices: Yes
- Non-Partisan offices: Yes
- Write-in voting: Yes
- Primary presidential delegation nominations: No
- Ballot Rotation: Yes
- Straight Party voting: No
- Cross-party endorsement: No
- Split Precincts: No
- Vote for N of M: Yes

6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.2 Test Set-Up (Continued)

General Election: GEN-02 (Continued)

- Recall issues, with options: Yes
- Cumulative voting: No
- Ranked order voting: Yes
- Provisional or challenged ballots: No
- Early Voting: Yes

In addition to the parameters listed above, the following will also be tested:

- Early voting election with at least one unit in all precincts
- Voting options for over-voting
- Voting options for under-voting
- Spanish language ballots
- Audio ballots utilizing ADA capabilities

General Election: GEN-03

The Gen-03 is a basic election held in two precincts. This election contains eight contests compiled into two ballot styles. Four of the contests are in both ballot styles. The other four contests are split between the two precincts. This election was designed to functionally test the handling of multiple ballot styles, support for at least three languages including a character-based language, support for common voting variations, and audio support for at least three languages and an ADA binary input device.

The parameters of this election are listed below:

- Closed Primary: No
- Open Primary: No
- Partisan offices: Yes
- Non-Partisan offices: Yes
- Write-in voting: Yes
- Primary presidential delegation nominations: No
- Ballot Rotation: No
- Straight Party voting: No
- Cross-party endorsement: No



6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.2 Test Set-Up (Continued)

General Election: GEN-03 (Continued)

- Split Precincts: No
- Vote for N of M: Yes
- Recall issues, with options: No
- Cumulative voting: No
- Ranked order voting: No
- Provisional or challenged ballots: Yes
- Early Voting: No

In addition to the parameters listed above, the following will also be tested:

- Spanish language ballot with a basic voting pattern and write-in candidates
- Spanish audio input to simulate ADA device with write-in option
- Character based language with basic voting pattern
- Character based language utilizing an ADA option
- Binary input to support ADA option
- Binary input to support ADA audio device

Primary Election: PRIM-01

The Prim-01 is a closed primary election in two precincts (one precinct is a split), containing thirty contests compiled into five ballot styles. Each ballot style contains six contests. This election was designed to functionally test an closed primary with multiple ballot styles, support for two languages, and support for common voting variations.

The parameters of this election are listed below:

- Closed Primary: Yes
- Open Primary: No
- Partisan offices: Yes
- Non-Partisan offices: Yes
- Write-in voting: Yes
- Primary presidential delegation nominations: No
- Ballot Rotation: No
- Straight Party voting: No



6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.2 Test Set-Up (Continued)

Primary Election: PRIM-01 (Continued)

- Cross-party endorsement: No
- Split Precincts: Yes
- Vote for N of M: Yes
- Recall issues, with options: No
- Cumulative voting: No
- Ranked order voting: No
- Provisional or challenged ballots: Yes
- Early Voting: No

In addition to the parameters listed above, the following will also be tested:

- Alternative language utilized with a write-in option
- ADA audio device utilized with a write-in option

Primary Election: PRIM-03

The Prim-03 is a basic election held in two precincts. This election contains ten contests and is compiled into two ballot styles. Two of the contests are in both ballot styles. The other eight contests are split between the two party ballots. This election was designed to functionally test the handling of multiple ballot styles, support for at least three languages including an Ideographic based language, support for common voting variations, and audio support for at least three languages and an ADA binary input device.

The parameters of this election are listed below:

- Closed Primary: Yes
- Open Primary: No
- Partisan offices: Yes
- Non-Partisan offices: Yes
- Write-in voting: Yes
- Primary presidential delegation nominations: No
- Ballot Rotation: No
- Straight Party voting: No



6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.2 Test Set-Up (Continued)

Primary Election: PRIM-03 (Continued)

- Cross Party Endorsement: No
- Split Precincts: No
- Vote for N of M: Yes
- Recall issues, with options: No
- Cumulative voting: No
- Ranked order voting: No
- Provisional or challenged ballots: Yes
- Early Voting: No

In addition to the parameters listed above, the following will also be tested:

- Spanish ballot with basic voting pattern and write-in option
- Spanish language ballot using ADA audio device with write-in option
- Character based language ballot with basic voting pattern
- Character based language utilizing ADA device
- Binary input to support ADA option
- Binary input to support ADA audio device

6.3 Test Sequence

The components of the OVS 1.3 voting system will undergo testing to verify that the modification performs as described by Unisyn and meets the requirements of the 2005 VVSG. The following sections provide a list of each test and a brief description of each test. NTS personnel will utilize a combination of functional testing and TDP reviews to evaluate the system performance. (The tests are not in a specific sequence.)

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.1 Hardware Test Descriptions

Hardware tests are divided into two categories: Non-Operating and Operating. The Non-Operating tests are intended to simulate the storage and transport of equipment between the storage facility and the polling location. The Operating tests are intended to simulate conditions that the EUT may encounter during operation. Prior to and immediately following Non-Operating and Operating test, the EUT shall be subjected to an operational status check.

The Non-Operating tests include the following:

Low Temperature – This requirement addresses a range of tests for voting machines and precinct counters, as such devices are stored between elections and are transported between the storage facility and polling place, to meet specific minimum performance standards for low temperatures.

High Temperature – This test addresses a range of tests for voting machines and precinct counters, as such devices are stored between elections and are transported between the storage facility and polling place, to meet specific minimum performance standards for high temperature.

Humidity Test – This requirement addresses a range of tests for voting machines and precinct counters, as such devices are stored between elections and are transported between the storage facility and polling place, to meet specific minimum performance standards for humidity.

Vibration – This requirement addresses a range of tests for voting machines and precinct counters, as such devices are stored between elections and are transported between the storage facility and polling place, to meet specific minimum performance standards for vibration.

Bench Handling – The bench handling test simulates stresses faced during maintenance and repair of voting machines and ballot counters.

The Operating tests include the following:

Electromagnetic Radiation – This test verifies that radiated and conducted emissions from the voting system hardware do not exceed the allowable limits of Title 47CFR, Part 15, Class B. The test for electromagnetic radiation shall be conducted in compliance with the FCC Part 15 Class B requirements by testing per ANSI C63.4 (Volume II, Section 4.8.b).

Electrostatic Disruption – This test demonstrates the voting system's hardware to withstand electrostatic discharges during normal operation. This test is equivalent to the procedure of IEC 61000-4-2. The test for electrostatic disruption shall be conducted in compliance with the test specified in IEC 61000-4-2 (Volume II, Section 4.8.c).

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.1 Hardware Test Descriptions (Continued)

Electromagnetic Susceptibility – This test demonstrates the voting system's hardware to withstand radiated electromagnetic fields during normal operation. This test is equivalent to the procedure of IEC 61000-4-3. The test for electromagnetic susceptibility shall be conducted in compliance with the test specified in IEC 61000-4-3 (Volume II, Section 4.8.d).

Conducted RF Immunity – This test demonstrates the voting system's hardware ability to withstand conducted RF energy on power and I/O lines during normal operation. This test is equivalent to the procedure of IEC 61000-4-6. The test for conducted RF immunity shall be conducted in compliance with the test specified in IEC 61000-4-6 (Volume II, Section 4.8.g).

Temperature Power Variation – The operational environmental test subjects the system hardware to varying temperatures and voltages, demonstrating hardware/data recording accuracy reliability Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) of 163 hours.

Maintainability – Maintainability represents the ease with which preventive and corrective maintenance actions can be performed based on the design characteristics of equipment and software and the processes the manufacturer and election officials have in place for preventing failures and for reacting to failures.

Electrical Supply – This requirement addresses the battery power source for providing electrical supply during a power failure.

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.1 Hardware Test Descriptions (Continued)

Table 6-1 OVS 1.3 Hardware Test Sequence

Test	Description	Procedure	Test Level	Specimen
Low Temperature	MIL-STD-810D minimum temperature shall be -4 degrees F	OP 18	Component	OVO
High Temperature	MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2 maximum temperature shall be 140 degrees F	OP 19	Component	OVO
Humidity Test	MIL-STD-810D, Method 501.2 ten 24 hour humidity cycles	OP 20	Component	OVO
Vibration	MIL-STD-810D, Method 514.3 physical shock and vibration during handling and transport	OP 17	Component	OVO
Bench Handling	MIL-STD-810D, Method 516.3 Procedure VI six 4" drops on each edge totaling 24 drops	OP 16	Component	OVO
Electromagnetic Radiation	FCC Part 15 Class B for both radiated and conducted emissions	OP 9	Component	OVO
Electrostatic Disruption	IEC 61000-4-2 (1995-01) 15kV air discharge and 8kV contact discharge	OP 10	Component	OVO
Electromagnetic Susceptibility	IEC 61000-4-3 electromagnetic field of 10V/m modulated by a 1kHz, 80% AM modulation at 80MHz to 1000MHz frequency	OP 11	Component	OVO
Conducted RF Immunity	IEC 61000-4-6 (1996-04) conducted radio frequency energy	OP 14	Component	OVO



6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.1 Hardware Test Descriptions (Continued)

Table 6-1 OVS 1.3 Hardware Test Sequence (Continued)

Test	Description	Procedure	Test Level	Specimen
Temperature Power Variation	MIL-STD-810D, Method 502.2 and Method 501.2 163 hours at 50 degrees to 95 degrees	OP 21	Component	OVO
Maintainability	The ease with which preventive maintenance actions can be performed	OP 27	Component & Document	OVO & TDP Package
Electrical Supply	Meets voltage and power requirements of 2005 VVSG Vol. 1 Section 4.1.2.4	OP 29	Component	OVO

6.3.2 Software Test Descriptions

The software tests include the following:

Source Code Compliance Review – NTS qualified personnel will compare the source code to the manufacturer's software design documentation to ascertain how completely the software conforms to the manufacturer's specifications. Source code inspection shall also assess the extent to which the code adheres to the requirements in Section 5 of the EAC 2005 VVSG Volumes I and II.

Compliance Build of the System Software, Firmware, and Utilities – Before testing can begin, compliance builds of all the applications will be constructed by NTS personnel using the build environment, build documentation, and reviewed source code. This is to ensure the software being tested is constructed from the same source code that was reviewed.

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.2 Software Test Descriptions (Continued)

COTS Source Code Review – Unmodified, general purpose COTS non-voting software (e.g., operating systems, programming language compilers, database management systems, and web browsers) are not subject to the detailed examinations specified in this section; however, NTS personnel will examine such software to ensure that the specific version of software being used is identical to the design specification in order to confirm that the software has not been modified. NTS will verify by downloading the software directly from the manufacturer site, verifying against NRSL, or by being provided original OEM discs.

NTS qualified personnel may inspect the COTS generated software source code in preparation of test plans and to provide some minimal scanning or sampling to check for embedded code or unauthorized changes. For purposes of code analysis, the COTS units shall be treated as unexpanded macros.

The portions of COTS software that have been modified by the manufacturer in any manner are subject to review. Source code generated by a COTS package and embedded in software modules for compilation or interpretation will be provided in human readable form to NTS personnel to enable review.

Baseline of EMS Operating and Build Machine OS – NTS personnel will review the submitted NIST SCAP FDCC checklist for the EMS Operating System and Build Machine OS. The review will be performed for completeness, clarity, and consistency.

Security Source Code Review – The security source code review is a detailed review of the functionality of the source code that has been submitted. Both automated and manual reviews of the source code will be performed.

Trusted Build – The trusted build is a process of converting the reviewed source code into machine-readable binary instructions for a computer. This test will follow Section 5.6 of the EAC Testing and Certification Program manual.

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.2 Software Test Descriptions (Continued)

Table 6-2 OVS 1.3 Software Test Sequence

Test	Description	Procedure	Test Level	Specimen
Compliance Source Code Review	Source code review for compliance	NTSHVS14.2 OP 5a	Component	Source Code
Compliance Build	Using the build documents and source code to construct the EMS	NTSHVS14.3 OP 7b, OP 7c	Component	Source Code
Source Code COTS Review	Source code review to examine 3 rd party products for modification and versions	NTSHVS14.2 OP 5d	Component	COTS Source Code
Baseline OS	RFI 2008-03 OS Configuration	NTSHVS14.3 OP 25	Component	NIST SCAP FDCC Checklist
Source Code Functional Review	Source code review for functionality and high level software design	NTSHVS14.2 OP 5b	Component & Integration	Source Code
Source Code Security Review (manual)	Source code review for specific security concerns augmented by an automated review	NTSHVS14.2 OP 5c OP 6a	Component & Integration	Source Code
Trusted Build	Creation and installation of the final system software	NTSHVS14.6 OP 7, OP 7a	Component	System software

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.3 System Testing

Physical Configuration Audit – The Physical Configuration Audit compares the voting system components submitted for qualification to the manufacturer’s technical documentation, and shall include the following activities:

- Establish a configuration baseline of software and hardware to be tested and confirm whether manufacturer’s documentation is sufficient for the user to install, validate, operate, and maintain the voting system
- Verify software conforms to the manufacturer’s specifications, inspect all records of manufacturer’s release control system, if changes have been made to the baseline version, verify manufacturer’s engineering and test data are for the software version submitted for certification
- If the hardware is non-COTS, NTS will review drawings, specifications, technical data, and test data associated with system hardware to establish system hardware baseline associated with software baseline
- Review manufacturer’s documents of user acceptance test procedures and data against system’s functional specifications and resolve any discrepancy or inadequacy in manufacturer’s plan or data prior to beginning system integration functional and performance tests
- Subsequent changes to baseline software configuration made during testing, as well as system hardware changes that may produce a change in software operation are subject to re-examination

Functional Configuration Audit – The functional configuration audit encompasses an examination of manufacturer’s tests and the conduct of additional tests to verify that the system hardware and software perform all the functions described in the manufacturer’s documentation submitted in the TDP. In addition to functioning according to the manufacturer’s documentation, tests will be conducted to ensure all applicable EAC 2005 VVSG requirements are met. This testing is accomplished through a process called sequencing.

Sequencing is the act of navigating through the user interface to verify that the system performs as described by the manufacturer and does not violate any of the VVSG requirements. The path that the tester navigates follows the logical flow of accomplishing tasks required to conduct an election. For example, a task in conducting an election is to add a candidate. The tester will follow the flow of the user interface to add the candidate to a contest. If there are multiple ways to achieve this, then each method will be tested. This process will continue until all tasks for conducting an election are completed. Any paths, or combination of paths, that are determined to be at risk for failure that are outside of the normal flow of the interface will be tested on an individual basis.



6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.3 System Testing (Continued)

TDP Review – The technical data package must be submitted as a precondition of national certification testing. These items are necessary to define the product and its method of operation, to provide technical and test data supporting the manufacturer’s claims of the system’s functional capabilities and performance levels, and to document instructions and procedures governing system operation and field maintenance. Any information relevant to the system evaluation shall be submitted to include source code, object code, and sample output report formats.

Security Test – The security test is designed and performed to test the capabilities of the voting system against the requirements defined in Volume I, Section 7. These procedures shall focus on the ability of the system to detect, prevent, log, and recover from a broad range of security risks identified. This test will also examine system capabilities and safeguards claimed by Unisyn in the TDP to go beyond these risks. The range of risks tested is determined by the design of the system and potential exposure to risk.

Accuracy – The accuracy test ensures that each component of the voting system can each process 1,549,703 consecutive ballot positions correctly within the allowable target error rate. The accuracy test is designed to test the ability of the system to “capture, record, store, consolidate, and report” specific selections and absences of a selection. The required accuracy is defined as an error rate. This rate is the maximum number of errors allowed while processing a specified volume of data. For paper-based voting systems, the ballot positions on a paper ballot must be scanned to detect selections for individual candidates and contests and the conversion of those selections detected on the paper ballot converted into digital data.

In an effort to achieve this and to verify the proper functionality of the units under test, the following methods will be used to test components of the voting system:

The accuracy requirements for the OVO will be met by the execution of the standard accuracy test.

- Stand-Alone Precinct Scanner – Tested by utilizing a combination of hand marked (70%) and pre-marked (30%) ballots to achieve accuracy rate greater than 1,549,703 correct ballot positions.

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.3 System Testing (Continued)

System Integration – System Level certification tests address the integrated operation of both hardware and software, along with any telecommunication capabilities. Compatibility of the voting system software components or subsystems with one another, and with other components of the voting system environment, shall be determined through functional tests integrating the voting system software with the remainder of the system.

Additionally, the system shall be configured exactly as it would for normal field use. This includes connecting all supporting equipment and peripherals including ballot boxes, voting booths (regular and accessible), and any physical security equipment such as locks and ties. NTS personnel will properly configure and test the system by following the procedures detailed in the OVS 1.3 voting system technical documentation.

Regression Testing – Regression Testing will be performed on all system components to verify all functional and firmware modifications made during the test campaign did not adversely affect the system and its operation.

NTS will verify the audit log records for error and exception activity to verify proper documentation and recovery action for all functional tests performed. A detailed listing of all audit log entries shall be provided by Urnsyn in the TDP submitted. During testing, audit log entries will be compared to this list to ensure that all expected events are recorded. To ensure the system's ability to gracefully shutdown and recover from error conditions, negative test cases will be performed to introduce such error conditions. The error conditions introduced will be based on the system limits specified within the vendors TDP documentation.

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6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS (Continued)

6.3 Test Sequence (Continued)

6.3.3 System Testing (Continued)

Table 6-3 OVS 1.3 System Test Sequence

Test	Description	Procedure	Test Level	Specimen
Physical Configuration Audit	Audit hardware and software models and versions	NTSHVS14.3 OP 25	Component & System	System hardware and software
Functional Configuration Audit	Functional testing to the system documentation and EAC 2005 VVSG requirements	NTSHVS14.4 OP 26	Component & Integration	System
Technical Data Package (TDP) Review	Documentation review for compliance, correctness, and completeness	NTSHVS14.1 OP 3	Document	TDP package
Security	Assess the ability of the system to detect, prevent, log, and recover from a broad range of security risks	NTSHVS14.8 OP6a-d	Component & Integration	System
Accuracy	Test of accuracy to ~1.6 million ballot positions per system component.	NTSHVS14.9 OP 41	System	System
System Integration	Test of all system hardware, software and peripherals.	OP 30	System	System

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7.0 TEST OPERATIONS PROCEDURES

7.1 Proprietary Data

All proprietary data that is marked will be distributed only to those persons that the manufacturer or EAC identifies as needing the information to conduct qualification testing. The manufacturer is required to mark all proprietary documents as such. All organizations and individuals receiving proprietary documents will ensure those documents are not available to non-authorized persons.



APPENDIX A
PROJECT SCHEDULE



ID	Task Mode	Task Name	Duration	Start	Finish
1		Test Plan	40 days	Mon 7/21/14	Mon 9/15/14
2		Test Plan Creation	6 days	Mon 7/21/14	Mon 7/28/14
3		Test Plan Review by ILTS	2 days	Tue 7/29/14	Wed 7/30/14
4		Test Plan Submitted to EAC	0 days	Wed 7/30/14	Wed 7/30/14
5		EAC Test Plan Review	20 days	Thu 7/31/14	Wed 8/27/14
6		Test Plan Revision	2 days	Thu 8/28/14	Fri 8/29/14
7		Test plan Re-Submission	0 days	Fri 8/29/14	Fri 8/29/14
8		EAC Re-Review	10 days	Tue 9/2/14	Mon 9/15/14
9		TDP Review	54 days	Wed 7/9/14	Tue 9/23/14
10	✓	PCA	2 days	Mon 7/14/14	Tue 7/15/14
11		Source Code (initial for HW testing)	2 days	Mon 7/14/14	Tue 7/15/14
12		Review Complete	1 day	Mon 7/14/14	Mon 7/14/14
13	📄	Source Code Build	1 day	Tue 7/15/14	Tue 7/15/14
14		System Setup	2 days	Wed 7/16/14	Thu 7/17/14
15		Hardware Testing EMI	8 days	Tue 9/2/14	Thu 9/11/14
16		Electromagnetic Radiation	2 days	Tue 9/2/14	Wed 9/3/14
17		Electromagnetic Susceptibility	2 days	Thu 9/4/14	Fri 9/5/14
18		Electrostatic Disruption	1 day	Mon 9/8/14	Mon 9/8/14
19		Conducted RF Immunity	1 day	Fri 9/19/14	Fri 9/19/14
20		Hardware Testing ENV	13 days	Fri 7/18/14	Tue 8/5/14
21		Vibration	0.5 days	Fri 7/18/14	Fri 7/18/14
22		Bench Handling	0.5 days	Fri 7/18/14	Fri 7/18/14
23		Humidity	264 hrs	Fri 7/18/14	Tue 7/29/14
24		High Temperature	1 day	Wed 7/30/14	Wed 7/30/14
25		Low Temperature	1 day	Thu 7/31/14	Thu 7/31/14
26		Temperature Power	80 hrs	Mon 9/15/14	Thu 9/18/14
27		Source Code Review - Functional Testing	3 days	Fri 9/12/14	Tue 9/16/14
28	📄	Compliance Build - Functional Testing	1 day	Wed 9/17/14	Wed 9/17/14
29		FCA	8 days	Mon 9/22/14	Wed 10/1/14
30		Electrical Supply Test	1 day	Mon 9/22/14	Mon 9/22/14
31		Accuracy	4 days	Thu 10/2/14	Tue 10/7/14
32		Maintainability	1 day	Tue 9/23/14	Tue 9/23/14
33	📄	System Intgration	5 days	Wed 10/8/14	Tue 10/14/14



ID	Task Mode	Task Name	Duration	Start	Finish
34		Trusted Build and EAC Package	1 day	Wed 10/15/14	Wed 10/15/14
35		Regression	1 day	Thu 10/16/14	Thu 10/16/14
36		Build and Tool Verification	2 days	Fri 10/17/14	Mon 10/20/14
37		Test Report	43 days	Fri 10/17/14	Thu 12/18/14
38		Test Report Creation	7 days	Fri 10/17/14	Mon 10/27/14
39		Test Report to ILTS	2 days	Tue 10/28/14	Wed 10/29/14
40		Test Report Update	1 day	Thu 10/30/14	Thu 10/30/14
41		Report Submitted to EAC	0 days	Thu 10/30/14	Thu 10/30/14
42		EAC Review	20 days	Fri 10/31/14	Mon 12/1/14
43		Report Corrections	3 days	Tue 12/2/14	Thu 12/4/14
44		EAC Re-Review	10 days	Fri 12/5/14	Thu 12/18/14



APPENDIX B
CHANGE NOTES



Item Number	Module Affected	Modification
E-01	ALL	Cross Party Endorsement - All candidates to be assigned to more than one party affiliation. Straight ticket selection for any assigned party will select if all other conditions are met.
E-02	OCS, OVCS	Updated OS to CentOS 6.5 to support the new OCS hardware (Dell Latitude 5540 and Dell OptiPlex XE2)
E-03	BLM, OVO, OVCS, OVI	Increase number of digits in barcode for ballot style ID from 3 to 4. The 3 digit ballot style ID is no longer supported. This feature allows the system to support more ballot styles per election.
E-04	BLM, OVO, OVI, OVCS	Increase number of precinct ID digits from 4 to 5 on screen entry and in the barcode. The 4 digit precinct ID is no longer supported. This feature allows greater flexibility in precinct ID assignment.
E-05	EM	Add new options for OVI font size selection (large and small) and OVO show percentages on tally. This modification allows the user to set the options in EM.
E-06	OVI	Use EM option of Large or Small Font for the top of the OVI ballot (See E-05)
E-07	OVO	Use EM option 'Show percentages' to know if percentage values should be shown on the tally reports (See E-05)
E-08	TC, OVCS	Added the ability to hide/re-enable sessions
E-09	OVI	Changed the write-in character entry limit from 40 to 30 characters
E-10	OVI	Change Write-In Information format on Top of OVI Ballot to be designated by *** symbols to help with write-in extraction (via OCR) for the OVO write-in report.
E-11	OVO	Change Recount session to be contest specific.
E-12	OVO	Change Write-In Report to show Write-Ins extracted from OVI ballots.
E-13	OVO	After printing the Zero Count report for Pre-Init Precincts, a screen displays allowing the user to print an additional copy of the Zero Count report.
E-14	OVO	If election title is more than 3 lines, the title lines will be concatenated and wrapped as needed to display.
E-15	OVO	Add Party Designation for Primary Contests in Write In Report
E-16	OVO	During OVO close process, display screen requiring a Yes/No response from the user to print the Write-in Report.
E-17	OVO	Add OVO Write-in report defaulting to compressed images.



Item Number	Module Affected	Modification
E-18	BLM, OVO, OVCS	Add second barcode on the back side of two sided ballots. Added this feature to provide a validation that ballot style and page match.
E-19	BLM	Modified the "Keep Together" function which tries to keep all contests in a group in a single column to automatically move all contest in a group to the next column if necessary. This is a conditional column break, only moves to next column if necessary
E-20	BLM, OVI	Allow multiple contests headers per contest.
E-21	OVO	Change shape of the blade on the back side of the gate to enhance return of ballots
E-22	OVCS	A stop command has been introduced for the OVCS which allows the user to halt the scanning of ballots based upon any combination of invalid, no selection, write-in, overvote, and undervote ballots.
E-23	OVO,OVCS, EM, Tabulator, TR	Added the capability to count the number of blank ballots by a precinct and add the total to the tally. This count may be optionally printed on the OVO summary and/or printed on all reports that display the ballot count value.
E-24	TR	Added columns to the Statement of Votes Cast Report to show overvote/undervote counts by precinct and by contest.
E-25	OVI	On the OVI Summary Screen, if a contest is under voted, the background of the box containing the word "Undervote" is colored red to provide a color visual indicator of an undervote.
E-26	OVO/OVI	Software and election version information has been added to the machine info tape/screen as a standard part of the Open and Close tapes.
E-27	BLM	In a primary election, if a party specific ballot style is the functional equivalent of the Non-Partisan ballot style (All partisan contests are "NO CANDIDATES FILED" for ballot style), the ballot style should not be created/saved for the election and the party not included for that precinct when parties are selected on the OVI.
E-28	TR	An option has been added to allow data exported by CSV to be exported by Split instead of consolidating the data by "parent" ballot style.
HW-01	OVI	Introduced a new hinge to the OVI-VC which allows for adjustment of the viewing angle of the OVI-VC display.
HW-02	OVO	Introduced a new motherboard for use on OVO units to replace the current motherboard which has reached End of Life status.
HW-03	OVO	Introduced a new display for use on the OVO units to replace the current display which has reached End of Life Status.



Item Number	Module Affected	Modification
HW-04	OVO	A new plastic ballot box, the OpenElect Ballot Box Version 1.3 was introduced for use with the OVO units.
HW-05	OVO	New power supplies were introduced for the Citizen Printer and the PDI Scanner to replace parts which have reached End Of Life Status.
HW-06	OVI-VC	New power supplies were introduced for the Star Printer and the GVision touch screen to replace parts which have reached End Of Life Status.



APPENDIX C
COTS SOFTWARE TABLE



The OVS 1.3 System includes the following COTS software which has been delivered by Unisyn:

* NOTE: All hashes for COTS software were obtained from the COTS provider and then verified by NTS. All proprietary software developed by the manufacturer is built by NTS and the hashes are provided by NTS.

OCS and OVCS COTS Software Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Java SE Development Kit	Development Kit 6 Update 2 for Linux	jdk-6u2-linux-i586.bin	6a488cb0a161a1c3a541a66e3b076f8e
Java SE Runtime Environment	Runtime Environment 6 Update 2	jre-6u2-linux-i586.bin	0d30636b5cd23e161da5eda9409f02d5
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
Apache Tomcat	6.0.13	apache-tomcat-6.0.13.tar.gz	50442a96332f0ec0cc1fba354f733ad6
PDI Scanner Driver and Libraries for OVCS	2.1.4	PS3_Canon_libraries_2014Jan06A.zip	6b28a3c6dccab539261ca96bd94dd1e5

COTS Operating System Software Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Linux CentOS Distribution for OVS 1.3 (used for the OVO/OVI with old motherboard)	5.0	CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-1of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-2of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-3of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-4of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-5of6.iso CentOS-5.0-i386-bin-6of6.iso	f749d7e17fa01604b9956304efba2333; 963258ceafda5c5e6f79be86028b6b3d; a08ec9ccfdce89c24f3d6567219f90c42; b31c239009b780d1c89c311c192e43be; 0c3990be2271bf44c1495aa0003b5552; 9e6f91a5292f46b02777133765fc03fe
Linux CentOS Distribution (used for the OCS and OVCS)	5.7	CentOS-5.2-i386-bin-DVD.iso	c89db7f5294465d593e7b02c232e0e9070111487
Linux CentOS Distribution (used for the OVO/OVI with new motherboard)	6.3	CentOS-6.3-i386-bin-DVD1.iso	0285160d8ba3cfc720ea55e98e464eac



OVO Third-Party Software (COTS) Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Common Files			
Java SE Runtime Environment	Runtime Environment 6 Update 2	jre-6u2-linux-i586.bin	0d30636b5cd23e161da5eda9409f02d5
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
Apache Tomcat	6.0.13	apache-tomcat-6.0.13.tar.gz	50442a96332f0ec0cc1fba354f733ad6
PDI Scanner Driver and Libraries for OVO	6.3.32	PS3_Canon_libraries_2014Jan06A.zip	6b28a3c6dccab539261ca96bd94dd1e5
Citizen Printer for OVO	1.11.2.7	CSA_JPOS11127_setupEN.bin	d150d08693bf7dbe758adfdab94f655d
OpenCSV	2.3	opencsv-2.3-src-with-libs.tar.gz	d3423d8e3b0ae5c899cee32baa17a36f
Jetway J7F2			
openChrome Video Driver	0.2.900-7.el5	xf86-video-openchrome-0.2.900.tar.gz	3e36895eb4b4d61e21aa27d370f151c8
eGalax Touchscreen Driver	3.00.3719	eGalaxTouch-3.00.3719-32b-k26.tar.gz	51c835408093ccfc4055a9eab9537998
FVWM Desktop Window Manager	2.4.19	fvwm-2.4.19.tar.gz	a2fd2c07061303883d6bf89eb2b259ff
Jetway 2550			
Xenarc Touchscreen Driver	2.5.2107	eGTouch_v2.5.2107.L-x.tar.gz	cfb148b3997257ed0e4a8eb3fa6b3932
Linux Kernel	3.4.13	linux-3.4.13.tar.bz2	9c850d00c898ba792f29eb6a5973961c
Bash	4.1.2-15.el6	bash-4.1.2-15.el6_5.2.i686.rpm	3f85b5595b60f655f646aee702398a93

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OVI Third-Party Software (COTS) Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Common Files			
Java SE Development Kit	Development Kit 6 Update 2 for Linux	jdk-6u2-linux-i586.bin	6a488cb0a161a1c3a541a66e3b076f8e
Java SE Runtime Environment	Runtime Environment 6 Update 2	jre-6u2-linux-i586.bin	0d30636b5cd23e161da5eda9409f02d5
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
RXTX - Library and Jar	2.1-7r2	rxtx-2.1-7-bins-r2.zip	5f21ae633602a24fd3cdd096951476c2
Jetway J7F2			
openChrome Video Driver	0.2.900-7.el5	xf86-video-openchrome-0.2.900.tar.gz	3e36895eb4b4d61e21aa27d370f151c8
eGalax Touchscreen Driver	3.00.3719	eGalaxTouch-3.00.3719-32b-k26.tar.gz	51c835408093ccfc4055a9eab9537998
FVWM Desktop Window Manager	2.4.19	fvwm-2.4.19.tar.gz	a2fd2c07061303883d6bf89eb2b259ff
Jetway 2550			
Xenarc Touchscreen Driver	2.5.2107	eGTouch_v2.5.2107.L-x.tar.gz	cfb148b3997257ed0e4a8eb3fa6b3932
Linux Kernel	3.4.13	linux-3.4.13.tar.bz2	9c850d00c898ba792f29eb6a5973961c

Linux Build Machine Third-Party (COTS) Software Descriptions

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Java SE Development Kit	Development Kit 6 Update 2 for Linux	jdk-6u2-linux-i586.bin	6a488cb0a161a1c3a541a66e3b076f8e
Java 2 Enterprise Edition	1.3.01	j2sdkee-1_3_01-linux.tar.gz	224e9687c73ba48f1186e434368ec9b3
Java Cryptography Extension	Jurisdiction Policy Files 6	jce_policy-6.zip	b20f9d6ed14e55d73a5ed204bca01e7a
Apache Ant	1.7.0	apache-ant-1.7.0-bin.zip	ac30ce5b07b0018d65203fbc680968f5
Jasper Reports	2.0.5	jasperreports-2.0.5-project.zip	b80bd29e4f95f18bd15da65cfd45d1d2
SQL Connector	5.1.7	mysql-connector-java-5.1.7.zip	f9a8008367f5b25bdec045c54100d5b0
Apache Axis	1.4	axis-bin-1_4.zip	9eda42bf82a274349f18c5affd93608
Apache Commons Codec	1.3	commons-codec-current.zip	c30c769e07339390862907504ff4b300
Apache Commons Http	3.0	commons-httpclient-3.0.zip	42d96b0c7d627a2170fd57280476c8fe
Apache Commons File Upload	1.2	commons-fileupload-1.2-bin.zip	6f6e6112ebb87a9087da8ca1f8d8fd6a



Linux Build Machine Third-Party (COTS) Software Descriptions (Continued)

Software Required For Testing	Software Version	Filename	Hash Value (MD5)
Apache Commons IO	1.3.2	commons-io-1.3.2-bin.zip	ba31cc4a0d85842e4b0bfd2472382ba
Apache Tag Library	1.1.2	jakarta-taglibs-standard-current.zip	f75c964f1b276b022c24a677ecc17d4d
PDF Help	4.92b23	pdfhelp.jar	f2542f332e5be4549a48f876d63ac915
Javazoom MP3	1.9.4	mp3spi1.9.4.zip	e259e7674d9b19e76f005cee2810e7f5
Citizen Printer for OVO	1.11.2.7	CSA_JPOS11127_setupEN.bin	d150d08693bf7dbe758adfdab94f655d
PDI Scanner Driver and Libraries for OVO and OVCS	2.1.4, 6.3.32	PS3_Canon_libraries_2014Jan06A.zip	6b28a3c6dccab539261ca96bd94dd1e5
RXTX - Library and Jar	2.1-7r2	rxtx-2.1-7-bins-r2.zip	5f21ae633602a24fd3cdd096951476c2
PDI Tool For Verification of Binary File	1.0	VisionX_11202008.EXE	af8905f015c7d7ff730b9f8b0811134b
Fonts for OCS	None	arial.zip; ARIALBD.zip; arialbi.zip; ariali.zip	c7f4d931da264bee5855cbf69630c81d; 589a0d88320f8a33dbcd4f2c1929ebce; b868660de8a00fe20f70970cca275038; 7968209fd0c62466a27fcde0f4104fec
Star 700II Printer	1.4.2_11-b06	starjavapos_linux_20070317.zip	172b1fcfeca654b00463be74efc7fbb

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APPENDIX B – TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE (TDP) ISSUES REPORT

Documentation Issues Report - ILTS 3.1					
Issue Number	Status (Open/Closed/On Hold)	Document Name	Document Section	Document Version	Description
1	Closed	Attestation Letter			Need Attestation Letter for 3.1
2	Closed	04-00448 OVS_Configuration_Management_Plan	Appendix E	Release 1.3 Version 1,1	The Test Document Changed cells in Appendix E need to be populated.
3	Closed	04-00444_OVS_System_Functionality		Release 1.3 Version 1,1	The headers and Revision History have Release 1.2.2 but the cover page has Release 1.3
4	Closed	04-00445_OVS_Personnel_Training_and_Deployment_Requirements		Release 1.3 Version 1,1	The Cover page, headers, and Revision History have as Release 1.2.
5	Closed	04-00449_OVS_System_Coding_Standards		Release 1.3 Version 1,0	The Cover page, headers, and Revision History have as Release 1.1.
6	Closed	04-00454_OVS_QA_Plan		Release 1.3 Version 1,1	The Cover page and Revision History have as Release 1.2.
7	Closed	04-00464_Software_Design_and_Specification			The Cover page has Release 1.1 and Version 1.6. The Revision History has Release 1.1 and Version 1.0
8	Closed	04-00469_OVS_Final_QA_Report			The Cover page and Revision History have as Release 1.2.
9	Closed	04-00504_Installation_Configuration_and_Maintenance_Specification			The Cover page and Revision History have as Release 1.0.
10	Closed	04-00510_System_Verification			The Cover page and Revision History have as Release 1.1
11	Closed	04-00513_System_HW_Verification			The Cover page and Revision History have as Release 1.2 and Version and 1.1.
12	Closed	04-00549_EOS_Linux_Installation			The Cover page and Revision History have as Release 1.1
13	Closed	Enhancement 14			The PE could not find any information in the TDP concerning Enhancement 14
14	Closed	Enhancement 21			The PE could not find any information in the TDP concerning Enhancement 21
15	Closed	Enhancement 27			The PE could not find any information in the TDP concerning Enhancement 27
16	Closed	Enhancement 28			The PE could not find any information in the TDP concerning Enhancement 28
17	Closed	Enhancement 29			The PE could not find any information in the TDP concerning Enhancement 29
18	Closed	04-00460_OVS_System_Operations_Guide_Warehouse		pg 175, Section 11.3.3	Selected Recount Contest's Graphic — The functionality of the buttons at the bottom of the graphic are not detailed.
19	Closed				An issue was discovered with the OVCS scanner which caused issues with scanning ballots. The cause was identified as the OVCS Scanner cable being plugged into a USB Super Speed port. McDermot Courts of Unisyn has been notified that a TDP update will be required to warn users that the OVCS Scanner is not compatible with USB Super Speed Ports.
20	Closed	04-00454_OVS_QA_Plan		pg 3, Revision History	the last line (08/26/2014) of the document revision history should have the "release" as 1.3 and not "1.4".

APPENDIX C – DISCREPANCY REPORT

ID ²	Summary	Resolutions
25	<p>If the Election Manager 1.3_VSTL_R3 application was opened on the EMS Laptop, one of the options in the OVO Settings tab was not visible on the screen due to a resolution issue.</p> <p>The "Show Percentages" option for the OVO was not visible on the screen and there were no scroll bars available to allow the user to view and select the option.</p>	<p>On the OVO Options Tab in the Election Manager application, a scroll bar was added on the right side of the window to allow users using the Laptop to access the Show Percentages option.</p>
26	<p>A preview window is displayed in the Ballot Layout Manager application when the Graphics menu is accessed. In the Preview window a preview of the ballot header is displayed. The Precinct ID listed in the preview used the old 4 Digit Precinct Number and did not reflect the enhancement which changed all Precinct Numbers to 5 digit numbers.</p>	<p>In the preview window under the Graphics menu, the ballot header preview was updated to display a 5 digit precinct ID.</p>
27	<p>The Dell Latitude E5540 laptop did not appear to have CD-R media writing capabilities required for the functionality of the system.</p>	<p>The cd media creation application previously used in earlier versions of the EOS operating system was no longer present. A new application was being used for CD-R media writing but was not present in the Unisyn supplied TDP. Instructions for accessing and using this new CD-R media writing application were added to the TDP.</p>
28	<p>An error was encountered while scanning ballots on the OVCS. Ballots were scanned using the Bulk Scan mode and after scanning completed, the application kept the Accept and Clear buttons greyed out for approximately 10 seconds. A message was then displayed which stated that an error had occurred and to see the application log for details.</p>	<p>Unisyn analyzed this issue and were able to identify that this issue occurred when the OVCS scanner was plugged into the OVCS workstation using a "Super Speed USB 3.0 port." Unisyn updated instructions and warnings in the OVCS User Guide to notify user's that the OVCS scanner should not be plugged into a USB 3.0 Super Speed ("SS") port.</p>
29	<p>An election with a three line election title containing the maximum number of allowable characters was being loaded onto an OVO using the Load Election command located on the OVO Maintenance Menu. The majority of the first two lines of the Election Title displayed correctly, however, XML tags for line breaks were visible within the text and the third line of the election title was not being displayed.</p>	<p>The Load Election screen was updated to correct this issue so that all three lines of the election title display in their entirety and no XML tags are visible within the text.</p>
32	<p>The OVO 1.3 exceeded the Radiated Emission Limits of FCC Part 15 Class B. In the vertical antenna polarization, radiated RF emissions exceeded the limit at the frequency of 66.72 MHz by 2.45 dBμV/m.</p>	<p>After Unisyn mitigated the hardware issue, a second Electromagnetic Emissions test was performed on the OVO 1.3. The OVO unit successfully met the requirements of the Electromagnetic Emissions test.</p>
34	<p>The SCAP Review was performed on the Unisyn OVS 1.3 voting system and the system was found to be non-compliant with the VISA Version 1 Release 4 security requirements.</p>	<p>Unisyn addressed the non-conformances discovered during the SCAP Review and another review was performed. The second security review found the Unisyn OVS 1.3 voting system to be compliant with the VISA Version 1 Release 4 security requirements.</p>

² The discrepancy tracking system that is utilized by NTS creates unique ID numbers based on overall entries within the database and not within individual projects. Thus, the ID numbers may not be sequential.

APPENDIX D - INSTRUMENTATION SHEETS & DATA SHEETS



Temperature Power Variation



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 9/15/2014 JOB NUMBER: PRO30407 TYPE OF TEST: TEMP CYCLE
TECHNICIAN: LARRY IVEY CUSTOMER: ILTS TEST AREA: ENV CHAMBER 5

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	CONTROLLER	THERMOTRON	6800	783382	115947	-148 to 437°F	±.25%	3/4/2014	3/4/2015
2	DMM	FLUKE	87	60530990	112270	MULTI	±0.1%+1	11/12/2013	11/12/2014
3	TEMP ALARM	THERMOTRON	012005	66408642	114131	-125 to 375°F	.25%	3/4/2014	3/4/2015
4	TEMP RECORDER	HONEYWELL	DR450T	912182464400	108993	-200-600°F	.4°F	3/4/2014	3/4/2015


This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: *Larry Ivey 9/15/14*


CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: *Michael Walker 9/15/14*

Q.A.: *Rachel Stewart 9/15/14*


Temperature Power Variation (Continued)



Temperature Power Variation (Continued)



Temperature Power Variation (Continued)



NO.	PR030407
CUSTOMER	ILTS
TEST	Temp
APP. DTL	1 WET CULB
CHAMBER	5
START DATE	9-18-14
TECHNICIAN	J
CHECKED BY	
DATE	

Humidity



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 7/17/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: HUMIDITY
 TECHNICIAN: T TURNER CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: CHAMBER 1

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	HUMIDITY/TEMP	VAISALA	HMT315	H1410001	01611*	MULTI	MFG	3/13/2014	9/9/2014
2	TEMP	THERMOTRON	SE12005	28414	114757*	-70-180°C	.3°C	5/29/2014	5/29/2015
3	TEMP RECORDER	HONEYWELL	DR4500A	9823Y836318	114840*	-184-371°C	.35°C	5/29/2014	5/29/2015

This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION:

Trance Turner 7/17/14


CHECKED & RECEIVED BY:

Jan Drey 7-18-14


Q.A.:

David Melvin 7/18/14


Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)




Humidity (Continued)





Humidity (Continued)



Humidity (Continued)



Humidity (Continued)



JWR	PR030407
CUSTOMER	Orlysyn
TYPE TEST	Temp Humidity
DRY BULB	1
CHAMBER	1
WET BULB	2
START DATE	6-29-17
TECHNICIAN	F
CHECKED BY:	
DATE:	

High Temperature



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET


DATE: 7/29/2014 JOB NUMBER: PRO30407 TYPE OF TEST: HIGH LOW TEMP
 TECHNICIAN: LARRY IVEY CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: ENV CHAMBER 1

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	TEMP	THERMOTRON	SE12005	28414	114757	-70-180°C	.3°C	5/29/2014	5/29/2015
2	TEMP RECORDER	HONEYWELL	DR4500A	9823Y8363180	114840	-184-371°C	.35°C	5/29/2014	5/29/2015


This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: Larry Ivey 7-29-14 CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: Michael L Walker 7/29/14
 Q.A.: Brenda Moore 7/29/14

High Temperature (Continued)



Low Temperature (Instrumentation Sheet Same As High Temperature)



J/NR	PR030407
CUSTOMER	CAI SPN
TYPE TEST	Low Thermal
DRY BULB	1 WET BULB
CHAMBER	1
START DATE	7-30-2014
TECHNICIAN	Donald H. K. Singer
CHECKED BY:	DATE:

Conducted RF Immunity



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 9/22/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: CONDUCTED RF IMMUNITY
 TECHNICIAN: J. GALEONE CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: EMI LAB CHAMBER 1

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	AMPLIFIER	AMP RESEARCH	500A100A	0324951	04816	10kHz-100MHz	NCR	8/25/2014	8/25/2015
2	ATTENUATOR	NARDA	769-6	03180	04860	DC to 6GHz	MFG	4/7/2014	4/7/2015
3	LOAD	BIRD	8080	22438	04678	50ohm/25watt	mfg	5/10/2013	5/10/2015
4	PASS IMP ADAPT	FISHER CC	FCC-801-150-50-CD	9785	116853	150KHz-230MH	MFG	7/14/2014	7/14/2015
5	PASS IMP ADAPT	FISHER CC	FCC-801-150-50-CD	9784	116854	150KHz-230MH	MFG	7/14/2014	7/14/2015
6	PASSIVE	FISHER CC	FCC-801-M3-25A	04044	110405	150KHZ - 230M	MFG	9/3/2014	9/3/2016
7	SIG GEN	AEROFLEX	2023A	202306/068	03704	9KHz-1.2GHz	MFG	8/21/2014	8/21/2015
8	SPECTRUM	HP	8566B	2747A05517/2	01695	100HZ-22GHZ	MFG	10/23/2013	10/23/2014
9	SPECTRUM	HP	8566B	3014A06704	117093	100HZ-22GHZ	CERT	8/4/2014	8/4/2015

This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: [Signature] CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: [Signature] 9/22/14
 Q.A.: [Signature] 9/22/14

Electrical Supply



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 9/26/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: ELECTRICAL SUPPLY
 TECHNICIAN: STEPHEN HAN CUSTOMER: ILTS TEST AREA: VOTING LAB

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	STOPWATCH	EXTECH	365510	NSN	04955 2	MFG	5 sec/day	7/17/2014	7/17/2015

This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: Steph H 9/26/14 CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: Steph H 9/26/14
 Q.A.: Patricia Houston 9/26/14

Electromagnetic Radiation



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 11/3/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: FCC PART 15
 TECHNICIAN: J. SMITH CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: OATS 2

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	ANTENNA	ELECTROMETRIC	EM-6917A-1	124116	114415	30MHZ - 3GHZ	SEE DATA	9/11/2013	9/11/2015
2	ATTENUATOR	NARDA	766-20	740580	01443	DC-4 GHz	MFG	4/7/2014	4/7/2016
3	DMM	FLUKE	87	64440152	112518	MULTI	±0.1%+1	6/12/2014	6/12/2015
4	EMI TEST	ROHDE SCHWARZ	ESCI	100386	117803	MULTI	MFG	5/16/2014	5/16/2015
5	LISN	FISHER CC	FCC-LISN-50/250-25	01008	116634	9 KHz - 100 MH	MFG	7/3/2014	7/3/2015


This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: *John Smith* 11/3/14


CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: *W. Buehler* 11/3/14

Q.A.: *Jeffrey L. ...* 11/4/14

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions – Vertical – OVI-VC 1




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions – Horizontal – OVI-VC 1

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Line - OVI-VC 1




FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Neutral - OVI-VC 1

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions – Vertical – OVI-VC 2




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions – Horizontal – OVI-VC 2

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Line - OVI-VC 2




FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Neutral - OVI-VC 2

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions - Vertical - OVI-7




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions - Horizontal - OVI-7

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Line - OVI-7




FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Neutral - OVI-7

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions – Vertical – OVO




FCC Part 15, Radiated Emissions – Horizontal – OVO

Electromagnetic Radiation (Continued)



FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Line - OVO



FCC Part 15, Conducted Emissions - Neutral - OVO

Electrostatic Disruption



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 9/8/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: ESD
 TECHNICIAN: J. GALEONE CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: ESD ROOM

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	DISCHARGE	EMC-PARTNER	ESD3000DM1	049	03229	150pF	MFG	7/30/2014	7/30/2015
2	ESD GUN	EMC-PARTNER	ESD3000	059	04446	16.5 KV	±10%	10/16/2013	10/16/2014
3	ESD TARGET	HAEFELY TRENCH	2520311	152461	110794	15KV	±5%	1/14/2014	1/14/2016
4	OSCILLOSCOPE	TEKTRONIX	DPO5104	C012091	01737	MFG	MFG	10/25/2013	10/25/2014
5	TEMP/HUM/BAR	EXTECH	SD700	Q590477	01539	MULTI	MFG	3/18/2014	3/18/2015

This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION:

[Signature]
9/8/14

CHECKED & RECEIVED BY:

[Signature] 9/8/14

Q.A.:

Burda *Mans* 9/8/14

Electrostatic Disruption (Continued)



ESD DATA SHEET

Job No.: PR030407

Start Date: 9/8/2014

Customer: Unisyn Temperature: 66.5°F Humidity: 52.1%

EUT: OVO Atmospheric Pressure: 29.33 mm/hg

Model No.: OVO 1.3 Measurement Point: See Test Points Below

Interference Signal: See Applied Signal

Serial No.: UNI000039 Frequency Range: N/A

Test Title Electrostatic Disruption

Test Points	Meets Limit		Applied Level (kV)	Discharge Type	Times Tested	Comments
	Yes	No				
Front Left Keyhole	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Front Right Keyhole	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Molding Left Side of Ballot Slot	X		±2, ±4, ±8, ±15	Air	80	No Discharges
Molding Right Side of Ballot Slot	X		±2, ±4, ±8, ±15	Air	80	No Discharges
Monitor, Upper Left Corner	X		±2, ±4, ±8, ±15	Air	80	No Discharges
Monitor, Center	X		±2, ±4, ±8, ±15	Air	80	No Discharges
Monitor, Lower Right Corner	X		±2, ±4, ±8, ±15	Air	80	No Discharges
Vertical Coupling Plane (Front)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Vertical Coupling Plane (Right)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Vertical Coupling Plane (Left)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Vertical Coupling Plane (Back)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Horizontal Coupling Plane – (Front)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Horizontal Coupling Plane – (Right)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Horizontal Coupling Plane – (Left)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV
Horizontal Coupling Plane – (Back)	X		±8	Contact	20	10 Discharges @ +8kV, 10 Discharges @ -8kV

Notice of Anomaly: N/A

Witness: N/A

Tested By: W. Ruel Technician Date: 11/20/14

Approved: Ray Wick Project Engineer Date: 11/20/14

Bench Handling



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 7/18/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: BENCH HANDLING
 TECHNICIAN: R.BRELAND CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: DYN LAB

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	ANGLE LEVEL	DEJON TOOL CO	AL-5	NSN	110952 #	90°	±.5°	4/2/2014	10/2/2014
2	RULER	PRODUCTS ENGIN	TEMPERED	NSN	04468 #	48"	±1/32NDS	6/18/2014	6/18/2016

This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: Robert Breland 7/18/14 CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: James Ziegler 7-18-14
 Q.A.: Rachel Stewart 7/18/14

Vibration



INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT SHEET

DATE: 7/18/2014 JOB NUMBER: PR030407 TYPE OF TEST: VIBRATION
 TECHNICIAN: R.BRELAND CUSTOMER: UNISYN TEST AREA: DYN LAB

No.	Description	Manufacturer	Model	Serial #	Asset #	RANGE	ACCURACY	Cal Date	Cal Due
1	ACCELEROMETER	ENDEVCO	7704-100	BJ29	100844	100 pC/g / 20-5k	±5%	3/4/2014	8/31/2014
2	DMM	FLUKE	45	5095170	114297	MULTI	CERT	6/26/2014	6/26/2015
3	SIG COND	ENDEVCO	2775B	AL46	02166	GAIN	±1.5%	4/16/2013	1/17/2015
4	VIB CONTROL	SPECTRAL DYNAL	2400	1657	116969	MFG	MFG	3/13/2014	12/13/2014

This is to certify that the above instruments were calibrated using state-of-the-art techniques with standards whose calibration is traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

INSTRUMENTATION: *R. Breland* 7/18/14 CHECKED & RECEIVED BY: *Janet* 7/18/14

Q.A.: *John* 7/18/14



Vibration (Continued)

VIBRATION TEST DATA SHEET

Customer **Unisyn** Spec. **MIL-STD-810D** Specimen **Open Elect 1.3 OVO** Ambient
 Job No. **PR030407** Method **514.3** Part No. _____ Specimen Temp. _____ Photo Yes No
 GSI Yes No Procedure **WVSG Vol. II 4.6.3** S/N **UNI000036**


Test Title **Transportation Vibration**

Date	Time	Axis	Temp (F)	SINUSOIDAL		RANDOM		TOTAL Accel. (grms)	Test Time (min)	COMMENTS	NAME
				Freq. (cps)	Disp. ("da)	Accel. (±g)	Freq. (cps)				
7/18/14	11:03	Vert.	Amb				10	0.01500		Run 1	RB
							40	0.01500			
							500	0.00015	1.0216	30	
7/18/14	13:17	Trans	Amb				10	0.00013		Run 2	RB
							20	0.00065			
							30	0.00065			
							78	0.00002			
							79	0.00019			
							120	0.00019			
							500	0.00001	0.2022	30	


Job No. **PR030407**
 Report No. **PR030407-01**
 Date **11/21/2014**
 Page No. **1** of **2**

WH-1028A Signed *[Signature]* 11/21/14 Approved *[Signature]* 11/24/14


Vibration (Continued)




Vibration (Continued)



Vibration (Continued)



Electromagnetic Susceptibility



EUT Power Input:	120 VAC			
EN61000-4-3 Radiated Immunity				
Temperature: 23C	Humidity: 45%		Barometric Pressure: 995mbars	
Radiated Immunity Test Level: 10 V/m				
Frequency (Hz)	Polarity		Angle (Degree)	Comments
	Vertical Results	Horizontal Results		
80MHz - 1GHz	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	0	
80MHz - 1GHz	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	90	
80MHz - 1GHz	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	180	
80MHz - 1GHz	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pass <input type="checkbox"/> Fail	270	

APPENDIX E - DURABILITY ATTESTATION



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September 8, 2014

National Technical Systems
7800 Highway 20 West
Huntsville, AL 35806

Statement of Product Compliance

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is to certify that Unisyn has designed the OVO and OVI products and selected OVS COTS components to withstand normal use without deterioration and without excessive maintenance costs for a period of ten years.

The cases of the OVO, OVI and OVCS units have been produced from impact resistive plastics with textured surfaces and high quality hardware. The color of the case is integrated into the plastic to minimize visual detection of marks over a long lifetime.

The COTS components utilized in the OVO, OVI, and throughout the OVS system including the OVCS were selected from vendors with long- term commitment to product availability, longer vendor tested life expectancy, and lower replacement costs due to higher production volumes.

The design of the systems included special detailed focus on maintainability and serviceability, insuring easy and safe access to internal and external components.

The OVO, OVI, and OVCS components and supporting hardware (such as the UPS) fully comply with the following standards and guidelines:

2002 VSS Volume I, Section 3.4.2
2005 VVSG Volume I, Version 1.0, Section 4.3.2

Sincerely,



Kenneth Parks

Manager – Technical Operations
ILTS
2310 Cousteau Court
Vista, CA 92081