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# Test Plan for EAC 2005 VVSG Certification Testing to be Performed on Election Systems & Software Voting System 5.2.0.3

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- Prepared for: Election Systems & Software, Inc. 11208 John Galt Blvd Omaha, NE 68137
- Prepared by: National Technical Systems Huntsville 7800 Hwy 20 West Huntsville, AL 35806







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# **SIGNATURES**

Prepared by:

10,0

Date:

Date:

Date:

7/16/15

Angela Whaley, Technical Writer

Approved by:

7/16/15

ames Long, Program Manager

7/16/15

Approved by:

Robert Hardy, Department Manager

Reviewed by:

Brenda Mouse Fou Rick Davis, QA Manager Date:

4/16/15



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## **1.0 INTRODUCTION**

Election Systems & Software (ES&S), herein referred to as manufacturer, submitted the Election Systems & Software Voting System 5.2.0.3 (EVS5203) to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), for certification testing to the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Standards (2005 VVSG). EVS 5.2.0.3 is a modification to the previously 2005 VVSG certified EVS 5.2.0.0 voting system (Certification number: ESSEVS5200), and as such, will be tested by National Technical Systems Huntsville (NTS Huntsville) based on the "modified system" requirements set forth in section 4.4.2.3 of the EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0. This National Certification Test Plan, hereafter referred to as Test Plan, presents the process and test methods that will be used to validate 2005 VVSG compliance of EVS 5.2.0.3 and follows the EAC guidance provided in NOCs 2009-005 and 2013-02.

#### 1.1 Description and Overview of EAC Certified System Being Modified

The following subsections describe the EAC Certified System that is baseline for the submitted modification. All information was derived from the previous Certification Test Report and/or EAC Certificate of Conformance.

#### 1.1.1 Baseline Certified System

EVS 5.2.0.0 is certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (Certification number: ESSEVS5200). All information for this test plan was derived from the previous Certification Test Report and/or EAC Certificate of Conformance. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 describe the hardware and software/firmware versions submitted for certification testing. For a complete description of the configuration and description of the EVS 5.2.0.0 product, refer to the EVS 5.2.0.0 Test Report located on the EAC's website at http://www.eac.gov.



## 1.1.1 Baseline Certified System (Continued)

Software	Software/Firmware Version				
Proprietary Software					
ElectionWare	4.6.0.0				
Election Reporting Manager (ERM)	8.11.0.0				
ES&S Event Log Service (ELS)	1.5.5.0				
Removable Media Service (RMS)	1.4.5.0				
VAT Previewer	1.8.6.0				
ExpressVote Previewer	1.4.0.0				
COTS So	oftware				
Adobe Acrobat Standard	11				
Cerberus FTP	6.0.7.1				
Microsoft Server 2008	R2 w/ SP1				
Microsoft Windows 7, SP1	5.1 w/ SP1				
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable – x64	9.0.30729				
Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x64 Redistributable	10.0.40219				
Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x86 Redistributable	10.0.40219				
Microsoft .net Framework	4.5.1				
Micro Focus RM/COBOL Runtime	12.06				
Symantec Endpoint Protection - Small Business Edition 2013	12.1.4				

### Table 1-1. Previously Certified Software

## Table 1-2. Previously Certified Voting System Equipment

Component	Hardware Version	Firmware Version			
Proprietary Hardware					
ExpressVote Accessible Voting Station	1.0	1.4.0.0			
DS200 Precinct Count Scanner	1.2.1, 1.2.3, & 1.3	2.12.0.0			
DS850 Central Count Scanner	1.0	2.10.0.0			
AutoMARK A100	1.0	1.8.6.0			
AutoMARK A200 (SBC 2.0 & SBC 2.5)	1.1	1.8.6.0			
AutoMARK A300 (SBC 2.0 & SBC 2.5)	1.3	1.8.6.0			
Plastic Ballot Box	1.2 & 1.3	N/A			
Metal Ballot Box	1.0, 1.1, & 1.2	N/A			
COTS Hardware					
EMS Server – Dell	PowerEdge T710	N/A			
EMS Reporting Workstation – Dell	Optiplex 980	N/A			
EMS Reporting Laptop – Dell	E6410	N/A			
Motorola QR Code Scanner	DS9208	N/A			
Delkin USB Flash Drives	512MB, 1, 2, 4, & 8GB	N/A			
Delkin Compact Flash	1GB	N/A			
DS850 Report Printer	OKI B430dn & B 431dn	N/A			
DS850 Audit Printer	OKI Microline 420	N/A			
Avid Headphones	Avid FV 60	N/A			



#### **1.1.2 Description of Submitted Modifications**

Descriptions of submitted modifications to the voting system include changes to address specific requirements for the State of Maryland, cryptographic key generation discrepancy, and other stability enhancing features. There were no hardware modifications submitted. Descriptions of submitted modifications to each part of the voting system are identified below:

#### **ElectionWare**

• Changed the Maryland state profile data element in the ElectionWare Admin Database to disable the default State Results Transfer menu items in ERM.

Due to the creation of a state specific results reporting module (EXP) for the State of Maryland, the MultiJurisdiction Rule in the Electionware admin database needed to be defaulted to False in the Maryland Rules Profile. This data element is used by ERM to control (limit) access to the generic "State Transfer" menu options within ERM as these functions will now be part of the Maryland specific EXP module. The net effect of this change is that the State Transfer Menu item in ERM will be grayed out for elections that now use the Maryland Rules Profile in Electionware. These ERM menu items will now be encapsulated in the Maryland state specific EXP module being developed for use in Maryland per specifications by the Maryland State Board of Elections.

 Included a new version of RSACRYPTO in the ElectionWare Install that ensures compatibility with the MS Crypto library used by the ExpressVote.

The change to RSACRYPTO.EXE addresses an incompatibility between the COTS cryptography library from RSA BSAFE and the Microsoft Crypto library used on the ExpressVote. The RSACrypto proprietary module is a standalone .EXE that uses the RSA BSAFE cryptography library and is called from ElectionWare and ERM for all encryption, decryption, signing, and signature validation needs. The MS Crypto library expects all RSA signatures to be exactly 128 bytes in length. The RSA BSAFE library allows RSA digital signatures to be the length determined by the mathematical formula and may generate digital signatures less than 128 bytes when the leading digit(s) of the generated signature are zero. This results in a signature verification failure on the ExpressVote.

The solution implemented is a modification to the RSACRYPTO.EXE program whereby each time an RSA signature is generated for data used by ExpressVote, the resultant signature file is checked to see if it is 128 bytes in length. If the signature file is less than 128 bytes, leading zero (0x00) bytes are pre-pended to signature file until the signature is exactly 128 bytes in length.

The change made does not affect any other tabulation or ballot marking devices included in the EVS 5.2.0.3 release as it relates to only the signing of data that is used by the ExpressVote.

#### <u>ERM</u>

• Corrected the display of the District Control File name prompt in certain reporting options tabs.

ERM contains three reports that allow the user to create then select to use an optional control file to select one or more specific districts to include on the Names and Districts Totals Canvass and the Numbered Key (District Only) Canvass. ERM was incorrectly placing a series of 'N's in the District Control File Name prompt on the Reports Options Tab at the time of report execution for these three reports. ERM was corrected to display either a blank prompt for the District Control File Name or the name of the control file previously entered by the user when previously



#### 1.1.2 Description of Submitted Modifications (Continued)

executing one of these three reports.

• Resolved the COBOL error that occurs when creating a Results XML File on a hardened system.

Executing ERM on a hardened system and selecting the Create Results XML File resulted in a Cobol Runtime and ERM application error. The determined cause for error was that the file was attempting to be created in a read-only folder as specified by the hardening script. The program change redirected this work file to the proper folder where all other ERM work files are created.

- Included the new version of RSACRYPTO in the ERM Install that ensures compatibility with the MS Crypto library used by the ExpressVote.
- Eliminate the check for and rebuild of old format results and counter files.

In order to support a customer accessing a previous election dataset that used the old format of these files when using the newer versions of the software (backwards compatibility), this function would first check a flag in the ERM Control File to determine what format of files each specific ERM election dataset contained. If ERM determined that the files were in the older format, a process was executed to read the old format of the files and convert them to the new file formats. A potential file sharing issue in the logic that reads the Control File to determine if the files need to be reformatted can cause a false positive and incorrectly initiate the file rebuild process. The results files created in the EVS family of software do not use the old format making this function unnecessary.

#### 1.1.3 Initial Assessment

An initial assessment was performed to determine the scope of testing for the submitted modification. The results of this assessment are presented in three categories: Functional, Software, and Technical Data Package.

Based on the assessment of submitted changes, it was determined that a limited Functional Configuration Audit will be required to verify that the voting system continues to meet 2005 VVSG requirements. Limited in this instance refers to only functional changes that were made in this modification (new features, changes to functions, etc.) or functions that have not changed but may be impacted by the modification.

All added or modified Lines of Code (LOC) will require a source code review to ensure the 2005 VVSG requirements are met and that changes to the software do not introduce any new functions or features outside of the modifications in section 1.1.2. In determining the extent of the required source code review, the submitted source code for EVS 5.2.0.3 was compared to the EAC certified EVS 5.2.0.0 source code. Table 1-3 provides the software comparison results.

Product	Baseline	New	Lines of Code Changed		
Product	Daseime	Version	Files	Lines	
Electionware	4.6.0.0	4.6.1.0	23	3847	
ERM	8.11.0.0	8.11.1.0	13	1005	
RSACrypto	3.6.0.0	3.6.1.0	4	120	
Totals			40	4972	

**Table 1-3. Software Comparison Results** 



#### **1.1.3 Initial Assessment (Continued)**

The submitted Technical Data Package (TDP) is constructed with the certified EVS 5.2.0.0 TDP and the EVS 5.2.0.3 changes to the certified documents. NTS Huntsville personnel determined that the following documents are impacted by this modification:

- EVS 5203\_C\_D\_0100\_SysOvr
- EVS 5203\_C\_L\_RequirementsMatrix
- EVS 5203\_CM\_BP\_1011\_EMSBuildProcedureTrustedBuild1
- EVS 5203\_D\_SDS00\_ElectionWare04\_PostgreSQL Table and Field Descriptions
- EVS 5203\_SDS00\_ElectionWare
- EVS 5203\_DOC\_SOP\_ERM
- EVS 5203\_DOC\_D\_1200\_ChangeNotes
- EVS 5203\_D\_SDS00\_ERM
- EVS5200\_CM\_SPC00\_SysSecuritySpec

A review of these documents shall ensure that all EVS 5.2.0.3 changes are properly documented and compliant with 2005 VVSG.

#### 1.1.4 Regression Test

Regression testing shall be conducted on the ERM to establish assurance that the modifications have no adverse impact on the compliance, integrity, or performance of the system as outlined in the 2005 VVSG.



#### 1.2 References

- Election Assistance Commission 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Volume I, Version 1.0, "Voting System Performance Guidelines," and Volume II, Version 1.0, "National Certification Testing Guidelines," dated December 2005
- Election Assistance Commission Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0, effective date July 2017
- Election Assistance Commission Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual, Version 1.0, effective date July 2017
- National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NIST Handbook 150, 2006 Edition, "NVLAP Procedures and General Requirements (NIST Handbook 150)," dated February 2006
- National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NIST Handbook 150-22, 2008 Edition, "Voting System Testing (NIST Handbook 150-22)," dated May 2008
- United States 107th Congress Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (Public Law 107-252), dated October 2002
- Test Guidelines Documents: EMI-001A, Test Guidelines for Performing Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Testing," and EMI-002A, "Test Procedure for Testing and Documentation of Radiated and Conducted Emissions Performed on Commercial Products"
- NTS Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 5
- ANSI/NCSL Z540-1, "Calibration Laboratories and Measuring and Test Equipment, General Requirements"
- ISO 10012-1, "Quality Assurance Requirements for Measuring Equipment"
- EAC Requests for Interpretation (RFI) (listed on www.eac.gov)
- EAC Notices of Clarification (NOC) (listed on www.eac.gov)
- EAC Quality Monitoring Program residing on:

http://www.eac.gov/testing\_and\_certification/quality\_monitoring\_program.aspx

- NTS Test Report No. T71379.01-01 Rev B National Certification Test Report for Certification Testing of the Election Systems & Software EVS 5.2.0.0 Voting System
- ES&S EVS 5.2.0.0 Technical Data Package
- ES&S EVS 5.2.0.3 Technical Data Package



## **1.3** Terms and Abbreviations

Table 1-4 defines all terms and abbreviations applicable to this Test Plan.

Term	Abbreviation	Definition
Anomaly		Any non-repeatable testing event that is not the expected result or interrupts the test operations.
Americans with Disabilities Act 1990	ADA	ADA is a wide-ranging civil rights law that prohibits, under certain circumstances, discrimination based on disability.
Configuration Management	СМ	Systems engineering process for establishing and maintaining consistency of a product's performance, functional and physical attributes with its requirements, design and operational information throughout its life
Commercial Off-the- Shelf	COTS	Commercial, readily available hardware or software.
Deficiency		Any repeatable test result that was not the expected result or violates a requirement of the 2005 VVSG.
United States Election Assistance Commission	EAC	Commission created per the Help America Vote Act of 2002, assigned the responsibility for setting voting system standards and providing for the voluntary testing and certification of voting systems.
ES&S Event Log Service	ELS	ES&S Event Log Service is a Windows Service that runs in the background of any active ES&S Election Management software application to monitor the proper functioning of the Windows Event Viewer
Election Management System	EMS	Within the EVS 5.2.0.3 voting system, the EMS is comprised of five components: ElectionWare, ERM, ES&S Event Log Service, VAT Previewer and ExpressVote Previewer.
Election Reporting Manager	ERM	EMS reporting component.
Election Systems and Software	ES&S	Identified vendor doting the equipment under test as part of this test plan.
Engineering Change Order	ECO	
Equipment Under Test	EUT	Refers to the individual system component or multiple piece of the same component
ES&S Voting System	EVS	Proprietary equipment owned by ES&S
Functional Configuration Audit	FCA	Verification of system functions and combination of functions cited in the manufacturer's documentation.
Help America Vote Act	HAVA	Act created by United States Congress in 2002.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers	IEEE	
Intelligent Mark Recognition	IMR	Visible light scanning technology to detect completed ballot targets.

## Table 1-4. Terms and Abbreviations



## **1.3 Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)**

Term	Abbreviation	Definition	
National Institute of Standards and Technology	NIST	Government organization created to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhances economic security and improves our quality of life.	
Notice of Clarification	NOC	Provides further guidance and explanation on the requirements and procedures of the EAC's Voting System Certification or Voting System Testing Laboratory programs.	
Physical Configuration Audit	РСА	Review by accredited test laboratory to compare voting system components submitted for certification testing to the manufacturer's technical documentation, and confirmation the documentation meets national certification requirements.	
Personal Computer	PC	Computer component of the EVS 5.2.0.3 voting system.	
Quality Assurance	QA	Administrative and procedural activities implemented as a way of preventing mistakes or defects.	
Quantity	QTY	Number/Count of items	
Quick Response Code	QR Code	Two-dimensional barcode	
Request for Interpretation	RFI	A means by which a registered Manufacturer or Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) may seek clarification on a specific Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) standard.	
System Under Test	SUT	Refers to the system as a whole (all components)	
Technical Data Package	TDP	Manufacturer documentation related to voting system required to be submitted as a precondition of testing.	
Trusted Build		Final build of source code performed by a trusted source and overseen by the manufacturer which is delivered to the EAC designated repository; also referred to as a "Witness Build".	
Underwriters Laboratories Inc.	UL	Safety consulting and certification company	
Uninterruptible Power Supply	UPS	Electrical apparatus providing emergency power when an input power source fails.	
Voter Assist Terminal	VAT	Electronic ballot marking device component is the ES&S AutoMARK.	
National Technical Systems, Inc.	NTS	Identified VSTL hosting the testing of the equipment listed in this test plan; facilities located in Huntsville, Alabama.	
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program	NVLAP	Program which provides an unbiased third-party test and evaluation program to accredit laboratories in the respective fields to ISO 17025 standard.	
NTS Operating Procedure	OP	NTS Test Method or Test Procedure.	

## Table 1-4. Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)



#### **1.3** Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)

Term	Abbreviation	Definition
Virtual Review Tool	VRT	Test campaign management software used by the EAC and vendors applying for qualification testing.
Voting System Test Laboratory	VSTL	NTS
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines	VVSG	EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0.

#### Table 1-4. Terms and Abbreviations (Continued)

### 1.4 Project Schedule

The project schedule for the test campaign is in Appendix B – Project Schedule.

#### 1.5 Scope of Test

The scope of testing is limited to the modifications introduced into the previously certified EVS 5.2.0.0 voting system. The modifications are described in section 1.1.2.

### 1.5.1 Block Diagram

Figure 1-1 provides a visual system overview of the submitted voting system.




Figure 1-1. System Overview Diagram



#### 1.5.2 System Limits

System limitations remains unchanged for all previously certified components of the EVS 5.2.0.0 voting system.

#### **1.5.3 Supported Languages**

The submitted voting system supports English, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese languages.

#### **1.5.4 Supported Functionality**

Supported functionality remains unchanged for all previously certified components of the EVS 5.2.0.0 voting system.

#### 2.0 PRE-CERTIFICATION TESTING AND ISSUES

This section describes testing performed by either VSTL or the manufacturer prior to submitting the voting system to the EAC.

#### 2.1 Evaluation of Prior VSTL Testing

No prior VSTL testing was submitted for consideration.

#### 2.2 Evaluation of Prior non-VSTL Testing

No prior non-VSTL testing was submitted for consideration.

#### 2.3 Known Field Issues

The EVS 5.2.0.0 voting system has one identified field issue. The RSA Crypto suite used by ElectionWare to generate RSA keys will sometimes create a key that is too short. This causes a key mismatch issue when loading the keys into ExpressVote.



## 3.0 MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR TESTING

The following sections list the materials required to be delivered to facilitate testing of the submitted system.

#### 3.1 Software

Proprietary software and COTS identified in Table 3-1 will be provided by the manufacturer as part of this test campaign.

Software	Software/Firmware Version				
Proprietary Software					
Electionware	4.6.1.0				
Election Reporting Manager (ERM)	8.11.1.0				
ES&S Event Log Service (ELS)	1.5.5.0				
Removable Media Service (RMS)	1.4.5.0				
VAT Previewer	1.8.6.0				
ExpressVote Previewer	1.4.0.0				
COTS S	oftware				
Adobe Acrobat Standard	11				
Cerberus FTP	6.0.7.1				
Microsoft Server 2008	R2 w/ SP1				
Microsoft Windows 7	5.1 w/ SP1				
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable – x64	9.0.30729				
Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x64 Redistributable	10.0.40219				
Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x86 Redistributable	10.0.40219				
Microsoft .net Framework	4.5.1				
Micro Focus RM/COBOL Runtime	12.06				
Symantec Endpoint Protection - Small Business	12.1.4				
Edition 2013					

Table 3-1.	<b>Required</b> V	oting System	Software
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### 3.2 Hardware

Proprietary equipment and COTS identified in Table 3-2 will be provided by the manufacturer as part of this test campaign.

Component	Hardware Version	Firmware Version			
Proprietary Hardware					
ExpressVote Accessible Voting Station	1.0	1.4.0.0			
DS200 Precinct Count Scanner	1.2.1, 1.2.3, & 1.3	2.12.0.0			
DS850 Central Count Scanner	1.0	2.10.0.0			
AutoMARK A100	1.0	1.8.6.0			
AutoMARK A200 (SBC 2.0 & SBC 2.5)	1.1	1.8.6.0			
AutoMARK A300 (SBC 2.0 & SBC 2.5)	1.3	1.8.6.0			
Plastic Ballot Box	1.2 & 1.3	N/A			
Metal Ballot Box	1.0, 1.1, & 1.2	N/A			
	COTS Hardware				
EMS Server – Dell	PowerEdge T710	N/A			
EMS Reporting Workstation – Dell	Optiplex 980	N/A			
EMS Reporting Laptop – Dell	E6410	N/A			
Motorola QR Code Scanner	DS9208	N/A			
Delkin USB Flash Drives	512MB, 1, 2, 4, & 8GB	N/A			
Delkin Compact Flash	1GB	N/A			
DS850 Report Printer	OKI B430dn & B 431dn	N/A			
DS850 Audit Printer	OKI Microline 420	N/A			
Avid Headphones	Avid FV 60	N/A			

Table 3-2.	Required	<b>Voting System</b>	Equipment
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#### 3.3 Test Materials

Table 3-3 describes the test materials required to execute the required testing.

Test Material	Quantity	Make	Model
Ballot on Demand Printer	1	OKI Data	C9650
ES&S Pens	20	BIC	Grip Roller
Ethernet Switch	1	Dell	HNC67M1
CF Card Reader	1	SanDisk	018-6305

**Table 3-3. Required Test Materials** 



## 3.4 Deliverables

The materials listed in Table 3-4 are identified by the manufacturer as materials deliverable to the end users.

Deliverable Material	Version	Description
ExpressVote	Firmware 1.4.0.0; Hardware 1.0	Vote Capture Device
DS200	Firmware 2.12.0.0; Hardware 1.2.1 or	Precinct Ballot
03200	1.2.3 or 1.3	Scanner
AutoMARK A100 or A200 or A300	Firmware 1.8.6.0; Hardware 1.0 or 1.1 or 1.3	Voter Assist Terminal
DS850	Firmware 2.10.0.0; Hardware 1.0	Central Ballot Scanner
OKI Printer	B430dn or B431dn	Laser Report Printer
OKI Printer	Microline 420	Dot Matrix Printer
Headphones	Avid FV 60	Stereo Headphones
Electionware	4.6.1.0	EMS
ERM	8.11.1.0	EMS
ES&S Event Log Service	1.5.5.0	EMS
Removable Media Services	1.4.5.0	EMS
VAT Previewer	1.8.6.0	EMS
EVS 5.2.0.3 Voting System Overview	1.0	TDP Document
EVS 5.2.0.3 System Functionality Description	1.0	TDP Document
ES&S ElectionWare Volume I: Administrator's Guide	4.6	TDP Document
ES&S ElectionWare Volume II: Define User's Guide	4.6	TDP Document
ES&S ElectionWare Volume III: Design User's Guide	4.6	TDP Document
ES&S ElectionWare Volume IV: Deliver User's Guide	4.6	TDP Document
ES&S ElectionWare Volume V: Results User's Guide	4.6	TDP Document
Election Reporting Manager User's Guide	8.1	TDP Document
ExpressVote Operator's Guide	2.1	TDP Document
DS200 Operator's Guide	2.14	TDP Document
DS850 Operator's Guide	2.11	TDP Document
AutoMARK System Operator's Guide	1.8	TDP Document
Voting System Security Specification	1.0	TDP Document
Security Script Description	1.0	TDP Document

## Table 3-4. Voting System Deliverables



#### 3.4 Deliverables (Continued)

Deliverable Material	Version	Description
EMS Client Workstation Secure	1.0	TDP Document
Setup & Configuration Guide	1.0	TDP Document
EMS Server Secure Setup &	1.0	TDP Document
Configuration Guide	1.0	TDP Document
Standalone EMS Workstation		
Secure Setup & Configuration	1.0	TDP Document
Guide		
AutoMARK System Security	12	TDP Document
Specification	12	

#### 3.5 **Proprietary Data**

All data that is considered by the manufacturer as proprietary is marked as such.

#### 4.0 TEST DESIGN AND SPECIFICATIONS

NTS Huntsville personnel shall ensure that all certification testing conducted on the manufacturer's voting system follows NTS Huntsville's procedures for testing, the requirements of the EAC 2005 VVSG, and EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0.

#### 4.1 **Requirements**

To evaluate the modification test requirements, each section of the EAC 2005 VVSG was analyzed to determine the applicable tests required. The following subsections detail the results of this analysis.

#### 4.1.1 Requirements Mapping

Table 4-1 maps the submitted modifications as detailed in Section 1.1.2 to the 2005 VVSG Requirements. In addition, NTS Huntsville will verify and validate that the manufacturer is in compliance with stated QA and CM plans.



#### 4.1.1 Requirements Mapping (Continued)

Change ID	Changed Component	Change Description	Impacted 2005 VVSG Requirement
ENH33843	ElectionWare	Changed the Maryland state profile data element in the ElectionWare Admin Database to disable the default State Results Transfer menu items in ERM.	Vol II Section 6.7
ENH33844	ElectionWare	Include a new version of RSACRYPTO in the ElectionWare Install that now uses the PKCS1 padding scheme to ensure compatibility with the MS Crypto library used by the ExpressVote.	Vol II Section 6.7
BUG33846	ERM	Corrected the display of the District Control File name prompt in certain reporting options tabs.	Vol II Section 6.7
BUG33847	ERM	Resolved the COBOL error that occurs when creating a Results XML File on a hardened system.	Vol II Section 6.7
ENH33845	ERM	Include a new version of RSACRYPTO in the ERM Install that now uses the PKCS1 padding scheme to ensure compatibility with the MS Crypto library used by the ExpressVote.	Vol II Section 6.7
ENH33842	ERM	Eliminate the check for and rebuild of old format results and counter files.	Vol II Section 6.7
N/A	TDP	Voting System Overview	Vol II Section 2.2.1
N/A	TDP	Software Design and Specification - Electionware	Vol II Section 2.5
N/A	TDP	Software Design and Specification - Electionware Database Descriptions	Vol II Section 2.5
N/A	TDP	Software Design and Specification - ERM	Vol II Section 2.5
N/A	TDP	System Change Notes	Vol II Section 2.11

#### Table 4-1. Modification Requirements Mapping

#### 4.1.2 Rationale for Excluded Requirements

NTS Huntsville determined all requirements excluded from the previous test campaign were not applicable to the submitted modifications listed in Section 1.1.2 based on one or more of the following criteria:

- The submitted modification will not impact the specific requirement.
- It was previously determined that the specific requirement was not applicable to the baseline system.
- A NOC or RFI made the specific requirement not applicable.



#### 4.1.3 NOCs

Applicable NOCs released by the EAC as of the date of the Plan pertaining to this test campaign are listed in Table 4-2.

NOC ID	Name
2008-003	EAC Conformance Testing Requirements
2009-002	Laboratory Independence Requirement
2009-005	Development and Submission of Test Plans for Modifications to EAC Certified Systems
2012-02	Clarification of System Identification Tool Functionality
2013-02	Detailed Description of Changes for Modifications

### Table 4-2. Applicable NOCs

#### 4.1.4 RFIs

Applicable RFIs the EAC has released as of the date of the Plan pertaining to this test campaign are listed in Table 4-3.

RFI ID	Name	
2007-02	EAC Decision on Variable Names	
2009-04	EAC Decision on Audit Log Events	
2010-02	EAC Decision on Coding Conventions	
2010-03	EAC Decision on Database Coding Conventions	
2010-05	EAC Decision on Testing of Modifications to a Certified System	
2010-07	EAC Decision on Module Length	
2010-08	EAC Decision on Calling Sequence	
2012-04	EAC Decision on Software Setup Validation	
2013-03	EAC Decision on Timestamps	

#### Table 4-3. Applicable RFIs

#### 4.2 Hardware Configuration and Design

Hardware configuration and design remain unchanged for all previously certified components of the EVS 5.2.0.3.

#### 4.3 Software System Functions

Software system functions remain unchanged for all previously certified components of the EVS 5.2.0.3 voting system.



#### 4.4 Test Case Design

Test cases are designed around specifications and requirements, i.e., what the voting system is supposed to do (per the manufacturers design specifications) and what the voting system is required to do (per the guiding standards document). The tests cases used are primarily functional in nature; however, in certain cases non-functional tests may also be used. The test designer selects both valid and invalid inputs and determines the correct output without any knowledge of the test object's internal structure. The acceptable range for system performance and the expected results for each test case are derived from the manufacturer's documentation and the 2005 VVSG. All test cases are validated and approved by the project lead or other qualified VSTL personnel, i.e., VSTL QA Representative.

#### 4.4.1 Software Module Test Case Design and Data

NTS Huntsville personnel implements component level testing during the Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) for each component and subcomponent exercising the functionality of each as designed and documented. NTS Huntsville will utilize limited structural-based techniques (white-box testing) mainly in the area of Source Code Review and Security Testing. NTS Huntsville will depend heavily on specification-based techniques (black-box testing) for the individual software components. The most common specification-based techniques applied to the voting system during software testing will be "equivalence partitioning", "boundary value", and "pairwise" testing.

- "Equivalence Partitioning" will be used to evaluate specific software functions and data entry points of the voting system for valid and invalid data during the FCA. For software functions and data entry points, an entry will be made for a valid data requirement and at least one invalid data requirement to test for normal and abnormal conditions.
- "Boundary Value" testing will be used to evaluate specific software functions and data entry
  points for minimums and maximums during the FCA. For software functions and data entry
  points, an entry will be made for all minimum and all maximum documented requirements
  to test for normal and abnormal conditions. This technique will be used for numeric ranges
  as well as non-numeric ranges.
- "Pairwise" testing is a combinatorial method of software testing that, for each pair of input parameters to a system, tests all possible discrete combinations of those parameters. NTS Huntsville uses combinatorial test design to identify the minimum number of tests needed to get the coverage required to exercise the functionality. Combinatorial test design enables testers to get greater test coverage with fewer tests. Note that "coverage", as used here, is referring to functional combinatorial coverage, not requirements coverage.



#### 4.4.2 Software Functional Test Case Design and Data

NTS Huntsville personnel shall perform the specification-based technique used at the functional test case level entitled "Use Case." The identified actors and their responsibilities are listed in Table 4-4.

Role/Actor	Responsibility	
Election	Enters the election definition with translation and audio.	
Administrator	Maintains EMS users and the election database.	
Warehouse	Loads the election definition onto the voting equipment.	
Technician	Runs diagnostic test and maintains the units.	
Poll Worker Sets up and closes down the voting equipment on election-day at the precinct		
Poli worker	location.	
Voter	Physically casts the ballot on election-day.	
ADA Voter	Votes unassisted on election-day with special needs.	
Election Official	Reports and audits the election result post-election day.	

Table 4-4.	"Use Case"	Identified Roles a	and Responsibilities
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"Use Case" will be utilized during the FCA with a single pass through each component using only valid data. This pass will be considered the "Master Copy" of data to be passed between interfacing points of applications during integration level testing. If a component downstream in the test process needs data from previous processes, the "Master Copy" of data can be used or altered to accelerate the test process. Known tests that will utilize the "Master Copy" of data at the integration level are Security and Usability.

#### 4.4.3 System-level Test Case Design

System-level testing examines the ability of proprietary software, hardware, and peripherals in addition to the COTS software, hardware, and peripherals to operate as a complete system. NTS Huntsville utilizes test cases designed to ensure that integrated components function as specified by the manufacturer's documentation and meet the requirements of the VVSG.

#### 4.5 Test Specifications

The following subsections provide a brief description of the testing to be performed.



#### 4.5.1 Physical Configuration Audit

The Physical Configuration Audit compares the voting system components submitted for qualification to the manufacturer's technical documentation, and shall include the following activities:

- Establish a configuration baseline of software and hardware to be tested; confirm whether manufacturer's documentation is sufficient for the user to install, validate, operate, and maintain the voting system
- Verify software conforms to the manufacturer's specifications; inspect all records of manufacturer's release control system; if changes have been made to the baseline version, verify manufacturer's engineering and test data are for the software version submitted for certification
- If the hardware is non-COTS, NTS Huntsville will review drawings, specifications, technical data, and test data associated with system hardware to establish system hardware baseline associated with software baseline
- Review manufacturer's documents of user acceptance test procedures and data against system's functional specifications; resolve any discrepancy or inadequacy in manufacturer's plan or data prior to beginning system integration functional and performance tests
- Subsequent changes to baseline software configuration made during testing, as well as system hardware changes that may produce a change in software operation are subject to re-examination

#### 4.5.2 Functional Configuration Audit

The functional configuration audit encompasses an examination of manufacturer's tests, and the conduct of additional tests, to verify that the system hardware and software perform all the functions described in the manufacturer's documentation submitted in the TDP. In addition to functioning according to the manufacturer's documentation, tests will be conducted to ensure that requirements of Volume II section 6.7 and all other applicable EAC 2005 VVSG requirements are met. This testing is accomplished through a process called sequencing.

Sequencing is the act of navigating through the user interface to verify that the system performs as described by the manufacturer and does not violate any of the VVSG requirements. The path that the tester navigates follows the logical flow of accomplishing task required to conduct an election. For example, a task in conducting an election is to add a candidate. The tester will follow the flow of the user interface to add the candidate to a contest. If there are multiple ways to achieve this, then each method will be tested. This process will continue until all tasks for conducting an election are completed. Any paths, or combination of paths, that are determined to be at risk for failure that are outside of the normal flow of the interface will be tested on an individual basis.



#### 4.5.3 TDP Evaluation Specifications

NTS Huntsville qualified personnel utilize a TDP Review Matrix which lists every EAC 2005 VVSG requirement pertaining to TDP review. NTS Huntsville will review the modified documents listed in section 1.1.3 and other documents required to execute testing. NTS Huntsville will record the results of the review of each document to the applicable requirements listed in the TDP Review Matrix.

During the TDP review process, each document will be reviewed for completeness, clarity, correctness, and continuity. The review results will be formally reported to manufacturer. If a revised document is received, it will be re-reviewed as discussed in this section. The TDP will be continued to be reviewed during the entire testing process as these documents will be utilized to set up the systems, verify correct operational results and in other tests as needed. At the end of the TDP review process, a Deficiency Report will be issued listing the non-compliant items on a document-by-document basis, if applicable.

#### 4.5.4 Source Code Review

As the source code is received, a SHA256 hash value will be created for each source code file. NTS Huntsville source code team will conduct a visual scan of each line of source code for an initial review and every line of modified source code for acceptance for all languages. This is done to verify compliance of EAC 2005 VVSG coding standards. Each identified violation shall be recorded by making notes of the standards violation along with directory name, file name, and line number.

In circumstance where the coding language facilitates the use of automated tools, NTS will develop a process for conducting the source code review with an automated tool. In addition, NTS Huntsville personnel will perform a manual 10% review of all automated source code review to verify that the automated tool was configured properly.

A technical report of all identified violations will be sent to the manufacturer for resolution on a regular basis. All revised source code will be checked for corrections until the final issue is resolved. At the end of the source code review process, a Deficiency will be issued listing all non-compliances. The results will be included in the final test report.

Unmodified, general purpose COTS non-voting software (e.g., operating systems, programming language compilers, database management systems, and web browsers) is not subject to the detailed examinations specified in this section; however, NTS Huntsville personnel will examine such software to ensure that the specific version of software being used is identical to the design specification in order to confirm that the software has not been modified. NTS Huntsville will verify by downloading the software directly from the manufacturer site, verifying against NRSL, or by being provided original OEM discs.

If there is COTS generated software source code, NTS Huntsville qualified personnel will inspect the COTS generated software source code in preparation of test plans and to provide some minimal scanning or sampling to check for embedded code or unauthorized changes. For purposes of code analysis, the COTS units shall be treated as unexpanded macros. These will be identified in the Test Report.

The portions of COTS software that have been modified by the manufacturer in any manner are subject to review. Source code generated by a COTS package and embedded in software modules for



compilation or interpretation will be provided in human readable form to NTS Huntsville personnel to enable review.

#### 4.6 Source Code Build Process

NTS Huntsville utilizes two build processes, a compliance build and a trusted build. Compliance builds for all software builds that are not required to be witnessed by the vendor. This build process follows the documented procedures of a "Trusted Build" in the EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0, with two exceptions: The image products will not be submitted to the EAC, and no manufacturer representative shall be required to be present or on-site for these builds. The "Trusted Build" process is described in section 5.6 of the EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual, version 1.0.

#### 4.7 QA & CM System Review

The manufacturer submitted QA Plan and CM Plan will be reviewed. The review will be limited to only the changes within this modification to determine compliance with EAC 2005 VVSG Volume II Section 2, and Volume I Sections 8 and 9, EAC stated requirements, and with the requirements of the internal manufacturer documentation. In addition, the manufacturer TDP documentation package will be reviewed to determine if the manufacturer's QA Plan and the CM Plan are being followed. The results of the TDP review shall be entered on a spreadsheet as previously described in Section 4.6 of this test plan. The results of the TDP review, including the QA and CM compliance results of the Technical Data Package Review, will be included in the final test report.

#### 5.0 TEST DATA

#### 5.1 Test Data Recording

All equipment utilized for test data recording shall be identified in the test data package. For hardware environmental and operational testing, the equipment shall be listed on the Instrumentation Equipment Sheet for each test. The output test data shall be recorded in an appropriate manner as to allow for data analysis. For source code and TDP reviews, results shall be compiled in output reports and submitted to the manufacturer for resolution.

Additionally, all test results, including functional test data, will be recorded on the relevant NTS Huntsville Operating Procedures and Test Cases. Results will also be recorded real-time in engineering log books. Incremental reports will be submitted to the manufacturer and the EAC at the completion of major test areas to communicate progress and results as deemed necessary by the stakeholders.

#### 5.2 Test Data Criteria

NTS Huntsville will evaluate all test data against the manufacturer provided TDP and the requirements set forth in the EAC 2005 VVSG. Per the EAC 2005 VVSG, these parameters shall encompass the test tolerances and samples to define the minimum number of combinations or alternatives of input and output conditions that can be exercised to constitute an acceptable test of the parameters involved. The parameters will also include events with criteria defining the maximum number of interrupts, halts, or other system breaks that may occur due to non-test conditions (excluding events from which recovery occurs automatically or where a relevant status message is displayed).



#### 6.0 TEST PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS

NTS Huntsville is an independent testing laboratory for systems and components under harsh environments, including dynamic and climatic extremes as well as the testing of electronic voting systems. NTS Huntsville holds the following accreditations:

- ISO-9001:2000
- NVLAP Accredited ISO 17025:2005
- EAC Accredited VSTL, NIST 150,150-22
- A2LA Accredited (Certification No.'s 0214.40, 0214.41, and 0214.42)
- FCC Approved Contractor Test Site (Part 15, 18)

#### 6.1 Test Facilities

All testing will be conducted at the NTS Huntsville, AL facility unless otherwise annotated. Environmental non-operating (storage) and operating hardware testing will be conducted utilizing an adequately sized environmental test chamber or dynamic vibration (shaker) system equipped with the required data gathering support equipment. All remaining operating hardware tests will be conducted at the appropriate test site with the required support equipment. All instrumentation, measuring, and test equipment used in the performance of this test program will be listed on the Instrumentation Equipment Sheet for each test and shall be calibrated in accordance with NTS Quality Assurance Program, which complies with the requirements of ANSI/NCSL Z540-1 and ISO 10012-1.

Standards used in performing all calibrations are traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) by report number and date. When no national standards exist, the standards are traceable to international standards or the basis for calibration is otherwise documented.

Unless otherwise specified herein, all remaining tests, including system level functional testing, shall be performed at standard ambient conditions outlined in Table 6-1.

Event	Ambient Range
Temperature	68 to 75 degrees (°) Fahrenheit (F)
Relative Humidity	Local Site Humidity
Atmospheric Pressure	Local Site Pressure

#### **Table 6-1. Standard Ambient Conditions**



#### 6.1 Test Facilities (Continued)

The following tolerances listed in Table 6-2 shall be used unless otherwise specified herein.

Phenomena	Tolerance Allowance
Time	± 5%
Temperature	± 3.6°F (2°C)
Vibration Amplitude	± 10%
Vibration Frequency	± 2%
	20 to 500 Hertz ± 1.5 dB
Random Vibration Acceleration	500 to 2000 Hertz ± 3.0 dB
Random Overall grms	± 1.5 dB
Acoustic Overall Sound Pressure Level	+4/-2 dB

#### Table 6-2.Test Tolerances

Deviations to the above tolerances may be submitted by the responsible test laboratory with sufficient engineering information to substantiate the deviation request, but only when best effort technique and system limitations indicate the need for a deviation.

#### 6.2 Test Set-up

All voting system components (hardware and software), shall be received and documented utilizing NTS Huntsville Receiving Ticket (QP HSV-150, 05/04/15) and proper QA procedures. When voting system hardware is received, each test article will be unpacked and inspected for obvious signs of degradation and/or damage that may have occurred during transit. Noticeable degradation and/or damage, if present, shall be recorded, photographed, and the manufacturer shall be notified. NTS Huntsville VSTL personnel will notify NTS Huntsville QA personnel that the equipment is ready for receipt inspection. QA personnel shall record the serial numbers and part numbers. Comparison shall be made between those numbers recorded and those listed on the shipper's manifest. Any discrepancies noted shall be brought to the attention of the manufacturer representative for resolution. All TDP and source code modules received will be inventoried and maintained by the Project Lead assigned to testing.

For test setup, the system will be configured as it would for normal field use. This includes connecting all supporting equipment and peripherals. NTS Huntsville will properly configure and initialize the system, and verify that it is ready to be tested by following the procedures detailed in the voting system TDP.



#### 6.3 Test Sequence and Description

The components of the voting system will undergo testing to verify that the modification performs as described by the manufacturer and meets the requirements of the 2005 VVSG. The required functional tests are outlined in the subsections below. The sequence will follow the schedule in Appendix B – Project Schedule.

#### 6.3.1 Physical Configuration Audit

NTS Huntsville will perform a physical configuration audit on the submitted hardware to verify that it is unmodified from the certified EVS 5.2.0.0 hardware.

#### 6.3.2 Functional Configuration Audit

The FCA for the EVS 5.2.0.3 campaign will include review of modified elements of the Electionware, and ERM. The FCA tests will be designed per the specifications in section 4.5.3. During the FCA, both normal and abnormal data was input into the system to attempt to introduce errors and test for error recovery.

#### 6.3.3 TDP

NTS Huntsville will ensure that all submitted modifications are accurately documented and that the documents adhere to the requirements of the 2005 VVSG. A complete listing of the EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP is located in Appendix A – Technical Data Package.

#### 6.3.4 Source Code Review

The source code review of EVS 5.2.0.3 will be based on the source code changes from EVS 5.2.0.0 to EVS 5.2.0.3.

#### 6.4 Test Operations Procedure

These subsections address the procedures that NTS will follow during this modification testing campaign.



#### 6.4.1 Pass/Fail Criteria

The PASS/FAIL criteria at the Component Level will be based on the expected result. If the System Under Test (SUT) performs as expected, the test is considered as passed. If the SUT does not perform as expected, the test will be evaluated for tester, test procedure, or test equipment errors. If it is determined there were no tester, test procedure, or test equipment errors, the test will be repeated in an attempt to reproduce the results. If the results cannot be reproduced, the anomaly will be logged and monitored throughout the test campaign and subsequent testing efforts. If the results can be reproduced and the expected results are not met, the SUT will have failed the test. NTS Huntsville personnel will document the error and track the error through resolution.

The PASS/FAIL criterion for System Level testing is whether the system can continue to operate as expected. The System Level test is considered as passed if either 1) no errors are found, or 2) an error is encountered but the system continues to operate and engineering analysis determines that the root cause does not affect system level testing. The system level test is considered failed when an error is encountered and the system is too unstable to continue or engineering analysis determines the root cause could affect further testing. If an error occurs during system level testing, the error shall be documented. If the voting system is able to recover and continue, the test will continue. If the error causes the system to become unstable, the test shall be halted. All errors documented during System Level Testing shall be tracked through resolution.

#### 6.4.2 Anomalies

NTS Huntsville defines an anomaly as any unexpected result and/or event that deviates from what is standard, normal, or expected in which no root cause has been determined. All anomalies are logged and monitored throughout the test campaign and subsequent testing efforts. Anomalies may become deficiencies when a root cause is established.

#### 6.4.3 Deficiencies and Resolutions

NTS Huntsville defines a deficiency as any repeatable test result or event that is counter to the expected result or violates the specified requirements. The manufacturer will be required to submit a root cause analysis and correct any deficiency before testing can be resumed. Engineering analysis will be performed to determine what effect the resolution has on the component. A determination will be made whether Regression Testing will be sufficient or a complete re-test is necessary. All deficiencies and their resolutions will be documented on the NTS Huntsville Deficiency tracking system and the EAC Virtual Review Tool.

#### 6.4.4 Test Results and Assessment

NTS Huntsville personnel will test every EAC 2005 VVSG requirement impacted by the submitted modification. NTS Huntsville personnel will report all deficiencies discovered during this test campaign to the manufacturer and the EAC. If NTS Huntsville determines there is not enough data to ensure a requirement was met, the test plan will be altered and further testing will be done.



#### 6.4.5 Terms of NTS Huntsville Recommendation for Certification

The EAC has the final decision as to whether the system meets all the requirements for an EAC-certified system. NTS Huntsville will either recommend approval, if the system meets all applicable sections of the VVSG, or report that the system does not meet all applicable sections of the VVSG.



**APPENDIX A – TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE** 



## A.1 Technical Data Package

The documents listed in Table A-1 comprise the EVS 5.2.0.3 Voting System TDP.

EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP Documents	Version	Doc No.	Document Code
Sys	tem Overvi	ew	
Voting System Overview	1.0	01-01	EVS5203_C_D_0100_SysOvr
System Fun	ctionality D	Description	
System Functionality Description	1.0	02-01	EVS5203_C_D_0200_SFD
AutoMARK System Functionality Description	2.0	02-02	AutoMARK_ESS_System_Functionality
Automark System Functionality Description	2.0	02-02	_AQS-18-5001-001-R
System Ha	rdware Spe	cification	
AutoMARK System Hardware Overview	4	03-01	AutoMARK_ESS_System_Hardware
			_Overview_AQS-18-5002-000-S
AutoMARK System Hardware Specification	em Hardware Specification 3 03-02 AutoMARK_ESS_System_Hardware		
			_Specification_AQS-18-5000-001-F
System Hardware Specification – DS200 HW Rev 1.2	3.0	03-03	DS200HW_M_SPC_0312_HWSpec
System Hardware Specification – DS200 HW Rev 1.3	4.0	03-04	DS200HW_M_SPC_0313_HWSpec
System Hardware Specification – DS850 HW Rev 1.0	1.1	03-05	DS850HW_M_SPC_0310_HWSpec
System Hardware Specification – ExpressVote HW Rev	3.0	03-06	ExpressVoteHW_M_SPC_0310_HWSpec
1.0			
Software De	esign and Sp	pecification	1
AutoMARK Ballot Image Processing Specifications	11	04-01	AQS-13-5002-003-S
AutoMARK Ballot Scanning and Printing Specification	9	04-02	AQS-13-5002-007-S
AutoMARK Driver API Specification	9	04-03	AQS-13-5000-002-F
AutoMARK Embedded Database Interface	12	04-04	AQS-13-5002-005-S
Specifications		04 04	
AutoMARK GUI Design Specifications	10	04-05	AQS-13-5001-005-R
AutoMARK Operating Software Design Specifications	10	04-06	AQS-13-5001-002-R
AutoMARK Operations and Diagnostic Log	6	04-07	AQS-18-5002-004-S
Specifications	Ŭ	04 07	
AutoMARK Programming Specifications Details	11	04-08	AQS-13-5001-011-R
AutoMARK Software Design Specifications	10	04-09	AQS-13-5001-004-S
AutoMARK Software Design Specification Overview	1.8	04-10	AutoMARK ESS Software Design Spec
	1.0	04 10	Overview
AutoMARK Software Development Environment	10	04-11	AQS-13-5001-006-R
AutoMARK Software Diagnostics Specifications	10	04-12	AQS-13-5000-004-F
AutoMARK Software Standards Specification	10	04-13	AQS-13-4000-000-S
ES&S Coding Standards	3.0	04-14	ESSSYS_D_P_0400_CodingStandards
ES&S System Development Program	2.0	04-15	ESSSYS_SG_P_0400_SystemDevProgram
Software Design Specifications DS200	1.0	04-16	EVS5203_D_SDS00_DS200
Software Design Specifications DS850	1.0	04-17	EVS5203_D_SDS00_DS850
	EVS5203_D_SDS00_Election		EVS5203_D_SDS00_ElectionWare04_Pos
ElectionWare PostgreSQL Table and Field Descriptions		04-02	tgreSQL Table and Field Descriptions
			(Folder)
ElectionWare Appendix 4: ElectionWare PostgreSQL	1.0	04-02-01	ElectionWare04_Readme
Table and Field Descriptions	1.0	04-02-01	
Software Design and Specification - ELS	1.0	04-18	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ELS
Software Design and Specification - ERM	1.0	04-19	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ERM
Software Design and Specification – ERM Appendices	1.0	04-20	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ERM01_Appendices

### Table A-1. EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP



## A.1 Technical Data Package (Continued)

The documents listed in Table A-1 comprise the EVS 5.2.0.3 Voting System TDP.

## Table A-1. EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP (Continued)

EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP Documents	Version	Doc No.	Document Code
Software Design and Specification - ExpressVote	1.0	04-21	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ExpressVote
Software Design and Specification - Electionware	1.0	04-22	EVS5203_SDS00_ElectionWare
Software Design and Specification - ELS	1.0	04-18	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ELS
Software Design and Specification - ERM	1.0	04-19	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ERM
Software Design and Specification – ERM Appendices	1.0	04-20	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ERM01_Appendices
Software Design and Specification - ExpressVote	1.0	04-21	EVS5203_D_SDS00_ExpressVote
Software Design and Specification - Electionware	1.0	04-22	EVS5203_SDS00_ElectionWare
System Test/V	/erification	Specificatio	n
Voting System Test Plan ES&S Voting System 5.2.0.3	1.0	05-01	EVS5203_QA_D_0500_SysTestPlan
Common Industry Format Usability Test Report – AutoMARK (VAT)	1.0	05-02-01	AMVATHW_P_D_0510_CIFRptAMVAT
CIF Usability Test Report – DS200 1.2.1	1.2.1	05-02-02	DS200HW_P_D_0512_CIFRptDS200
CIF Usability Test Report – ExpressVote 1.0	N/A	05-02-03	ExpressVoteHW_P_D_0509_ CIFRptExpressVote
System Se	ecurity Spec	cification	
AutoMARK System Security Specification	6	06-01	AutoMARK ESS System Security Specification AQS-18-5002-001-S
System Security Specification	1.0	06-02	EVS5203_CM_SPC00_SysSecuritySpec
Hardening Procedures for ES&S	1.0	00-02	EVS5203_CM_SPC00_SyssecuritySpec
	1.0	06-03	HardeningProcedures
Security Script Description	1.0	06-04	EVS5203_CM_SPC02_SecScriptDesc
	perations P		
Network Setup Guide	1.0	07-01	EVS5203_CM_SOP_NetworkConfigGuide
System Operations Procedures – AutoMARK	1.0	07-02	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_AMVAT
System Operations Procedures – DS200	1.0	07-03	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_DS200
System Operations Procedures – DS850	1.0	07-04	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_DS850
System Operations Procedures – Event Log Service	1.0	07-05	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_ELS
System Operations Procedures – Election Reporting Manager	1.0	07-06	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_ERM
Electionware Administrator's Guide	1.0	07-07	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_EW01Admin
Electionware Define: User's Guide	1.0	07-08	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_EW02Define
Electionware Design: User's Guide	1.0	07-09	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_EW03Design
Electionware Deliver: User's Guide	1.0	07-10	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_EW04Deliver
Electionware Results: User's Guide	1.0	07-11	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_EW05Results
System Operations Procedures – ExpressPass	1.0	07-12	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_ExpressPass
System Operations Procedures – ExpressVote	1.0	07-13	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_ExpressVote
System M	aintenance	Manuals	
System Maintenance Manual – ES&S AutoMARK	1.0	08-1	EVS5203_DOC_SMM_AMVAT
System Maintenance Manual – ES&S DS200	1.0	08-2	EVS5203_DOC_SMM_DS200
System Maintenance Manual – ES&S DS850	1.0	08-3	EVS5203_DOC_SMM_DS850
System Maintenance Manual – ES&S ExpressVote	1.0	08-4	EVS5203_DOC_SMM_ExpressVote



## A.1 Technical Data Package (Continued)

The documents listed in Table A-1 comprise the EVS 5.2.0.3 Voting System TDP.

## Table A-1. EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP (Continued)

EVS 5.2.0.3 TDP Documents	Version	Doc No.	Document Code
Personnel De	ployment a	nd Training	
Personnel Deployment and Training Program	3.0	09-01	ESSSYS_T_D_0900_TrainingProgram
Configurati	on Manage	ment Plan	
Configuration Management Program	2.0	10-1	ESSSYS_CM_P_1000_CMProgram
Technical Documentation Program	5.0	10-2	ESSSYS_DOC_P_1000_TDProgram
C	A Program		
Manufacturing Quality Assurance Plan	2.0	11-01	ESSSYS_M_P_1100
Manufacturing Quality Assurance Plan		11-01	_MNFQualityAssurancePlan
Software Quality Assurance Program	2.0	11-02	ESSSYS_QA_P_1100
Software Quality Assurance Program	2.0	11-02	_SoftwareQualityAssuranceProgram
Software/Firmware Acceptance	2.0	11-03	ESSSYS_QA_L_1100
	2.0	11-05	_SoftwareFirmwareAcceptance
System	n Change N	lotes	
System Change Notes	1.0	12-01	EVS5203_DOC_D_1200_ChangeNotes
Other	TDP Docun	nents	
ES&S Ballot Production Handbook	1.0	13-01	EVS5203_DOC_SOP_BPG

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## **APPENDIX B – PROJECT SCHELDULE**



## **B.1 - Project Schedule**

Table B-1 provides the project schedule based on the estimated time to complete each task.

## Table B-1.Project Schedule

		Task	Task Name	Duration Sta	art	Finish	Predecessors		Jun 28, '15							
	0	Mode						Т	F	S	S	м	т	W	Т	
1		2	Application Process		ri 6/26/15	Wed 7/1/15		_ '	Ý				1			
2		Þ	Application Submission		ri 6/26/15	Fri 6/26/15		_	_							
3		3	EAC Review			Wed 7/1/15		_						<b>_</b> 1		
4		3	Test Plan	1000 CONTRACTOR 1000 CONTRACTOR 1000	hu 7/2/15	Wed 8/19/15		_							_	
5		-	Test Plan Submission		nu 7/2/15	Thu 7/2/15	3	_						4	-	
6		-	EAC Review		lon 7/6/15	Fri 7/31/15	5									
7		-	NTS Comment Resolution	3 days N	lon 8/3/15	Wed 8/5/15	6									
8		-	EAC Re-Review	10 days T	nu 8/6/15	Wed 8/19/15	7									
9		-	Source Code Review	1 day T	nu 7/2/15	Thu 7/2/15	3									
10		-	Trusted Build	1 day 🛛 N	lon 7/6/15	Mon 7/6/15	9									
11		-	TDP Review	5 days N	lon 7/6/15	Fri 7/10/15	9									
12		ԱՄ ՆՄ	Function Testing	8 days T	ue 7/7/15	Thu 7/16/15	10									
13		-	Test Report	34 days F	ri 7/17/15	Wed 9/2/15										
14		-	Test Report Submission	1 day F	ri 7/17/15	Fri 7/17/15	12									
15	]	2	EAC Review	20 days N	lon 7/20/15	Fri 8/14/15	14									
16	1	-	NTS Comment Resolution	1 day 🛛 🕅	lon 8/17/15	Mon 8/17/15	15									
17	1	3	EAC Re-Review	10 days T	ue 8/18/15	Mon 8/31/15	16									
18	1	-	NTS Certified Report Issuance	2 days T	ue 9/1/15	Wed 9/2/15	17									
			Task		External N		•					lup				
Split				Inactive Ta	isk 🗌		Man	ual Su	ımma	ry						
Project: Project1 Milestone Date: Wed 7/1/15 Summary		Milestone	•	Inactive M	ilestone 🔍	>	Star	-only			E					
			Summary		Inactive Su	ımmary 🗸		Finis	h-only	1		а				
ate:			Project Summary		Manual Ta			Dead				4				
ate:					ivianual 1d			Deat	anne							
ate:			External Tasks		Duration-			Prog	ress			_			_	
ate:					Duration-			Prog	ress			-			-	