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Chapter 3: Usability, Accessibility, and Privacy Requirements

3.1 Overview

The importance of usability and accessibility in the design of voting systems has become increasingly apparent. It is not sufficient that the internal operation of these systems be correct; in addition, voters and election officials must be able to use them effectively and efficiently.

There are some properties of voting systems that make good design especially difficult:

  • The voting task itself can be fairly complex; the voter may have to navigate an electronic ballot, choose multiple candidates in a single contest, understand the effect of party-line voting, or decide on ballot questions written in legal language;
  • Voting is performed infrequently (compared with tasks such as using an ATM), so there is relatively limited opportunity for voters and poll workers to gain familiarity with the process;
  • Changes in the election process, including new voting equipment, may require voters and poll workers to use new and unfamiliar procedures; and
  • The set of "users" for voting equipment is exceptionally diverse. The voting public encompasses a broad range of factors, including physical and cognitive abilities, language skills, and technology experience.

3.1.1 Purpose

The challenge, then, is to provide a voting system that voters can use comfortably, efficiently, and with justified confidence that they have cast their votes correctly. The requirements within this section are intended to serve that goal. Three broad principles motivate this section:

  1. All eligible voters are to have access to the voting process without discrimination. The voting process must be accessible to individuals with disabilities. The voting process includes access to the polling place, instructions on how to vote, initiating the voting session, selecting among contest choices, review of the ballot, final submission of the ballot, and getting help when needed.
  2. Each cast ballot must accurately capture the selections made by the voter. The ballot must be presented to the voter in a manner that is clear and usable. Voters should encounter no difficulty or confusion regarding the process for recording their votes.
  3. The voting process must preserve the secrecy of the ballot. The voting process should preclude anyone else from determining the content of a voter's ballot, without the voter's cooperation. If such a determination is made against the wishes of the voter, then his or her privacy has been violated.

Note that these principles refer to the entire voting process. The VVSG applies only to voting systems; other aspects of the process (such as administrative rules and procedures) are outside the scope of the VVSG, but are nonetheless crucial for the full achievement of the principles.

3.1.2 Special terminology

Several uncommon terms are used in this section. For the convenience of the reader, they are defined below. Many other technical terms frequently used throughout the VVSG are defined in Appendix A. Note in particular the distinctions among these terms: voting process, voting system, voting device, voting session, and voting station.

  • Accessible Voting Station (Acc-VS) - the voting station specially equipped for individuals with disabilities referred to in HAVA 301 (a)(3)(B).
  • Audio-Tactile Interface (ATI) - a voter interface designed not to require visual reading of a ballot. Audio is used to convey information to the voter and sensitive tactile controls allow the voter to convey information to the voting system.
  • Common Industry Format (CIF) - the format to be used for summative usability test reporting, described in ISO/IEC 25062:2006 "Common Industry Format (CIF) for Usability Test Reports" [ISO06e].
  • Summative Usability Testing - evaluation of a product with representative users and tasks designed to measure the usability (defined as effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction) of the complete product. The purpose of a summative test is to evaluate a product through defined measures, rather than diagnosis and correction of specific design problems, as in formative testing.
  • Voter-Editable Ballot Device (VEBD) - voting systems such as DREs and EBMs that present voters with an editable ballot (as opposed to manually-marked paper ballots), allowing them easily to change their votes prior to final casting of the ballot. "VEBD-V" denotes the visual interface of such systems and "VEBD-A" denotes the audio interface.
  • Voting Performance Protocol (VPP) - a carefully defined method for measuring how well subjects perform various voting tasks within a controlled experiment.

3.1.3 Interaction of usability and accessibility requirements

All the requirements in Section 3 have the purpose of improving the quality of interaction between voters and voting systems. Please note how Sections 3.2 and 3.3 work together:

  • The requirements for general usability in Section 3.2 apply to ALL voting systems as indicated by their “Applies to” clause, including the Acc-VS. They cover the features that are applicable both to the general population and to voters with disabilities. In particular, note that the Acc-VS is classified as a Voter-Editable Ballot Device and therefore all VEBD requirements apply to the Acc-VS. Requirements for any alternative languages required by state or federal law are also included under Section 3.2.
  • The requirements for accessibility in Section 3.3 cover only those features that are mandatory for the accessible voting station (Acc-VS) in addition to the general usability requirements. For instance, an audio interface would be of interest mainly to those with vision or other reading disabilities, but not to those who can use a visual interface. Therefore, to determine what usability features are required of the Acc-VS, one must examine both Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The features of the Acc-VS may also assist those not usually described as having a disability, e.g., voters with poor reading vision or somewhat limited dexterity.

3.2 General Usability Requirements

The voting system should support a process that provides a high level of usability for all voters. The goal is for voters to be able to negotiate the process effectively, efficiently, and comfortably.

Many of the mandatory voting system standards in HAVA Section 301 [HAVA02] relate to the interaction between the voter and the voting system:


a. Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for federal office shall meet the following requirements:

1. In general.--

A. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall--

i. Permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;

ii. Provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and

iii. If the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office -

I. Notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot;

II. Notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and

III. Provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.

B. A state or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by -

i. Establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and

ii. Providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error).

C. The voting system shall ensure that any notification required under this paragraph preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.


The requirements of this section are intended to support these basic usability standards of HAVA.

3.2.1 Performance Requirements

Usability is defined generally as a measure of the effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction achieved by a specified set of users with a given product in the performance of specified tasks. In the context of voting, the primary user is the voter (although the equipment is used by poll workers as well), the product is the voting system, and the primary task is the correct recording of the votes (although other tasks are associated with poll workers as users, e.g. system setup).

Additional requirements for task performance are independence and privacy: the voter should normally be able to complete the voting task without assistance from others, and the votes should be private. Lack of independence or privacy may adversely affect effectiveness (e.g., by possibly inhibiting the voter's free choice) and efficiency (e.g., by slowing down the process).

General usability is covered by both high-level performance-based requirements (in this section) and design requirements (in following sections). Whereas the latter require the presence of specific features generally thought to promote usability, the former directly address metrics for effectiveness (e.g., correct capture of voter selections), efficiency (e.g., time taken to vote), and satisfaction. The voting system is tested by having groups of people (representing voters) attempt to perform various typical voting tasks. The requirement is met only if those tasks are accomplished with a specified degree of success.

3.2.1.1 Overall performance metrics

The requirements of this section set benchmarks for the usability of the voting system as a whole. There are three performance requirements that deal with effectiveness and two reporting requirements, one for efficiency and one for satisfaction.The metrics are defined as follows:

  • Total Completion Score – the proportion of users who successfully cast a ballot (whether or not the ballot contains erroneous votes). Failure to cast a ballot might involve problems such as a voter simply “giving up” during the voting session because of an inability to operate the system, or a mistaken belief that one has successfully operated the casting mechanism.
  • Perfect Ballot Index – the ratio of the number of cast ballots containing no erroneous votes to the number of cast ballots containing one or more errors (either a vote for an unintended choice, or a missing vote).
  • Voter Inclusion Index – a measure of both voting accuracy and consistency. It is based on mean accuracy and the associated standard deviation. Accuracy per voter depends on how many “voting opportunities” within each ballot are performed correctly. A low value for the standard deviation of these individual accuracy scores indicates higher consistency of performance across voters..
  • Average Voting Session Time – mean time taken per voter to complete the process of activating, filling out, and casting the ballot.
  • Average Voter Confidence – mean confidence level expressed by the voters that the system successfully recorded their votes.

Because of the statistical nature of the testing, numerical results must be interpreted very carefully. The numbers have meaning only within the context of the Voting Performance Protocol (VPP). Note especially that the tests associated with these requirements are designed as repeatable controlled experiments and not as “realistic” measures of voting behavior, as might be found in a wide variety of voting contexts. Please see [HFP07] for full details.

Preliminary research at the direction of the TGDC that included experimentation with a variety of voting systems has allowed the Human Factors Subcommittee of the TGDC to judge that the following benchmark values would allow better systems to pass the test, while preventing certification of poorer systems:

These tentative values may be adjusted based on planned research to be conducted with additional systems. The TGDC may also consider whether the benchmarks should be strengthened in anticipation of improvements in the design of future voting systems.

3.2.1.1-A Total completion performance

The system SHALL achieve a Total Completion Score of at least 98% as measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting System

Test Reference: Performance

3.2.1.1-B Perfect ballot performance

The system SHALL achieve a Perfect Ballot Index of at least 2.33 as measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting System

Test Reference: Performance

3.2.1.1-C Voter inclusion performance

The system SHALL achieve a voter inclusion index of at least 0.35 as measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting System

Test Reference: Performance

3.2.1.1-D Usability metrics from the Voting Performance Protocol

The test lab SHALL report the metrics for usability of the voting system, as measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting system

Source: New requirement

3.2.1.1-D.1 Effectiveness metrics for usability

The test lab SHALL report all the effectiveness metrics for usability as defined and measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting system

Source: New requirement

3.2.1.1-D.2 Voting session time

The test lab SHALL report the Average Voting Session Time, as measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting system

DISCUSSION

This requirement encourages systems to enable voters to vote with reasonable speed. Note that this requirement does not apply to the audio interface of a system, or to the use of special input devices for voters with dexterity disabilities.

Source: New requirement

3.2.1.1-D.3 Average voter confidence

The test lab SHALL report the Average Voter Confidence, as measured by the VPP.

Applies To: Voting system

Source: New requirement

3.2.1.2 Manufacturer testing

3.2.1.2-A Usability testing by manufacturer for general population

The manufacturer SHALL conduct summative usability tests on the voting system using individuals who are representative of the general population and SHALL report the test results, using the Common Industry Format, as part of the TDP.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

DISCUSSION

Voting system developers are required to conduct realistic usability tests on the final product before submitting the system to conformance testing. This is to encourage early detection and resolution of usability problems.

3.2.2 Functional capabilities

The usability of the voting process is enhanced by the presence of certain functional capabilities. These capabilities differ somewhat depending on whether or not the system presents an editable interface within which voters can easily change their votes (typically an electronic screen) or an interface in which voters must obtain a new ballot to make changes (typically a manually-marked paper ballot).

3.2.2-A Notification of effect of overvoting

If the voter selects more than the allowable number of choices within a contest, the voting system SHALL notify the voter of the effect of this action before the ballot is cast and counted.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

In the case of manual systems, this may be achieved through appropriately placed instructions. This requirement has no force for VEBD systems, since they prevent overvoting in the first place.

3.2.2-B Undervoting to be permitted

The voting system SHALL allow the voter, at the voter’s choice, to submit an undervoted ballot without correction.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.2-C Correction of ballot

The voting system SHALL provide the voter the opportunity to correct the ballot for either an undervote or overvote before the ballot is cast and counted.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

In the case of manual systems, this may be achieved through appropriately placed written instructions. Some corrections may require the voter to obtain a new paper ballot from a poll worker. Also, note the requirements on precinct-count optical scanners in Section 3.2.2.2 below.

3.2.2-D Notification of ballot casting

If and only if the voter successfully casts the ballot, then the system SHALL so notify the voter.

Applies To: DRE, PCOS

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this requirement is to provide feedback to voters to assure them that the voting session has been completed. Note that either a false notification of success or a missing confirmation of actual success violates this requirement.

3.2.2.1 Editable interfaces

Voting systems such as DREs and EBMs present voters with an editable interface, allowing them to easily change their votes prior to final casting of the ballot.

3.2.2.1-A Prevention of overvotes

The VEBD SHALL prevent voters from selecting more than the allowable number of choices for each contest.

Applies To: VEBD

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

This requirement does not specify exactly how the system must respond when a voter attempts to select an "extra" candidate. For instance, the system may prevent the selection and issue a warning, or, in the case of a single-choice contest, simply change the vote.

3.2.2.1-B Warning of undervotes

The VEBD SHALL provide feedback to the voter, before final casting of the ballot that identifies specific contests for which the voter has selected fewer than the allowable number of choices (i.e., undervotes).

Applies To: VEBD

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For VEBD systems, no allowance is made for disabling this feature. Also, see requirement below on "Clarity of Warnings."

3.2.2.1-C Independent correction of ballot

The VEBD SHALL provide the voter the opportunity to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted. This correction process SHALL NOT require external assistance. The corrections to be supported include modifying an undervote or overvote, and changing a vote from one candidate to another.

Applies To: VEBD

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.2.1-D Ballot editing per contest

The VEBD SHALL allow the voter to change a vote within a contest before advancing to the next contest.

Applies To: VEBD

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The point here is that voters using an editable interface should not have to wait for a final ballot review screen in order to change a vote.

3.2.2.1-E Contest navigation

The VEBD SHALL provide navigation controls that allow the voter to advance to the next contest or go back to the previous contest before completing a vote on the contest(s) currently being presented (whether visually or aurally).

Applies To: VEBD

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For example, voters should not be forced to proceed sequentially through all the contests before going back to check their votes within a previous contest.

3.2.2.1-F Notification of ballot casting failure (DRE)

If the voter takes the appropriate action to cast a ballot, but the system does not accept and record it successfully, including failure to store the ballot image, then the DRE SHALL so notify the voter and provide clear instruction as to the steps the voter should take to cast the ballot.

Applies To: DRE

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

If a DRE fails at the point of casting a ballot, it must clearly indicate to the voter and to election officials responding to the failure whether or not the ballot was cast. Otherwise, election officials may be unable to provide substantial confirmation that the vote was or was not counted, possibly resulting in disenfranchisement or the casting of two ballots by a single voter.

A device that "freezes" when the voter attempts to cast the ballot, providing no evidence one way or the other whether the ballot was cast, would violate this requirement.

Source: 2002 VSS I.2.4.3.3.k / VVSG'05 I.2.3.3.3.m

3.2.2.2 Non-Editable interfaces

Non-Editable interfaces, such as manually-marked paper ballots (MMPB) do not have the same flexibility as do editable interfaces. Nonetheless, certain features are required, especially in the case of precinct-based optical scanners. Note that the technical definition of "marginal mark" may be found in Appendix A. Basically, a marginal mark is one that, according the manufacturer specifications, is neither clearly countable as a vote nor clearly countable as a non-vote.

3.2.2.2-A Notification of overvoting

The voting system SHALL be capable of providing feedback to the voter that identifies specific contests for which the voter has made more than the allowable number of votes (i.e.,. overvotes).

Applies To: PCOS

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.2.2-B Notification of undervoting

The voting system SHALL be capable of providing feedback to the voter that identifies specific contests for which the voter has made fewer than the allowable number of votes (i.e., undervotes). The system SHALL provide a means for an authorized election official to deactivate this capability entirely and by contest.

Applies To: PCOS

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.2.2-C Notification of blank ballots

The voting system SHALL be capable of notifying the voter that he or she has submitted a paper ballot that is blank on one or both sides. The system SHALL provide a means for an authorized election official to deactivate this capability.

Applies To: PCOS

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

One purpose of this feature is to detect situations in which the voter might be unaware that the ballot is two-sided. This feature is distinct from the ability to detect and warn about undervoting.

3.2.2.2-D Ballot correction or submission following notification

If the voting system has notified the voter that a potential error condition (such as an overvote, undervote, or blank ballot) exists, the system SHALL then allow the voter to correct the ballot or to submit it as is.

Applies To: PCOS

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

This requirement mandates that the equipment be capable of allowing either correction or immediate submission. For instance, a questionable paper ballot might be physically ejected for possible correction. This requirement does not constrain the procedures that jurisdictions might adopt for handling such situations (e.g., whether poll worker intervention is required).

3.2.2.2-E Handling of marginal marks

Paper-based precinct tabulators SHOULD be able to identify a ballot containing marginal marks. When such a ballot is detected, the tabulator SHALL:

  1. Return the ballot to the voter;
  2. Provide feedback to the voter that identifies the specific contests for which a marginal mark was detected; and
  3. Allow the voter either to correct the ballot or to submit the ballot "as is" without correction.

Applies To: Precinct tabulator

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this requirement is to provide more certainty about the handling of poorly-marked ballots. If a given candidate or option is clearly marked as chosen, or left completely unmarked, then there is no ambiguity to resolve. However, each manufacturer should define a "gray zone" (with respect to location, darkness, etc.) in which marks will be actively flagged as ambiguous.

3.2.2.2-F Notification of ballot casting failure (PCOS)

If the voter takes the appropriate action to cast a ballot, but the system does not accept and record it successfully, including failure to read the ballot or to transport it into the ballot box, the PCOS SHALL so notify the voter.

Applies To: PCOS

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

This requirement means that PCOS systems must detect and report electrical and mechanical failures within the system itself. It does not require the detection of errors on the part of the voter. See also Requirement Part 1: 7.7.4-B.

3.2.3 Privacy

The voting process must preclude anyone else from determining the content of a voter's ballot without the voter's cooperation. Privacy ensures that the voter can cast votes based solely on his or her own preferences without intimidation or inhibition.

3.2.3.1 Privacy at the polls

3.2.3.1-A System support of privacy

The voting system SHALL prevent others from determining the contents of a ballot.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The voting system itself provides no means by which others can "determine" how one has voted. Of course voters could simply tell someone else for whom they voted, but the system provides no evidence for such statements, and therefore voters cannot be coerced into providing such evidence.

It is assumed that the system is deployed according to the installation instructions provided by the manufacturer. Whether the configuration of the voting system protects privacy may well depend on proper setup.

3.2.3.1-A.1 Visual privacy

The ballot, any other visible record containing ballot information, and any input controls SHALL be visible only to the voter during the voting session and ballot submission.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

This requirement may involve different approaches for electronic and paper interfaces. In both cases, appropriate shielding of the voting station is important. When a paper record with ballot information needs to be transported by the voter, devices such as privacy sleeves may be necessary. This requirement applies to all records with information on votes (such as a vote verification record) even if that record is not itself a ballot.

3.2.3.1-A.2 Auditory privacy

During the voting session, the audio interface of the voting system SHALL be audible only to the voter.

Applies To: VEBD-A

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

Voters who are hard of hearing but need to use an audio interface may also need to increase the volume of the audio. Such situations require headphones with low sound leakage.

3.2.3.1-A.3 Privacy of warnings

The voting system SHALL issue all warnings in a way that preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

HAVA 301 (a)(1)(C) mandates that the voting system must notify the voter of an attempted overvote in a way that preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot. This requirement generalizes that mandate.

3.2.3.1-A.4 No receipts

The voting system SHALL NOT issue a receipt to the voter that would provide proof to another of how the voter voted.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.3.2 No recording of alternative format usage

When voters use non-typical ballot interfaces, such as large print or alternative languages, their anonymity may be vulnerable. To the extent possible, only the logical contents of their ballots should be recorded, not the special formats in which they were rendered. In the case of paper ballots, where the interface is the record, some format information is unavoidably preserved.

3.2.3.2-A No recording of alternative languages

No information SHALL be kept within an electronic CVR that identifies any alternative language feature(s) used by a voter.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.3.2-B No Recording of Accessibility Features

No information SHALL be kept within an electronic CVR that identifies any accessibility feature(s) used by a voter.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.4 Cognitive issues

The features specified in this section are intended to minimize cognitive difficulties for voters. They should always be able to operate the voting system and understand the effect of their actions.

3.2.4-A Completeness of instructions

The voting station SHALL provide instructions for all its valid operations.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

DISCUSSION

If an operation is available to the voter, it must be documented. Examples include how to change a vote, how to navigate among contests, how to cast a straight party vote, how to cast a write-in vote, and how to adjust display and audio characteristics.

3.2.4-B Availability of assistance from the system

The voting system SHALL provide a means for the voter to get help directly from the system at any time during the voting session.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The voter should always be able to get help from the system if needed. The purpose is to minimize the need for poll worker assistance. VEBD voting systems may provide this with a distinctive "help" button. Any type of voting system may provide written instructions that are separate from the ballot.

3.2.4-C Plain Language

Instructional material for the voter SHALL conform to norms and best practices for plain language.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

Although part of general usability, the use of plain language is also expected to assist voters with cognitive disabilities. The plain language requirements apply to instructions that are inherent to the voting system or that are generated by default. To the extent that instructions are determined by election officials designing the ballot, they are beyond of the scope of this requirement.

Warnings and alerts issued by the voting system SHOULD clearly state:

  1. The nature of the problem;
  2. Whether the voter has performed or attempted an invalid operation or whether the voting equipment itself has malfunctioned in some way; and
  3. The set of responses available to the voter.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For instance, “You have not interacted with the system for the past three minutes. Please press the ‘Need more time’ button right away to tell the system that you’re still here – Thank you.” rather than “System detects imminent timeout condition.” In case of an equipment failure, the only action available to the voter might be to get assistance from a poll worker.

3.2.4-C.2 Context before action

When an instruction is based on a condition, the condition SHOULD be stated first, and then the action to be performed.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For instance, use "In order to change your vote, do X", rather than "Do X, in order to change your vote."

The system SHOULD use familiar, common words and avoid technical or specialized words that voters are not likely to understand.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For instance, "... there are more contests on the other side ..." rather than "...additional contests are presented on the reverse ..."

3.2.4-C.4 Start each instruction on a new line

The system SHOULD start the visual presentation of each new instruction on a new line.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

This implies not "burying" several unrelated instructions in a single long paragraph.

3.2.4-C.5 Use of positive

The system SHOULD issue instructions on the correct way to perform actions, rather than telling voters what not to do.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For example, “Fill in the oval for your write-in vote to count” rather than “If the oval is not marked, your write-in vote cannot be counted.”

3.2.4-C.6 Use of imperative voice

The system's instructions SHOULD address the voter directly rather than use passive voice constructions.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For example, "remove and retain this ballot stub" rather than "this ballot stub must be removed and retained by the voter."

3.2.4-C.7 Gender-based pronouns

The system SHOULD avoid the use of gender-based pronouns.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For example, "...write in your choice directly on the ballot..." rather than "... write in his name directly on the ballot..."

3.2.4-D No bias among choices

Consistent with election law, the voting system SHALL support a process that does not introduce bias for or against any of the contest choices to be presented to the voter. In both visual and aural formats, the choices SHALL be presented in an equivalent manner.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

DISCUSSION

Certain differences in presentation are mandated by state law, such as the order in which candidates are listed and provisions for voting for write-in candidates. However, comparable characteristics such as font size or voice volume and speed must be the same for all choices.

3.2.4-E Ballot design

The voting system SHALL provide the capability to design a ballot with a high level of clarity and comprehensibility.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.4-E.1 Contests split among pages or columns

The voting system SHOULD NOT visually present a single contest spread over two pages or two columns.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

Such a visual separation poses the risk that the voter may perceive one contest as two, or fail to see additional choices. If a contest has a large number of candidates, it may be infeasible to observe this guideline.

3.2.4-E.2 Indicate maximum number of candidates

The ballot SHALL clearly indicate the maximum number of candidates for which one can vote within a single contest.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.4-E.3 Consistent representation of candidate selection

The relationship between the name of a candidate and the mechanism used to vote for that candidate SHALL be consistent throughout the ballot.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For example, the response field where voters indicate their votes must not be located to the left of some candidates' names, and to the right of others'.

3.2.4-E.4 Placement of instructions

The system SHOULD display instructions near to where they are needed.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

For instance, only general instructions should be grouped at the beginning of the ballot; those pertaining to specific situations should be presented where and when needed.

3.2.4-F Conventional use of color

The use of color by the voting system SHOULD agree with common conventions: (a) green, blue or white is used for general information or as a normal status indicator; (b) amber or yellow is used to indicate warnings or a marginal status; (c) red is used to indicate error conditions or a problem requiring immediate attention.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.4-G Icons and language

When an icon is used to convey information, indicate an action, or prompt a response, it SHALL be accompanied by a corresponding linguistic label.

Applies To: Voting device

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

While icons can be used for emphasis when communicating with the voter, they must not be the sole means by which information is conveyed, since there is no widely accepted "iconic" language and therefore not all voters may understand a given icon.

3.2.5 Perceptual issues

The requirements of this section are designed to minimize perceptual difficulties for the voter. Some of these requirements are designed to assist voters with poor reading vision. These are voters who might have some difficulty in reading normal text, but are not typically classified as having a visual disability and thus might not be inclined to use the Accessible Voting Station.

3.2.5-A Screen flicker

No voting system display screen SHALL flicker with a frequency between 2 Hz and 55 Hz.

Applies To: VEBD-V

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

DISCUSSION

Aside from usability concerns, this requirement protects voters with epilepsy.

3.2.5-B Resetting of adjustable aspects at end of session

Any aspect of the voting station that is adjustable by the voter or poll worker, including font size, color, contrast, audio volume, or rate of speech, SHALL automatically reset to a standard default value upon completion of that voter's session. For the Acc-VS, the aspects include synchronized audio/video mode and non-manual input mode.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

This ensures that the voting station presents the same initial appearance to every voter.

3.2.5-C Ability to reset to default values

If any aspect of a voting system is adjustable by the voter or poll worker, there SHALL be a mechanism to reset all such aspects to their default values.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The purpose is to allow a voter or poll worker who has adjusted the system into an undesirable state to reset all the aspects and begin again.

3.2.5-D Minimum font size

Voting systems SHALL provide a minimum font size of 3.0mm (measured as the height of a capital letter) for all text intended for voters or poll workers.

Applies To: Voting device

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.5-E Available font sizes

A voting station that uses an electronic image display SHALL be capable of showing all information in at least two font sizes, (a) 3.0-4.0 mm and (b) 6.3-9.0 mm, under control of the voter. The system SHALL allow the voter to adjust font size throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes.

Applies To: VEBD-V

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

While larger font sizes may assist most voters with poor vision, certain disabilities such as tunnel vision are best addressed by smaller font sizes. Larger font sizes may also assist voters with cognitive disabilities. This requirement mandates the availability of at least two font sizes, but additional choices (including continuous variability) are allowed.

3.2.5-F Use of sans serif font

Text intended for the voter SHOULD be presented in a sans serif font.

Applies To: Voting device

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

Research has shown that users prefer such fonts.

3.2.5-G Legibility of paper ballots and verification records

Voting systems using paper ballots or paper verification records SHALL provide features that assist in the reading of such ballots and records by voters with poor reading vision.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

While this requirement may be satisfied by one of its sub-requirements, other innovative solutions are not precluded.

3.2.5-G.1 Legibility via font size

The system MAY achieve legibility of paper records by supporting the printing of those records in at least two font sizes, 3.0 - 4.0mm and 6.3 - 9.0mm.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

Although the system may be capable of printing in several font sizes, the use of various font sizes in an actual election may be governed by local or state laws and regulations.

3.2.5-G.2 Legibility via magnification

The system MAY achieve legibility of paper records by supporting magnification of those records. This magnification MAY be done by optical or electronic devices. The manufacturer MAY either: 1) provide the magnifier itself as part of the system, or 2) provide the make and model number of readily available magnifiers that are compatible with the system.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

The magnifier(s) either provided or cited must, of course, provide legibility for the paper as actually presented on the system. For instance, if the paper record is under a transparent cover to prevent the voter from touching it, the means of magnification must be compatible with this configuration.

3.2.5-H Contrast Ratio

The minimum figure-to-ground ambient contrast ratio for all text and informational graphics (including icons) intended for voters or poll workers SHALL be 3:1.

Applies To: Voting device

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

3.2.5-I High contrast for electronic displays

The voting station SHALL be capable of showing all information in high contrast either by default or under the control of the voter. The system SHALL allow the voter to adjust contrast throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes. High contrast is a figure-to-ground ambient contrast ratio for text and informational graphics of at least 6:1.

Applies To: VEBD-V

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

3.2.5-J Accommodation for color blindness

The default color coding SHALL support correct perception by voters with color blindness.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”

DISCUSSION

There are many types of color blindness and no color coding can, by itself, guarantee correct perception for everyone. However, designers should take into account such factors as: red-green color blindness is the most common form; high luminosity contrast will help colorblind voters to recognize visual features; and color-coded graphics can also use shape to improve the ability to distinguish certain features.

3.2.5-K No reliance solely on color

Color coding SHALL NOT be used as the sole means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

While color can be used for emphasis, some other non-color mode must also be used to convey the information, such as a shape or text style. For example, red can be enclosed in an octagon shape.

3.2.6 Interaction issues

The requirements of this section are designed to minimize interaction difficulties for the voter.

3.2.6-A No page scrolling

Voting systems SHALL NOT require page scrolling by the voter.

Applies To: VEBD

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

That is, the page of displayed information must fit completely within the physical screen presenting it. Scrolling is not an intuitive operation for those unfamiliar with the use of computers. Even those experienced with computers often do not notice a scroll bar and miss information at the bottom of the "page." Voting systems may require voters to move to the next or previous "page."

3.2.6-B Unambiguous feedback for voter's selection

The voting system SHALL provide unambiguous feedback regarding the voter’s selection, such as displaying a checkmark beside the selected option or conspicuously changing its appearance.

Applies To: Voting system

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

3.2.6-C Accidental Activation

Input mechanisms SHALL be designed to minimize accidental activation.

Applies To: Voting device

Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”

DISCUSSION

There are at least two kinds of accidental activation. One is when a control is activated as it is being “explored” by the vote