

	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement
State name	0.912	0.911
Sign name	0.906	0.903
Match signature	0.900	0.895
Non-photo ID	0.894	0.887
Photo ID	0.887	----
Affidavit	----	0.878
Total difference from lowest to highest	0.025	0.033
N	54,973	
<p>Figures represent the predicted probability of registered voters saying they voted as the identification requirement varies from the lowest to the highest point in the scale, with all other variables held constant.</p> <p>Data source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, November 2004.</p>		

	White voters		Hispanic voters
	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement	Minimum requirement
State name	0.920	0.922	0.870
Sign name	0.915	0.915	0.849
Match signature	0.909	0.907	0.826
Non-photo ID	0.902	0.899	0.800
Photo ID	0.895	----	----
Affidavit	----	0.890	0.773
Total difference from lowest to highest	0.025	0.032	0.097
N	44,760		2,860

Figures represent the predicted probability of registered voters saying they voted as the identification requirement varies from the lowest to the highest point in the scale, with all other variables held constant. Maximum voter identification requirements were not a significant predictor of voting for Hispanic voters. Maximum and minimum voter identification requirements were not a significant predictor for African-American voters.

Data source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, November 2004.

	18 - 24		25 - 44		45 - 64	65 and older
	Maximum requirements	Minimum requirements	Maximum requirements	Minimum requirements	Minimum requirements	Minimum requirements
State name	0.839	0.831	0.831	0.831	0.936	0.916
Sign name	0.819	0.814	0.820	0.817	0.932	0.910
Match signature	0.797	0.759	0.808	0.803	0.927	0.904
Non-photo ID	0.774	0.775	0.796	0.788	0.923	0.898
Photo ID	0.750	----	0.783	----	----	----
Affidavit	----	0.754	----	0.773	0.918	0.892
Total difference -- lowest to highest	0.089	0.077	0.048	0.058	0.018	0.024
N	5,065		20,066		20,758	9,084
<p>Figures represent the predicted probability of registered voters saying they voted as the identification requirement varies from the lowest to the highest point in the scale, with all other variables held constant. Maximum voter identification requirements were not a significant predictor of voting for voters ages 45 to 64 and 65 and older.</p> <p>Data source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, November 2004.</p>						

Comment [o3]: Can you add something to this footnote to once again clarify the difference between the very high turnout figures derived from the CPS respondents self-reports and actual measures of turnout which tend to be in the 50% - 65% range.

Table 8. Predicted probability of voter turnout – Voters above and below the poverty line

	Voters above the poverty line		Voters below the poverty line
	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement	Minimum requirement
State name	0.920	0.922	0.784
Sign name	0.915	0.915	0.772
Match signature	0.909	0.907	0.758
Non-photo ID	0.903	0.899	0.745
Photo ID	0.897	----	----
Affidavit	----	0.891	0.731
Total difference from lowest to highest	0.023	0.031	0.053
N	49,935		5,038

Figures represent the predicted probability of registered voters saying they voted as the identification requirement varies from the lowest to the highest point in the scale, with all other variables held constant. Maximum voter identification requirements were not a significant predictor of voting for voters who were below the poverty line.

Data source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, November 2004.

Table 9. Predicted probability of voter turnout – By education

	Less than high school		High school		College		Graduate school	
	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement
State name	0.775	0.779	0.866	0.869	0.960	0.959	0.977	0.979
Sign name	0.759	0.762	0.858	0.859	0.956	0.954	0.973	0.973
Match signature	0.743	0.743	0.850	0.848	0.951	0.950	0.968	0.967
Non-photo ID	0.725	0.724	0.842	0.836	0.945	0.945	0.963	0.959
Photo ID	0.708	----	0.833	----	0.939	----	0.957	----
Affidavit	-----	0.705	----	0.824	----	0.940	-----	0.950
Total difference -- lowest to highest	0.067	0.074	0.033	0.045	0.021	0.019	0.020	0.029
N	4,903		16,361		11,017		5,739	

Figures represent the predicted probability of registered voters saying they voted as the identification requirement varies from the lowest to the highest point in the scale, with all other variables held constant. Maximum and minimum voter identification requirements were not a significant predictor of voting for those with some college education.

Data source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, November 2004.



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
03/24/2006 06:00 PM

To ddavidson@eac.gov
cc
bcc
Subject Eagleton ID report

Comments regarding the Eagleton Report on Voter ID

While the report is generally acceptable, I found some parts of it to be misleading and at times appearing biased to support a view that imposing ID requirements at the polls should be discouraged. As an example, on the first page they write about poll workers facing “long lines and limited time,” suggesting that may be a problem for them to check ID. I am not sure what their point may be as poll workers in states that require ID checking will still have to do so no matter how long the voter lines they have. Some states may not have long lines at the polls and voters may not have the “limited time” suggested in the report.

They selectively quote the Carter-Baker Commission study to suggest that “photographic ID requirements for in-person voting do little to address the problem of registration by mail” even though the Carter-Baker study actually promotes the idea of a photographic ID requirement at the polls. To be fair, they need to state that fact.

Their table on page 7 indicates that Missouri’s current ID requirement for first-time voters relies on HAVA requirements. It is my understanding that Missouri law requires that all voters must show some type of ID at the polls (therefore it should state “Provide ID” as they did in listing CO, CN and LA).

On page 9 and in subsequent pages they make reference to “voting age population” (VAP) data issued by the Census Bureau. Is all the data they represent in their analysis based on the VAP or do they take into consideration the Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP), which takes into account the number of non-citizens who may be included in the VAP. It wasn’t clear. You may remember that Kim Brace talked about the VAP vs. CVAP issue with us extensively and indicated that the CVAP figure is always the better one to use when analyzing Census Bureau data against voting data. He also said that many of the non-citizens included in the VAP figures tend to be Hispanic. And since the Eagleton study is making conclusions that indicate that ID requirements may tend to reduce Hispanic voter turnout, it becomes important to understand which figures Eagleton uses.

I would like to know if the new Census report on the 2004 election released this week changes any of their perspectives.

On page 12 they make reference to the CPS data and indicate that it reported a voter turnout rate of 89%, which is much higher than other data reported (which is also explained in their narrative). However, while the report indicates that the CPS data is “widely-accepted,” it does make clear by whom. I think for credibility reasons they need more supporting language since there is a significant difference between a self-reported turnout of 89% and the reality of 63%.

026319

Karen Lynn-Dyson/EAC/GOV

To Juliet E. Thompson-Hodgkins/EAC/GOV@EAC

cc

03/28/2006 10:25 AM

bcc Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV

Subject Fw: Voter ID Paper --Final Draft

Let's discuss once you've had a chance to review. As stated, there are a number of their statistical manipulations which I question.

Karen Lynn-Dyson
Research Manager
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue , NW Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
tel:202-566-3123

— Forwarded by Karen Lynn-Dyson/EAC/GOV on 03/28/2006 09:20 AM —



"Tom O'Neill"

[REDACTED]

To klynndyson@eac.gov

03/16/2006 09:27 AM

cc

Subject RE: Voter ID Paper --Final Draft

Karen,

Glad the paper arrived. Sorry it was a bit later than promised, but we reworked the statistical analysis on the basis of some insightful suggestions by the Peer Review Group. . .that took a few extra days (and nights). Looking back at my email to you, I realize the full statistical analysis was not attached as it should have been. It is appendix to the paper that will be of interest to those who want the details of our methodology. It is attached to this email.

I will be away, without access to email, until late Monday afternoon, but if you need to, you can reach me by cell phone at 908-794-1030.

Tom O'Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: klynndyson@eac.gov [mailto:klynndyson@eac.gov]

Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 9:00 AM

To: tom_oneill [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Voter ID Paper --Final Draft

Tom-

Thanks for getting this to me. I've forwarded it on to the Commissioners.

Will try to see if I can get feedback next week.

026320

Regards-
K

Karen Lynn-Dyson
Research Manager
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue , NW Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005



tel:202-566-3123 Vercellotti314.doc



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
03/17/2006 04:46 PM

To Karen Lynn-Dyson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc Thomas R. Wilkey/EAC/GOV
bcc
Subject Re: Voter ID Paper --Final Draft

Karen,
Are we allowed to make comments on this paper in which they might consider changes --or is this the final version that we are to "accept" as is?
Paul

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
Karen Lynn-Dyson

From: Karen Lynn-Dyson
Sent: 03/16/2006 08:57 AM
To: Paul DeGregorio; Raymundo Martinez; Gracia Hillman; Donetta Davidson
Cc: Thomas Wilkey; Juliet Thompson-Hodgkins; Amie Sherrill; Adam Ambrogi; Sheila Banks; Elieen Collver
Subject: Fw: Voter ID Paper --Final Draft

Commissioners-

Attached please find a copy of the draft Voter ID best practices paper which Eagleton submitted to me last evening.

I will confer with Tom regarding when you would like this put on your Commissioner meeting agenda.

Regards-

Karen Lynn-Dyson
Research Manager
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue , NW Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
tel:202-566-3123

----- Forwarded by Karen Lynn-Dyson/EAC/GOV on 03/16/2006 08:47 AM -----



"Tom O'Neill"
[Redacted]
03/15/2006 08:21 PM

To klynndyson@eac.gov
cc "Tim Vercellotti" <tim.vercellotti@[Redacted]>, arapp@[Redacted], davander@[Redacted], dlinky@[Redacted], ireed@[Redacted], joharris@[Redacted], john.weingart@[Redacted], rmandel@[Redacted], "Johanna Dobrich" <jdobrich@[Redacted]>, tokaji.1@[Redacted], foley.33@[Redacted], lauracw@[Redacted]
Subject Voter ID Paper --Final Draft

Karen,

Attached is the final draft of the Voter ID paper, with recommendations for the EAC to consider promulgating as best practices. Two appendices are included as part of the draft and a third, the statistical analysis of the effects of different voter ID requirements on turnout, is attached separately to this email.

We look forward to discussing this final draft with you and with the commissioners on April 3. I'll be preparing a Powerpoint presentation for that meeting. Any guidance you can give me later this month on particular questions that briefing should address would be appreciated.

The Moritz-Eagleton team will be meeting next Tuesday at 9:30 a.m.. If you have preliminary comments you would like us to consider, that meeting would be a most convenient occasion to discuss them.

Tom O'Neill



ReportFinalDraft.doc

026323

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
09/15/2006 04:21 PM

To pdegregorio@eac.gov
cc
bcc
Subject Bill Lambrecht

History:  This message has been replied to

Mr. Chairman,

We're in business. He had decided to go a different direction for the story he interviewed you for... it ended up being about voter ID, and he didn't quote you. So, he's going to do a piece about you that will run the Wednesday before the meeting. He's going to call Blount & Aiken for quotes, and said the St. Louis folks will talk to people there. He said it will also help promote the meeting. He liked the hook about you going out doing two things you've always wanted to do: 1) having a meeting in your hometown and 2) at your alma matter. I told him off the record you were being courted and could possibly end up working for the current administration.

He wants to talk to you on Tuesday, so I'll get with Amie to figure out a time. Also, do you mind if I send him your latest CV?

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov

026324



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
09/15/2006 04:34 PM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
bcc
Subject Re: Bill Lambrecht 

Thanks. Yes, send him the CV.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Jeannie Layson
Sent: 09/15/2006 04:21 PM
To: Paul DeGregorio
Subject: Bill Lambrecht

Mr. Chairman,

We're in business. He had decided to go a different direction for the story he interviewed you for... it ended up being about voter ID, and he didn't quote you. So, he's going to do a piece about you that will run the Wednesday before the meeting. He's going to call Blount & Aiken for quotes, and said the St. Louis folks will talk to people there. He said it will also help promote the meeting. He liked the hook about you going out doing two things you've always wanted to do: 1) having a meeting in your hometown and 2) at your alma matter. I told him off the record you were being courted and could possibly end up working for the current administration.

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Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov

026325

Matthew
Masterson/EAC/GOV
02/05/2007 05:00 PM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
bcc

Subject Fw: Voter ID materials

Commissioner:

Karen sent this e-mail to me and I wanted to make sure that you had these materials as well. She informed me that you should have these already but I figured I would forward these along just in case you didn't have them. I am reading over them right now and will share my thoughts with you when we get a chance to talk.

Matthew V. Masterson, Esq.
Special Assistant to Commissioner Paul DeGregorio
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave. NW, Washington, D.C.
(202)566-3106

— Forwarded by Matthew Masterson/EAC/GOV on 02/05/2007 04:58 PM —

Karen Lynn-Dyson/EAC/GOV

02/05/2007 04:09 PM

To Sheila A. Banks/EAC/GOV@EAC, Matthew
Masterson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc Elieen L. Kuala/EAC/GOV@EAC
Subject Voter ID materials

Sheila/Matt-

Attached are materials which your Commissioners may find useful for Thursday's meeting.

I am also preparing a series of additional questions for Commissioner Davidson, which she may be sharing with her colleagues.

K



New EAC Voter ID Report.doc VoterIDReport062806INAL.pdf EAC Voter ID draft-long version.doc

Karen Lynn-Dyson
Research Director
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue , NW Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
tel:202-566-3123

026326

EAC Statement on Future Study of Voter Identification Requirements

Background

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) authorizes the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to conduct periodic studies of election administration issues. HAVA Section 303 (b) mandates that first time voters who register by mail are required to show proof of identity before being allowed to cast a ballot. The law prescribes certain requirements concerning this section, but also leaves considerable discretion to the States for its implementation. The EAC sought to examine how these voter identification requirements were implemented in the 2004 general elections and to prepare guidance for the states on this topic.

In May 2005 EAC entered into a contract with the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey and the Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University to perform a review and legal analysis of state legislation, administrative procedures and court cases, and to perform a literature review on other research and data available on the topic of voter identification requirements. Further, the contractor was to analyze the problems and challenges of voter identification, to hypothesize alternative approaches and recommend various policies that could be applied to these approaches.

The contractor also performed a statistical analysis of the relationship of various requirements for voter identification to voter turnout in the 2004 election. Using two sets of data-- aggregate turnout data at the county level for each state, and reports of individual voters collected in the November 2004 Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau-- the contractor arrived at a series of findings, conclusions and subsequent recommendations for further research into the topic which are detailed in the attached report.

EAC Recommendations for further study and next steps

EAC finds this initial review of States' voter identification requirements, state laws and litigation surrounding the implementation of voter identification requirements an important beginning step in its consideration of voter identification requirements. From this study and compilation of data EAC considers it advisable to engage in a longer-term, systematic review of voter identification requirements and is recommending that at a minimum the agency engage on an ongoing basis in:

- A state-by-state review, reporting and tracking of voter identification requirements.
- A review and study of how voter identification requirements are implemented and how these practices may vary from state law and statute.

From this ongoing review and tracking EAC can determine the feasibility and advisability of further research and study into how voter identification requirements have had an impact over time on factors such as voter turnout and voter registration.

EAC believes that the findings from this initial study of voter identification requirements are helping inform additional studies it is conducting on a variety of related topics. The EAC study on first time voters who have registered to vote by mail and several forthcoming studies related to voter registration processes will provide necessary additional data to help inform discussions and debate related to ballot access and ballot security. The EAC also anticipates that follow-on study it does related to election crimes and various aspects of voting accessibility will also help inform and guide these ballot security and ballot access discussions.

Finally, EAC is likely to consider implementing one or more of the following research studies that will serve to augment the work begun by the Eagleton Institute of Politics:

- A study of how certain voter identification provisions that have been in place for two or more Federal elections have had an impact on voter turnout and voter registration figures;
- A research study which examines, in greater detail, the relationship between race and voter turnout, and race and methods for registering voters;
- Studies on the inter-relationship between various voter registration processes, voter turnout and number of election crimes reported or litigated;
- Publication of a series of case studies which detail a particular state's or jurisdiction's experiences with various voter identification and voter registration regimes;
- A policy paper or memorandum exploring the alternatives to current voter identification processes and regimes.

**Report to the
U. S. Election Assistance Commission
On
Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements
Pursuant to the
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002
Public Law 107-252**

June 28, 2006

Submitted by

The Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
The Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University

**Report to the
U. S. Election Assistance Commission**

Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements

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The Research Team

This research report on Voter Identification Requirements in the 2004 election is part of a broader analysis that also includes a study of Provisional Voting, which has already been submitted to the EAC. Conducting the work was a consortium of The Eagleton Institute of Politics of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, and The Moritz College of Law of The Ohio State University.

The Eagleton Institute explores state and national politics through research, education, and public service, linking the study of politics with its day-to-day practice. It focuses attention on how contemporary political systems work, how they change, and how they might work better. Eagleton regularly undertakes projects to enhance political understanding and involvement, often in collaboration with government agencies, the media, non-profit groups, and other academic institutions.

The Moritz College of Law has served the citizens of Ohio and the nation since its establishment in 1891. It has played a leading role in the legal profession through countless contributions made by graduates and faculty. Its contributions to election law have become well known through its Election Law @ Moritz website. *Election Law @ Moritz* illuminates public understanding of election law and its role in our nation's democracy.

Project Management Team

Dr. Ruth B. Mandel
Director, Eagleton Institute of Politics
Board of Governors Professor of Politics
Principal Investigator
Chair of the Project Management Team

Edward B. Foley
Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated
Professor of Law
The Moritz College of Law
Director of Election Law @ Moritz

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Eagleton Institute of Politics

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Tim Vercellotti
Assistant Research Professor
Assistant Director, Center for Public Interest
Polling
Eagleton Institute of Politics

Laura Williams
The Moritz College of Law

Peer Review Group

A draft of this report and the statistical analysis in its appendix were critiqued by a Peer Review Group. The comments of its members improved the quality of our work. While the Group as a whole and the comments of its members individually contributed generously to the research effort, any errors of fact or weaknesses in inference are the responsibility of the Eagleton-Moritz research team. The members of the Peer Review Group do not necessarily share the views reflected in our recommendations.

R. Michael Alvarez
Professor of Political Science
California Institute of Technology

Timothy G. O'Rourke
Dean, Fulton School of Liberal Arts
Salisbury University

John C. Harrison
Massee Professor of Law
University of Virginia School of Law

Bradley Smith
Professor of Law
Capital University Law School

Martha E. Kropf
Assistant Professor Political Science
University of Missouri-Kansas City

Tim Storey
Program Principal
National Conference of State Legislatures

Daniel H. Lowenstein
Professor of Law, School of Law
University of California at Los Angeles

Peter G. Verniero
former Attorney General, State of New Jersey
Counsel, Sills, Cummis, Epstein and Gross, PC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EAC VOTER IDENTIFICATION ISSUES

Report Background

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) (Public Law 107-252) authorizes the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) (Sec. 241, 42 USC 15381) to conduct periodic studies of election administration issues. The purpose of these studies is to promote methods for voting and administering elections, including provisional voting, that are convenient, accessible and easy to use; that yield accurate, secure and expeditious voting systems; that afford each registered and eligible voter an equal opportunity to vote and to have that vote counted; and that are efficient.

This study provides information on voter identification practices in the 2004 election. It makes recommendations for best practices to evaluate future proposals for voter ID requirements, including the systematic collection and evaluation of information from the states. The research was conducted by the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, and the Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University under a contract with the EAC, dated May 24, 2005. The work included a review and legal analysis of state statutes, regulations and litigation concerning voter identification and provisional voting as well as a statistical analysis of the relationship of various requirements for voter identification to turnout in the 2004 election. This report is a companion to a report on Provisional Voting submitted to the EAC on November 28, 2005 under the same contract.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Background and Methods

This report arrives at a time of considerable ferment over the issue of voter identification. The debate across the nation over requiring voters to produce a specific identification document before being permitted to cast a regular (as opposed to a provisional) ballot, has revealed supporters and opponents in polarized camps.

- Proponents of stricter identification requirements base their case on improving the security of the ballot by reducing opportunities for one kind of vote fraud --multiple voting or voting by those who are not eligible. The proponents argue that their goal is to ensure that only those legally entitled to vote do so, and do so only once at each election.

- Opponents seek to forestall more stringent identification requirements, such as government-issued photo ID, in order to ensure broad access to a regular ballot. They fear that some voters --such as, they argue, racial and ethnic minorities, the young, and elderly voters-- may lack convenient access to the required ID documents, or that such voters may be fearful of submitting their ID documents to official scrutiny and thus stay away from the polls.
- Both sides argue that their preferred policy will engender faith in the electoral process among citizens.

This report considers policy issues associated with the voter ID debate. It inquires whether empirical study can suggest a way to estimate the effects of different voter ID requirements on turnout. That analysis would constitute an important first step in assessing tradeoffs between ballot security and ballot access. The aim of this research is to contribute to the effort to raise the quality of the debate over this contentious topic. The tradeoffs between ballot security and ballot access are crucial. A voting system that requires voters to produce an identity document or documents may prevent the ineligible from voting. It may also prevent eligible voters from casting a ballot. If the ID requirement of a ballot protection system blocks ineligible voters from the polls at the cost of preventing eligible voters who lack the required forms of identification, the integrity of the ballot may not have been improved; the harm may be as great as the benefit.

As part of the project's effort to analyze the relationship between Voter ID requirements, turnout, and their policy implications, a statistical analysis examined the potential variation in turnout. This statistical study developed a model to illuminate the relationships between voter ID requirements and turnout. This model's findings and limitations suggest avenues for further research and analysis that may assist the EAC and the states as they explore policies to balance the goals of ballot integrity and ballot access.

The statistical analysis describes one possible way to estimate what might be the incremental effect on voters' access to the ballot of an increase in the rigor of voter identification requirements. We do not offer this statistical analysis as the last word, but rather as a preliminary word on the subject. Its findings must be regarded as tentative; the information (such as the specific reasons some potential voters are not allowed to cast a regular ballot) that that might permit greater certainty is simply not available. Indeed, as our recommendations indicate, the next step to improve understanding of the effects of stricter voter identification on

turnout and on vote fraud is to collect more information on both topics systematically and regularly.

Making a statistical estimate of the effect of voting regulations on turnout is difficult. The dynamics of turnout are complex, much studied, and only partially understood. Some agreement exists, however, that three factors that exert substantial influence on voter turnout are:¹ the socioeconomic status of the potential voter; legal requirements to vote; and the political context of the election. By focusing on how voters identify themselves at the polls, this report emphasizes legal requirements. The statistical analysis also considers some of the socioeconomic, racial, and age characteristics of the electorate, as well as the political context in 2004 (such as whether a state was a battleground in the presidential race).

Examining tradeoffs between ballot security and ballot access requires some measure of the effectiveness of voter ID requirements in reducing multiple voting or voting by ineligible voters. The existing evidence on the incidence of vote fraud, especially on the kind of vote fraud that could be reduced by requiring more rigorous voter identification, is not sufficient to evaluate those tradeoffs.² Assessing the effectiveness of voter ID as a way to protect the integrity of the ballot should logically include an estimate of the nature and frequency of vote fraud. This research does not include consideration of vote fraud, nor does it estimate the possible effectiveness of various voter ID regimes to counter attempts at vote fraud. Our analysis also cannot take into account how many potential voters who did not turn out under comparatively stricter voter ID requirements might have been ineligible or eligible to vote.

Despite these qualifications regarding the quality of the available data and the limitations of statistical analysis, however, the different statistical methods and two different sets of data on turnout in 2004 election used in the study point to the same general finding. Stricter voter identification requirements (for example, requiring voters to present non-photo ID compared to simply stating their names) were correlated with reduced turnout in the models employed, as described in detail in Appendix C.³ As explained below, these models find that a statistically

¹ See, for example, Tom William Rice and Patrick J. Kenney, "Voter Turnout in Presidential Primaries." 1985. *Political Behavior*, 7: 101-112. Identification requirements are not the only legal restrictions on voting. States also differ, for example, in their registration requirements (including how long before the election registration must take place and the identity documents required register).

² The EAC has contracted with other researchers to study vote fraud issues.

³ Appendix C: Tim Vercellotti, Eagleton Institute of Politics, *Analysis of Effects of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout*. Using the aggregate data, photo ID did not have a significant effect on turnout, possibly because in the

significant relationship exists, even when controlling for other factors (such as whether the election was in a battleground state) that might affect turnout. (But note that in the model using the aggregate data, photo ID did not have a significant effect on turnout. The reason may have been that in this election, each state with a photo ID requirement provided an alternate way for those without a photo ID to cast a regular ballot.) Without knowing more about the effects of stricter voter ID on reducing multiple voting or voting by ineligible voters, however, the tradeoffs between ballot security and ballot access cannot be assessed.

Methodology

The report includes detailed information on the nature of the statutory requirements across the country in 2004 and on the statutes and court decisions that provide the legal context for the voter ID debate. We gathered information on the requirements in effect in the 50 states and the District of Columbia in that year. Based on our interpretation of state statutes, supplemented in some cases by conversations with state election officials, we divided the states' ID requirements into five categories. We believe each category is more rigorous than the one preceding, based on the demands they make on voters.⁴ The categories range from "Stating Name" which we judge to be somewhat less demanding than "Signing Name." "Signature Match" requires poll workers to examine the signature and compare it to a sample, which is slightly more demanding than the voter simply signing. "Present ID" requires voters to offer some documentary evidence of their identity, ranging from a utility bill to a passport. It is more demanding than the previous three categories because it requires that the voter remember to bring this documentation to the polls. (Even a simple ID, such as a utility bill, may not be available to some renters or, say, those in group housing.) We regard a government "Photo ID" as the most rigorous requirement. Such identity documents may not be uniformly and conveniently available to all voters.

For each state, we identified both the "maximum" and "minimum" identification requirements. The term "maximum" refers to the most that voters may be *asked* to do or show at the polling place (putting aside cases in which particular voter's eligibility may be questioned pursuant to a state challenge process). The term "minimum," on the other hand, refers to the most that voters can be *required* to do or show, in order to cast regular ballot (again leaving aside a state

2004 election every state requiring photo ID provided an alternative way to cast a regular ballot for those voters who lacked photo identification. The individual data from the Current Population Survey did show a significant effect, but only for the overall sample and for white voters, which may be an artifact of the large sample size.

⁴ Even the most relaxed provisions for identification at the polls—anything stricter than the honor system used in North Dakota—will impose some burden on particular voters. Harvard Law Review 119:1146

challenge process). We have included “maximum” requirements in our analysis, and not simply “minimum” requirements, because simply asking voters to produce particular identifying information may have a deterrent effect, even if voters are ultimately allowed to cast a regular ballot without that identification. For example, in a state where voters are asked to show photo ID at the polling place, but still allowed to vote by completing an affidavit confirming their eligibility, the “maximum” of being asked to show photo ID may deter some voters even though the “minimum” would allow them to vote without photo ID.

It is worth emphasizing that, at the time of the 2004 election, there was *no* state that had a “minimum” requirement of showing photo ID – in other words, there was no state that required voters to show photo ID in order to cast a regular ballot. For this reason, our report does not measure the impact of laws, like those recently enacted in Indiana and Georgia, which require voters to show photo ID in order to cast a regular ballot without an affidavit exception.

To examine the potential variation on turnout rates associated with each type of voter ID requirements in effect on Election Day 2004, the statistical analysis drew on two sets of data. These were, first, aggregate turnout data at the county level for each state and, second, the reports of individual voters collected in the November 2004 Current Population Survey by the U. S. Census Bureau. Using two different data sets makes it possible to check the validity of one analysis against the other. It also provides insights not possible using only one of the data sets. The aggregate analysis cannot provide valid estimates on the effects of different ID requirements on particular demographic groups (e.g., the old, the young, African-Americans, the poor, or high school graduates). The Current Population Survey data does permit that kind of analysis, although it has the disadvantage of relying on self-reports by respondents about their registration status and experience in the polling place.

To understand legal issues that have been raised in recent litigation over voter ID requirements, we collected and analyzed the few major cases that have been decided so far on this issue. The decisions so far provide some guidance on the constitutional and other constraints as to voter ID requirements.

Summary of Findings

As voter identification requirements vary, voter turnout varies as well. This finding emerged from both the statistical analysis’s aggregate data and the individual-level data, although not always

for both the maximum and minimum sets of requirements. The overall relationship between the stringency of ID requirements and turnout was fairly small, but still statistically significant.

In the model used with the aggregate data in the statistical analysis, for the maximum ID requirements, the match-signature requirement and the provide-a- non-photo-ID requirement, but not the photo ID requirement, were all correlated with lower turnout compared to requiring that voters state their names. When the registration closing deadline was added as an independent variable in the aggregate analysis, signature match and non-photo id remained significant and negative predictors in the model.

The reduction in turnout was not the same for all demographic groups in the citizen voting age population.

The non-photo identification requirement showed the most significant and consistent correlation with reduced turnout. This result may be surprising given the intense debates surrounding photo identification requirements. The effect of photo ID requirements cannot, however, be assessed from the data the statistical analysis examined, since none of the states had laws in 2004 that conditioned voting on presentation of photo ID. Each of the five states that had photo ID as a “maximum” requirement (i.e., the most that voters could be asked to show at the polls) accepted another type of identification or an affidavit as a “minimum” requirement in the 2004 election (i.e., they were allowed to cast a regular ballot with something less than photo ID).

Significant questions about the relationship of voter identification requirements to turnout remain unanswered. The data examined in this project could not capture the dynamics of how identification requirements might lower turnout. If ID requirements dampen turnout, is it because individuals are aware of the requirements and stay away from the polls because they cannot or do not want to meet the requirements? Or, do the requirements result in some voters being turned away when they cannot meet the requirements on Election Day? Other factors that may also be correlated with stricter ID laws – such as less user-friendly voter registration systems – may actually be causing lower turnout. The CPS data do not include the information needed to answer this question. Knowing more about the “on the ground” experiences of voters concerning identification requirements could guide policy-makers at the state and local level in determining whether and at what point in the electoral cycle a concerted public information campaign might be most effective in helping voters to meet identification requirements. Such

knowledge also could help in designing training for election judges to handle questions about, and potential disputes over, voter identification requirements.

Our analysis of litigation suggests that the courts will look more strictly at requirements that voters produce a photo ID in order to cast a regular ballot, than at non-photo ID laws. The courts have used a balancing test to weigh the legitimate interest in preventing election fraud against the citizen's right to privacy (protecting social security numbers from public disclosure, for example) and the reasonableness of requirements for identity documents. To provide both the clarity and certainty in administration of elections needed to forestall destabilizing challenges to outcomes, a best practice for the states may be to limit requirements for voter identification to the minimum needed to prevent duplicate registration and ensure eligibility.

The current lack of understanding of precisely how voter ID requirements affect turnout could be ameliorated by requiring the collection and reporting of additional data, including the reasons potential voters are required to cast a provisional ballot and the reasons for rejecting provisional ballots during the 2006 and subsequent elections. Also useful would be the results of surveys of voters on their experiences in meeting voter ID requirements and on what type of ballot they cast.⁵ And, of course, more information is needed on the incidence and varieties of vote fraud, but that inquiry is outside the scope of this report.

Recommendations for consideration and action by the EAC

The dynamics of Voter ID requirements –how more rigorous voter ID requirements may affect the decision by potential voters to go or stay away from the polls-- are not perfectly understood. This lack of understanding should be recognized in the policy process in the states. The debate over voter ID in the states would be improved by additional research sponsored by the EAC.

The EAC should consider the following actions to improve understanding of the relationship between voter ID requirements and the two important goals of ensuring ballot access and ensuring ballot integrity.

⁵ Arizona held its first election with its new, stricter ID requirements on March 14, 2006. In at least one county (Maricopa) election officials handed a survey to voters that asked if they knew about the voter identification law and if they did, how they found out about it. Edythe Jensen, "New Voter ID Law Goes Smoothly in Chandler," *Arizona Republic*, March 15, 2006. More surveys of this kind can illuminate the dynamics of voter ID and voting in ways that are not possible now because of insufficient data.

1. Encourage or sponsor further research to clarify the connection between Voter ID requirements and the number of potential voters actually able to cast a ballot that is actually counted.
2. Recommend as a best practice the publication of a "Voting Impact Statement" by states as they assess their voter ID requirements to protect the integrity of the ballot. The analysis will help ensure that efforts to increase ballot security have a neutral effect on electoral participation by eligible voters. A "Voter Impact Statement" would estimate the number and demographics of 1) eligible, potential voters that may be kept from the polls or permitted to cast a provisional ballot by a stricter ID requirement; and 2) and assess the number of ineligible voters who will be prevented from voting by the stricter ID requirements.
3. Encourage or require the states in the 2006 election and beyond, to collect and report reliable, credible information on the relationship between ballot access and ballot security. EAC should publish an analysis of this information to provide a sound factual basis for the states to consider as they estimate the incidence of the kinds of vote fraud that more stringent ID requirements may prevent. The analysis should describe the dynamics of the voter ID process in preserving the security of the ballot. EAC might also use the information reported by the states to encourage further assessment by the states of the effectiveness of programs to ensure that all eligible voters have required ID and are permitted to vote in future elections. Well-designed longitudinal studies in the states can show the results of changing voter ID requirements on electoral participation over time. The studies should include precinct-level data to provide the fine-grained analysis that can provide a solid foundation for policy.
 - I. Useful information could be supplied by state-sponsored surveys of voters conducted by local election officials. Such surveys would make clear why those who cast a provisional ballot were found ineligible to cast a regular ballot. The answers would illuminate the frequency with which ID issues divert voters into the provisional ballot line.
 - II. Surveys to ask voters what they know about the voter id requirements would also provide useful context for evaluating the effect of various voter ID requirements on electoral participation.
 - III. Spot checks by state election officials on how the identification process works at polling places could provide information on how closely actual practice tracks

statutory or regulatory requirements. Such reports should be available to the public.

4. Encourage states to examine the time period allowed for voters who cast a provisional ballot because they lacked required ID to return with their identification. In eleven states, voters who had to cast a provisional ballot because they lacked the ID required for a regular ballot were permitted to return later with their ID. Their provision of this ID is the critical step in evaluating the ballots. The length of the period in which the voter may return with ID is important. In setting the time period for return, which now varies among the states from the same day to about two weeks, states should consider three factors: the convenience of the voter, the total time allowed to evaluate ballots⁶, and the safe harbor provision in presidential elections.
5. Recommendations to the states from EAC should reflect current judicial trends. Requirements that voters provide some identifying documentation have been upheld where photo ID is *not* the only acceptable form. Whether laws requiring photo ID will be upheld is less certain.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

Background and Approach of the Study

Voter ID requirements are just one set of rules governing voting that may affect turnout. Social scientists have long studied how election rules affect participation in elections. The general view today is that the individual citizen makes the choice of whether to vote in a way similar to other decisions that a rational citizen makes, by comparing costs and benefits. The benefits of voting are fairly stable and hard to specify given the remote probability that any one vote will make a difference in an election. But whatever the benefit as perceived by an individual voter, as the costs of voting (for example, time, hassle, acquisition of information) increase, the likelihood that a citizen will vote decrease. Not all groups in the population calculate the cost of participation in the same way, so that election laws (such as registration or identification requirements) may affect different groups differently.

A short summary of some of the social science literature illustrates what may be a broad consensus that the rules of elections affect turnout, but note the important differences in the details of what groups may be most affected.

⁶ Our research on provisional voting reveals that states that provide more than a week to evaluate provisional ballots end up counting substantially more of those ballots than states that provide less than a week.

- Bowler, Brockington and Donovan in "Election Systems and Voter Turnout: Experiments in the United States". *The Journal of Politics*, 63:3 (August 2001) concluded that electoral systems help shape turnout by altering the benefits perceived by voters. For example, cumulative voting systems have 5% greater turnout than plurality systems
- The effect of registration systems has been the subject of many studies over the last 40 years. Kelley, Ayres, and Bowen in "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First." *American Political Science Review*. 61:2 (June 1967) found that local variations in the rate of voting are most directly tied to variations in the rate of registering to vote, and that the rate of registering to vote in localities is most directly related to the laws and administration of the registration process. They concluded that the decline in voting over the past 80 years was due, in part, to the rise of registration laws.
- Brians and Grofman in "Election Day Registration's Effect on U.S. Voter Turnout." *Social Science Quarterly*. 82:1 (March 2001), found that relaxing registration laws produces higher turnout. In particular, they observed that relaxing registration laws is more likely to promote voter turnout among those with medium levels of income and education, rather than those at the lowest levels. Highton in "Easy Registration and Voter Turnout," *Journal of Politics*. 59:2 (May 1997), concluded similarly that registration laws affect voter turnout, but also observed that easier registration promotes turnout among those in lower socio-economic status.
- Mitchell and Wlezien. "The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate," *Political Behavior*. 17:2 (June 1995) agreed that easier registration promotes higher turnout, but also concluded that higher turnout from easier registration would be unlikely to change the composition of the electorate. Nagler in "The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on U.S. Voter Turnout." *American Political Science Review*. 85:4 (December 1991) found that registration laws decrease voter turnout by depressing the eligible electorate, but that lower educated people are not disproportionately impacted by these laws. But Rosenstone and Raymond E. Wolfinger in "The Effect of Registration Laws on Voter Turnout." *American Political Science Review*. 72:1 (March 1978) found that while registration laws did affect both voter turnout and the composition of the electorate, the sharpest effect of these restrictions was felt in the South and among the least educated.

- Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass in "Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout." *American Political Science Review*. 81:1 (March 1987) found that people who move constitute a major demographic group affected by registration laws. They estimated that altering laws to facilitate voting by recently moved people could increase turnout by 9%. Highton in "Residential Mobility, Community Mobility, and Voter Turnout." *Political Behavior*. 22:2 (June 2000) also found that people who move have lower turnout than stable residents, and estimated that the decline was more a result of registration laws than a loss of social connections.
- Highton and Wolfinger in "Estimating the Effects of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993." *Political Behavior*. 20:2 (June 1998) concluded that the Motor Voter laws led to a significant increase in voting; that eliminating voter purges for not voting also increases voting; and that these effects are felt most heavily by the young (under 30) and the mobile (moved within past 2 years). Knack, in "Does 'Motor Voter' Work? Evidence from State-Level Data." *Journal of Politics*., 57:3 (August 1995), also found that motor voter does lead to increased registration and voting, but that other parts of NVRA of 1993, like mail-in registrations, agency-based registrations, and limitations on voter purges had not been as influential two years after the passage of the act.

While voter ID may not have been the subject of as much research as the registration process, establishing the eligibility of a person to vote has long been part of the electoral process. Voters may have to identify themselves twice in the electoral process: when registering to vote and then when casting a ballot. The pressures felt by the voter arising from the need to check ID, even so simple a check as a signature match, can be greater at the polls on Election Day than at the time of registration. Poll workers may feel under pressure when faced with long lines and limited time.

Voter ID requirements on Election Day

This analysis focuses on ID requirements on Election Day, but with an appreciation that the ID requirements at time of registration and on Election Day are inter-related.⁷ The emphasis in this report is on Voter ID requirements on Election Day and afterwards as election judges evaluate provisional ballots. This is the critical period for the electoral system, the time when ballot access and ballot security are in the most sensitive balance.

⁷ As the Carter-Baker Commission noted, photo ID requirements for in-person voting do little to address the problem of fraudulent registration by mail, especially in states that do not require third-party organizations that register voters to verify ID. Commission on Federal Election Reform, pp 46-47.

The report looks at voter ID issues that go beyond the rather narrow identification requirements in HAVA. Much of the current debate in state legislatures over voter ID ranges beyond HAVA to require more rigorous documentation of identity for all would-be voters, not just those who had not registered in person and are casting a ballot for the first time. Current controversies in the states over voter ID seems to have been sparked in part by the HAVA requirements, but goes beyond those requirements, and sets the context for the analysis here.⁸

We recognize that the previously technical, rather dull subject of voter ID requirements has become fiercely partisan and divisive in many states. The polarization of the debate has raised the stakes over this issue, making dispassionate analysis both more valuable and more rare.⁹ Voter ID is often described as the critical step in protecting the integrity of the ballot, the process to ensure that the potential voter is eligible and, if eligible, is permitted to cast one ballot and one ballot only. Truly protecting the integrity of the ballot, however, requires a perspective that takes in the entire voting process. It demands more than preventing the ineligible from voting, and should also ensure that all those who are eligible and want to vote can cast a ballot that counts. The protection effort must embrace all forms of voting, including absentee ballots, and consider each step in the process from registration through vote counting.

A voting system that requires voters to produce an identity document or documents may prevent the ineligible from voting. It may also prevent the eligible from casting a ballot. If the ID requirements block ineligible voters from the polls at the cost of preventing eligible voters who cannot obtain or have left at home the required forms of identification, the integrity of the ballot may not have been improved; the harm may be as great as the benefit. Ultimately, a normative evaluation of whether a state should adopt a stricter voter ID requirement (and, if so, what particular form that new requirement should take) will weigh value judgments as well as available factual evidence. Nonetheless, this report has proceeded on the premise that

⁸ Harvard Law Review 119:1127: "Legislators hoping to stiffen their state antifraud laws have taken their cue from identification provisions buried in HAVA."

⁹ "Of the various electoral procedure laws passed in the fifty states since the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and those still being debated in state legislatures and local media, few arouse more potent partisan feelings than voter identification laws." *Harvard Law Review* 119:1144. John Fund's 2004 book, *Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threaten Our Democracy*, cites (pages 16 – 17) a Rasmussen Research poll that asked respondents if they were more concerned with voting by ineligible participants or with disenfranchisement of eligible voters. Sixty-two percent of Kerry supporters, but only 18 percent of Bush supporters, worried more about *disenfranchisement*; 58 percent of Bush supporters, but only 19 percent of Kerry supporters were more concerned with *voter fraud*.

increased understanding of the factual evidence relating to the imposition of voter ID requirements, based on available data and statistical analysis of that data, can help inform the policy process.

Assessing the effectiveness of voter ID as a way to protect the integrity of the ballot should logically include an estimate of the nature and frequency of vote fraud. The EAC has commissioned a separate analysis of the incidence of vote fraud. Consequently, this research does not include consideration of vote fraud nor the possible effectiveness of various voter ID regimes to counter attempts at vote fraud. As a result, our study of the possible effects of voter ID requirements on turnout cannot take into account how many potential voters who did not turn out under comparatively stricter voter ID requirements might have been ineligible or eligible to vote.

In some states, voters lacking required ID, or who have ID that does not reflect their current address, are able to vote only by casting a provisional ballot.¹⁰ Voter ID requirements that require voters to bring a document to the polls --rather than simply sign their names-- may divert more voters to the provisional ballot. Requiring poll workers to request and check ID, can put stress on the already demanding environment of the polling place. Scrutiny of ID can create lines at the polling places. Further delays can result when voters cast a provisional ballot and fill out the ballot envelope. Voters who cast a provisional ballot because they lack their ID on Election Day, and who then fail to return with the needed document or documents, will have their ballot rejected.¹¹ And, of course, the cost of processing provisional ballots is greater than the cost of regular ballots.

Each of these potential consequences of more elaborate voter identification processes can increase the chance of litigation. Long lines will, at best, discourage voters and at worst make voting seem a hassle, an impression that could keep more citizens (even those with ID) from the polls.

¹⁰ For example, the Florida voter ID law adopted after the 2004 election and pre-cleared by the Department of Justice, permits voters who cannot meet the ID requirements to sign an affidavit on the envelope of a provisional ballot, which will be counted if the signature matches that on the voter's registration form.

¹¹ The EAC's Election Day Study found "improper ID," to be the third most common reason for a provisional ballot to be rejected. "Improper ID" was cited by 7 states responding to the survey, compared to 14 mentions for voting in the wrong precinct. *Election Day Study*, Chapter 6, p. 5.

Evaluating the effect of different Voter ID regimes can be most effective when based on clear standards --legal, equitable, practical. The standards outlined here might be described as questions policy-makers should ask about Voter ID requirements. We suggest seven questions that address important dimensions of the problem.

1. Is the Voter ID system designed on the basis of valid and reliable empirical studies of the incidence of the sorts of vote fraud it is designed to prevent?¹²
2. How effective is the ID requirement in increasing the security of the ballot? How well can it be coordinated with a statewide voter database?¹³
3. How practical is the requirement? (Can it be administered smoothly by the staff and budget likely to be made available? How much additional training of polling place workers might be required?) Is it simple enough or can it be defined with sufficient clarity that poll workers throughout the state can administer it uniformly and with a minimum of local interpretation made on the fly under the pressure of Election Day?¹⁴
4. How cost-effective is the system? Does it demonstrably increase the security of the ballot affordably, measured in both monetary and other costs? To improve understanding of the non-monetary component of the costs, conducting a voter impact study might be appropriate. The voter impact study would examine, before the adoption of the regulation, the cost of compliance by the voter (such as the cost in time and money of acquiring a photo ID card), any offsetting benefits to voters, and the possible disparate effects of the regulation on various groups of voters.¹⁵ A thorough, objective impact statement that demonstrated the nexus between the identification regime and the integrity of the ballot could provide protection against inevitable legal challenges.

¹² "Often where the battle over voter identification is most heated, real evidence of voter fraud proves scarce: in Georgia, for example, the Secretary of State averred that she had never encountered a single instance of voter impersonation at the polls. State laws might sometimes impose tighter restrictions on in-person voting than on absentee ballots, which yield the greatest incidence of, and provide the easiest avenue for, voter fraud. . ." Harvard Law Review 127:1144 (2006)

¹³ See the final section of this report for a brief overview of possible effects of a statewide voter database on voter identification issues.

¹⁴ In New York, in 2004, disparities in training and voting information were made apparent in a study finding elections officials had wildly varying interpretations of what the state's voter identification requirement actually was. Tova Wang, "Warning Bell in Ohio," December 5, 2005. Website, the Foundation for National Progress.

¹⁵ "Absent clear empirical evidence demonstrating widespread individual voter fraud, legislatures need to fashion narrowly tailored voter identification provisions with an eye toward the inevitable and well-grounded constitutional challenges that will arise in the courts. Only as states grow more adept at administering elections will courts likely demonstrate greater willingness to uphold strict identification requirements." Harvard Law Review 127:1144 (2006)

5. If a side effect of the Voter ID regulation is likely to reduce turnout, generally or among particular groups, is it possible to take other steps to ameliorate the adverse consequences?¹⁶
6. Does it comply with the letter and spirit of Voting Rights Act?
7. The seventh question is the most difficult to answer. How neutral is the effect of the Voter ID requirement on the composition of the qualified and eligible electorate? Might it, intentionally or unintentionally, reduce the turnout of particular groups of voters or supporters of one party or another without an offsetting decrease in vote fraud?

Voter ID and Turnout

Based on research for this study by the Moritz College of Law, states had one of five types of maximum requirements in place on Election Day 2004. These are shown in Table 1, *Voter ID Requirements*. The five categories: at the polling place, voters were asked to either: state their names (10 states); sign their names (13 states and the District of Columbia); sign their names, to be matched to a signature on file (seven states); provide a form of identification that did not necessarily include a photo (15 states); or provide a photo identification (five states).¹⁷ Using this information made it possible to code the states according to these requirements, and examine the assumption that voter identification requirements would pose an increasingly demanding requirement in this order: stating one's name, signing one's name, matching one's signature to a signature on file, providing a form of identification, and providing a form of photo identification, however, in all "photo ID" states in 2004, voters without photo ID could cast a regular ballot after signing an affidavit concerning their identity and eligibility or provide other forms of ID). The report refers to this set of ID requirements as "maximum," the most rigorous ID the voter can be asked to present at the polling place in order to cast a regular ballot.¹⁸

Election laws in several states offer exceptions to these requirements if potential voters lack the necessary form of identification. Laws in those states set a minimum standard – that is the

¹⁶ For example, the Carter-Baker Commission coupled its recommendation for a national voter ID card to a call for an affirmative effort by the states to reach out and register the unregistered, that is, to use the new Voter ID regime as a means to enroll more voters. Similarly, Richard Hasen has suggested combining a national voter ID with universal registration. See his "Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown," 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 937 (2005).

¹⁷ Oregon conducts elections entirely by mail. Voters sign their mail-in ballots, and election officials match the signatures to signatures on file. For the purposes of this analysis, Oregon is classified as a state that requires a signature match.

¹⁸ As noted above, our analysis does not consider additional requirements that particular voters may be subjected to as part of an official challenge process, in the event that their eligibility is called into question.

minimum requirement that a voter may be required to satisfy in order to vote using a regular ballot. States can be categorized based on the minimum requirement for voting with a regular ballot. In 2004 the categories were somewhat different compared to the maximum requirement, in that none of the states required photo identification as a minimum standard for voting with a regular ballot. That is, voters who lacked photo ID would still be allowed to vote in all states, if able to meet another requirement. Four states required voters to swear an affidavit as to their identity (Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and North Dakota). The five categories for minimum requirements were: state name (12 states), sign name (14 states and the District of Columbia), match one's signature to a signature on file (six states), provide a non-photo identification (14 states), or swear an affidavit (four states). The analysis also examined this array of minimum identification requirements to assess how they correlated with turnout: state name, sign name, match signature, provide non-photo identification, and, given the potential legal consequences for providing false information, swearing an affidavit. As noted above, *no* state had a "minimum" requirement of showing photo ID. This analysis therefore cannot estimate the effect of laws, such as those recently enacted in Indiana and Georgia that require voters to show photo ID in order to cast a regular ballot without an affidavit or other exception.

We recognize the difficulties in summarizing each state's voter ID requirements. The problem is illustrated by the number of footnotes to Table 1 below. The variety of statutory and regulatory details among the states is complex.

Moving beyond the statutes and regulations, we also recognize that the assignment of each state to one category may fail to reflect actual practice at many polling places. As in any system run by fallible humans, the voter ID process is subject to variation in practice.¹⁹ Voters may have been confronted with demands for identification different from the directives in state statutes or regulation. It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that while actual practices may vary, the variance is around each state's legal requirement for ID. The analysis of the effect of state requirements on turnout must be viewed with some caution. We believe that the categories used in this report provide an acceptable level of discrimination among voter identification regimes.

¹⁹ One state election official told us that, "We have 110 election jurisdictions in Illinois, and I have reason to believe [the voter ID requirements] are administered little bit differently in each one. We wish it weren't that way, but it probably is."

TABLE 1 – Voter ID Requirements²⁰

State	Maximum Forms of ID Required 2004	Current ID Requirement for First-Time Voters	Current ID Requirements for All Other Voters	Verification Method for Provisional Ballots
Alabama	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Address & Registration
Alaska	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Signature
Arizona	Provide ID	Gov-issued Photo ID	Gov-issued Photo ID ¹	Address & Registration
Arkansas	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Address & Registration
California	Sign Name	Sign Name	Sign Name	Signature
Colorado	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Address & Registration
Connecticut	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Affidavit
D.C.	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Address & Registration
Delaware	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Affidavit
Florida	Photo ID ²	Photo ID	Photo ID	Signature
Georgia	Provide ID	Gov. Issued Photo ID	Gov. Issued Photo ID	Affidavit
Hawaii	Photo ID^^	Photo ID	Photo ID^^	Affidavit
Idaho	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	EDR
Illinois	Give Name	Provide ID*	Match Sig.	Affidavit
Indiana	Sign Name	Gov. Issued Photo ID	Gov. Issued Photo ID	Bring ID Later
Iowa	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Bring ID Later
Kansas	Sign Name	Sign Name	Sign Name	Bring ID Later
Kentucky	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Affidavit
Louisiana	Photo ID	Photo ID	Photo ID^	DOB and Address
Maine	Give Name	Provide ID*	Give Name	EDR
Maryland	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Bring ID Later
Mass.	Give Name	Provide ID*	Give Name	Affidavit
Michigan	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Bring ID Later
Minnesota	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	EDR
Mississippi	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Affidavit
Missouri	Provide ID	Provide ID*	Provide ID	Address & Registration
Montana	Provide ID	Provide ID*	Provide ID	Bring ID Later
Nebraska	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Affidavit
Nevada	Match Sig.	Provide ID*	Match Sig.	Affidavit
New Jersey	Match Sig.	Provide ID*	Match Sig.	Bring ID Later
New Mexico	Sign Name	Provide ID	Provide ID	Bring ID Later
New York	Match Sig.	Provide ID*	Match Sig.	Affidavit
NH	Give Name	Provide ID	Give Name	EDR
North Carolina	Give Name	Provide ID*	Give Name	Varies
North Dakota	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	No Registration
Ohio	Match Sig.	Provide ID	Provide ID	Address & Registration
Oklahoma	Sign Name	Provide ID*	Sign Name	Address & Registration
Oregon	Match Sig.	Provide ID*	Match Sig.	Signature
Penn.	Match Sig.	Provide ID ⁴	Match Sig.	Address & Registration
Rhode Island	Give Name	Provide ID*	Give Name	Address & Registration

²⁰ See Appendix 1 for a more detailed summary, including citations and statutory language, of the identification requirements in each state.

South Carolina	Photo ID ⁵	Photo ID	Photo ID^^	Address & Registration
South Dakota	Photo ID ⁶	Photo ID	Photo ID^^	Affidavit
Tennessee	Provide ID	Provide ID ⁷	Provide ID	Affidavit
Texas	Provide ID	Provide ID ⁸	Provide ID	Bring ID Later
Utah	Give Name	Provide ID	Give Name	Bring ID Later
Vermont	Give Name	Provide ID	Give Name	Affidavit
Virginia	Provide ID	Provide ID	Provide ID	Affidavit
Washington	Sign Name	Provide ID	Provide ID	Address & Registration
West Virginia	Match Sig.	Provide ID	Match Sig.	Address & Registration
Wisconsin	Give Name	Provide ID	Give Name	Bring ID Later
Wyoming	Give Name	Provide ID	Give Name	Affidavit

* States applies only HAVA's ID requirement, applicable to first-time voters who registered by mail and did not provide applicable ID at the time of registration.

¹ Arizona voters who lack a photo ID may present 2 forms of ID with no photograph.

² Florida required a photo ID in 2004, but voters without that credential could sign an affidavit concerning their identity and eligibility and cast a regular ballot. Florida subsequently changed its law to require that voters present photo ID to cast a regular ballot, though voters without photo ID may still cast a provisional ballot by signing an affidavit, which ballot should ordinarily be counted.

³ Louisiana required a photo ID in 2004. Voters without that credential could sign an affidavit concerning their identity and eligibility and cast a regular ballot.

⁴ Pennsylvania requires ID of all first-time voters, whether they registered by mail or in-person.

⁵ Voters lacking a photo ID could vote by providing another form of ID in 2004.

⁶ Voters lacking a photo ID could vote by providing another form of ID in 2004.

⁷ Tennessee voters must provide signature and address. In counties without computerized lists, the signature is compared to the registration card. In counties with computerized lists, the signature is compared to a signature on ID presented with the registration.

⁸ Texas voters must present a current registration certificate. Those without a certificate can vote provisionally after completing an affidavit.

Relationship of Voter ID requirements to Turnout

The statistical analysis examined the potential variation in turnout rates based on the type of voter identification required in each state on Election Day 2004 using two sets of data: aggregate turnout data at the county level for each state, as compiled by the Eagleton Institute of Politics, and individual-level survey data included in the November 2004 Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.

The statistical analysis examined turnout among U.S. citizens of voting age in both the aggregate and the individual-level data. Determining citizenship status in the individual-level data simply involved restricting the analyses to individuals who identified themselves as citizens in the November 2004 Current Population Survey. (Those who said they were not citizens did not have the opportunity to answer the supplemental voting questions contained in the Current Population Survey.)

Findings of the statistical analysis

The analysis looked at the voter identification requirements in two ways, as a continuous variable and as a series of discrete variables. As a continuous variable the maximum voter identification requirements are ranked according to how demanding they were judged to be, with photo ID as the most demanding requirement. As discrete variables, the statistical analysis assume that stating name is the least demanding ID requirement and compare each other requirement to it.

The analysis treating the requirements as a continuous variable offers some statistical support for the premise that as the level of required proof increases, turnout declines. Averaging across counties in each state, statewide turnout is negatively correlated with maximum voter identification requirements ($r = -.30, p < .05$). In considering the array of minimum requirements, with affidavit as the most demanding requirement, however, the correlation between voter identification and turnout is negative, but it is not statistically significant ($r = -.20, p = .16$). This suggests that the relationship between turnout rates and minimum requirements may not be linear. Breaking down the turnout rates by type of requirement reveals in greater detail the relationship between voter identification requirements and voter turnout.

Table 2 – Variation in 2004 State Turnout Based on Voter Identification Requirements

Maximum Requirement		Minimum Requirement	
Voter Identification Required in the States	Mean Voter Turnout for States in that Category	Voter Identification Required in the States	Mean Voter Turnout for States in that Category
State Name	64.2 %	State Name	63.0 %
Sign Name	61.1 %	Sign Name	60.4 %
Match Signature	60.9 %	Match Signature	61.7 %
Provide Non-Photo ID	59.3 %	Provide Non-Photo ID	59.0 %
Provide Photo ID	58.1 %	Swear Affidavit	60.1 %
<i>Average Turnout (All States)</i>	60.9 %		

This table displays the mean turnout using the aggregate county level data for each state in 2004.

The aggregate data show that 60.9 percent of the estimated citizen voting age population voted in 2004. Differences in voter turnout at the state level in 2004 varied based on voter identification requirements. Taking into account the maximum requirements, an average of 64.6 percent of the voting age population turned out in states that required voters to state their names, compared to 58.1 percent in states that required photo identification. A similar trend

emerged when considering minimum requirements. Sixty-three percent of the voting age population turned out in states requiring voters to state their names, compared to 60.1 percent in states that required an affidavit from voters. Given the lack of a clear, consistent linear relationship between turnout and minimum identification requirements, however, we opted to treat the voter identification requirements as a series of dichotomous variables.²¹(Dichotomous variables reflect either the presence or absence of a characteristic. In the dummy variable for non-photo ID, a state would be coded as 1 if it required non-photo ID, and 0 otherwise.)

Voter identification requirements are just one factor that might affect voter turnout. Multivariate models that take into account other predictors of turnout can paint a more complete picture of the relationship between voter identification requirements and turnout. This analysis estimated the effects of voter identification requirements in multivariate models that also took into account the electoral context in 2004 and demographic characteristics of the population in each county. While the model takes account of several important variables, statistical models do not capture all the messiness of the real world. It is a simplification of a complex reality, and its results should be treated with appropriate caution.

The model also took into account such variables as:

- Was the county in a presidential battleground state?
- Was the county was in a state with a competitive race for governor and/or the U.S. Senate?
- Percentage of the voting-age population in each county that was Hispanic or African-American ²²
- Percentage of county residents age 65 and older
- Percentage of county residents below the poverty line

Another contextual factor to consider is voter registration requirements, such as the deadline for registration. As states set the deadline farther away from Election Day, the task of remembering

²¹ The voter identification requirements are coded as a series of dummy variables, coding each variable as one if the requirement existed in a given state, and zero otherwise. This yielded five dichotomous variables for maximum requirements (state name, sign name, match signature, non-photo identification, or photo identification), and five dichotomous variables for minimum requirements (state name, sign name, match signature, non-photo identification, or providing an affidavit). Omitted is the variable for stating one's name so that it could serve as the reference category in comparison with the other four identification requirements in each of the statistical analyses.

²² The U.S. Census projections for 2003 provided the data for the percentage of the voting-age population in each county that was Hispanic or African-American and for the percentage of county residents age 65 and older.

to register to vote becomes more challenging. Thus our model takes into account the number of days between each state's registration deadline and the election.

The dependent variable in each model using the aggregate data was voter turnout at the county level, with turnout calculated as the percentage of the citizen voting-age population that voted in the 2004 election.

The results of this modeling suggest that the stricter voter identification requirements of matching one's signature to a signature on file with election authorities or presenting a non-photo ID are associated with lower turnout compared to turnout in states that required voters to simply state their name, holding constant the electoral context and demographic variables.

Contextual factors, such as whether the county was in a battleground state or whether that state had a competitive race for governor and/or U.S. Senate, were associated with increased voter turnout. The time between the closing date for registration and the election was correlated with a slight negative effect on turnout. As the percentage of Hispanics in the county's population increased, turnout declined. The percentage of senior citizens in the county and household median income were associated with higher turnout. The percentage of African-Americans in the county did not have a significant effect in the model. The percentage of senior citizens in the county and household median income showed a positive correlation with turnout. In this aggregate model, the percentage of African-Americans in the county was not associated with a significant difference in turnout.

The relationship of the minimum voter identification requirements to turnout was not demonstrated. None of the dummy variables for voter identification requirements were statistically significant. (A "dummy variable" represents a particular attribute and has the value zero or one for each observation, e.g. 1 for male and 0 for female.) Being a battleground state and having a competitive statewide race were significant and positive, as was the percentage of senior citizens in the county and household median income. The percentage of Hispanics in the county's population continued to be associated with reduced turnout, as was the number of days between the closing date for registration and the election.²³

²³ This test incorporated a series of interactions between the maximum and minimum voter identification requirements and the percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics living in the counties. In each case the interactions did not improve the fit of the models to the data. See tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix of Vercellotti's paper in the appendices.

Analysis of the aggregate data at the county level generates some support for the hypothesis that stricter identification requirements are correlated with lower turnout. For the maximum requirements, a signature match and non-photo identification –but not photo identification-- were correlated at a significant level with lower turnout in 2004, compared to requiring that voters simply state their names.

Aggregate data, however, cannot fully capture the individual demographic factors that may figure into the decision to turn out to vote.²⁴ Voter identification requirements could have a relationship to the turnout of particular groups of voters, in ways that county-level aggregate data on turnout would not capture. To explore the effects of voter identification requirements on turnout more completely, it is important to examine individual-level data as well.

Individual-level Analysis

Individual-level turnout data exists in the November 2004 Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The Census Bureau conducts the CPS monthly to measure unemployment and other workforce data, but the bureau adds a battery of voter participation questions to the November survey in even-numbered years to coincide with either a presidential or midterm Congressional election.

One of the of the CPS is the sheer size of the sample. The survey's Voting and Registration Supplement consisted of interviews, either by telephone or in person, with 96,452 respondents.²⁵ The large sample size permits analyses of smaller groups, such as Black or Hispanic voters or voters with less than a high school education. The statistical analysis in relying on the CPS is based on reports from *self-described* registered voters. Omitted are those who said they were not registered to vote, as are those who said they cast absentee ballots because the identification requirements for absentee ballots may differ from those required when one votes in person. Eliminated from the sample are respondents who said they were not U.S. citizens, who in this survey were not asked the voter registration and turnout questions. In

²⁴ For example, previous research has found that education is a powerful determinant of turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, but see also Nagler 1991).²⁴ Married people also are more likely to vote than those who are not married (Alvarez and Ansolabehere 2002; Alvarez, Nagler and Wilson 2004; Fisher, Kenny, and Morton 1993).

²⁵ It is important to note that the Census Bureau allows respondents to answer on behalf of themselves and others in the household during the interview. While proxy reporting of voter turnout raises the possibility of inaccurate reports concerning whether another member of the household voted, follow-up interviews with those for whom a proxy report had been given in the November 1984 CPS showed 99 percent agreement between the proxy report and the information given by the follow-up respondent (U.S. Census Bureau 1990).

addition to the voter identification requirements, the models include other socioeconomic, demographic, and political environment factors that might have influenced turnout in 2004.²⁶ The dependent variable in these analyses is whether a respondent said he or she voted in the November 2004 election.²⁷

In the model, three of the voter identification requirements have a statistically significant correlation with whether survey respondents said they had voted in 2004. That is, compared to states that require voters only to state their names, the requirement to sign one's name, provide a non-photo ID, or photo ID in the maximum requirements or affidavit in the minimum is associated with lower turnout.

Of the other state factors, only the competitiveness of the presidential race showed a significant, correlation with increased turnout. In terms of demographic influences, African-American voters were more likely than white voters or other voters to say they had cast a ballot, while Asian-Americans were less likely than white or other voters to say they had turned out. Hispanic voters were not statistically different from white or other voters in terms of reported turnout. Consistent with previous research, income, and marital status all were positive predictors of voting. Women also were more likely to say they voted than men. Among the age categories, those ages 45 to 64 and 65 and older were more likely than those ages 18 to 24 to say they voted. Respondents who had earned a high school diploma, attended some college, graduated from college or attended graduate school were all more likely to say they voted than those who had not finished high school.

While the probit models provide statistical evidence for the relationship of voter identification requirements and other variables to turnout, probit coefficients do not lend themselves to intuitive interpretation.²⁸ Table 3 below shows predicted probabilities (calculated from the probit

²⁶ The models are estimated using probit analysis, which calculates the effects of independent variables on the probability that an event occurred – in this case whether a respondent said he or she voted and using robust standard errors to control for correlated error terms for observations from within the same state.

²⁷ The U.S. Census Bureau reported, based on the November 2004 CPS, that 89 percent of those who identified themselves as registered voters said they voted in 2004 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Previous research has shown that, generally speaking, some survey respondents overstate their incidence of voting. Researchers speculate that over-reports may be due to the social desirability that accompanies saying one has done his or her civic duty, or a reluctance to appear outside the mainstream of American political culture (U.S. Census Bureau 1990). It is also possible that voting is an indication of civic engagement that predisposes voters to agree to complete surveys at a higher rate than non-voters (Flanigan and Zingale 2002). Hence the voter turnout rates reported in the CPS tend to be up to 10 percentage points higher than the actual turnout rate for the nation (Flanigan and Zingale 2002). Even with this caveat, however, the CPS serves as a widely accepted source of data on voting behavior.

²⁸ A probit model is a popular specification of a generalized linear regression model, using the probit link function.

coefficients) of voting for each level of voter identification requirements while holding all other independent variables in the models at their means.²⁹

Table 3. Predicted probability of voter turnout – all voters		
	Maximum requirement	Minimum requirement
State name	91.7%	91.5%
Sign name	89.9%	90.2%
Match signature	Not significant	Not significant
Non-photo ID	89.0%	89.0%
Photo ID	88.8%	----
Affidavit	----	87.5%
Total difference from “state name” to “photo ID” or “affidavit”	2.9%	4.0%
N	54,973	
Figures represent the predicted probability of registered voters saying they voted as the identification requirement varies from stating one’s name to providing photo identification or an affidavit , with all other variables held constant.		
Data source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, November 2004.		

Taking into account that signature matches were not a predictor of turnout, the differences in predicted probability decline from stating one’s name to providing a photo identification or affidavit. Voters in states that required photo identification were 2.7 percent less likely to vote than voters in states where individuals had to give their names.³⁰ In terms of the minimum requirement, voters in states that required an affidavit at minimum were 4 percent less likely to turn out than voters in states where they had to give their names.

The differences were more pronounced for those with fewer years of education. Constraining the model to show predicted probabilities only for those with less than a high school diploma, the probability of voting was 5.1 percent lower in states that required photo identification as the maximum requirement and 7 percent lower in states that required an affidavit as the minimum

²⁹ In the case of dichotomous independent variables, holding them at their mean amounted to holding them at the percentage of the sample that was coded 1 for the variable (Long 1997).

³⁰ The voter turnout percentages may seem disproportionately high compared to the turnout rates reported in the aggregate data analysis. It is important to consider that the turnout rates in the aggregate data were a proportion of all citizens of voting-age population, while the turnout rates for the individual-level data are the proportion of only registered voters who said they voted.

requirement compared to states where stating one's name was the maximum or minimum requirement.

Race and ethnicity have generated particular interest in the debate over voter ID requirements.³¹ The analysis using the aggregate data shed no light on the association between voter ID requirements and turnout for African-American and Hispanic voters. But in the models using the individual data, some significant relationships emerged for African-American, Hispanic and Asian citizens. For the entire population, the signature, non-photo identification and photo identification requirements all were associated with lower turnout compared to the requirement that voters simply state their names. These correlations translated into reduced probabilities of voting of about 3 to 4 percent for the entire sample, with larger differences for specific subgroups. For example, the predicted probability that Hispanics would vote in states that required non-photo identification was about 10 percentage points lower than in states where Hispanic voters gave their names. The difference was about 6 percent for African-Americans and Asian-Americans, and about 2 percent for white voters.

The model also showed that Hispanic voters were less likely to vote in states that required non-photo identification as opposed to stating one's name. Hispanic voters were 10 percent less likely to vote in non-photo identification states compared to states where voters only had to give their name.

More rigorous voter identification requirements were associated with lower turnout rates for Asian-American voters as well. Asian-American voters were 8.5 percent less likely to vote in states that required non-photo identification compared to states that require voters to state their names under the maximum requirements, and they were 6.1 percent less likely to vote where non-photo identification was the minimum requirement.

Conclusions of the Statistical Analysis

The statistical analysis found that, as voter identification requirements vary, voter turnout varies as well. This finding emerged from both the aggregate data and the individual-level data,

³¹ Incorporating discrete variables for Hispanics, African-Americans, and Asian-Americans into one model carries the implicit assumption that the remaining variables, including education and income, will influence each of these groups in a similar manner in terms of deciding whether to vote. These assumptions are not always born out by the data (see Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999.) To isolate the effects of voter identification and other variables on voter turnout within specific racial and ethnic groups, the sample is divided into sub-samples and the model re-run to calculate the data discussed and shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7 in Appendix C.

although not always for both the maximum and minimum sets of requirements. The overall relationship between ID requirements and turnout for all registered voters was fairly small, but still statistically significant.

In the aggregate data, the match-signature requirement and the provide-a-non-photo ID requirement were correlated with lower turnout compared to requiring that voters state their names. But the photo-ID requirement did not have an effect that was statistically significant, possibly because in 2004 each state requiring a photo-ID provided an alternative way to cast a regular ballot for voters who lacked that document.

In the model using the individual-level data the signature, non-photo ID, and photo ID requirements were all correlated with lower turnout compared to the requirement that voters simply state their names (in the entire sample and for white voters, but the statistical significance may be an artifact of the very large sample size). That the non-photo identification requirement was the most consistent in terms of statistical significance across the groups is intriguing given the intense debates surrounding photo identification requirements.

Significant questions about the relationship between voter identification requirements and turnout remain unanswered. The data examined in the statistical analysis could not capture the dynamics of how identification requirements might lower turnout, nor could they rule out that other attributes of a state's electoral system might explain the statistically significant correlations that the study found. If ID requirements dampen turnout, is it because individuals are aware of the requirements and stay away from the polls because they cannot or do not want to meet the requirements? Or, do the requirements result in some voters being turned away when they cannot meet the requirements on Election Day, or forced to cast a provisional ballot that is not ultimately counted? The CPS data do not include measures that can answer this question. Knowing more about the "on the ground" experiences of voters concerning identification requirements could guide policy-makers at the state and local level in determining whether and at what point in the electoral cycle a concerted public information campaign might be most effective in helping voters to meet identification requirements. Such knowledge also could help in designing training for election judges to handle questions about, and potential disputes over, voter identification requirements.

Litigation Over Voter ID Requirements

A handful of cases have challenged identification requirements in court in recent years. In general, requirements that voters provide some identifying documentation have been upheld, where photo ID is *not* the only acceptable form. Whether laws requiring photo ID will be upheld is more doubtful. To date, only two cases have considered laws requiring voters to show photo ID (*Common Cause v. Billups* and *Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita*). Cases challenging the mandatory disclosure of voters' Social Security numbers on privacy grounds have yielded mixed results.

Non-photo identification. For the most part, courts have looked favorably on requirements that voters present some form of identifying documents if the photo identification is not the only form accepted. In *Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson*, No. 04CV7709, 2004 WL 2360485, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004), plaintiffs challenged a law requiring all in-person voters to show identification (not just first-time registrants). The court upheld this requirement against a constitutional challenge. Similarly, in *League of Women Voters v. Blackwell*, 340 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ohio 2004), the court rejected a challenge to an Ohio directive requiring first-time voters who registered by mail to provide one of the HAVA-permitted forms of identification, in order to have their provisional ballots counted. Specifically, the directive provided that their provisional ballots would be counted if the voter (a) orally recited his driver's license number or the last four digits of his social security number or (b) returned to the polling place before it closed with some acceptable identification (including reciting those identification numbers). *Id.* This was found to be consistent with HAVA.

Photo ID. Since the 2004 election, two states have adopted laws requiring photo identification at the polls in order to have one's vote counted, without an affidavit exception: Georgia and Indiana.³² Both these requirements were enacted in 2005 and both have been challenged in court. The Georgia law required voters attempting to cast a ballot in person present a valid form of photographic identification. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. On October 18, 2005, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the application of the new identification requirements on constitutional grounds. In granting the injunction, the court held that plaintiffs' claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection) and Twenty-Fourth Amendment (poll tax) had a

³² Indiana's law does allow voters without ID to cast provisional ballots, and then to appear before the county board of elections to execute an affidavit saying that they are indigent and unable to obtain the requisite ID without payment of a fee. But in contrast to other states, voters cannot cast a ballot that will be counted by submitting an affidavit at the polls, affirming that they are the registered voter and are otherwise eligible to vote.

substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits at trial (*Common Cause v. Billups*, Prelim. Inj. 96, 104). In January 2006, Georgia enacted a modified version of its photo ID law, which the court has not yet ruled on. In the other state that has enacted a photo ID requirement (Indiana), legal challenges have also been filed. (*Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita* and *Crawford v. Marion County Election Board*). On April 14, 2006, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence showing that the state's ID law would have an adverse impact on voters. Another case of significance, for purposes of photo ID requirements, is *American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota v. Kiffmeyer*, No. 04-CV-4653, 2004 WL 2428690, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2004). In that case, the court enjoined a Minnesota law that allowed the use of tribal photo ID cards, only for an Indian who lived on the reservation. 2004 WL 2428690, at *1. The Court found no rational basis for distinguishing based on whether or not the cardholder lives on the reservation. *Id.* at *1, 3. These decisions indicate that courts are likely to carefully scrutinize the evidence regarding the impact of photo ID requirements.

Privacy. In *Greidinger v. Davis*, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993), the court struck down on due process grounds a Virginia law requiring disclosure of voters' social security numbers for voter registration. The social security numbers recorded in voter registration lists had been disclosed to the public and political parties that had requested the lists. The court found that the requirement to give the social security number effectively conditioned rights on the consent to an invasion of privacy. It concluded that this public disclosure of the social security numbers was not necessary to achieve the government's interest in preventing fraud. On the other hand, in *McKay v. Thompson*, 226 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000), the court rejected privacy challenges based on both the Constitution and federal statutes, to a Tennessee law requiring social security numbers for voter registration since 1972. 226 F.3d at 755. Second, the NVRA only permits requiring the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent duplicate voter registration and to determine eligibility. The distinction appears to be between the use of Social Security numbers for internal purposes only, which was deemed permissible, and the disclosure of those numbers to the public which was not.

These decisions suggest that the courts will carefully scrutinize the evidence, where states require that voters produce a photo ID in order to cast a regular ballot. The courts have used a

balancing test to weigh the legitimate interest in preventing election fraud against the citizen's right to privacy (protecting social security numbers from public disclosure, for example) and the reasonableness of requirements for identity documents. To provide both the clarity and certainty in administration of elections needed to forestall destabilizing challenges to outcomes, these early decisions suggest that best practice may be to limit requirements for voter identification to the minimum needed to prevent duplicate registration and ensure eligibility.

Developments since 2004

Since the passage of HAVA, with its limited requirements for voter identification, and following the 2004 election, debate over voter ID has taken place in state legislatures across the country. That debate has not been characterized by solid information on the consequences of tightening requirements for voters to identify themselves before being permitted to cast a regular, rather than a provisional, ballot.

Better information might improve the quality of the debate. Answers to the following key questions are not available in a form that might satisfy those on both sides of the argument.

- What is the overall incidence of vote fraud?
- How does fraud take place in the various stage of the process: registration, voting at the polls, absentee voting, or ballot counting?
- What contribution can tighter requirements for voter ID make to reducing vote fraud?
- What would be the other consequences of increasingly demanding requirements for voters to identify themselves? This is the question addressed, within the limits of the available data, in the analysis in this report.

Answering these questions would provide the information needed for more informed judgement in the states as they consider the tradeoffs among the competing goals of ballot integrity, ballot access, and administrative efficiency. The Carter-Baker Commission recognized the tradeoffs when it tied recommendation for national ID to an affirmative effort by government to identify unregistered voters and make it easy for them to register.

State Voter Databases and Voter ID

With the implementation of the HAVA Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List, an application for voter registration for an election for Federal office may not be accepted or processed unless the application includes a driver's license number or last four digits of the

Social Security number on the voter registration form. This information can be used to verify the identity of the registrant through interfacing with lists maintained by the Motor Vehicle office and Social Security office. If registrants do not have either a driver's license or Social Security number, the State will assign a unique identifier number to that person.

Some states are wrestling now with these unresolved issues. In New Jersey, for example, pending legislation would require that voters must be able to confirm their registration through a secure access to the Statewide Voter Registration List. It also requires voters to present ID at the polls in order to cast a regular ballot if the numbers recorded on the registration have not been verified (or if no verifiable number appears on the registration). It recognizes the HAVA requirement that if the number provided by the voter has not been verified and if the voter does not present ID at the polls, that voter may cast a provisional ballot. The bill does not specify they have to provide ID within 48 hours in order for their vote to count, as is the case with first-time mail-in registrants.

As some states gain experience in this area, the EAC would perform a useful service by making timely recommendations of best practices for all states to consider.

Conclusions

The analysis of voter ID requirements is complex. It takes into account important values associated with an electoral process, such as ballot access and integrity. The continuing effort to understand how voter ID requirements may affect turnout and the integrity of the ballot could benefit from additional factual information, including statistical analyses. Our research includes a statistical study of this kind. It indicated that the level of voter turnout in a state is correlated with the stringency of the voter ID requirement imposed by that state. Additional empirical research of this nature, with additional data collected by or for the EAC, would further illuminate the relationship between stricter voter ID rules and turnout, perhaps explaining if awareness of a strict ID requirement tends to discourage would-be voters from going to the polls. Or, additional research may shed light on whether, if voters did go to the polls, stricter Voter ID requirements will divert more voters into the line for provisional ballots. The consequence of increased reliance on provisional ballots can be longer lines at the polls and confusion, without necessarily a clear demonstration that the security of the ballot is correspondingly increased.³³

³³ In this connection, the Brennan Center's response to the Carter-Baker Commission report observes that, "while it might be true that in a close election "a small amount of fraud could make the margin of

The debate over voter ID in the states would be improved by additional research sponsored by the EAC. That might include longitudinal studies of jurisdictions that have changed voter ID requirements, as well as precinct-level analyses that would allow more finely tuned assessment of the correlation between stricter identification requirements and turnouts. Further research could also identify methods to eliminate the need for voters to bring specific identity documents with them to the polls, while assuring that each voter who casts a ballot is eligible and votes only once.

difference," it is equally true that the rejection of a much larger number of eligible voters could make a much bigger difference in the outcome." *Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform*, The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Spencer Overton, On Behalf Of The National Network on State Election Reform, September 19, 2005

EAC Report on Voter Identification

Executive Summary

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) authorizes the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to conduct periodic studies of election administration issues. HAVA Section 303 (b) mandates that first time voters who register by mail are required to show proof of identity before being allowed to cast a ballot. The law prescribes certain requirements concerning this section, but also leaves considerable discretion to the States for its implementation. The EAC sought to examine how these voter identification requirements were implemented in the 2004 general elections and to prepare guidance for the states on this topic.

In May 2005 EAC entered into a contract with the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey and the Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University to perform a review and legal analysis of state legislation, administrative procedures and court cases, and to perform a literature review on other research and data available on the topic of voter identification requirements. Further, the contractor was to analyze the problems and challenges of voter identification, to hypothesize alternative approaches and recommend various policies that could be applied to these approaches.

The contractor also performed a statistical analysis of the relationship of various requirements for voter identification to voter turnout in the 2004 election. Using two sets of data, aggregate turnout data at the county level for each state, and reports of individual voters collected in the November 2004 Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, the contractor found the overall relationship between the stringency of ID requirements and turnout to be fairly small, but statistically significant.

Based on The Eagleton Institute year-long inquiry into voter identification requirements EAC will implement one or more of the following recommendations:

- Further research into the connection between voter ID requirements and the number of ballots cast and counted;
- A state-by-state review of the impact that voter ID requirements are having on voter's participation;
- A state-by-state review of the relationship between ballot access and ballot security and the number of voters whose ballot is counted;
- A state-by-state review of time periods between voters casting of provisional ballots and the time allowed to return with an ID as well as a review of acceptable forms of identification other than photo ID.

Introduction

This study was conducted at a time in which considerable attention is being paid to the issue of voter identification. Proponents of stricter identification requirements base their case on improving the security of the ballot by reducing opportunities for multiple voting or voting by those who are not eligible. The goal is to ensure that only those legally entitled to vote do so, and do so only once at each election. Opponents of stricter ID requirements seek to ensure board access to a regular ballot. There is a fear that some voters -- racial and ethnic minorities, young and elderly voters-- lack convenient access to required ID documents, or that these voters may be fearful of submitting their ID documents for official scrutiny.

This report considers policy issues associated with the voter ID debate. It examines the relationships between voter ID requirements and voter turnout along with the various policy implications of the issue.

Methodology of the Study

In May 2005, under contract with the EAC, the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, and the Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University undertook a review and legal analysis of state statutes, regulations and litigation concerning voter identification and provisional voting as well as a statistical analysis of the relationship of various requirements for voter identification to turnout in the 2004 election. The contract also included research and study related to provisional voting requirements. These research findings were submitted and reviewed by the EAC as a separate study.

The Eagleton Institute of Politics gathered information on the voter identification requirements in 50 states and the District of Columbia for 2004. Based on interpretations of state statutes and supplemental information provided through conversations with state election officials, state ID requirements were divided into five categories, with each category of identification more rigorous than the one preceding: stating name, signing name, signature match, presenting an ID, and the most rigorous, presenting a government photo ID. The Eagleton Institute also categorized and identified each state according to maximum and minimum identification requirements. Maximum requirements refer to the most that voters may be asked to do or show at the polling place. Minimum requirements refer to the most that voters can be required to do or show in order to cast a regular ballot. These definitions and the subsequent state-by-state analysis of voter identification requirements omitted those cases in which a particular voter's eligibility might be questioned using a state's voter ballot challenge process.

Two data sets were used to apply the criteria (variables) that were developed above: aggregate voter turnout data at the county level which was gathered from the EAC's 2004 Election Day Survey and; reports of individual voters collected through the November 2004 Current Population Survey administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. Use of EAC

survey data and Census Bureau CPS data provided a way to cross-check the validity of the analysis and conclusions that would be drawn regarding the effect of voter ID requirements on voter turnout.

Study Oversight and Methodological Review

A draft of the Eagleton Institute report and findings on voter identification requirements was critiqued by a peer review group convened by the Eagleton Institute. A second review of the study's research and statistical methodologies was conducted using a group of research and statistical experts independently convened by the EAC. Comments and insights of the peer review group members were taken into account in the drafting of a study report although there was not unanimous agreement among the individual reviewers regarding the study findings and recommendations.

The Eagleton Institute of Politics Peer Review Group

R Michael Alvarez, California Institute of Technology
John C. Harrison, University of Virginia School of Law
Martha E. Kropf, University of Missouri-Kansas City
Daniel H. Lowenstein, University of California at Los Angeles
Timothy G. O'Rourke, Salisbury University
Bradley Smith, Capital University Law School
Tim Storey, National Conference of State Legislatures
Peter G. Verniero, former Attorney General, State of New Jersey

The EAC Peer Review Group

Jonathan Nagler, New York University
Jan Leighley, University of Arizona
Adam Berninsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Summary of the Research

Maximum and Minimum Voter Identification Requirements

In order to analyze what, if any, correlation may exist between a State's voter identification requirements and voter turnout, the Eagleton Institute first coded a state according to how demanding its voter ID requirement was. The voter ID requirement, ranked from lowest to highest was as follows: stating one's name, signing one's name, matching one's signature to a signature on file, providing a form of identification and, providing a form of photo identification. Several possible caveats to this ranking system were noted. For all states which had photo identification requirements in 2004, voters

without a photo ID were permitted to cast a regular ballot after signing an affidavit regarding his or her identity and eligibility. These voters were also allowed to provide other forms of ID. The researchers also noted that while each state may be assigned to a category, that categorization may not reflect the actual practice related to voter identification that may or may not have taken place at many polling places.

Research performed for this study by the Moritz College of Law found that states had five different types of **maximum** identification requirements in place on Election Day 2004. For the purposes of this study a requirement that called for a signed affidavit or the provision of other forms of ID was considered the most rigorous or the “maximum” requirement. At the polling place voters were asked to:

- State his or her name (10 states)
- Sign his or her name (13 states and the District of Columbia)
- Sign his or her name, which would be matched to a signature on file (seven states)
- Provide a form of identification that did not necessarily include a photo (15 states)
- Provide a photo identification (five states)

Using the same criteria, but applying them as **minimum** rather than maximum criteria for voting the research showed: **(check this section- it doesn't really make sense)**

- State his or her name (12 states)
- Sign his or her name (14 states and the District of Columbia)
- Matching the voter's signature to the signature on file (6 states)
- Provide a non-photo identification (14 states)
- Swear by an affidavit (4 states)

The results of the research are summarized in Table 1.

Election laws in several states offer exceptions to these ID requirements if potential voters lack the necessary form of identification. Laws in these states set a minimum requirement that a voter may be required to satisfy in order to vote using a regular ballot. In 2004 none of the states required photo identification as a minimum standard for voting with a regular ballot. That is, voters who lacked photo ID were allowed to vote in all states, if he or she was able to meet another ID requirement.

The Relationship of Voter Identification Requirements to Voter Turnout

A statistical analysis examining the variation in turnout rates based on the type of voter ID required by each state in the 2004 election was conducted using two sets of data: 1) aggregate turnout data at the county level for each state (compiled by the Eagleton Institute of Politics-**footnote about how they collected the data**) and 2) individual level survey data included in the November 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.

The analysis looked at the voter identification requirements as a continuous variable and as a series of discrete variables. As a continuous variable the maximum voter identification requirements were ranked according to how demanding they were judged to be, with photo identification considered to be the most demanding requirement (**what about affidavit????**). Used as discrete variable, the statistical analysis considered stating the name as the least demanding ID requirement; the other ID requirements were then compared to that requirement.

Aggregate-level statistical analysis

The statistical analysis performed by the Eagleton Institute of Politics found that when averaging across counties in each state, statewide turnout is negatively correlated to maximum voter identification requirements ($r=-.30$, p less than $.05$). When a statistical analysis is performed on the other minimum voter ID requirements (with affidavit being the most demanding requirement), the correlation between voter identification and turnout is negative, but not statistically significant ($r=-.20$, $p=.16$). These findings would suggest that the relationship between turnout rates and minimum requirements may not be linear.

The aggregate data show that 60.9 percent of the estimated citizen voting age population voted in 2004. Taking into account the maximum requirements, an average of 64.6 percent of the voting age population turned out in states that required voters to state their names, compared to 58.1 percent in states that required photo identification. A similar trend was found when analyzing minimum ID requirements. Sixty-three percent of the voting age population turned out in states requiring voters to state their name, compared to 60.1 percent in states that required an affidavit from voters. This analysis showed there was not a clear, consistent linear relationship between turnout and minimum identification requirements.

(insert table 2- Variation in 2004 State Turnout Based on Voter Identification Requirements)

Multivariate models of analysis using aggregate-level data

The Eagleton Institute of Politics performed an additional analysis that would estimate the effects of voter identification requirements, that took into account the electoral context in 2004 and, the demographic characteristics of the population in each county. The model also considers such variables as whether or not the county was 1) in a presidential battleground state, 2) if the county was in a state with a competitive race for government and/or the U.S. Senate, 3) the percentage of voting-age population in each county that was Hispanic or African-American 4) the percentage of county residents age 65 and older, 5) the percent of county residents below the poverty line, and 6) the number of days between each state's registration deadline and the election.

The results of this statistical modeling and subsequent analysis indicated that the stricter voter ID requirements of matching a voter's signature to a signature on file or with presenting a non-photo identification are associated with lower voter turnout when compared to voter turnout in states that required voters to simply state his or her name. These conclusions were reached when variables 1-5 listed above were held constant.

Other results from the Eagleton Institute analysis of stricter voter identification requirements showed that:

- Increased voter turnout was associated with whether the county was in a battleground state or whether that state have a competitive race for governor and/or U.S.Senate.
- A slight negative effect on turnout was correlated with those state's with a longer time between the closing date for registration and the election.
- Voter turnout declined as the percentage of Hispanics in a county's population increased.
- Higher turnout (and a positive correlation) was associated with a higher percentage of senior citizens and household median income.
- The percentage of African-Americans in the county did not have a significant effect on turnout.

The Eagleton Institute analysis of minimum voter identification requirements showed that:

- A relationship between minimum voter ID requirements and turnout was not demonstrated.
- Battleground states and those with competitive state races had a significant and positive correlation to turnout.
- A higher percentage of senior citizens in the county and higher household median income were associated with higher turnout and showed a positive correlation to turnout.
- The percentage of Hispanics in the county was associated with reduced turnout.
- The increased number of days between the closing date for registration was associated with reduced turnout.

The analysis of these aggregate, county-level data showed a significant correlation, between maximum voter identification requirements (a signature match and non-photo

identification, but not a photo identification) and lower turnout in the 2004 election. This correlation was also significant when compared to the minimum voter ID requirement of the voter simply having to state his or her name.

Multivariate analysis using individual level turnout data

This analysis which used November 2004 Current Population Survey data conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau is based on reports from self-described registered voters. Not included in the analysis are persons who said they are not registered to vote, those who said they cast absentee ballots and those who said they were not U.S. citizens. The CPS' Voting and Registration Supplement consisted of interviews, either by telephone or in person, with 96,452 respondents. (**why is the N is Table 3 54,973?**)

In addition to the five maximum voter identification requirements (enumerated on page XX) the analysis performed included other socioeconomic, demographic and political factors that could have influenced turnout in the 2004 election. These independent variables were analyzed against the dependent variable of whether or not the respondent said he or she voted in the November 2004 election.

In this analysis three of the voter identification requirements were shown to have a statistically significant correlation with whether or not the survey respondents said they have voted in 2004. Lower voter turnout was associated with:

- those states with maximum voter requirements to sign one's name,
- those states with maximum voter requirements to provide a non-photo ID or photo ID, or
- those states with the minimum voter requirement to swear by an affidavit in order to cast a ballot without the state-required identification

Increased voter turnout showed:

- A significant correlation with the competitiveness of the Presidential race **(explain)**.
- African-American voters were more likely than white or other voters to say they have voted.
- Income and marital status were positive predictors of voting **(high income or low income, single, married?)**,
- Women were more likely to say they voted than men.
- Those ages 45 to 64 and 65 and older were more likely to say they voted than those ages 18 to 24.
- Those who earned a high school diploma, attended some college, graduated from college or attended graduate school were more likely to say they have voted than those who had not finished high school.

Analysis of the predicted probability of voter turnout using the individual data

Using this Census Bureau Current Population Survey data the Eagleton Institute of Politics performed an additional statistical analysis in which they calculated the effect of various independent variables on the probability that a respondent said he or she voted. This analysis, involving 54,973 voters cross-tabulated the maximum and minimum voter identification requirements in each state with the five levels of voting requirements: stating name, signing name, matching the signature, a non-photo ID, photo-ID signing an affidavit. The results of these **Predicted Probability of Voter Turnout for all Voter** tabulations are summarized in Table 3 below:

From this analysis, the Eagleton Institute of Politics found that three of the voter identification requirements (**which ones?**) exerted a statistically significant, negative effect on whether or not the CPS survey respondents said they had voted in 2004. That is, compared to states that require voters to only state their name, those states which require the voter to sign his or her name, to provide a non-photo ID, or to provide a photo ID as a maximum requirement, were shown to have a negative influence on turnout. Also, a negative influence on turnout was found when comparing those states that require voters to only state their name, as compared to those states which have as a minimum requirement for verifying voter ID, signing an affidavit.

This probability analysis also found that the competitiveness of the presidential race had a significant effect on turnout as well as some significant demographic and educational effects. For the entire voting population signature, non-photo identification and photo identification requirements were all associated with lower turnout rates compared to the requirements that voter simply state their names. The analysis further found that:

- The predicted probability that Hispanics would vote in states that required non-photo identification was about 10 percentage points lower than in states where Hispanic voters gave their names and that Hispanic voters were less likely to vote in states that required non-photo identification as opposed to only having to state one's name.
- Hispanic voters were 10 percent less likely to vote in non-photo identification states compared to states where voters only had to give their name. African American and Asian-American voters were about 6 percent less likely, while white voters were about 2 percent less likely.
- Asian-American voters were 8.5 percent less likely to vote in states that required non-photo identification compared to states that require voters to state their names under the maximum requirements, while they were 6.1

percent less likely to vote where non-photo identification was the minimum requirement.

- For those with less than a high school diploma, the probability of voting was 5.1 percent lower in states that required photo identification as the maximum requirement and 7 percent lower in those states that required an affidavit as the minimum requirement. These percentages were arrived at when comparing these states to ones that use as a minimum or maximum requirement, the voter to merely state his or her name.

Conclusions from the statistical analysis

The statistical analysis found that as voter identification requirements vary, so do voter turnout rates. These findings were borne out through analyses conducted on aggregate data and individual-level data. There were, however, some distinctions found depending upon whether or not the state's particular voter identification requirements were set as minimums or maximums.

- The overall relationship between voter identification requirements and turnout for all registered voters was found to be small but statistically significant.
- Using the aggregate data the signature match and the non-photo identification requirement correlated with lower turnout. The photo identification requirement did not have a statistically significant effect.
- In the individual-level data the signature, no-photo identification and photo identification requirement were all correlated with lower turnout when compared to the requirements that voter simply state their names.
- Across various demographic groups (African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Hispanics) a statistically significant relationship was found between the non-photo identification requirement and voter turnout

Caveats to the Analysis

The Eagleton Institute for Politics and the EAC make note that while this analysis is a good beginning, significant questions remain regarding the relationship between voter identification requirements and turnout. These analyses are unable, for example, to capture how or why identification requirements might lower turnout. That is, is it because voters are aware of the identification requirements and stay away from the polls because of them? Alternatively, do the requirements result in some voters being turned away when they cannot provide the identification, or must cast a provisional ballot?

Knowing more about the “on the ground” experience of voters regarding various identification requirements will guide state and local level policy makers in their efforts to educate voters about the requirements. These experiences could also help instruct election judges on how to handle questions and possible disputes over voter identification requirements.

Public Policy and Administrative Considerations

Voter Identification, often described as the critical step in protecting the integrity of the ballot, is a process which can ensure that the potential voter is eligible and, if eligible, is permitted to cast one ballot. A voting system that requires voters to produce an identification document or documents may prevent the ineligible from voting, but also may prevent the eligible from casting a ballot.

Evaluating the effect of different voter identification regimes can be most effective when based on clear legal, equitable and practical standards. The questions outlined below might point policymakers to standards that can be created around voter identification requirements.

1. Is the voter ID system designed on the basis of valid and reliable empirical studies that will address concerns regarding certain types of voting fraud?
2. Does the voter ID requirement comply with the letter and spirit of the Voting Rights Act?
3. How effective is the voter ID requirement on increasing the security of the ballot and can it be coordinated with the statewide voter registration database?
4. How feasible is the voter identification requirement? That is, are there administrative or budgetary considerations or concerns? How easy or difficult will it be for pollworkers who must administer the requirement?
5. How cost effective is the voter ID system? That is, what are the monetary and non-monetary costs to the voter and to the state for implementing the ID system?
6. If voter ID requirements are shown to reduce voter turnout (generally, or with some particular groups), what possible steps should be taken to ameliorate this problem?

Recommendations and Next Steps

As the Federal agency charged with informing election officials and the public about various issues related to the administration of elections EAC believes it should, in its capacity as a supporter of elections research, undertake additional study into the topic of voter identification requirements and the implementation of them in the following ways:

- Longitudinal studies of jurisdictions that have changed voter identification requirements.

- State-by-state and precinct-level analyses that will examine the correlations between various voter identification requirements and voter registration and turnout
- Alternative forms and methods for verifying a voter's identity.
- Continuing research into the connection between various voter identification requirements and the number of ballots cast and counted
- A continuing state-by-state update on changes to voter identification requirements.
- Continued collection of state-by-state data which will help examine the impact that voter identification requirements are having on the number of voters who are casting provisional ballots because of voter identification verification issues.

Appendix A: Summary of Voter Identification Requirements by State

Appendix B: Court Decisions and Literature on Voter Identification and Related Issue
Court Decisions

Appendix C: Annotated Bibliography on Voter Identification Issues

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
02/06/2007 03:09 PM

To ddavidson@eac.gov, ghillman@eac.gov,
pdegregorio@eac.gov
cc twilkey@eac.gov, jthompson@eac.gov,
klynndyson@eac.gov
bcc
Subject Voter ID talking pts

Commissioners,
Attached are suggested talking pts for the voter ID segment of the public meeting. Please let me know if you have questions or edits. After I receive everyone's input, I will circulate a final version.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100



www.eac.gov 2-8-07 Eagleton Talking Pts.doc

026373

VOTER ID REPORT TALKING POINTS

Public Meeting

February 8, 2007

I. Chair Davidson's Opening Comments for Eagleton Portion of Public Meeting

- This has been a highly anticipated report.
- We received the Eagleton draft in June 2006.
- We immediately realized that the data presented more questions than answers.
- Since we have limited staff and resources, we were unable to immediately resolve these questions. Our top priorities at the time were the lab accreditation and the voting system certification programs.
- In addition, we had to focus our efforts on getting information to election officials and the public concerning the November elections, especially because so many jurisdictions were using new voting equipment.
- Now that we have launched those programs, we are once again turning our attention to this research project.
- Let me introduce Tom O'Neil and Tim Vercellotti. They are here today to pick up where we left off, and to give us a brief overview of the research they conducted regarding voter identification.

II. Karen Lynn-Dyson Testimony

III. Eagleton Testimony

IV. Commissioners Q&A

V. Chair Closes Eagleton Portion of Public Meeting

- Obviously many questions have been raised today.
- Next step is for EAC to determine how to move forward.
- I request that Tom instruct staff to provide recommendations on how to proceed within the next 30 days.
- Once we determine how to move forward and what the final culmination of this initial research will be, we will notify everyone.
- Thank you Tom and Tim for your hard work and efforts in the study of this important topic.

Karen Lynn-Dyson/EAC/GOV
02/06/2007 04:46 PM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC, Bert A.
Benavides/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc ddavidson@eac.gov, ghillman@eac.gov,
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twilkey@eac.gov
bcc
Subject Re: Voter ID talking pts 

Bert, et.al-

Here is the testimony Jeannie and Julie just approved

K

Karen Lynn-Dyson
Research Director
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
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Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV

02/06/2007 03:09 PM

To ddavidson@eac.gov, ghillman@eac.gov, pdegregorio@eac.gov
cc twilkey@eac.gov, jthompson@eac.gov, klyndyson@eac.gov
Subject Voter ID talking pts

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Jeannie Layson
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026375



www.eac.gov 2-8-07 Eagleton Talking Pts.doc Karen Dyson testimony for Voter ID meeting.doc

VOTER ID REPORT TALKING POINTS

Public Meeting

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Remarks for Thursday's Public Meeting

In late May, 2005 this research contract awarded to The State University of New Jersey at Rutgers-- The Eagleton Institute of Politics using the Ohio State University Moritz School of Law, as its subcontractor.

The portion of the contract that was awarded related to the study and analysis of voter identification requirements was to :

- Collect and analyze state legislation, administrative procedures and court cases.
- Create a state-by-state compendium of the legislation, procedures, and litigation reviewed.
- Perform an analysis of how voter identification requirements were implemented around the country and to
- Recommend alternative approaches related to the future implementation of HAVA voter identification requirements. These recommendations were to be based on a literature review of research results, a review of data on voter identification and a diagnosis of the problems and challenges related to voter identification.

This contract was extended on two occasions to allow for additional review, including an EAC-initiated review conducted by an independently convened panel of experts who provided input to Eagleton on the first draft of its statistical analysis of voter identification requirements.

The Eagleton Institute of Politics submitted its draft report to the EAC on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements on June 28, 2006. Findings from Eagleton's study of provisional voting (that was a part of Eagleton's overall study) were included in EAC's Best Practices on Provisional Voting, which were published by EAC in October 2005.

Bryan Whitener /EAC/GOV
02/21/2007 05:47 PM

To Donetta L. Davidson/EAC/GOV@EAC, Gracia Hillman/EAC/GOV@EAC, Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc Bert A. Benavides/EAC/GOV@EAC, Bola Olu/EAC/GOV@EAC, Brian Hancock/EAC/GOV@EAC, Curtis Crider/EAC/GOV@EAC, DeAnna M.
bcc

Subject FYI - Today's media inquiries (2-21-07, Wed)

Commissioners:

Today we had the following media inquiries:

(1) Commissioner Hillman was interviewed by Charles Edwards of NPR in Atlanta about the Standards Bd. meeting. She explained the role of the board, talked about the agenda, including the visit to Kennesaw, and told him GA SOS Handel is on the board. She provided an overview of our voting system standards setting process and our programs to accredit labs and to test and certify systems. She also talked about the importance of gaining public confidence in the voting equipment they use, and talked about our responsibility to bring more accountability to the process.

(2) Jim Galloway of the Atlanta Journal Constitution wanted the report on voter ID. We explained that we had been working with the Eagleton Institute to study issues related to voter ID. We held a public meeting earlier this month in which we discussed this project to provide an update on progress being made. At the meeting, EAC commissioners asked the researchers questions about what they'd found so far, methodology, etc. At the conclusion of the questions, EAC Chair Donetta Davidson instructed EAC staff to take a look at Eagleton's recommendations for moving forward and w/n 30 days present the commissioners with suggestions for further research about voter ID laws. She noted that she thought it was important to study more than one election cycle, since some of these ID laws are so new. We sent him the Eagleton testimony. He requested info about the paper presented by Eagleton that referenced the statistics they collected for us, and we sent it to him.

(3) Josh Stager of Congressional Quarterly asked for the Eagleton report on voter ID. We referred him to the testimony on our website and explained that the presentation by Eagleton consisted of a briefing to EAC on their research. We said that the commissioners did not vote on or decide anything with regard to the research. We said that the chair asked the executive director to develop staff recommendations regarding the research to present to the commissioners within thirty days.

(4) Ken Vogel of Politico called Curtis and asked if the OIG had researched the qualifications of the two new commissioners. Curtis said no, that was part of the nomination process. The reporter asked if the OIG was looking into the Ciber issue, and Curtis said he could not comment on that.

###

026379



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV

10/18/2005 05:17 PM

To "Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj.gov"
<Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj.gov>@GSAEXTERNAL
cc

bcc Juliet E. Thompson/EAC/GOV

Subject Re: Research Grants 

Hans,

I wish you would have shown us the decency to have spoken to someone at the EAC before you sent this e-mail. Had you done so, you might have discovered that Ms. Wang was paired with Job Serebrov, a conservative attorney who, like you, has served on a local election board (Washington, Co, AK -Fayetteville). He has also worked on voting issues and election law in his practice, including voter fraud. He was counsel to the Arkansas GOP on ballot integrity issues and was the ballot protection specialist for Mike Huckabee in his campaign for Lt. Governor. In addition, Job formed and ran "Arkansans for Fair Elections", a non-partisan group that looked to investigate and prevent voter fraud issues. He headed that group for 8 years. Job served the Republican Party of Arkansas as the Chairman of the Committee for the Revision of the State Constitution.

Thor Hearne called me last week to indicate that Job had called him to be on the working group that Job and Ms. Wang are putting together to look at the voter fraud/voter intimidation issues.

Job was recommended to the EAC for this work by Julie Thompson. His references included two US 8th Circuit judges appointed by GOP presidents: Morris Arnold and Lavenski Smith.

You may recall that the Advisory Board made it clear to the EAC that they thought the Voter Fraud/Voter Intimidation issues should be studied together. That's why Ms. Wang has been paired with Mr. Serebrov to do this study.

Julie tells me that she had a wide-ranging discussion with you last week but you never brought this issue up. It's too bad, as it may have prevented you from sending an e-mail to so many people that contains only half the story.


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10/18/2005 03:45 PM

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"ddavison@eac.gov" <ddavison@eac.gov>
cc "christophert@.gov"

026330



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<tjsthree@...>, "wrklinerjr@..."
<wrklinerjr@...>

Subject Research Grants

Dear Commissioners:

On August 18 I sent you an email raising serious concerns over the awarding of a contract to the Moritz College of Law given its clearly demonstrated pre-existing opinions about provisional balloting and voter identification. Unfortunately, nothing was apparently done about this situation.

I have just learned that a similar situation has occurred. I understand that another research grant has been awarded to Tova Wang for research into "voter fraud and voter intimidation." Ms. Wang has an even more pronounced partisan and one-sided view of these issues than was present in the situation involving Moritz College. She has many posted opinions available on the Internet that make it clear that she will not be able to conduct research in an objective fashion on these issues. Just a few examples illustrate this:

"It is truly shocking how, given all the problems in the voting system and continued disenfranchisement, the terms of the debate have shifted to that of so-called 'ballot integrity.' It is reminiscent of how conservatives have misappropriated the concept of patriotism and the American flag, and used the power of language and messaging to distort the discussion, by using terms such as 'partial birth abortion' or death tax.'"

"This stands in stark contrast to the entire tenor of the Carter-Baker report, which presumes that fraud committed by voters is the biggest problem confronting our election system. There is simply no strong evidence of this, and some of the remedies proposed will take us backwards in the fight to increase voter participation."

"...voters are individually disenfranchised by continued, often race based, voter intimidation and deceptive practices..."

Carter-Baker Report: Some Bad Fixes for the Wrong Problem, 9/19/2005

"The data is also mounting that identification requirements have disproportionately disenfranchising impacts on certain communities...Given all this piling on of negative evidence, both in terms of the efficacy of ID requirements in fulfilling the goal their advocate's claim and their impact on voting rights, it is somewhat mind boggling that so many state officials, as well as other groups working on this issue, are still vigorously pushing for greater expansion of what seems to be a rather useless yet dangerous tool. Shouldn't the burden of proof now shift to the advocates of more voter ID to demonstrate the value of their cause?"

Voter ID and Fraud: Prove It, 7/28/2005

There are numerous more examples of her partisan opinions and attacks and demonstrably false claims against Republicans and election officials in general, such as her baseless charge in another article that "partisan election officials and party leaders usurped the process and manipulated the new federal voting law in ways that disenfranchised voters."

026381

Election 2004: A Report Card, 1/1/2005. The idea that she will write an objective report on issues that she has already expressed such strong opinions on ("there is no evidence that such election fraud is a serious problem") is hard to accept. I find it surprising that the EAC would award her a research grant or expect that election officials around the country would accept as valid a report written by an individual who asserts that "[a]t every step of the way, election officials in key states threw up unnecessary barriers to voting." Id. This gratuitous remark is an insult to the many hard-working election officials that we all know through our work who did everything they could during the last election to improve the election process and in large part succeeded.

Whatever procedures the EAC has set up to screen individuals and entities applying for research grants is obviously not working. I have no doubt that I could today, based on reading Ms. Wang's prior opinions, predict exactly what her report will conclude on the issues of voter fraud and voter intimidation. This situation needs to be corrected so that research is not being conducted by partisan individuals with preset opinions and views on issues. As with my prior email, I strongly recommend that the EAC reconsider the awarding of this contract.

Hans A. von Spakovsky
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division - Room 5539
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20530

Telephone (202) 305-9750
Facsimile (202) 307-2839

026382



Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV
10/25/2005 05:07 PM

To Karen Lynn-Dyson
cc
bcc
Subject Fw: Research Grants

see e-mail traffic below

— Forwarded by Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV on 10/25/2005 05:07 PM —



"Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj
.gov"
<Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdo
j.gov>
10/19/2005 09:49 AM

To "pdegregorio@eac.gov" <pdegregorio@eac.gov>
cc
Subject RE: Research Grants

perhaps if the Board of Advisors were kept better informed, I would not have been put into this position.

-----Original Message-----

From: pdegregorio@eac.gov [mailto:pdegregorio@eac.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2005 5:18 PM
To: von Spakovsky, Hans (CRT)
Subject: Re: Research Grants
Importance: High

Hans,

I wish you would have shown us the decency to have spoken to someone at the EAC before you sent this e-mail. Had you done so, you might have discovered that Ms. Wang was paired with Job Serebrov, a conservative attorney who, like you, has served on a local election board (Washington, Co, AK -Fayetteville). He has also worked on voting issues and election law in his practice, including voter fraud. He was counsel to the Arkansas GOP on ballot integrity issues and was the ballot protection specialist for Mike Huckabee in his campaign for Lt. Governor. In addition, Job formed and ran "Arkansans for Fair Elections", a non-partisan group that looked to investigate and prevent voter fraud issues. He headed that group for 8 years. Job served the Republican Party of Arkansas as the Chairman of the Committee for the Revision of the State Constitution.

Thor Hearne called me last week to indicate that Job had called him to be on the working group that Job and Ms. Wang are putting together to look at the voter fraud/voter intimidation issues.

Job was recommended to the EAC for this work by Julie Thompson. His references included two US 8th Circuit judges appointed by GOP presidents: Morris Arnold and Lavenski Smith.

You may recall that the Advisory Board made it clear to the EAC that they thought the Voter Fraud/Voter Intimidation issues should be studied together. That's why Ms. Wang has been paired with Mr. Serebrov to do this study.

026333

Julie tells me that she had a wide-ranging discussion with you last week but you never brought this issue up. It's too bad, as it may have prevented you from sending an e-mail to so many people that contains only half the story.

Paul DeGregorio
Vice Chairman
US Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave, NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
1-866-747-1471 toll-free
202-566-3100
202-566-3127 (FAX)
pdegregorio@eac.gov
www.eac.gov

"Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj.gov" <Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj.gov>
10/18/2005 03:45 PM

To

"'gmhillman@eac.gov'" <gmhillman@eac.gov>, "'rmartinez@eac.gov'"
<rmartinez@eac.gov>, "'pdegregorio@eac.gov'" <pdegregorio@eac.gov>,
"'eac.gov'" <jthompson@eac.gov/twilke>, "'ddavison@eac.gov'"
<ddavison@eac.gov>

cc

"'christophert@[REDACTED]'" <christophert@[REDACTED]>,
"'bkaufman@[REDACTED]'" <bkaufman@[REDACTED]>,
"'dlewis@[REDACTED]'" <dlewis@[REDACTED]>,
"'tjsthree@[REDACTED]'" <tjsthree@[REDACTED]>, "'wrklinerjr@[REDACTED]'"
<wrklinerjr@[REDACTED]>

Subject

Research Grants

Dear Commissioners:

On August 18 I sent you an email raising serious concerns over the awarding of a contract to the Moritz College of Law given its clearly demonstrated pre-existing opinions about provisional balloting and voter identification. Unfortunately, nothing was apparently done about this situation.

I have just learned that a similar situation has occurred. I understand that another research grant has been awarded to Tova Wang for research into "voter fraud and voter intimidation." Ms. Wang has an even more pronounced partisan and one-sided view of these issues than was present in the situation involving Moritz College. She has many posted opinions available on the Internet that make it clear that she will not be able to conduct research in an objective fashion on these issues. Just a few examples illustrate this:

026384

"It is truly shocking how, given all the problems in the voting system and continued disenfranchisement, the terms of the debate have shifted to that of so-called 'ballot integrity.' It is reminiscent of how conservatives have misappropriated the concept of patriotism and the American flag, and used the power of language and messaging to distort the discussion, by using terms such as 'partial birth abortion' or 'death tax.'"

"This stands in stark contrast to the entire tenor of the Carter-Baker report, which presumes that fraud committed by voters is the biggest problem confronting our election system. There is simply no strong evidence of this, and some of the remedies proposed will take us backwards in the fight to increase voter participation."

"...voters are individually disenfranchised by continued, often race based, voter intimidation and deceptive practices..."

Carter-Baker Report: Some Bad Fixes for the Wrong Problem, 9/19/2005

"The data is also mounting that identification requirements have disproportionately disenfranchising impacts on certain communities...Given all this piling on of negative evidence, both in terms of the efficacy of ID requirements in fulfilling the goal their advocate's claim and their impact on voting rights, it is somewhat mind boggling that so many state officials, as well as other groups working on this issue, are still vigorously pushing for greater expansion of what seems to be a rather useless yet dangerous tool. Shouldn't the burden of proof now shift to the advocates of more voter ID to demonstrate the value of their cause?"

Voter ID and Fraud: Prove It, 7/28/2005

There are numerous more examples of her partisan opinions and attacks and demonstrably false claims against Republicans and election officials in general, such as her baseless charge in another article that "partisan election officials and party leaders usurped the process and manipulated the new federal voting law in ways that disenfranchised voters." Election 2004: A Report Card, 1/1/2005. The idea that she will write an objective report on issues that she has already expressed such strong opinions on ("there is no evidence that such election fraud is a serious problem") is hard to accept. I find it surprising that the EAC would award her a research grant or expect that election officials around the country would accept as valid a report written by an individual who asserts that "[a]t every step of the way, election officials in key states threw up unnecessary barriers to voting." Id. This gratuitous remark is an insult to the many hard-working election officials that we all know through our work who did everything they could during the last election to improve the election process and in large part succeeded.

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Hans A. von Spakovsky
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General

026385

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U.S. Department of Justice
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Telephone (202) 305-9750
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026386

EAC Research Projects FY05*

	Subject of Study	Deliverable/Product	Due date
1.	Vote Count/Recount Procedures	Final study report. State-by-state compendium of procedures.	Final report in EAC staff review
2.	Legal Clearinghouse	Case law/legal statute database on election laws.	February 28, 2007
3.	Poll Worker Recruitment	250 page manual. Follow-on technical assistance training?	January 30, 2007
4.	College Poll Worker Recruitment	75 page manual. State-by-state compendium of pollworker requirements.	Final report in EAC staff review
5.	Voter Information Access Portals	Report on best practices for voter information websites.	Final report in EAC staff review
6.	Voting Fraud and Intimidation	EAC statement on recommendations for further study. Follow-on election crimes study?	Completed. Next steps under EAC review.
7.	Effective Designs for Election Administration	Exhibits of good ballot designs and polling place signs	Final report due March 30, 2007
8.	Provisional Voting & Voter ID	EAC statement on best practices in provisional voting. EAC statement on recommendations for further study?	Final reports in EAC staff review
9.	Election Day Survey	Data analysis of key data points. Posting of results through EAC website GIS system.	March 7, 2007
10.	Voter Registration Database Technology Assistance	Roundtable discussions with election officials and experts. Interim report and final report on implementation of VR databases	First roundtable March, 2007
11.	First Time Voters who Register by Mail	Report on focus group findings. Six state case studies.	Submitted by March 30, 2007
12.	Free Absentee Ballot Postage	Report on findings of national survey. Report on focus group findings Public hearing with EAC and the USPS	Submitted by May 30, 2007

026387

13.	Internet Voting	Report on findings of survey of UOCAVA voters. Four state case studies. A conference on internet/electronic voting	Case studies April, 2007. Conference May, 2007
14.	Social Security Study	Report on findings of a survey of the public and private sector on their uses of social security data, a public meeting on the use of social security information	Submitted by May 30, 2007
15.	Alternative Voting Methods	Literature review on international alternative voting methods, six state case studies, national survey of registered voters	Literature review and case studies under EAC staff review. Survey due September, 2007.
16.	Website translation and translation of election terms	Posting of glossary of election terms and website translation into Spanish on EAC's website	Final report in EAC staff review
17.	Voter Hotline Project	National survey of federal and state government voter hotlines, report of findings.	Submitted by June 30, 2007

GMHILLMAN
Sent by: Gracia Hillman

10/26/2005 06:29 PM

To "Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj.gov"
<Hans.von.Spakovsky@usdoj.gov>@GSAEXTERNAL
cc "bkaufman@██████████" <bkaufman@██████████>,
"christophert@██████████"
<christophert@██████████>, d davidson@eac.gov,
bcc

Subject Re: Research Grants - Response 

Dear Hans:

I am writing in response to your email in which you took exception to our retaining Ms. Tova Wang as a part-time consultant to help EAC explore the issues of voter fraud and voter intimidation. I know that you have heard directly from Vice Chairman DeGregorio and Commissioner Martinez on the matter but I thought it important that I write back to make certain that everyone had the same information.

As you now know, Ms. Wang is only one consultant who is working with us on these issues. When EAC determined that we should explore our options on how to study the issues of voter fraud and voter intimidation, as required under HAVA Section 241 (b), we made a conscious decision to retain consultants who would work part-time for a defined and limited period of time to provide broad and diverse perspectives, across the political spectrum, from right to left and including the middle.

EAC conducted broad outreach to identify a strong pool of consultant candidates. We reached agreement to retain 3 highly qualified people -- Stephen Ansolabehere, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang -- to work with us as we try to determine the scope of any project we might do on these issues.

Unfortunately, Dr. Ansolabehere's teaching assignments unexpectedly precluded him from being able to work as a part-time consultant but he has expressed his desire and in fact has agreed to continue working with us in an unpaid capacity as we explore our options and frame the issues. In the meantime, Mr. Serebrov and Ms. Wang have agreed to provide the consultant services that we sought. We believe that all three individuals will bring great value, careful thought and important perspectives to our work on these issues.

I hope this clarifies this part of EAC's extensive research and study agenda. EAC engages thoughtful deliberation and undertakes careful consideration of all of its activities. We value inclusiveness and know that we are best served when we have broad and diverse perspectives to inform our work. I am happy to talk with you at any time that you might have questions or concerns about our work.

Best Regards,

Gracia M. Hillman
Chair
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: 202-566-3100
Fax: 202-566-1392
www.eac.gov

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email message is from a federal agency. All attachments, if any, are intended solely for the use of the addressee and may contain legally privileged and confidential information. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying or other use of this message is strictly prohibited. If

026389

you received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately by replying to this message and please delete this message from your computer.

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
06/27/2006 05:18 PM

To pdegregorio@eac.gov, rmartinez@eac.gov,
ddavidson@eac.gov, ghillman@eac.gov
cc EAC Staff

bcc

Subject FYI ONLY: Today's media inquiries

1. Alexandria Burris of the Daily Advertiser (LA) wanted to know the mandatory requirements of HAVA, and I sent them to her. She then said a local clerk says even though HAVA only applies to equipment bought for federal elections, they ended up buying new equipment for state and local elections too, and isn't that just a sneaky way/blurring of the lines to impose mandates at the state level? I told her according to LA law, all voting machines used in the state are purchased by the secretary of state. I told her HAVA only applies to federal elections, and that it is up to each state whether to apply those same requirements to its local and state elections. Therefore, this is a question for the Louisiana secretary of state regarding what kind of equipment they purchase for local and state elections. I suggested that she call Marietta Norton (who I spoke to first) in the Louisiana secretary of state's office.

2. Zach Goldfarb of the Washington Post interviewed the chairman about the findings of the Brennan Center report, issued today. The chairman told him that equipment is only half of the equation, that officials had to have solid management guidelines in place, and told him about Quick Start and gave him a few examples. (We also sent him a link to Quick Start.) He also talked about the Election Management Guidelines we were working on. He also pointed out the security work we'd done with the VVSG, and noted that we asked for an increase from \$2.8M to \$5M for NIST to work on future iterations. He also talked about our certification program, and that it would be rigorous, thorough and transparent. Regarding efforts to make equipment like VVPAT mandatory, the chairman said it was important to recognize that this is a diverse country with diverse election needs, and that one size doesn't fit all. He said election officials were taking the security concerns very seriously and that they were implementing procedures at the local level. He encouraged the reporter to talk to election officials about this issue, since there were none listed on the Brennan Center's task force for this report. We suggested Dana DeBeauvoir in TX.

3. Commissioner Davidson was interviewed by several media outlets in Utah, and she attributed the success of the elections to the state's efforts to increase training and provide more education about the process for voters.

4. Scott Michels of US News and World Report heard about our voting fraud and voter intimidation research, and he had the following questions. The following responses were provided after conferring with Peg and Tom. 1. When will EAC receive the preliminary report on voter intimidation and voting fraud? We anticipate that we will have a draft final report from our consultants in 2-3 weeks, after our consultants have had time to review the transcript from the project Working Group meeting, which was not available until last week. This transcript will provide the comments made during the Working Group meeting. 2. When we receive the preliminary report, what is the EAC process to formulate a final product that will be made public?

First, Commissioners and EAC staff will review the preliminary draft. Then a draft will be submitted to the EAC Standards Board and EAC Advisory Board for review and comment. This second step is taken in accordance with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) §247, which requires EAC to carry out its duties under Title II, Subtitle C (Studies and Other Activities to Promote Effective Administration of Federal Elections) in consultation with the Standards Board and the Board of Advisors. 3. When will we make this research available to the public? What form will it be in? The final report cannot be made public until it has been accepted by the Commissioners. Normally, this does not happen until the researcher(s) submit a final report that has been revised to address clarifications and corrections deemed necessary through the review process described above. The time it takes for the researchers to produce this final report will depend, somewhat, on the number of clarifications and corrections deemed necessary.

I also told him that the researchers were charged with conducting preliminary background research and that they will summarize the preliminary research as well as the deliberations of our project Working Group. It also will include recommendations for future EAC activity related to the development of: (1)

026391

methods of identifying, deterring, and investigating voting fraud and voter intimidation; and (2) nationwide statistics on voting fraud. I told him that EAC initiated this preliminary research on voting fraud and voter intimidation in accordance with HAVA §241, which requires EAC to conduct research on election administration issues, including the development of: 1) nationwide statistics and methods of identifying, deterring, and investigating voting fraud in elections for Federal office [§241(b)(6)]; and 2) ways of identifying, deterring, and investigating methods of voter intimidation [§241(b)(7)]. And I pointed out that at its 2005 meeting, EAC's Board of Advisors recommended that the agency make research on these matters a high priority.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 08:49 AM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
bcc
Subject Re: Usa today 

I think it's a no big deal situation if another reporter or anyone else (Hill staff or otherwise) asks about it... it was a preliminary report that we shared with our advisory boards. When the final report is done, we'll release it. Also, I shared this media inquiry and the fact that we gave Rich the info with the entire staff and commishes in an Oct. 5 media log, if anyone feigns surprise.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
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Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov
Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 08:14 AM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
Subject Re: Usa today 

Yes. I was worried when I saw the headline. The article gives the impression that we are hiding the report. I told Wolf that it was only preliminary and that we were waiting for another but that the staff member overseeing it had been out a lot due to illness.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
Jeannie Layson
----- Original Message -----

From: Jeannie Layson
Sent: 10/11/2006 08:13 AM
To: Paul DeGregorio
Subject: Re: Usa today

Yes. I thought your quote was good.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov
Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 08:01 AM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV

026393



cc

Subject Usa today

Our fraud report is on the front page.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 09:15 AM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
bcc
Subject Re: USA Today 

Yes, will do.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov
Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 09:07 AM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
Subject Re: USA Today 

Perhaps you might want to use the word "advisory" instead of "oversight"

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Jeannie Layson
Sent: 10/11/2006 08:22 AM
To: Paul DeGregorio; Gracia Hillman; Donetta Davidson
Cc: Thomas Wilkey; Juliet Hodgkins; Margaret Sims; Bryan Whitener
Subject: USA Today

See story below that ran in today's USA Today. This reporter requested the info a few weeks ago, and we had to release it b/c it was distributed at a Standards Bd. meeting, which is considered a public venue. Also, the document was not labeled draft.

I anticipate that we may get questions about why we haven't released it. I propose the following response. Please let me know if you approve. The story follows.

"This was a preliminary report presented to our oversight committees. The EAC is waiting on a final report, which we will release upon its completion."

026395

Report refutes fraud at poll sites

Updated 10/11/2006 8:05 AM ET

By Richard Wolf, USA TODAY

WASHINGTON — At a time when many states are instituting new requirements for voter registration and identification, a preliminary report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission has found little evidence of the type of polling-place fraud those measures seek to stop.

USA TODAY obtained the report from the commission four months after it was delivered by two consultants hired to write it. The commission has not distributed it publicly.

NEW LAWS: Thousands of voters shut out

At least 11 states have approved new rules for independent voter-registration drives or requirements that voters produce specific forms of photo ID at polling places. Several of those laws have been blocked in court, most recently in Arizona last week. The House of Representatives last month approved a photo-ID law, now pending in the Senate.

The bipartisan report by two consultants to the election commission casts doubt on the problem those laws are intended to address. "There is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling-place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, 'dead' voters, non-citizen voting and felon voters," the report says.

The report, prepared by Tova Wang, an elections expert at the Century Foundation think tank, and Job Serebrov, an Arkansas attorney, says most fraud occurs in the absentee ballot process, such as through coercion or forgery. Wang declined to comment on the report, and Serebrov could not be reached for comment.

Others who reviewed the report for the election commission differ on its findings. Jon Greenbaum of the liberal Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law says it was convincing. The committee wrote to the commission Friday seeking its release.

Conservatives dispute the research and conclusions. Thor Hearne, counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights, notes that the Justice Department has sued Missouri for having ineligible voters registered, while dead people have turned up on the registration rolls in Michigan. "It is just wrong to say that this isn't a problem," he says.

That's one reason the commission decided not to officially release the report. "There was a division of opinion here," Chairman Paul DeGregorio says. "We've seen places where fraud does occur."

The consultants found little evidence of that. Barry Weinberg, former deputy chief of the voting section in the Justice Department's civil rights division, reviewed their work. "Fraud at the polling place is generally difficult to pull off," he says. "It takes a lot of planning and a lot of coordination."

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
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026396

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 09:34 AM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
bcc
Subject Re: USA Today 

Also, you may want to touch base with Rokita, since he was a member of the working group.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov
Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 09:07 AM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc
Subject Re: USA Today 

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Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Jeannie Layson
Sent: 10/11/2006 08:22 AM
To: Paul DeGregorio; Gracia Hillman; Donetta Davidson
Cc: Thomas Wilkey; Juliet Hodgkins; Margaret Sims; Bryan Whitener
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026398

Jeannie Layson /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 10:15 AM

To pdegregorio@eac.gov
cc asherrill@eac.gov, psims@eac.gov
bcc

Subject Interview Request

History:  This message has been replied to

Mr. Chairman,

Will Lester of the Associated Press wants to interview you briefly via phone about the preliminary fraud report. I recommend you accomodate him, as he has dutifully covered EAC, and plans to include us in a story next week about the election lanscape. He has requested a copy of the preliminary report, which I am sending to him. He only needs a few minutes, and as we discussed, i think the message is that these are preliminary findings that we presented to our advisory boards to get their input. When the final report is complete, we will release it. You can also use some of the talking pts from your speech, such as the challenge related to the very definition of the term "fraud," as people define it differently. How about I set it up for noon?

The only question he asked that I don't know the answer to is when we expect the final report. Peg... please weigh in on this.

Jeannie Layson
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026399

Margaret Sims /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 12:31 PM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC, Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC, twilkey@eac.gov
cc Amie J. Sherrill/EAC/GOV@EAC, Juliet E. Hodgkins/EAC/GOV@EAC, bwhitener@eac.gov
bcc

Subject Re: Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Report 

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I am using some of my work at home time on the draft report. Hopefully, I can meet with Julie and Tamar next week. After that, we will have a better idea of when it will be ready for a Commissioner briefing. ---
Peggy

Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV



Paul DeGregorio /EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 10:20 AM

To Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC
cc Amie J. Sherrill/EAC/GOV@EAC, Margaret Sims/EAC/GOV@EAC
Subject Re: Interview Request 

Find a time that works. There's a story in today's St Louis PD that points to over 1000 suspect voter registrations.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Jeannie Layson
Sent: 10/11/2006 10:15 AM
To: Paul DeGregorio
Cc: Amie Sherrill; Margaret Sims
Subject: Interview Request

Mr. Chairman,
Will Lester of the Associated Press wants to interview you briefly via phone about the preliminary fraud report. I recommend you accomodate him, as he has dutifully covered EAC, and plans to include us in a story next week about the election lanscape. He has requested a copy of the preliminary report, which I am sending to him. He only needs a few minutes, and as we discussed, i think the message is that these are preliminary findings that we presented to our advisory boards to get their input. When the final report is complete, we will release it. You can also use some of the talking pts from your speech, such as the

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challenge related to the very definition of the term "fraud," as people define it differently. How about I set it up for noon?

The only question he asked that I don't know the answer to is when we expect the final report. Peg... please weigh in on this.

Jeannie Layson
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov

Margaret Sims/EAC/GOV
10/11/2006 12:34 PM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC, Jeannie Layson/EAC/GOV@EAC, twilkey@eac.gov
cc Amie J. Sherrill/EAC/GOV@EAC, Juliet E. Hodgkins/EAC/GOV@EAC, Bryan Whitener/EAC/GOV@EAC, Tamar Nedzar/EAC/GOV@EAC
bcc

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
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1225 New York Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-566-3100
www.eac.gov



Amie J. Sherrill/EAC/GOV

10/11/2006 01:55 PM

To Paul DeGregorio/EAC/GOV@EAC

cc

bcc

Subject Voting Fraud.Voter Intimidation.pdf

History

 This message has been forwarded.

The report is attached.

Amie J. Sherrill
Special Assistant to Chairman Paul S. DeGregorio
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York NW - Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 566 3106



- Voting Fraud.Voter Intimidation.pdf

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U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

**Status Report on the
Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Research
Project**

May 17, 2006

INTRODUCTION

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires EAC to conduct research on election administration issues. Among the tasks listed in the statute is the development of:

- nationwide statistics and methods of identifying, deterring, and investigating voting fraud in elections for Federal office [section 241(b)(6)]; and
- ways of identifying, deterring, and investigating methods of voter intimidation [section 241(b)(7)].

EAC's Board of Advisors recommended that the agency make research on these matters a high priority.

FOCUS OF CURRENT RESEARCH

In September 2005, the Commission hired two consultants with expertise in this subject matter, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, to:

- develop a comprehensive description of what constitutes voting fraud and voter intimidation in the context of Federal elections;
- perform background research (including Federal and State administrative and case law review), identify current activities of key government agencies, civic and advocacy organizations regarding these topics, and deliver a summary of this research and all source documentation;
- establish a project working group, in consultation with EAC, composed of key individuals and representatives of organizations knowledgeable about the topics of voting fraud and voter intimidation;
- provide the description of what constitutes voting fraud and voter intimidation and the results of the preliminary research to the working group, and convene the working group to discuss potential avenues for future EAC research on this topic; and
- produce a report to EAC summarizing the findings of the preliminary research effort and working group deliberations that includes recommendations for future research, if any;

As of the date of this report, the consultants have drafted a definition of election fraud, reviewed relevant literature and reports, interviewed persons from government and private sectors with subject matter expertise, analyzed news reports of alleged election fraud, reviewed case law, and established a project working group.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION FRAUD

The consultants drafted a definition of election fraud that includes numerous aspects of voting fraud (including voter intimidation, which is considered a subset of voting fraud) and voter registration fraud, but excludes campaign finance violations and election administration mistakes. This draft will be discussed and probably refined by the project working group, which is scheduled to convene on May 18, 2006.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The consultants found many reports and books that describe anecdotes and draw broad conclusions from a large array of incidents. They found little research that is truly systematic or scientific. The most systematic look at fraud appears to be the report written by Lori Minnite, entitled "Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud". The most systematic look at voter intimidation appears to be the report by Laughlin McDonald, entitled "The New Poll Tax". The consultants found that books written about this subject all seem to have a political bias and a pre-existing agenda that makes them somewhat less valuable.

Moreover, the consultants found that reports and books make allegations but, perhaps by their nature, have little follow up. As a result, it is difficult to know when something has remained in the stage of being an allegation and gone no further, or progressed to the point of being investigated or prosecuted or in any other way proven to be valid by an independent, neutral entity. This is true, for example, with respect to allegations of voter intimidation by civil rights organizations, and, with respect to fraud, John Fund's frequently cited book, "Stealing Elections".

Consultants found that researchers agree that measuring something like the incidence of fraud and intimidation in a scientifically legitimate way is extremely difficult from a methodological perspective and would require resources beyond the means of most social and political scientists. As a result, there is much more written on this topic by advocacy groups than social scientists.

Other items of note:

- There is as much evidence, and as much concern, about structural forms of disenfranchisement as about intentional abuse of the system. These include felon disenfranchisement, poor maintenance of databases and identification requirements.
- There is tremendous disagreement about the extent to which polling place fraud, e.g. double voting, intentional felon voting, noncitizen voting, is a serious problem. On balance, more researchers find it to be less of a problem than is commonly described in the political debate; but some reports say it is a major problem, albeit hard to identify.

- There is substantial concern across the board about absentee balloting and the opportunity it presents for fraud.
- Federal law governing election fraud and intimidation is varied and complex and yet may nonetheless be insufficient or subject to too many limitations to be as effective as it might be.
- Deceptive practices, e.g. targeted flyers and phone calls providing misinformation, were a major problem in 2004.
- Voter intimidation continues to be focused on minority communities, although the American Center for Voting Rights uniquely alleges it is focused on Republicans.

Recommendations

The consultants recommend that subsequent EAC research include a follow up study of allegations made in reports, books and newspaper articles. They also suggest that the research should focus on filling the gap between the lack of reports based on methodical studies by social or political scientists and the numerous, but less scientific, reports published by advocacy groups.

INTERVIEWS

The consultants jointly selected experts from the public and private sector for interviews. The consultants' analysis of their discussions with these members of the legal, election official, advocacy, and academic communities follows.

Common Themes

- There is virtually universal agreement that absentee ballot fraud is the biggest problem, with vote buying and registration fraud coming in after that. The vote buying often comes in the form of payment for absentee ballots, although not always. Some absentee ballot fraud is part of an organized effort; some is by individuals, who sometimes are not even aware that what they are doing is illegal. Voter registration fraud seems to take the form of people signing up with false names. Registration fraud seems to be most common where people doing the registration were paid by the signature.
- There is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, "dead" voters, noncitizen voting and felon voters. Those few who believe it occurs often enough to be a concern say that it is impossible to show the extent to which it happens, but do point to instances in the press of such incidents. Most people believe that false registration forms have not resulted in polling place fraud,

although it may create the perception that vote fraud is possible. Those who believe there is more polling place fraud than reported/investigated/prosecuted believe that registration fraud does lead to fraudulent votes. Jason Torchinsky from the American Center for Voting Rights is the only interviewee who believes that polling place fraud is widespread and among the most significant problems in the system.

- Abuse of challenger laws and abusive challengers seem to be the biggest intimidation/suppression concerns, and many of those interviewed assert that the new identification requirements are the modern version of voter intimidation and suppression. However there is evidence of some continued outright intimidation and suppression, especially in some Native American communities. A number of people also raise the problem of poll workers engaging in harassment of minority voters. Other activities commonly raised were the issue of polling places being moved at the last moment, unequal distribution of voting machines, videotaping of voters at the polls, and targeted misinformation campaigns.
- Several people indicate that, for various reasons, DOJ is bringing fewer voter intimidation and suppression cases now, and has increased its focus on matters such as noncitizen voting, double voting, and felon voting. Interviews with DOJ personnel indicate that the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, focuses on systemic patterns of malfeasance in this area. While the Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, continues to maintain an aggressive pursuit of systematic schemes to corrupt the electoral process (including voter suppression), it also has increased prosecutions of individual instances of felon, alien, and double voting.
- The problem of badly kept voter registration lists, with both ineligible voters remaining on the rolls and eligible voters being taken off, remains a common concern. A few people are also troubled by voters being on registration lists in two states. They said that there was no evidence that this had led to double voting, but it opens the door to the possibility. There is great hope that full implementation of the new requirements of HAVA – done well, a major caveat – will reduce this problem dramatically.

Common Recommendations:

- Many of those interviewed recommend better poll worker training as the best way to improve the process; a few also recommended longer voting times or voting on days other than election day (such as weekends) but fewer polling places so only the best poll workers would be employed.
- Many interviewed support stronger criminal laws and increased enforcement of existing laws with respect to both fraud and intimidation. Advocates from across the spectrum expressed frustration with the failure of the Department of Justice to pursue complaints.

- With respect to DOJ's Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, John Tanner indicated that fewer cases are being brought because fewer are warranted – it has become increasingly difficult to know when allegations of intimidation and suppression are credible since it depends on one's definition of intimidation, and because both parties are doing it. Moreover prior enforcement of the laws has now changed the entire landscape – race based problems are rare now. Although challenges based on race and unequal implementation of identification rules would be actionable, Mr. Tanner was unaware of such situations actually occurring and his office has not pursued any such cases.
- Craig Donsanto of DOJ's Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, says that while the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate claims of fraud, the number of cases DOJ is investigating and the number of indictments his office is pursuing are both up dramatically. Since 2002, in addition to pursuing systematic election corruption schemes, DOJ has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters and double voters than ever before. Mr. Donsanto would like more resources so that his agency can do more and would like to have laws that make it easier for the federal government to assume jurisdiction over voter fraud cases.
- A couple of interviewees recommend a new law that would make it easier to criminally prosecute people for intimidation even when there is not racial animus.
- Several advocate expanded monitoring of the polls, including some associated with the Department of Justice.
- Almost everyone hopes that administrators will maximize the potential of statewide voter registration databases to prevent fraud.
- Challenge laws, both with respect to pre-election day challenges and challengers at the polls, need to be revised by all states to ensure they are not used for purposes of wrongful disenfranchisement and harassment.
- Several people advocate passage of Senator Barak Obama's "deceptive practices" bill.
- There is a split on whether it would be helpful to have nonpartisan election officials – some indicated they thought even if elections officials are elected as non partisan officials, they will carry out their duties in biased ways nonetheless. However, most agree that elections officials pursuing partisan agendas are a problem that must be addressed in some fashion. Suggestions included moving election responsibilities out of the secretary of states' office; increasing transparency in the process; and enacting conflict of interest rules.

- A few recommend returning to allowing use of absentee ballots “for cause” only if it were politically feasible.
- A few recommend enacting a national identification card, including Pat Rogers, an attorney in New Mexico, and Jason Torchinsky from ACVR, who advocates the proposal in the Carter-Baker Commission Report.
- A couple of interviewees indicated the need for clear standards for the distribution of voting machines

NEWS ARTICLES

Consultants conducted a Nexis search of related news articles published between January 1, 2001 and January 1, 2006. A systematic, numerical analysis of the data collected during this review is currently being prepared. What follows is an overview of these articles provided by the consultants.

Absentee Ballots

According to press reports, absentee ballots are abused in a variety of ways:

- Campaign workers, candidates and others coerce the voting choices of vulnerable populations, usually elderly voters.
- Workers for groups and individuals have attempted to vote absentee in the names of the deceased.
- Workers for groups, campaign workers and individuals have attempted to forge the names of other voters on absentee ballot requests and absentee ballots and thus vote multiple times.

It is unclear how often actual convictions result from these activities (a handful of articles indicate convictions and guilty pleas), but this is an area in which there have been a substantial number of official investigations and actual charges filed, according to news reports where such information is available. A few of the allegations became part of civil court proceedings contesting the outcome of the election.

While absentee fraud allegations turn up throughout the country, a few states have had several such cases. Especially of note are Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, and most particularly, Texas. Interestingly, there were no articles regarding Oregon, where the entire system is vote by mail.