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                UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

 

                              PUBLIC MEETING

 

 

 

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                    TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 2005 - 1:00 P.M.

 

              -------------------------------------------------

 

 

 

 

 

                          THE ADAM'S MARK HOTEL

 

                            DENVER, COLORADO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

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          1             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay, this hearing of the

 

          2   United States Election Commission will come to

 

          3   order. Before we begin, just a couple of

 

          4   announcements, may I ask everybody to make sure

 

          5   that your phones, pagers, and all other electronic

 

          6   devices are either turned off or silenced, so as

 

          7   not to disrupt the proceedings. This meeting is

 

          8   scheduled to run from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. There will

 

          9   be three panels and it will end with a 30 minute

 

         10   period, in which various individuals have signed up

 

         11   to do short testimonies.  Please stand and join me

 

         12   in the Pledge of Allegiance.

 

         13             ALL:  I pledge allegiance to the flag of

 

         14   the United States of America, and to the Republic

 

         15   for which it stands, one Nation, under God,

 

         16   individual, with liberty and justice for all.

 

         17             CHAIR HILLMAN:  If we could have a roll

 

         18   call, please?

 

         19             MS. THOMPSON:  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         20   Commissioners, please answer by saying present or

 

         21   here when I call your name.  Gracia Hillman, Chair?

 

         22             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Here.

 

         23             MS. THOMPSON:  Paul Degregorio, Vice-

 

         24   Chairman?

 

         25             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Here.

 

 

 


 

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          1             MS. THOMPSON:  Ray Martinez,

 

          2   Commissioner?

 

          3             MR. MARTINEZ:  Here.

 

          4             MS. THOMPSON:  Donetta Davidson,

 

          5   Commissioner?

 

          6             MS. DAVIDSON:  Here.

 

          7             MS. THOMPSON:  Madame Chair, that is four

 

          8   members present.

 

          9             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you.  We have

 

         10   before us the agenda for today's hearing.  Are

 

         11   there any changes to the agenda?  If not, it would

 

         12   be appropriate to adopt the agenda.

 

         13             MS. DAVIDSON:  So moved.

 

         14             MR. MARTINEZ:  Second.

 

         15             CHAIR HILLMAN:  All in favor?

 

         16             MS. DAVIDSON:  I.

 

         17             MR. MARTINEZ:  I.

 

         18             MR. DEGREGORIO:  I.

 

         19             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay.  Presentations on

 

         20   proposed Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, that

 

         21   is the subject of today's hearing.  This is the

 

         22   third of three hearings that the Election

 

         23   Assistance Commission is holding on the proposed

 

         24   Guidelines.  The Guidelines were posted for public

 

         25   comment on or about the 29th of June.  They will be

 

 

 


 

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          1   available for public comment for a 90 day period,

 

          2   which means the end of the comment period is about

 

          3   September 30.  In addition to the comments that we

 

          4   have received via e-mail, and fax, and other

 

          5   mechanisms to our offices, we are receiving

 

          6   testimony from individuals who we have invited to

 

          7   present for us, or individuals who have signed up

 

          8   for the public comment period.  All of it provides

 

          9   invaluable information and insight into the work

 

         10   that we are doing.  This is, of course, the first

 

         11   time that the Election Assistance Commission will

 

         12   be issuing Voluntary Voting System Guidelines under

 

         13   its authority, as mandated by the Help America Vote

 

         14   Act.  This is a process that we take very

 

         15   seriously.  It's a huge task. It's an enormous

 

         16   responsibility, but a very important one.  And

 

         17   while many of the issues that we address are very

 

         18   technical in nature, this also speaks to the

 

         19   essence of the confidence that the voters have in

 

         20   the voting systems that they use when they go to

 

         21   the polls to vote on election day.  And so, without

 

         22   further comment, unless there are any opening

 

         23   remarks from Commissioners -- no?  We will get into

 

         24   the panel.  Our first panel, local election

 

         25   officials, and in the order that they will present,

 

 

 


 

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          1   we have Bob Terwilliger?

 

          2             MR. TERWILLIGER:  That's right.

 

          3             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Terwilliger, I'm going to

 

          4   keep saying that and it's going to roll right up --

 

          5   who is Auditor Snohomish [phonetic], am I doing

 

          6   that right?

 

          7             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Um-hmm.

 

          8             CHAIR HILLMAN:  That is such a challenge,

 

          9   I love it -- Snohomish County, Washington.  Also

 

         10   with us is Lance Grough, Executive Director of the

 

         11   Chicago Board of Elections, and Russ Ragsdale,

 

         12   Clerk and Recorder, City and County of Broomfield.

 

         13   That means the City is Broomfield and the county is

 

         14   Broomfield?

 

         15             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, ma'am.

 

         16             CHAIR HILLMAN:  That's great, terrific.

 

         17   Thank you very much for accepting the invitation to

 

         18   be here.  And we will begin, I understand that we

 

         19   each have written testimony from the three of you,

 

         20   so we do have that to refer to.  And we ask that

 

         21   you take up to about seven minutes to just do a

 

         22   review and overview of your testimony, and then we

 

         23   will have questions to follow that.  Thank you.

 

         24             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Thank you, Madame

 

         25   Chair.  I appreciate the opportunity to be here

 

 

 


 

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          1   today.  My name is Bob Terwilliger.  I am currently

 

          2   the elected Snohomish County auditor from the State

 

          3   of Washington. I've been the elected auditor since

 

          4   1993, and for ten years before that I was Chief

 

          5   Deputy Auditor.  In addition, I have a law degree

 

          6   and served three years in the Snohomish County

 

          7   Prosecuting Attorney's Office, as a Deputy

 

          8   Prosecuting Attorney, advising the County Auditor's

 

          9   Office on legal matters related to Election Law.

 

         10   I'm also a member of the EAC Standards Board, so

 

         11   I've been directly and indirectly in the elections

 

         12   and voter registration business for over 25 years.

 

         13   It's clear that since the presidential elections of

 

         14   2000 and 2004, and in the State of Washington since

 

         15   the governor's race in 2004, the public in general

 

         16   and various interest groups, specifically, have

 

         17   become interested, energized, and involved in all

 

         18   aspects of election and voter registration

 

         19   processes.  This, I believe, is long overdue and is

 

         20   good in healthy turn of events.  Nowhere is this

 

         21   interest more prevalent than in and around the

 

         22   concern for how election tabulation software and

 

         23   hardware is developed, manufactured, tested, and

 

         24   deployed, and used in the process of counting

 

         25   ballots.  This series of events involves vendors,

 

 

 


 

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          1   election officials, testing authorities, and the

 

          2   public.  The purpose of my comments today is to

 

          3   offer my impression of the draft Voting System

 

          4   Guidelines, volume one.  My comments are limited to

 

          5   two through six.  The sections dealing with issues

 

          6   outlined in seven through nine are the [inaudible]

 

          7   well founded in the concepts and precepts of

 

          8   computers, and the associated technology,

 

          9   performance standards, and testing standards which

 

         10   is well beyond my expertise. In general, I believe

 

         11   the standards set forth in sections two through six

 

         12   follow common sense precepts that, to a large

 

         13   degree, are already followed by elections officials

 

         14   around the country.  As you have experts here to

 

         15   talk about the accessibility issues for the

 

         16   disabled, my only comment on those sections is that

 

         17   the level of specificity and the breadth of

 

         18   populations intended to be served by those

 

         19   standards will all add additional costs.  For many

 

         20   jurisdictions, even with the HAVA money, the cost

 

         21   implications are overwhelming, and certainly will

 

         22   be so once the HAVA money is gone. Therefore, it is

 

         23   critical that the mandatory requirements for voters

 

         24   with disabilities be limited to serve the largest

 

         25   numbers of a disabled community is possible, while

 

 

 


 

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          1   at the same time recognizing that not every single

 

          2   disability can be accommodated in a polling place

 

          3   environment.  As a county that converted its

 

          4   polling placing environment from one of optical

 

          5   scan central count to electronic DRE central count

 

          6   in 2002, I am especially interested in the sections

 

          7   dealing with electronic voting.  In our county,

 

          8   650,000 population, 359,000 registered voters,

 

          9   220,000 who vote by mail, we have deployed

 

         10   electronic voting without any major mishaps.  We do

 

         11   not use any wireless communication mode.  We do not

 

         12   transmit any data via the internet.  We have a

 

         13   stand alone, central count, ballot tabulation

 

         14   environment.  We count all ballots centrally.  We

 

         15   employ parallel monitoring for all elections.  We

 

         16   calculate pre-logic and accuracy test to all

 

         17   machines to be deployed in any given election.  And

 

         18   we also conduct a logic and accuracy test,

 

         19   supervised by the Secretary of State's office,

 

         20   three days before the election, and again on

 

         21   election day before we count ballots.  And finally,

 

         22   we conduct a post-election logic and accuracy test

 

         23   on all machines used in the election. We understand

 

         24   the need to demonstrate the trustworthiness of

 

         25   votes cast on electronic voting machines.  One area

 

 

 


 

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          1   over which counties, and to a large degree, the

 

          2   state election offices as well have had to rely on

 

          3   has been the area of testing the hardware and

 

          4   software by independent testing laboratories.  The

 

          5   requirements for more rigorous testing for hardware

 

          6   and software is set forth in sections three and

 

          7   four are, in my opinion, are long overdue.  My only

 

          8   suggestion would be to move rapidly to certify more

 

          9   independent testing authorities, and to require

 

         10   their process of testing be open to the public so

 

         11   trust can be built wit the public regarding the

 

         12   testing process.  For example, if there was

 

         13   sufficient testing authorities certified on a

 

         14   regional basis, then those interested members of

 

         15   the public, or interest groups in a region, could

 

         16   attend the testing process to ensure that the

 

         17   standards, as adopted by the EAC are being adhered

 

         18   to on a regular basis.  More openness about the

 

         19   testing of the source code, while at the same time

 

         20   protecting proprietary interests of the vendors is

 

         21   a good thing. Also, the records of the software and

 

         22   hardware that have been tested and certified must

 

         23   always be current, and what is being used in the

 

         24   local jurisdictions must always correspond to what

 

         25   has been tested and certified.  Section five talks

 

 

 


 

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          1   about telecommunication issues and protocols, which

 

          2   again are beyond my expertise.  Finally, I would

 

          3   like to make some comments on section six, which

 

          4   deals with the standards for electronic voting.  In

 

          5   order for the independent dual verification systems

 

          6   to be useful, the standards for this option must be

 

          7   developed quickly and hopefully economically as

 

          8   well.  Being a county that has electronic voting at

 

          9   the polls, and also being from a state that has

 

         10   required voter verified paper audit trails,

 

         11   effective January 1, 2006, my county is faced with

 

         12   spending $1 million to comply with this

 

         13   requirement.  If other jurisdictions can benefit

 

         14   from the quick development of independent dual

 

         15   verification systems at a reasonable cost, then the

 

         16   two major issues surrounding electronic voting, as

 

         17   stated in the draft, Voluntary Voting System

 

         18   Guidelines, which are whether electronic voting

 

         19   systems are accurately recording ballot choices,

 

         20   and whether the ballot record contents can be

 

         21   audited precisely, post election, may be resolved

 

         22   without resorting to the expense of alternative of

 

         23   voter verified paper audit trails.  The requirement

 

         24   for voter verified paper audit trails that various

 

         25   states, including Washington, have passed, may well

 

 

 


 

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          1   complicate the polling place environment without

 

          2   any real proof that the two major audit issues for

 

          3   electronic voting have been met.  I am convinced

 

          4   that the process we have in place in Snohomish

 

          5   County for programming, testing, deploying, and

 

          6   auditing of the electronic voting machines, coupled

 

          7   with the enhanced and more rigorous testing

 

          8   standards than the draft Voluntary Voting System

 

          9   Guidelines for software and hardware are sufficient

 

         10   to demonstrate that electronic voting machines are

 

         11   accurate and trustworthy.  The voluntary, excuse

 

         12   me, the voter verified paper audit trail solution

 

         13   for the independent dual verification systems need

 

         14   to be both available at a cost within reach of

 

         15   local election jurisdictions and in a manner

 

         16   transparent to the voter to be effective and

 

         17   showing that electronic voting is both accurate and

 

         18   trustworthy.  Thank you.

 

         19             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you, very much.

 

         20   Mr. Grough, Chicago, Illinois.

 

         21             MR. GROUGH:  Thank you.  Madame Chair, if

 

         22   it's all right with you, I did give written

 

         23   comments, but if I could not read from them because

 

         24   there's some items that I'd like to add, if the

 

         25   Commission would give me that --

 

 

 


 

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          1             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Certainly.

 

          2             MR. GROUGH:  -- permission.  Thank you.

 

          3   Yeah, it's funny, I've been in the election

 

          4   business for over 30 years now, and when I first

 

          5   got to the Chicago Board of Election, I thought all

 

          6   you had to do was get a polling place, get the

 

          7   ballots out there, have the voters vote, you count

 

          8   them and you're done. Well, my second day on the

 

          9   job I found out that's not true.  There are so many

 

         10   items that, you know, the election officials have

 

         11   to concentrate on.  And recently, after the 2000

 

         12   election, the public has now become an expert also.

 

         13   And after that cry after the 2000 presidential

 

         14   election, HAVA was enacted, and that's why this

 

         15   Commission was put in place.  And I have to applaud

 

         16   this Commission.  If you look at the way this

 

         17   Commission is made up, you have officials that know

 

         18   state election, local election, advocacy groups,

 

         19   campaigns.  This Commission has, probably out of

 

         20   all the federal commissions I've seen, has seen

 

         21   what we have been asking for many years.  And I

 

         22   have to applaud this Commission.  And I also would

 

         23   like to state that I've seen your budget.  I've

 

         24   seen your number of employees that you have

 

         25   working; I would like to urge Congress, and

 

 

 


 

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          1   whatever we can do in Illinois, to give you the

 

          2   tools to operate with.  I know the size of your

 

          3   staff.  I just run the city elections for the City

 

          4   of Chicago, and I have 163 full-time employees, and

 

          5   you're overlooking the entire United States, so

 

          6   there has to be some kind of accountability and

 

          7   Congress should know about that.  What I'd like to

 

          8   talk about is that, you know, the single most

 

          9   challenging aspect now facing election authorities

 

         10   in the United States is compliance with HAVA.  And

 

         11   this requirement, and one item I would like to talk

 

         12   about is people with disabilities.  In the City of

 

         13   Chicago, we believe everybody, everybody has the

 

         14   right to vote.  Everybody has the right to cast

 

         15   their ballot in secrecy, and I'd like to get --

 

         16   like to talk more about that.  But just to let you

 

         17   know, in the last two weeks the Chicago Board of

 

         18   Elections just implemented a contract, a $26

 

         19   million contract with a new vendor that we will be

 

         20   having -- we have gotten rid of punch card voting,

 

         21   we are probably the last name standing.  We thought

 

         22   punch card got a black eye, but due to public

 

         23   pressure, we're making that change.  And what we're

 

         24   doing is we're going to a dual system, and I'd like

 

         25   to explain that.  We're going to have optical

 

 

 


 

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          1   ballots being counted in the precincts, along with

 

          2   the DRE machine, so we can take care of people with

 

          3   disabilities, and under section 203 of the Voting

 

          4   Rights Act, language capabilities.  On DRE you're

 

          5   able to use multiple languages.  We're going to

 

          6   take both of those units that are being counted in

 

          7   the precinct, and we're going to download the

 

          8   memory card from the optical and the memory card

 

          9   from the DRE into one unit that will combine

 

         10   totals, will also print out those totals, and I

 

         11   know a lot of people don't want to hear those, but

 

         12   they will transmit those wirelessly to our office.

 

         13   And looking at the standards, I'd like to commend

 

         14   this Commission for keeping the availability, or

 

         15   allowing us to do this wireless transmission.  We

 

         16   think it's very necessary in the City of Chicago.

 

         17   We have 2,709 precincts scattered throughout the

 

         18   City of Chicago, and to get the results to us as

 

         19   soon as possible we think is very critical.  And

 

         20   I'll talk about security question and answer with

 

         21   the Commission after that.  We also have gone to

 

         22   name on ballot, and in fact, from going from punch

 

         23   card voting, using optical ballot as large as our

 

         24   ballot is in the City of Chicago, our ballot is

 

         25   going to be 22 inches long, which is the longest in

 

 

 


 

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          1   the industry.  And even with that we still may have

 

          2   to go to two different ballot cards, which is going

 

          3   to make our job that much harder. We talk about

 

          4   money; well, consider we are going from punch card

 

          5   to name on ballot will increase our printing cost

 

          6   by about a third, so we're looking at about $1.2

 

          7   million in printing ballots alone for the City of

 

          8   Chicago.  In the year after the 2000 election, a

 

          9   lot of jurisdictions ran to optical scan and found

 

         10   out that they weren't the end all and do all of

 

         11   equipment.  In fact, I'd like to say right now that

 

         12   there's not a DRE that I've seen that could handle

 

         13   everything.  There's not one DRE out there that can

 

         14   handle all the needs for the disability.  And in

 

         15   fact, your standards that you've just published,

 

         16   I'd like to applaud you that they have probably the

 

         17   toughest standards, meaning to meet with the

 

         18   disability community, but with less than seven

 

         19   months to go before our next election,

 

         20   approximately 210 days before we have our primary

 

         21   election, these standards are strictly voluntary,

 

         22   and they've just been published; they haven't even

 

         23   been adopted yet.  We had to purchase equipment,

 

         24   and we're in the process of having it delivered.

 

         25   It meets the 2002 standards, but I don't think it

 

 

 


 

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          1   all meets the 2006 standards that you guys have --

 

          2   that the Commission has proposed.  And that's going

 

          3   to cause a problem with us. I don't know if the

 

          4   Commission is going to ask for all equipment to be

 

          5   retested or not, that's something I will follow up

 

          6   with a paper to this Commission, because in our

 

          7   contract we do have that the company has to meet

 

          8   all standards for the 2006, so we're hoping that

 

          9   happens.  Before this Commission published your

 

         10   standards, we had to meet with the disability

 

         11   groups in Illinois to go over our equipment, and

 

         12   that took approximately two months and we're -- as

 

         13   you know, if you have a large group of people that

 

         14   are reviewing equipment, you will not always agree

 

         15   on one item.  And we have many that we did not

 

         16   agree on.  But we are going to try to put basically

 

         17   everything in place, as much as possible.  But

 

         18   under the proposed Voting System Guidelines

 

         19   contained, as I said, many high goals -- desirable

 

         20   goals for this, and the EAC should be commended as

 

         21   giving us that.  But please allow me to take a few

 

         22   minutes and review some of the Human Factor

 

         23   Guidelines that our ability to complete, and in my

 

         24   own personal opinion, the feasibility of some of

 

         25   these points.  It is my opinion and that of my

 

 

 


 

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          1   staff, there is no single voting system in the

 

          2   market today that will meet all the different needs

 

          3   and requirements for every type of disability.

 

          4   Despite our best effort, we are aware that we are

 

          5   not going to satisfy every disability advocate, but

 

          6   we're going to do everything we can.  And I think

 

          7   with your guidelines, a lot of those answers, a lot

 

          8   of those things will be answered. In the City of

 

          9   Chicago, we are equipping all 2,709 precinct

 

         10   polling places with one DRE designed to meet these

 

         11   needs of the disability.  Our DRE units incorporate

 

         12   headsets, I'm sorry, and audio instructions to

 

         13   navigate the blind voter through the ballot.  And

 

         14   we recently redesigned the navigational box to make

 

         15   it more user friendly for those voters that need

 

         16   it.  This is an accomplishment that after several

 

         17   meetings with our disability groups that we came up

 

         18   with some new equipment that's being added that

 

         19   wasn't part of our contract.  For those voters with

 

         20   no sight, the ability to have a screen go blank we

 

         21   thought was an advantage. A lot of our disability

 

         22   group says, well, some have partial eye sight that

 

         23   having the entire screen going blank is not what we

 

         24   wanted, so we had to make those modifications.  The

 

         25   guidelines suggested that electronic imaging

 

 

 


 

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          1   display be capable of providing all information in

 

          2   at least two different font types. Well, the

 

          3   equipment that we have in the present time does not

 

          4   do that.  Hopefully, by the November election, we

 

          5   should have that in place.  The advocacy guidelines

 

          6   also suggested that we provide for persons using

 

          7   paper ballot who have poor reading vision.  Well,

 

          8   for those persons, we have invited magnifying

 

          9   materials that we have been doing for the last 20

 

         10   years.  What I'd like to say is that, you know, we

 

         11   hear the problem of money. Money always seems to be

 

         12   a problem, but, you know, somebody -- I met

 

         13   somebody that says if you've never been in my

 

         14   shoes, you don't know what I go through.  I have a

 

         15   friend that is blind, and for the first time this

 

         16   March election he'll be able to vote without any

 

         17   assistance.  And I don't think you can put a price

 

         18   tag on that.  And I'd like to applaud the

 

         19   Commission.  I'd like to end that and take

 

         20   comments.  I'd like to end that and say that I

 

         21   applaud this Commission for doing everything you

 

         22   have, and I think we need to go farther. Thank you.

 

         23             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you, very much.

 

         24   Mr. Ragsdale, and that's Broomfield County,

 

         25   Colorado, right here in Colorado, right?

 

 

 


 

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          1             MR. RAGSDALE:  Yes, it is --

 

          2             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay --

 

          3             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- Madame Chair, thank

 

          4   you.

 

          5             CHAIR HILLMAN:  -- thank you.

 

          6             MR. RAGSDALE:  I am the Clerk and

 

          7   Recorder of the City and County of Broomfield.  My

 

          8   name is Russ Ragsdale.  Broomfield is located on

 

          9   the northern edge of the Denver metro area, and as

 

         10   such, I'd like to welcome, extend a welcome to the

 

         11   Commission and to the Standards Board who will be

 

         12   meeting the next two days in Colorado.  I hope your

 

         13   stay is both productive and enjoyable.  I would be

 

         14   remised if I didn't take this opportunity to also

 

         15   congratulate the Commission on the appointment of

 

         16   their newest Commission, former Colorado Secretary

 

         17   of State, Donetta Davidson.

 

         18             MS. DAVIDSON:  Thanks, Ron.

 

         19             MR. RAGSDALE:  Donetta and I -- I've had

 

         20   the distinct pleasure of being able to work with

 

         21   Donetta, for what, the last 70 or 80 -- well, it's

 

         22   probably been less than that, maybe only 20 years

 

         23   --

 

         24             MS. DAVIDSON:  A long time.

 

         25             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- but she has taught me a

 

 

 


 

                                                                       20

 

 

 

          1   lot about the world of elections and I appreciate

 

          2   that. And Colorado's loss is truly the nation's

 

          3   gain, so I wish you the best in your new adventure.

 

          4   I'd like to start off with kudos and appreciate to

 

          5   the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. The

 

          6   Voluntary Voting Systems Guideline is an amazing

 

          7   piece of work that was created in a very short

 

          8   period of time.  I find it very thorough as --

 

          9   looking through it, I did find some typos.  I did

 

         10   find some specific items that I'd like clarified,

 

         11   but overall I think it's an incredible piece of

 

         12   work, and I think it's a great starting point for

 

         13   our future in elections.  A couple of the areas

 

         14   that I want to focus on is one, how it deals with

 

         15   the interface with the voter, the end user, so to

 

         16   speak; how it is directed at the vendors and

 

         17   developers of elections systems, and of course,

 

         18   it's impact on local election officials.  The VVSG

 

         19   provides a great deal of focus on the voter as it

 

         20   should.  The usability for the voter and how our

 

         21   election systems interface with those voters, and

 

         22   how they are treated by our election systems.  If I

 

         23   may quote from the volume one, section 2.2.7, the

 

         24   human factors, it describes the difficulties of

 

         25   designing usable and accessible voting system.  I

 

 

 


 

                                                                       21

 

 

 

          1   think it does a good -- articulates very well, and

 

          2   there is a couple of these points I'd like to bring

 

          3   forth.  The first is voting is performed

 

          4   infrequently, so there is limited opportunity for

 

          5   voters and poll working to gain familiarity with

 

          6   the process.  This is an infrequent process, the

 

          7   one of elections, and I would like to bring that on

 

          8   to the local election officials too.  For those of

 

          9   us in mid to small size jurisdictions, often times

 

         10   we don't even have full-time staff working on

 

         11   elections.  They have other tasks as the year goes

 

         12   by.  So, I just want to point that out in time

 

         13   that's -- one of things I'd like to bring out, is

 

         14   this is a wonderful document, but we need to also

 

         15   make sure that it translates well.  How does it

 

         16   play Vioria [phonetic], so to speak?  How does it

 

         17   translate to the mid and small size jurisdictions.

 

         18   The second point that's on that -- in that same

 

         19   section is jurisdictions may change voting

 

         20   equipment, thus opiating [phonetic] whatever

 

         21   familiarity the voters might have acquired. Again,

 

         22   it's the familiarity -- that's the tool that, I'm

 

         23   sure, my colleagues to my right also appreciate.

 

         24   Familiarity in any of the elections aspects that

 

         25   the voters may have, whether it's the location of

 

 

 


 

                                                                       22

 

 

 

          1   polling place or the use of voting equipment.

 

          2   Unfortunately, with all the changes we're seeing in

 

          3   the world of elections, familiarity is becoming a

 

          4   rare commodity. There's also another thing I would

 

          5   like to vote out to is that in our mobile society,

 

          6   more often than jurisdictions changing voting

 

          7   systems, you will see voters moving from one

 

          8   jurisdictions to another.  And in those states that

 

          9   have not adopted a uniform voting system, those

 

         10   voters will be faced from election to election to

 

         11   different voting equipment.  For instance,

 

         12   Broomfield, I have three neighboring counties, and

 

         13   among the four of us we have two flavors of optical

 

         14   scan systems and two flavors of DREs.  So depending

 

         15   on what neighborhood the voter depends to live in,

 

         16   they may be dealing with a new voting system from

 

         17   election to election.  Also, in volume one, in the

 

         18   fifth section, it sets forth three broad

 

         19   principles, that I believe, are fundamental tenants

 

         20   that I would love to see stitched into a sample and

 

         21   hung on the wall of every election official in the

 

         22   country.  Those tenants are, one, all eligible

 

         23   voters shall have access to the voting process

 

         24   without discrimination.  Two, each cast ballot

 

         25   shall accurately capture the selections made by the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       23

 

 

 

          1   voter.  Three, the voting process shall preserve

 

          2   the secrecy of the ballot.  That sums it up, that's

 

          3   what our mission is, as local election officials.

 

          4   And I really appreciate that being articulated in

 

          5   the VVSG. It also focuses considerably on

 

          6   accessibility for voters with disabilities, as it

 

          7   well should.  And it's a requirement from HAVA, and

 

          8   it's something we're all going to have to face that

 

          9   challenge, as local election officials, in our

 

         10   world.  I'm really interested to see what testimony

 

         11   you received today from the representatives from

 

         12   the disability community, and see how they feel

 

         13   about the VVSG.  As Mr. Terwilliger said, some of

 

         14   these items in here are from folks that have more

 

         15   knowledge in those particular areas, and this is

 

         16   the case for me, with the handicapped

 

         17   accessibility. VVSG, is to large part, directed at

 

         18   the vendors and developers of elections systems, as

 

         19   it should be.  This is a certification process.

 

         20   This is what the vendors are going to have to live

 

         21   up to.  I think it sends a strong message to the

 

         22   vendors and developers of the systems that the

 

         23   systems must be auditable, the functions must be

 

         24   demonstrable and verifiable, and essentially the

 

         25   system must work.  And we appreciate you setting

 

 

 


 

                                                                       24

 

 

 

          1   that standard as high as you have.  Because a large

 

          2   portion of these guidelines are directed

 

          3   specifically at system developers, it is

 

          4   necessarily technical in nature.  And quite

 

          5   honestly, reading through this volume in the last

 

          6   two months, a lot of it has gone over my head from

 

          7   a technical aspect.  What I would -- what I would

 

          8   ask the Commission to do is keep in mind the

 

          9   development of a practical guide for the local

 

         10   election officials.  In other words, converting

 

         11   this document to something -- I guess, to be honest

 

         12   to you, I don't see too many of my peers having

 

         13   this sitting on their desk and referring to it as a

 

         14   resource to help them establish their processes and

 

         15   procedures in the elections office.  It's an

 

         16   absolutely fantastic foundation for us, but I think

 

         17   we need to, and if you'd indulge me, develop a VVSG

 

         18   for dummies, myself being one of the dummies of

 

         19   course.  Somehow so that we can convert this to the

 

         20   reality.  I think, when I read through this, one of

 

         21   the things that I was feeling was a disconnect

 

         22   between the effort towards the vendors and the

 

         23   voters, the disconnect with the local election

 

         24   officials.  Please don't minimize the role of the

 

         25   local election official in this process.  We are,

 

 

 


 

                                                                       25

 

 

 

          1   after all, the folks in most cases who are going to

 

          2   be procuring, implementing, managing, and

 

          3   maintaining these systems into the future.  We need

 

          4   to have the information and resources available to

 

          5   understand how to implement these in practical

 

          6   terms.  What HAVA requires, as Mr. Grough point

 

          7   out, we have requirements with HAVA coming up.  On

 

          8   January 2006 we're going to be required to have

 

          9   essentially a DRE in every polling place for voter

 

         10   accessibility.  What we're asking there, in some

 

         11   small to medium size jurisdictions, is

 

         12   sophisticated election equipment, electronic

 

         13   election equipment.  In jurisdictions that have

 

         14   little to no experience in managing information

 

         15   systems, this is going to be a challenge and we

 

         16   need to be able to make sure those folks get the

 

         17   right instructions and education on how to

 

         18   implement this and how to get that across to the

 

         19   voters.  One of the efforts by the Election

 

         20   Assistance Commission is the publication of the

 

         21   Election Management Best Practices, and that

 

         22   attempts to bring to the election officials around

 

         23   the country real life situations, real life

 

         24   solutions to the challenges we're facing.

 

         25   Unfortunately, I think that's been a passive

 

 

 


 

                                                                       26

 

 

 

          1   effort, and I would like to ask the Commission to

 

          2   convert that to a more aggressive effort.  If you

 

          3   could compel, or I could start doing that, or the

 

          4   three of us here, it might be a good idea to start

 

          5   compelling our colleagues to submit those

 

          6   solutions.  Left to our devices, we're relatively

 

          7   resourceful out there, and we are going to have to

 

          8   share those ideas and those solutions as we meet

 

          9   these challenges with the rest of the nation.  And

 

         10   in conclusion, one thing that's very clear after

 

         11   reading through the VVSG, successful implementation

 

         12   will not be a solo effort.  We cannot do it as a

 

         13   solo effort at the local level.  It cannot be done

 

         14   as a solo effort at the state level, nor the

 

         15   federal level.  It's going to take all three of us

 

         16   working in unison.  So I would ask that, yes, we

 

         17   need more additional resources, such as the

 

         18   information clearinghouse, and yes, of course, we

 

         19   will need more funding as we come along with this.

 

         20   And Donetta, not to put pressure on you so early in

 

         21   your new joy, but we're going to be relying on you

 

         22   too.  Thank you.

 

         23             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you very much.  Mr.

 

         24   Ragsdale, you're absolutely right.  Given the size

 

         25   and the numerous technical references in the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       27

 

 

 

          1   guidelines, it's not the kind of document that one

 

          2   can just flip to and go to section whatever,

 

          3   whatever, to get some guidance.  So we appreciate

 

          4   your request and recommendation about a practical

 

          5   handbook, if you will. But you've also done a

 

          6   rather unique thing, which I for one appreciate

 

          7   very much.  And that is you managed to find the

 

          8   statement of principles in there.  And it's one

 

          9   that really resonates to a very important issue.

 

         10   And I wish, if you would for me, for the record,

 

         11   just read that wonderful statement of principle

 

         12   that you found in there about the accessibility

 

         13   issue.  And I'm not sure if it's in the written

 

         14   testimony that we have, but I want to make sure

 

         15   that we have that for the record.

 

         16             MR. RAGSDALE:  This comes from volume

 

         17   one, section 2.2.7.  It actually enumerates three

 

         18   principles; the first being, I believe this is the

 

         19   one you're referring to, all eligible voters shall

 

         20   have access to the voting process without

 

         21   discrimination. Is that the one?

 

         22             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Right, yes, indeed.

 

         23             MR. RAGSDALE:  I think that, in

 

         24   conjunction with the other two that I read are --

 

         25             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Right.

 

 

 


 

                                                                       28

 

 

 

          1             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- like I say, that should

 

          2   be hung on the wall of every election official

 

          3   throughout the country.

 

          4             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Well, we do --

 

          5             MR. RAGSDALE:  They are well articulated.

 

          6             CHAIR HILLMAN:  -- we are challenged to

 

          7   find ways to translate some of the work we do into

 

          8   the kind of language and explanation that every

 

          9   voter can appreciate, with respect to the work that

 

         10   we are doing with election officials on behalf of

 

         11   voters.  And so it was nice to see you find that

 

         12   statement in the midst of those several hundred

 

         13   pages there.  Thank you.

 

         14             MR. RAGSDALE:  You're welcome.

 

         15             CHAIR HILLMAN:  We are now ready for

 

         16   questions, and Commissioner Davidson, if you'd like

 

         17   to begin.

 

         18             MS. DAVIDSON:  One of the questions I had

 

         19   --

 

         20             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Excuse me, one second,

 

         21   just to let me say that we have about 10 minutes

 

         22   again, for questions and to receive responses from

 

         23   the panelist --

 

         24             MS. DAVIDSON:  Okay.

 

         25             CHAIR HILLMAN:  -- okay?

 

 

 


 

                                                                       29

 

 

 

          1             MS. DAVIDSON:  One of the question --

 

          2   see, I thought I was going to be last, so I was

 

          3   going to pick up on everybody else's questions. The

 

          4   testing and what you're doing in Washington, and in

 

          5   your DREs, and the statements you made in testing

 

          6   -- before the Secretary the State coming out being

 

          7   part of the tests three days before, can you go in

 

          8   to a little bit of that testing area of how you're

 

          9   accomplishing that?

 

         10             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Approximately two to

 

         11   three weeks before each election we actually test

 

         12   the mechanics of each DRE that's going to be

 

         13   deployed to a polling place --

 

         14             MS. DAVIDSON:  Okay, the mechanics, okay.

 

         15             MR. TERWILLIGER:  And then we also vote a

 

         16   prescribed, predetermined ballot to make sure that

 

         17   the machine is accurately recording the choices

 

         18   that are available on the ballot styles that are on

 

         19   that machine.  And we certify that that's been

 

         20   done, not on two machines, but on every machine

 

         21   that's deployed in the election.  The Secretary of

 

         22   State test is a more general test where members

 

         23   from the public, party observers, come in and pick

 

         24   out three or four precincts randomly and test on

 

         25   three or four machines that are -- that have the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       30

 

 

 

          1   entire program ballot on it, and then when we bring

 

          2   the machines back in on election day, we do the

 

          3   same mechanical test, and also the same pre-

 

          4   described test ballot that we did beforehand to

 

          5   make sure that it's still recording correctly.  So

 

          6   if we have any machines with problems, we know.

 

          7             MS. DAVIDSON:  Do you see that there's a

 

          8   need for a best practices, and this is a little bit

 

          9   off the subject, but a best practices for every

 

         10   type of equipment out there, of what states are

 

         11   doing, and getting information back so we can

 

         12   develop some best practices to help some of the

 

         13   counties that are maybe mid-sized to small sized,

 

         14   to help develop some ease in what they should be

 

         15   doing?  On the other end, making sure that they're

 

         16   accomplishing every bit of the testing that they

 

         17   should be doing?

 

         18             MR. TERWILLIGER:  I do.  I do agree with

 

         19   my fellow -- Russ over here though that I come from

 

         20   a state where the smallest jurisdiction has 1,400

 

         21   registered voters in it, and the largest has 1.2

 

         22   million registered voters in it.  So staffing and

 

         23   expertise, et cetera, are not going to necessarily

 

         24   provide for the ability to do the level of testing

 

         25   that I can do with a staff that I have.  So, it's

 

 

 


 

                                                                       31

 

 

 

          1   going to take a marriage between the state's

 

          2   elections offices and the local elections offices

 

          3   to develop those best practices and then work in

 

          4   partnership, which we do a pretty good job of in

 

          5   the State of Washington, to make sure that this is

 

          6   being done, where the staffing component at the

 

          7   local level is not there to do that.

 

          8             MR. GROUGH:  But just to make a comment

 

          9   to follow-up with Bob.  The logic and accuracy

 

         10   test, once your ballot is known and you download

 

         11   your ballot into your equipment, I think that is --

 

         12   a lot of the states have that requirement.  You

 

         13   know, every piece of equipment before it goes out,

 

         14   we have to run a pre- audit test deck through it,

 

         15   after that, we seal up the equipment.  The Thursday

 

         16   before the election, we have to run a test through

 

         17   our central computer system. Once that has been

 

         18   deemed to be okay, we lock that down and nothing

 

         19   can be touched or changed until, you know, until

 

         20   Election Day.

 

         21             MS. DAVIDSON:  Um-hmm.

 

         22             MR. GROUGH:  And even election day we run

 

         23   another audit on the system.  So, I mean, there are

 

         24   a lot of checks and balances that we go through

 

         25   that the public does not understand.  I mean it's

 

 

 


 

                                                                       32

 

 

 

          1   not like you just put the ballot in and you go with

 

          2   it.  I mean there's a lot of testing that we have

 

          3   to make sure that everything, you know, is on the

 

          4   up and up.  And we have -- community groups are

 

          5   invited to come in and review our testing.  You

 

          6   know, I mean it's an open practice and that's what

 

          7   we'd like everybody to know.

 

          8             MS. DAVIDSON:  Don't you think it would

 

          9   bring some unity in to, you know, the transparency

 

         10   of the election if we can make our voters

 

         11   understand how much testing there is that goes on

 

         12   with equipment?

 

         13             MR. GROUGH:  We really do; we really do.

 

         14   I mean we run articles in the newspaper prior to

 

         15   let everybody know that we are going to do this

 

         16   testing and that you're invited to review it.

 

         17             MR. TERWILLIGER:  I think what happened

 

         18   nationally, and certainly what's happened in the

 

         19   State of Washington as a result of a governor's

 

         20   race that was absolutely incredible in terms of the

 

         21   closeness of it all is there are public groups and

 

         22   individuals that are so much more interested, so

 

         23   much more paying attention now, that the time is

 

         24   right to have those best practices identified so

 

         25   that they can be the check and balance as much as

 

 

 


 

                                                                       33

 

 

 

          1   we are on ourselves to make sure that we're really

 

          2   following those best practices when they're

 

          3   identified.  So often the public is -- doesn't have

 

          4   the time or hasn't taken the interest because they

 

          5   didn't think there was ever any reason to be

 

          6   involved. But now I think they're very aware that

 

          7   there is.  And it's not that many of us haven't, or

 

          8   all of us haven't been doing those testing

 

          9   procedures, but it's one of those things that's

 

         10   just an unknown.  And now I think we need to make

 

         11   it clear that we do it and we need to make it

 

         12   totally accessible for anybody that wants to come

 

         13   in and observe it, to observe it.

 

         14             MS. DAVIDSON:  I know Colorado has just

 

         15   changed laws, and I think many states have also,

 

         16   trying to up the amount of testing and the amount

 

         17   of credibility that is put in to the process prior

 

         18   to the election and after the election.  Russ, do

 

         19   you have anything you want to add to that?

 

         20             MR. RAGSDALE:  Just that going,

 

         21   Commissioner Davidson -- in Colorado we had the

 

         22   allocation for a public logic and accuracy test

 

         23   prior to the election, and that was the only public

 

         24   testing that was required by law.  And essentially

 

         25   that public LNA was a confirmation of the internal

 

 

 


 

                                                                       34

 

 

 

          1   testing that had taken place the week before.  And

 

          2   as was stated earlier, the public wasn't aware of

 

          3   how much internal testing was done, and how much

 

          4   diagnostic tests were performed on the equipment.

 

          5   We have been shown the light that needs to be

 

          6   transparent.  We need to invite the public in to

 

          7   watch that because it's a very positive step.

 

          8             MS. DAVIDSON:  Thank you.

 

          9             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you very much.

 

         10   Commissioner Martinez?

 

         11             MR. MARTINEZ:  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         12   Just a few quick questions, and I want to start

 

         13   with just a statement, and that is -- kind of pick

 

         14   up where my colleague, Commission Davidson has left

 

         15   off, and that is the issue of transparency.  And I

 

         16   want to say that I've been privileged in the 20

 

         17   months or so, serving as a Commissioner, to be able

 

         18   to visit lots of jurisdictions, including, really

 

         19   all three of yours. Not personally to your county

 

         20   and jurisdiction, Mr. Ragsdale, but to Colorado as

 

         21   a Commissioner, not to long ago and the invitation

 

         22   of then Secretary Davidson to talk to you and your

 

         23   colleagues at one of your training sessions.  Mr.

 

         24   Terwilliger, you've hosted me and our Vice-Chair,

 

         25   Paul Degregorio, not too long ago during your

 

 

 


 

                                                                       35

 

 

 

          1   recount process there in Snohomish County. And Mr.

 

          2   Grough, we've been to Chicago many times.  I was

 

          3   just there a few weeks ago for the ABA conference,

 

          4   and officially at your invitation on a couple of

 

          5   different occasions.  And I know first hand the

 

          6   commitment to equality, security, and to

 

          7   transparency that all of you exude from your

 

          8   particular positions in the -- as election

 

          9   administrators, so I want to applaud you for that

 

         10   dedication and for taking that time to be here

 

         11   today.  This is an important and very challenging

 

         12   project I think that we're all undertaking.  And

 

         13   I've said it before, perhaps you've heard me say it

 

         14   from the podium that the confidence meter of the

 

         15   American public, right now, seems to be moving, for

 

         16   whatever reason, in the wrong direction, despite

 

         17   the fact that, every jurisdiction I visit, I see a

 

         18   commitment to dedication and integrity, quite

 

         19   frankly.  And so I think that all of us can work at

 

         20   this together to make sure that the confidence

 

         21   meter is headed back in the right direction.  I

 

         22   think it will happen.  This is certainly a major

 

         23   effort in that direction.  Mr. Terwilliger, I want

 

         24   to ask a couple of questions about, specifically,

 

         25   in how the proposed guidelines would affect your

 

 

 


 

                                                                       36

 

 

 

          1   jurisdiction.  I think when I was there a few

 

          2   months ago you mentioned that, I think most of your

 

          3   ballots on election, for election day come in via

 

          4   mail, if I'm not mistaken, into Snohomish County?

 

          5             MR. TERWILLIGER:  That's correct.

 

          6             MR. MARTINEZ:  But yet you still, you do

 

          7   use DRE machines for voters who are going to vote

 

          8   on election day?

 

          9             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Correct.

 

         10             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.  And there is a

 

         11   requirement, a proposed requirement in the proposed

 

         12   Guideline in section -- on page 2.22 that says if

 

         13   the normal procedure includes voter verified paper

 

         14   audit trail, then the accessible voting system, in

 

         15   your case, it would be your DRE system, should

 

         16   provide features that enable voters who are blind

 

         17   to perform this verification.  The requirement goes

 

         18   on to say, and I'm quoting, if the state requires

 

         19   the paper record produced by the VVPAT to be the

 

         20   official ballot, then that voting system shall

 

         21   provide features that enable visually impaired

 

         22   voters to review the paper record. You're in a

 

         23   state that I believe through administrative action

 

         24   by Secretary Reed has required a VVPAT by 1/01/06.

 

         25   And I just wondered if you would comment on the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       37

 

 

 

          1   specificity of this particular requirement,

 

          2   proposed requirement?

 

          3             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Actually, at this point

 

          4   in time our state legislature has required a bi-

 

          5   legislation --

 

          6             MR. MARTINEZ:  I see, okay.

 

          7             MR. TERWILLIGER:  -- so -- but it doesn't

 

          8   identify that the VVPAT is the official ballot,

 

          9   except in manual recounts.

 

         10             MR. MARTINEZ:  Okay.

 

         11             MR. TERWILLIGER:  And it does have a

 

         12   requirement that we do a post election audit on up

 

         13   to four percent of the machines that are in any

 

         14   particular election, comparing the results off the

 

         15   machines back to the VVPAT.  Right now, we're

 

         16   awaiting certification from our vendor for their

 

         17   system to meet the terms and conditions that are

 

         18   outlined in the 2002 Standards, to be able to have

 

         19   the disabled community, and specifically the blind

 

         20   community, be able to review the VVPAT in a way

 

         21   that doesn't disclose or violate their right of

 

         22   secrecy.  So that's a work in progress and our

 

         23   expectation is that we are going to have that

 

         24   certified to us in January.  We're not going to

 

         25   meet the January 1 deadline, obviously --

 

 

 


 

                                                                       38

 

 

 

          1             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.

 

          2             MR. TERWILLIGER:  -- and then we'll go

 

          3   forward from there

 

          4             MR. MARTINEZ:  So in terms of this

 

          5   particular proposed language, it is -- it does not

 

          6   conflict with the way your legislature has written

 

          7   the VVPAT requirement, and that they haven't

 

          8   addressed it as the official record other than for

 

          9   recount purposes is what you're saying?

 

         10             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Correct.

 

         11             MR. MARTINEZ:  And then you also

 

         12   mentioned the independent dual verification

 

         13   systems, and I just want to explore that a little

 

         14   bit more with you.  I think what I hear you saying

 

         15   is if work can be done to explore other means to

 

         16   explore verification, other than through a paper

 

         17   audit trail, that you would encourage that as a

 

         18   local election administration?

 

         19             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Yes, I would.  I think

 

         20   there's been much testimony and some evidence to

 

         21   the fact that there are potential issues in terms

 

         22   of administering and maintaining the audit and

 

         23   secrecy and actually conducting whatever audit or

 

         24   recount exercise would have to take place on the

 

         25   verified paper audit trail.  I think technology, as

 

 

 


 

                                                                       39

 

 

 

          1   we all know it, advances so quickly, almost daily,

 

          2   that if there can be developed some transparent way

 

          3   for voters to know their ballots have been voted

 

          4   and recorded correctly on this electronic voting

 

          5   system that is equal to or great than what we're

 

          6   talking about with the voter verified paper audit

 

          7   trail, we should certainly explore that.

 

          8             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.

 

          9             MR. TERWILLIGER:  My testimony to my

 

         10   state legislature was actually to allow or to have

 

         11   the legislation have language in it to provide for

 

         12   that possibility, but they didn't see that that was

 

         13   something they could agree to at that point in

 

         14   time, and I think frankly because there isn't

 

         15   really anything identifiable out there yet.

 

         16             MR. MARTINEZ:  Um-hmm.

 

         17             MR. TERWILLIGER:  But I think we need to

 

         18   work towards that.

 

         19             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.

 

         20             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Because I think that

 

         21   may be a better, more effective way to demonstrate

 

         22   the accuracy of electronic voting, than the voter

 

         23   verified paper audit trail.

 

         24             MR. MARTINEZ:  Yeah.  Mr. Grough, any

 

         25   thoughts?  I know that -- I can't recall, but I

 

 

 


 

                                                                       40

 

 

 

          1   think Illinois is also one of the states that's

 

          2   required a paper trail for the use of any

 

          3   electronic voting systems?

 

          4             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, and I follow on a

 

          5   second that it's not the official --

 

          6             MR. MARTINEZ:  Okay.

 

          7             MR. GROUGH:  -- you know, it's only used

 

          8   for recount.

 

          9             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right, and you're going to

 

         10   have optical scan there in Chicago, but you're also

 

         11   going to have a mixture of optical scan and DRE

 

         12   systems?

 

         13             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, we are.

 

         14             MR. MARTINEZ:  Yeah, so you'll have to

 

         15   have a paper trail for the DRE systems?

 

         16             MR. GROUGH:  We do have -- yes, we do.

 

         17             MR. MARTINEZ:  Okay.  And then, the

 

         18   issue, Mr. Grough, with regard to wireless

 

         19   communication.  We were actually, at our last

 

         20   hearing, in Pasadena I think; I'm losing track of

 

         21   where I've been recently, but I think we were in

 

         22   Pasadena recently, and we took testimony of a very

 

         23   esteemed panel of folks who gave us various

 

         24   perspectives on the use of wireless communication

 

         25   for election and the process of administering an

 

 

 


 

                                                                       41

 

 

 

          1   election.  One of the requirements, I don't have it

 

          2   in front of me, but says that use of wireless

 

          3   communication ought to be encrypted if you're going

 

          4   to use it for the purposes to transmitted ballot

 

          5   information, or whatever.  And I assume that that

 

          6   is something that is called for in the use of

 

          7   wireless communication, as well?

 

          8             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, it is.  And

 

          9   Commissioner, I was invited to speak, but I could

 

         10   not make it because we were in negotiations on the

 

         11   contract.  So I had to miss that, but wireless

 

         12   technology has come so far. And with encryption and

 

         13   with the type of equipment that we have, I'm not

 

         14   worried about it.  Plus, everybody forgets, it is

 

         15   strictly unofficial -- what the results you get

 

         16   from the wireless is strictly unofficial.  We go

 

         17   back and do testing on it.  We have to then

 

         18   manually read everything into the system, so I mean

 

         19   -- and then we do a canvas.  So I mean wireless --

 

         20   people get very concerned when they say, oh, you're

 

         21   transmitting election totals over the air waves.

 

         22   Well, yes, we are but they're unofficial.

 

         23             MR. MARTINEZ:  Got it.  I appreciate

 

         24   that. Mr. Ragsdale, you mentioned election

 

         25   management standards, and I wonder -- that is, I

 

 

 


 

                                                                       42

 

 

 

          1   think a topic that we've been talking about since

 

          2   the first days of our Commission, and obviously now

 

          3   that we are in a position where this fiscal year we

 

          4   are fully funded by Congress, we are making some, I

 

          5   think, some increasingly proactive steps to try to

 

          6   develop some election management standards.  But I

 

          7   know that you want to move aggressively on that

 

          8   front, and what's the priority when it comes to

 

          9   that type of a standard to be developed?  I mean

 

         10   what are you looking for at the local level for us

 

         11   to be able to offer, be a best practices or be at

 

         12   some sort of voluntary standards in that area?

 

         13             MR. RAGSDALE:  Well, quite -- when you

 

         14   first put out the best practices on your website --

 

         15             MR. MARTINEZ:  Um-hmm.

 

         16             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- we went to it for

 

         17   better ways to do our business --

 

         18             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.

 

         19             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- essentially.  I think

 

         20   the priority now is ways to accomplish what is

 

         21   legally required, or to say shortly required of us.

 

         22   The testing requirements, the accessibility

 

         23   requirements, we need to know -- in the VVSG goes

 

         24   into quite an in- depth in security it measures.

 

         25             MR. MARTINEZ:  Um-hmm.

 

 

 


 

                                                                       43

 

 

 

          1             MR. RAGSDALE:  One thing that pops to

 

          2   mind is management of the actual physical

 

          3   environment, the election equipment and tabulation

 

          4   server and what have you.  That's something that a

 

          5   lot of jurisdictions don't have experience with.

 

          6             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.

 

          7             MR. RAGSDALE:  And that's something that

 

          8   should be kept isolated in a separate room, with

 

          9   key card entry.  What do you do?  Who has access to

 

         10   keys in those rooms?  Those kind of things that are

 

         11   really new challenges to a lot of jurisdictions.

 

         12             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right.

 

         13             MR. RAGSDALE:  So things that I would say

 

         14   if I could put it succinctly, what we need now as a

 

         15   priority and best practices is how to solve what is

 

         16   required of us --

 

         17             MR. MARTINEZ:  Sure.

 

         18             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- and made easy.

 

         19             MR. MARTINEZ:  Right, okay.  That's very

 

         20   helpful.  I want to go back, if I could, and for my

 

         21   last question, Mr. Terwilliger.  We talked this

 

         22   morning, and I'm not sure if you were here in the

 

         23   morning session during our meeting about the

 

         24   National Software Reference Library.  And as a

 

         25   county that uses DRE systems already, I'm just

 

 

 


 

                                                                       44

 

 

 

          1   wondering if you're familiar with the idea of a

 

          2   repository of the software that's used by the

 

          3   vendors and their systems and whether that could be

 

          4   of use to you as a local election administrator?

 

          5             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Yes, I am familiar with

 

          6   it and I think it would be useful because much of

 

          7   the objection, if you will that we hear from

 

          8   communities that have concerns about the electronic

 

          9   voting system is not knowing or not believing that

 

         10   there is a standard or that we are using the same

 

         11   version that was certified.  And I think it would

 

         12   be helpful to all elections officials and all the

 

         13   vendors, frankly, to have that place where that

 

         14   could be stored.

 

         15             MR. MARTINEZ:  Great.  I'm the -- that's

 

         16   the end of my questions, but I do want to say since

 

         17   I normally address you as Bob, I'm sorry if I

 

         18   butchered your last name during our discussion.

 

         19             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Well, you did fine.

 

         20             MR. MARTINEZ:  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         21             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay, Mr. Vice-Chairman?

 

         22             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         23   Mr. Terwilliger, as Commissioner Martinez

 

         24   indicated, last December he and I had the great

 

         25   opportunity to observe the recount that was going

 

 

 


 

                                                                       45

 

 

 

          1   on in Washington State, and we had the honor of

 

          2   coming to your county and watching that process.

 

          3   And of course, you went through and your staff went

 

          4   through a very meticulous process to count those

 

          5   ballots, to account for each one of them.  And in

 

          6   doing so, you went through several recounts of the

 

          7   vote.  You had the election night and you had --

 

          8   there were several recounts.  In that process, did

 

          9   you learn anything that you can tell us that would

 

         10   help in establishing these voting system

 

         11   guidelines?  Did you learn anything about the

 

         12   accuracy of your system that, you know, by doing

 

         13   it, by hand counting, we really learned that these

 

         14   results are accurate.  And is there anything that

 

         15   we can learn from that, perhaps we can include or

 

         16   include perhaps in management practices that we may

 

         17   come out with, in your experience of the recount of

 

         18   Washington State?

 

         19             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Well, I think it's

 

         20   interesting -- first of all, it's my understanding

 

         21   that not all states even have recount statutes to

 

         22   the degree that the State of Washington does.  From

 

         23   our unique experience, a change was made in our

 

         24   state statute in the legislature that just ended

 

         25   its session.  So now on a statewide race, if the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       46

 

 

 

          1   closeness of the race is within 1,000, and less

 

          2   than one quarter a percent, we're going to go right

 

          3   to a hand recount.  And that is to eliminate the

 

          4   perception that occurred in our state, because our

 

          5   first state under our prior law was that we did a

 

          6   machine recount.  We recounted all the ballots

 

          7   again with the same tabulation machines, and then,

 

          8   it still was close enough that, as we all know, the

 

          9   Democratic Party applied for a hand recount and the

 

         10   results changed.  I don't think there was anything

 

         11   untort about that.  It's just that it doesn't feel

 

         12   good and it doesn't look good, and it doesn't

 

         13   perceive well to the public.  So, in terms of the

 

         14   machinery and the tabulation accuracy, I think it's

 

         15   clearly accurate and does give us clear indication

 

         16   of who won and who lost when your differences are

 

         17   greater than the differences that we were talking

 

         18   about in our state.  But when they get to be within

 

         19   that level, I don't think that there's any machine

 

         20   that's accurate enough to represent that. And the

 

         21   public, at large, I believe, has a much better

 

         22   feeling about who won and who lost, at the end of

 

         23   the day, when the ballots are actually looked at by

 

         24   individual teams, you know, where they were in our

 

         25   state.  So I think the legislation is a good piece

 

 

 


 

                                                                       47

 

 

 

          1   of legislation because now, in that statewide

 

          2   environment, which maybe we'll never experience

 

          3   again, we're not going to have that intermediate

 

          4   machine recount.  We're going to go right to a hand

 

          5   recount and that will be it.

 

          6             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Did you find --

 

          7             MR. TERWILLIGER:  That was a learning

 

          8   experience.

 

          9             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Was it accurate in your

 

         10   county?

 

         11             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Yes, um-hmm.

 

         12             MR. DEGREGORIO:  I realized in some

 

         13   counties there were some votes added because votes

 

         14   were found.

 

         15             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Right.

 

         16             MR. DEGREGORIO:  And that's a different

 

         17   story than --

 

         18             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Exactly.

 

         19             MR. DEGREGORIO:  -- from then --

 

         20             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Right.  And when you

 

         21   can look at the optical scan ballot, which is a

 

         22   vast majority of the ballots in the State of

 

         23   Washington because of how many of folks vote by

 

         24   mail, because we have that liberal provision, you

 

         25   see all kinds of indications on the ballot.  We're

 

 

 


 

                                                                       48

 

 

 

          1   clearly as a state that one would characterize as a

 

          2   voter intense state, and we have clear rules and

 

          3   regulations about how to decide whether that ballot

 

          4   should be transferred, duplicated to another

 

          5   ballot, in a way to represent that voter intent.

 

          6   Those are the issues that you can clarify when

 

          7   you're doing a hand recount that aren't going to be

 

          8   picked up in a machine recount, but when the

 

          9   difference is five, six, seven, ten, 50,000 votes,

 

         10   that's accurate enough to determine clearly who won

 

         11   and who lost.  When the difference is 134 votes, I

 

         12   think you need to be looking at the ballots.

 

         13             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Okay, thank you.  Mr.

 

         14   Grough --

 

         15             MR. GROUGH:  Yes.

 

         16             MR. DEGREGORIO:  -- certainly I'm

 

         17   familiar with your shop there in Chicago.  I'm 20

 

         18   years familiar with Chicago, in fact.  And you had

 

         19   punch cards for years?

 

         20             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, we have.

 

         21             MR. DEGREGORIO:  And you took the

 

         22   leadership -- a leadership role after the 2000

 

         23   election to invest millions of dollars to give

 

         24   voters of the City of Chicago second chance voting

 

         25   with punch cards, which most jurisdictions that had

 

 

 


 

                                                                       49

 

 

 

          1   punch cards did not do that.  But you did that. And

 

          2   I certainly was there last November to witness your

 

          3   last use of punch cards and how that worked, and it

 

          4   did work well.  But now you have, you know, you

 

          5   just described this new system that you're going to

 

          6   with DRE, optical scan, and Commissioner Martinez

 

          7   talked about the wireless aspect of the guidelines

 

          8   --

 

          9             MR. GROUGH:  Um-hmm.

 

         10             MR. DEGREGORIO:  -- and how it will be

 

         11   applied.  Now, do you see any difference with these

 

         12   guidelines applying to unofficial results that will

 

         13   be transmitted from your polling places to your

 

         14   office on election night, as opposed to any

 

         15   official results that may be transmitted from some

 

         16   point from the polling place to your offices?

 

         17             MR. GROUGH:  Well, just to let me say

 

         18   that we've done many recounts in the City of

 

         19   Chicago, as you know, and we have never had a

 

         20   difference in what we've done unofficially,

 

         21   wirelessly, and we've done a hand recount.  So I

 

         22   said, there hasn't been any changes on that.  The

 

         23   public, believe it or not, is the one that, in the

 

         24   City of Chicago, asked for this wireless

 

         25   transmission.  They want to know as soon as

 

 

 


 

                                                                       50

 

 

 

          1   possible who won or who lost.  The news media, in

 

          2   fact, the reason why we went to wireless where we

 

          3   had a remote transmission site was hit by lightning

 

          4   and the phone lines were out, and the news media

 

          5   accused us of holding back election results in a

 

          6   certain area of the City of Chicago.  That's why --

 

          7   that's basically why we went with the wireless

 

          8   transmission.  We wanted to have the public feel as

 

          9   confident as possible that their election results

 

         10   or their election is being counted fairly.

 

         11             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Many jurisdictions

 

         12   across the country are changing over from paper

 

         13   machines and punch cards.  You're not the last

 

         14   jurisdiction standing; I guarantee you, there's

 

         15   several counties in my own State of Missouri that

 

         16   are not where you are in this process.  But you

 

         17   mentioned that you negotiated with your vendors,

 

         18   your vendor, when buying your equipment, that

 

         19   they're going to meet the EAC guidelines.  Is that

 

         20   correct?

 

         21             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, yes.

 

         22             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Was that difficult to

 

         23   do? Did you get any push back from that?  Or were

 

         24   they ready to put that as part of the package in

 

         25   selling this product to you?

 

 

 


 

                                                                       51

 

 

 

          1             MR. GROUGH:  Well, I don't want to speak

 

          2   for the vendor, but this contract -- it took two

 

          3   months to negotiate, so there were a lot of items

 

          4   that were in question.  But I think the vendor

 

          5   understands that it's to their advantage to meet

 

          6   these guidelines when you're selling the equipment.

 

          7   What's better than to say that you meet all the

 

          8   requirements that are out there.  So, for a vendor

 

          9   not to fight to have those standards met I think

 

         10   doesn't make any sense at all.

 

         11             MR. DEGREGORIO:  You know, I knew I hear

 

         12   from a nervousness in jurisdictions around the

 

         13   country who are purchasing equipment the worry that

 

         14   they have in buying something today that a year

 

         15   from now may not meet the EAC Voluntary Voting

 

         16   System Guidelines that's adopted by their state. So

 

         17   I think what you have done is helped them.  And I

 

         18   think that other jurisdictions, perhaps, will look

 

         19   to you and the way that you did this as they

 

         20   purchase equipment.  I hope that perhaps you can

 

         21   share your contract.  I know that it's a public

 

         22   record with them, so they can at least see what the

 

         23   City of Chicago got from this effort.  Mr.

 

         24   Ragsdale, you indicated that you had a system in

 

         25   place for a few years, is that correct?  Is it an

 

 

 


 

                                                                       52

 

 

 

          1   optical scan system?

 

          2             MR. RAGSDALE:  Yes, Mr. Degregorio, we've

 

          3   had a unique situation in Broomfield.  We became a

 

          4   county in November 2001 --

 

          5             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Oh.

 

          6             MR. RAGSDALE:  -- so our system isn't

 

          7   older than that, three years.  We have an optical

 

          8   scan system that we use in our polling places, and

 

          9   DREs in our early voting where we have multiple

 

         10   voting styles.

 

         11             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Now, we're going to

 

         12   adopt these Voluntary Voting System Guidelines in

 

         13   the fall, probably in October.  I assume that the

 

         14   State of Colorado will take a look at them and

 

         15   determine if they want to adopt these guidelines as

 

         16   their guidelines.  Do you have a contract with your

 

         17   vendor?  How do you see your jurisdiction meeting

 

         18   these guidelines if the State of Colorado indeed

 

         19   adopts them as their own?

 

         20             MR. RAGSDALE:  That's an excellent

 

         21   question, and a question that I imagine that every

 

         22   local election official around the country is

 

         23   asking themselves.  We are obviously under the

 

         24   mandate from HAVA that January 2006 to have

 

         25   accessible voting equipment in every polling place.

 

 

 


 

                                                                       53

 

 

 

          1   We need to have that equipment, at minimum,

 

          2   matching the 2002 FEC certification.  Colorado is

 

          3   going to adopt the Guidelines set forth by the EAC.

 

          4   It does leave us with a bit of a conundrum if we

 

          5   cannot get a negotiation with our vendors; we may

 

          6   very well be buying equipment that is, in practical

 

          7   terms, obsolete as soon as these guidelines are

 

          8   adopted.  Now, I know you have the 24 months until

 

          9   they're implemented, but that's still in essence,

 

         10   that's a very short life span for any kind of

 

         11   computer based system.  It's an issue. It is very

 

         12   much.  Now, the Secretary of State in Colorado is

 

         13   taking a proactive effort in that in trying to do a

 

         14   contract statewide that any of the counties can

 

         15   then join under that umbrella contract, which will

 

         16   help us, hopefully, but the negotiation there is

 

         17   that the vendor will come back and retrofit, at a

 

         18   minimum, that equipment to meet the EAC Guidelines.

 

         19             MR. DEGREGORIO:  You mentioned earlier in

 

         20   your discussion with other Commissioners the

 

         21   management best practices, the need for that as

 

         22   part of these Voluntary Voting System Guidelines,

 

         23   and we are moving in that direction.  We hope to

 

         24   actually do an RFP and get moving on establishing a

 

         25   process where we're going to put together some good

 

 

 


 

                                                                       54

 

 

 

          1   management practices and hire some people to do

 

          2   that, over a period of time.  But, when would be

 

          3   the opportune time, and I ask all three of you, to

 

          4   have these management practices, best practices,

 

          5   from the EAC.  We're going to adopt these

 

          6   guidelines; they're not going to take effect though

 

          7   for a couple of years, although we do know that

 

          8   jurisdictions will -- may move up their own

 

          9   deadlines for these Guidelines, and vendors will

 

         10   try to meet them certainly before the deadline that

 

         11   we put forth when we adopt these guidelines.  But

 

         12   you have elections next year, and I'd like to know

 

         13   from all of you, when is the opportune time from

 

         14   you to be receiving from us some of these

 

         15   management best practices for these new guidelines.

 

         16   We'll start here.

 

         17             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Well, obviously, I

 

         18   think the sooner the better.  But I also think that

 

         19   these best practices guidelines probably have more

 

         20   direct impact and more immediate benefit than the

 

         21   Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines do.  In other

 

         22   words, there's a lot more need and a lot more

 

         23   immediacy that can be accomplished by a

 

         24   jurisdictions needing and having available to them

 

         25   best practices in the various areas that you heard

 

 

 


 

                                                                       55

 

 

 

          1   us talk to today, just about security, about

 

          2   audibility, about management of the hardware and

 

          3   software that you now currently have.  These

 

          4   guidelines aren't going to mean a whole lot if

 

          5   those best practices aren't in place now.  So, in

 

          6   terms of a priority, I almost think it's almost

 

          7   more important to have as many of those out quicker

 

          8   and take time to make sure that these are done

 

          9   correctly and meet the concerns that are being

 

         10   raised.  Because there's, in my opinion, where the

 

         11   need is.  I see it in my own State, as I say

 

         12   because of the size of the jurisdictional

 

         13   differences, to have a resource that the smaller

 

         14   counties can just go to and say, oh, this is what

 

         15   we need to do; this is how we should do it.  I

 

         16   think it would be extremely beneficial sooner

 

         17   rather than later.

 

         18             MR. GROUGH:  I'm in agreement with that,

 

         19   and especially for the smaller counties in

 

         20   Illinois.  You have to understand there's some

 

         21   counties that don't even have their own computers;

 

         22   they share the AllState computer next door to

 

         23   operate their vote counting equipment.  So, I'm

 

         24   just saying as soon as we can get the best

 

         25   practices out there so everybody will be on that

 

 

 


 

                                                                       56

 

 

 

          1   even level playing field.

 

          2             MR. RAGSDALE:  I would absolutely act

 

          3   with that.  I think that the comments by Mr. Grough

 

          4   about negotiating the contract with this vendor and

 

          5   getting them to assure compliance with the EAC

 

          6   guidelines.  I think -- I look at the weight of

 

          7   Chicago as a client in negotiations, it's probably

 

          8   a little more leverage than Broomfield brings to

 

          9   bear with my 28 polling places, but I feel your

 

         10   pain.  It's something I'm sure I could use mightily

 

         11   from the larger jurisdictions, and I think the

 

         12   sooner we can get those out there, the better for

 

         13   all.

 

         14             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Thank you, gentleman.

 

         15             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay, thank you.  The

 

         16   State of Washington is moving towards moving by

 

         17   mail.  I know we're here talking about the Voting

 

         18   Systems Guidelines, and I really appreciate the

 

         19   time that you've taken, but as the State moves

 

         20   toward its neighbor Oregon, and voters seem to like

 

         21   being able to vote by mail, I'm wondering what is

 

         22   the impetus for that?  What's been the motivation

 

         23   to see an overwhelming number of people prefer to

 

         24   do voting by mail?

 

         25             MR. TERWILLIGER:  A couple of things,

 

 

 


 

                                                                       57

 

 

 

          1   Commissioner Hillman.  The State adopted, oh maybe

 

          2   10 or 15 years ago, what I would refer to as sort

 

          3   of fail- safe absentee voting.  You need no reason

 

          4   to vote; you can simply opt for that as a status.

 

          5   Primarily following the lead of Oregon when they

 

          6   went to all mail balloting our state legislature

 

          7   wasn't willing to make that step, but they did

 

          8   approve legislation to say that can be a voting

 

          9   status.  By choice, our voting public has chosen

 

         10   that status to the point of, today, approximately

 

         11   70 percent of our 3.3, or whatever it is, million

 

         12   registered voters are voting that way by choice.

 

         13   So for many of the counties there's that issue, but

 

         14   there's also a geographical issue of large county,

 

         15   small population, trying to locate polling places,

 

         16   staffing the polling places, delivering the ballots

 

         17   after the election day is over, et cetera, so the

 

         18   voting by mail facilitates that.  It also probably

 

         19   comes as close to where we may ever be in the State

 

         20   of Washington to one uniform voting system, if the

 

         21   State actually takes the leap and goes all the way.

 

         22   Right now, when you're in a large county like I am,

 

         23   King and Pearus [phonetic] are our other two larger

 

         24   counties, you're running a dual election system.

 

         25   You're running a polling place election, which is

 

 

 


 

                                                                       58

 

 

 

          1   probably around 30 to 35 percent of our registered

 

          2   voters, and then a vote by mail system at the same

 

          3   time.  And it does add complexity, and it adds for

 

          4   problems in terms of security and audit trails, et

 

          5   cetera, so that's been the impetus.  Right now,

 

          6   today, 30 of our 39 counties have opted to do that;

 

          7   however, the nine that haven't represent the four

 

          8   largest counties in the State.  So 60 percent of

 

          9   the registered voters are still involved in a dual

 

         10   system.  But it's hard to say where it will go when

 

         11   the legislature convenes in 2006.  But it's been a

 

         12   convenience factor for the voters, and I think it's

 

         13   also been a cost saving factor for some of the

 

         14   smaller jurisdictions to not have to run two

 

         15   systems at the same time.

 

         16             CHAIR HILLMAN:  In the counties that are

 

         17   using principally voting by mail, what will be

 

         18   available for -- what is available for voters who

 

         19   prefer to vote by person?

 

         20             MR. TERWILLIGER:  They all know that they

 

         21   have to purchase a certain number of electronic

 

         22   voting devices in order to satisfy the

 

         23   disabled/handicapped accessibility requirement, and

 

         24   I would expect that anyone who wants to come and

 

         25   actually vote in person will also be able to vote

 

 

 


 

                                                                       59

 

 

 

          1   on those devices as well, but of course the impetus

 

          2   is going to have most everybody vote by mail.

 

          3             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you.  Mr. Grough,

 

          4   you talked about the DREs meeting the requirements

 

          5   of HAVA, with respect to providing access to

 

          6   disabled voters.

 

          7             MR. GROUGH:  Yeah.

 

          8             CHAIR HILLMAN:  In July, toward the end

 

          9   of July I believe it was, the Election Assistance

 

         10   Commission issued an advisory, if you will.  We

 

         11   called it a gap analysis, talking about minimally

 

         12   what systems need to have to be compliant with the

 

         13   requirement of HAVA, effective January 1.

 

         14             MR. GROUGH:  Yes.

 

         15             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Did you find that -- was

 

         16   that useful, helpful for you/

 

         17             MR. GROUGH:  Yes, it was.  Yes, it was.

 

         18   I think all of us here would be certain to say it

 

         19   was useful.

 

         20             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay, all right.

 

         21             MR. GROUGH:  And we did use that.

 

         22             CHAIR HILLMAN:  All right.  You also

 

         23   talked about the complexity of conducting elections

 

         24   from end to end, and most people wouldn't

 

         25   understand that or even take the time to want to

 

 

 


 

                                                                       60

 

 

 

          1   understand that.  And I think you're right, it's a

 

          2   very complex enterprise, if you will, not

 

          3   complicated, but complex.  And I'm wondering, in

 

          4   your option, how many elected officials in

 

          5   Illinois, those that are affected by how elections

 

          6   are conducted in Chicago, could be conversant about

 

          7   the complexity of what it takes to run an election?

 

          8             MR. GROUGH:  You know, it's funny, I've

 

          9   always said that the reason election laws have not

 

         10   been changed in Illinois is because a politician

 

         11   was elected this way and he wanted to stay elected.

 

         12   You know, I don't think a lot of your -- in the

 

         13   City of Chicago, let's say, your local people, your

 

         14   average person knows more about his local elected

 

         15   official than about his national elected official.

 

         16   I mean you would have more people knowing about

 

         17   your mayor, your alderman, than talking about the

 

         18   President.  In fact, somebody said it's not a

 

         19   trickled down effect in the City of Chicago, it's a

 

         20   trickle up effect.  I mean, your alderman is

 

         21   someone that people talk to or see more than they

 

         22   do the President.  So I'm saying, I think your

 

         23   politicians, our local politicians understand the

 

         24   complexity of elections.  I think -- they come into

 

         25   my office daily.  I have politicians running in and

 

 

 


 

                                                                       61

 

 

 

          1   out of the office daily looking for different items

 

          2   and know what we're doing, and I do appreciate

 

          3   that.  I think the public knows about it now also.

 

          4   Like I said, after the 2000 election, everybody is

 

          5   interested in elections in the City of Chicago, but

 

          6   they always have been.  By having a bad rap, people

 

          7   have done more to look at our elections than

 

          8   anybody else.  On election day, not only do I have

 

          9   community groups, but we have the FBI, and the

 

         10   State's attorneys, and other law enforcement

 

         11   agencies, and we appreciate that.  We have nothing

 

         12   to hide.

 

         13             CHAIR HILLMAN:  For the other two

 

         14   panelists, what are your experiences comparing to

 

         15   what Mr. Grough just laid out with respect to the

 

         16   amount of information that elected officials gather

 

         17   from your offices about the process?

 

         18             MR. RAGSDALE:  That's an excellent

 

         19   question. I think Chicago may be unique, at least

 

         20   from my perspective, in that people know their

 

         21   local elected officials better than they do their

 

         22   federal officials. I think just to witness the

 

         23   turnout we had last November and the interest that

 

         24   was displayed by the electorate, this year we have

 

         25   our municipal election in November.  Odd years in

 

 

 


 

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          1   Colorado we have coordinated elections, and

 

          2   municipalities will add their races to that ballot,

 

          3   so we have our mayor and city council members up in

 

          4   this race, so really me -- my job security is more

 

          5   important this year than it was last. But actually

 

          6   for the elected officials and for the electorate in

 

          7   general, they know less about what's happening, I

 

          8   think, in the race this year than they did last

 

          9   year.  I don't think we'll ever see the -- at least

 

         10   in an odd year election, the level of interest that

 

         11   we had this last November.  As far as the elected

 

         12   officials knowing about the process, I think that's

 

         13   -- I'm not sure how to answer that.  A lot of our

 

         14   local candidates who are running for our city

 

         15   council, because our department that handles

 

         16   elections is part of the city budget, they do have

 

         17   an interest in it, and they do want to know that

 

         18   their voters are having the opportunity to vote and

 

         19   know where to go.  Polling place location is always

 

         20   very important to them, and how we communicate that

 

         21   information to the voters.  But as far as the

 

         22   intricacies of setting up an election, and setting

 

         23   the perimeters for it, and testing the equipment,

 

         24   it's -- I'd have to say it's pretty low.

 

         25             MR. TERWILLIGER:  I would say that one

 

 

 


 

                                                                       63

 

 

 

          1   thing that will peak the interest of state

 

          2   legislatures more than ever before is to have a

 

          3   governor's race that was as close as ours was. They

 

          4   now know more about elections than they ever did

 

          5   before, but quite frankly before that they were as

 

          6   naive about it as the average person in the public.

 

          7   I got to my poll, I vote, the ballots are counted

 

          8   and everything comes out just fine. Understanding

 

          9   the intricacies and the complexities of it, there

 

         10   were a couple of state legislators from my county

 

         11   that actually did take the time to come in and

 

         12   visit the office several times, and they had a

 

         13   knowledge base that was relied upon, quite frankly

 

         14   in the state legislature up until this point in

 

         15   time.  And still, but I mean there are more now --

 

         16   more familiar just because of our experience.  Even

 

         17   the local county council, county executive does not

 

         18   really take the time or has the understanding of

 

         19   the complexity of what we do in elections.

 

         20             CHAIR HILLMAN:  I'll tell you where I'm

 

         21   going with that question.  Each of you addressed

 

         22   how the bar has been raised, if you will, with

 

         23   respect to the management practices and standards

 

         24   within elections. And you addressed the financial

 

         25   implications of that. And if Congress did not

 

 

 


 

                                                                       64

 

 

 

          1   appropriate any more money to the states in

 

          2   requirements payments; it does not appear that will

 

          3   happen.  It didn't happen this year; it does not

 

          4   appear it will happen in 2006, and we don't know

 

          5   what the future holds.  Will state and county

 

          6   appropriators be ready to address the issue?  Will

 

          7   they be ready to understand the cost implications

 

          8   and the need for additional funds to go to

 

          9   jurisdictions, to be able to support the conduct of

 

         10   elections the way that each of you had described

 

         11   what you're working to achieve?

 

         12             MR. GROUGH:  I could, just to let you

 

         13   know in the City of Chicago, I think the City is

 

         14   talking about $100 and something million deficit.

 

         15   The county is looking at about an $189 million

 

         16   deficit.  So with deficits like that, elections

 

         17   would not be a top priority.

 

         18             MR. TERWILLIGER:  I think that's the true

 

         19   case in our State as well.  Although there was a

 

         20   whole package of election reform legislation

 

         21   passed; many of those have financial implications,

 

         22   and many of the counties are going before their

 

         23   county councils right now and asking for monetary

 

         24   support for that.  The state legislature did refund

 

         25   what we know as our election certification and

 

 

 


 

                                                                       65

 

 

 

          1   training component of our Secretary of State's

 

          2   Office as a response to our issues, which is a good

 

          3   thing because they do provide training uniformly

 

          4   throughout the State and do audit reviews on best

 

          5   practices on the county level.  But they've not

 

          6   been able to do that for the last four or five

 

          7   years because the State cut the funding, but now

 

          8   they've put it back into place.  So that was a

 

          9   positive response by our state legislature, but

 

         10   there's still more to do and it remains to be seen

 

         11   how they respond to it.

 

         12             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Mr. Ragsdale?

 

         13             MR. RAGSDALE:  I would have to point out

 

         14   our former Secretary of State created a blue ribbon

 

         15   panel after the last election in November that was

 

         16   -- part of the members of that panel were

 

         17   legislators, state legislators.  And I think that

 

         18   was a great tool to educate the legislators, seeing

 

         19   what their fellow legislators were doing, and the

 

         20   word of mouth, and the informal communication from

 

         21   that I think helped tremendously.  I think the

 

         22   State level, the Secretary of State, we were

 

         23   fortunate in Colorado to have the Secretary of

 

         24   State who worked quite closely with the legislators

 

         25   and was able to educate them to a degree of the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       66

 

 

 

          1   needs of the elections world.  However, in Colorado

 

          2   we do have term limits, so that education process

 

          3   needs to continue as new legislators come in.  So I

 

          4   don't think it's something we can certainly rest on

 

          5   our laurels to say our state legislators are now

 

          6   educated and we can move forward knowing and being

 

          7   comfortable that our funding will be there.  I

 

          8   don't believe that that's the case.

 

          9             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay.  I think about that

 

         10   a lot because I know setting the standards for the

 

         11   voting systems will require constant upgrading in

 

         12   the out years, replace -- equipment replacement,

 

         13   upgrading, and so on an so forth.  And just the

 

         14   notion of state and local jurisdictions having

 

         15   sufficient funds so that ten years from now the

 

         16   momentum can continue, and we don't have to see

 

         17   ourselves revisiting all over again voting systems

 

         18   that aren't serving the ever increasing demands.  I

 

         19   mean I think Chicago pushes the envelope with

 

         20   respect to the number of polling places you have,

 

         21   the number of elected offices that there are, and

 

         22   you know, just the size of your ballot, and the

 

         23   extent to which systems can accommodate those -- in

 

         24   an affordable way.  Okay, thank you.  I think we

 

         25   are about 2:20, the end of this panel.  And it is

 

 

 


 

                                                                       67

 

 

 

          1   time for panel two.  And thank you very much,

 

          2   gentlemen --

 

          3             MR. TERWILLIGER:  Thank you.

 

          4             MR. RAGSDALE:  Thank you.

 

          5             MR. GROUGH:  Thank you.

 

          6             CHAIR HILLMAN:  -- for the time that

 

          7   you've taken and the information that you have

 

          8   shared.  And we will now set up for panel two,

 

          9   community interest groups, and that's Ms. Lillie

 

         10   Coney, the Electronic Privacy Information Center,

 

         11   and Mr. John Lott, Resident Scholar at the American

 

         12   Enterprise Institute.  Thank you very much.  I'm

 

         13   trying to find an EAC staff person or somebody from

 

         14   -- the lights are a little blinding, but Carol,

 

         15   thank you.  Okay, we have with us Ms. Lillie Coney

 

         16   and Mr. John Lott.  And we do have your written

 

         17   testimony, and we would ask that you just summarize

 

         18   from that the highlights, the things you want us to

 

         19   really know and remember, and take up to five or

 

         20   seven minutes to do that and then we'd like to have

 

         21   time for questions with you.  Thank you.

 

         22             MS. CONEY:  Thank you.  I'd like to thank

 

         23   you on behalf of the Electronic Privacy Information

 

         24   Center --

 

         25             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Can you move the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       68

 

 

 

          1   microphone a little closer maybe and speak up so we

 

          2   can hear you?

 

          3             MS. CONEY:  Sorry.  First, I'd like to

 

          4   request that I'd be allowed to revise next to my

 

          5   mark for the permanent record for this hearing?

 

          6             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Sure.

 

          7             MS. CONEY:  First, my name is Lillie

 

          8   Coney. I'd like to thank you on behalf of the

 

          9   Electronic Privacy Information Center and its

 

         10   project, the National Committee for Voting

 

         11   Integrity, for this opportunity to contribute to

 

         12   your deliberation on the final Guidance, which will

 

         13   be given to States on electronic voting -- on

 

         14   voting technology and systems. The things that the

 

         15   National Committee for Voting Integrity would like

 

         16   to vote out are one, it's a wonderful document, one

 

         17   that looks at accessibility issues.  It goes far

 

         18   beyond a lot of expectations initially going into

 

         19   the process.  It is a living document that will be

 

         20   with us for quite a while, that a portion of it

 

         21   will be a landmark, basically, the guidance that

 

         22   should be looked to for states and localities to

 

         23   make voting accessible for those with disabilities.

 

         24   I think the issues of privacy and transparency and

 

         25   auditability are issues that really need to be

 

 

 


 

                                                                       69

 

 

 

          1   focused on in the document, provide some guidance

 

          2   to states in those areas.  The bar for voting

 

          3   technology and voting systems should not be set

 

          4   artificially low.  I think that the opportunity to

 

          5   sit a floor, and encourage states and localities to

 

          6   reach for higher areas of expectation and goals are

 

          7   -- this is a wonderful opportunity to be able to do

 

          8   that.  As far as the general comments, while the

 

          9   Voting Technology Guidelines has some strong

 

         10   recommendations, there are some areas that are of

 

         11   some concern to the electronic technology

 

         12   community, as long -- as well as those are in

 

         13   resident, auditability, and transparency.

 

         14   Transparency in open government procedures that

 

         15   allow public access to the elections administration

 

         16   process are very important to democratic processes.

 

         17   Guidance should make them aware that the challenges

 

         18   to transparency posed by bar codes on voted

 

         19   ballots, and non-disclosure agreements as a

 

         20   condition for purchase of electronic voting -- of

 

         21   voting technology is an impediment to transparency.

 

         22   On the issue of audit, in the draft version of the

 

         23   Voting System Guidelines, two little focuses placed

 

         24   on the importance of conducting audits of election

 

         25   results.  For audits to be credible, the same

 

 

 


 

                                                                       70

 

 

 

          1   vendor that supplied the voting technology being

 

          2   audited should not perform the audit.  It is

 

          3   important to know when election systems perform is

 

          4   expected as well as when they do not.  For this

 

          5   reason, independent verifiable and transparent

 

          6   audits of election results should be routine.

 

          7   Audits should include a representative hand count

 

          8   of ballots or ballot images, documentation of the

 

          9   change of custody about voting technology, and the

 

         10   chain of custody on all unmarked or marked ballots.

 

         11   States are well within their prerogative to

 

         12   determine how audit information will be used, but

 

         13   they should be strongly encouraged to incorporate

 

         14   audits into their election procedure, and to make

 

         15   the results of those audits public.  As far as

 

         16   privacy is concerned, one the aspects of privacy

 

         17   that needs to be address are absentee voting or

 

         18   early voting.  The privacy of those voters are just

 

         19   as important as the privacy of voters that vote on

 

         20   election day.  Some states have taken up some

 

         21   interesting avenues to try to address privacy and

 

         22   absentee voting.  They use double envelopes, where

 

         23   the exterior of the envelope that's being sent out

 

         24   or the one that's being returned doesn't reflect

 

         25   party affiliation or any more information necessary

 

 

 


 

                                                                       71

 

 

 

          1   than to return that envelope -- make sure it gets

 

          2   to its destination.  And as soon as practical, the

 

          3   exterior envelopes need to be removed from that

 

          4   ballot so it can be properly counted as part of the

 

          5   election process. Security issues that we have some

 

          6   concerns about, security is a matter of trade-offs.

 

          7   It's basically -- it's a formula of what are you

 

          8   going to get for what you're willing to pay.  And

 

          9   the EAC is in a position to make decisions

 

         10   regarding trade-offs to establishing a practice,

 

         11   reliable, secure, accessible, transparent, and

 

         12   accurate, and auditable elections.  If the results

 

         13   of the Commissions' actions are that it can be said

 

         14   that our domestic elections are more secure,

 

         15   reliable, accessible, transparent, accurate, and

 

         16   auditable, then you've done your job.  The voter is

 

         17   the only person who should know they cast a

 

         18   particular vote.  They should not be able to prove

 

         19   their vote on a particular ballot to any person.

 

         20   They should be no mark or any identification --

 

         21   identified feature on that ballot that would

 

         22   attract back to that voter.  There's a particular

 

         23   voting technology that was deployed in the last

 

         24   year's election that records all votes on a

 

         25   continuous spool of paper -- a roll of paper.  That

 

 

 


 

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          1   system is definitely a problem when it comes down

 

          2   to making sure that these principles are able to be

 

          3   followed.  And your recommendation in the guideline

 

          4   would disallow a system of that type, and that is a

 

          5   very strong position to take regarding

 

          6   accessibility and verifiability. Tele-communication

 

          7   requirements would like to make sure that strong

 

          8   recommendations that are made to states that there

 

          9   are villages associated with telecommunication

 

         10   systems that, in particular, the internet has

 

         11   insecurities that are very difficult to address.

 

         12   Last year, the Pentagon canceled its Serve

 

         13   [phonetic] project because of a report that was

 

         14   very critical and pointed out many of these

 

         15   vulnerabilities.  There is a study that is directed

 

         16   under HAVA that would look at telecommunication

 

         17   systems, including the Internet that would be very

 

         18   beneficial in giving direction to states, as well

 

         19   as be an information resource for the Commission,

 

         20   to help provide direction in that regard.  States

 

         21   should be encouraged to review the benefits of

 

         22   using such systems, assess the risks that are

 

         23   associated with such systems, have contingency

 

         24   plans in place in the event of some kind of

 

         25   complication that may not be foreseeable at this

 

 

 


 

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          1   point in time, but maybe reasonable in the review

 

          2   of these systems and looking at their potential

 

          3   risk of vulnerabilities.  There's also an issue

 

          4   with electrostatic disruption.  The standards,

 

          5   based on the analysis of members of the National

 

          6   Committee for Voting Integrity, only look at

 

          7   humidity below 25 percent.  Many states in this

 

          8   area -- in many states in this nation, in many

 

          9   localities in many states, that's not a realistic

 

         10   view of what the average humidity, that states

 

         11   should be encouraged to look at where technology

 

         12   will deployed, and the factors, the conditions, in

 

         13   which those machines will be used to set the

 

         14   standard for what will be allowable or acceptable

 

         15   in this regard.  Voting system security, and also

 

         16   looking at infrared technology, I strongly

 

         17   recommend not allowing that technology to become

 

         18   standard in the construction of voting machines,

 

         19   that states be directed to do a detailed analysis

 

         20   of the need for that technology along with

 

         21   technical consideration of what the potential risks

 

         22   are.  Looking at the technology, it's very

 

         23   commonplace, we see it everywhere, but that also

 

         24   means the standards are very common.  The

 

         25   information on the spectrum range on where the

 

 

 


 

                                                                       74

 

 

 

          1   technology operates is also very well known.  It's

 

          2   conceivable that it would pose a security risk if

 

          3   someone intentionally tried to use that technology

 

          4   in a way that would undermine an election.  The

 

          5   best approach is not to use it.  If states find

 

          6   that it is something they absolutely must have,

 

          7   that they have -- it would be good to be able to

 

          8   physically remove the technology from the machines

 

          9   before they're deployed for elections, and at the

 

         10   minimum, as your recommendation suggests, an opaque

 

         11   material be used to cover access to that port.  But

 

         12   states should be definitely directed regarding the

 

         13   seriousness of failed system of that nature, if

 

         14   it's deployed and used in an election.  The other

 

         15   issue looking at is the -- what follows six months

 

         16   from now.  How does direct -- NIST will assist in

 

         17   compiling a list of laboratories that will be

 

         18   suitable for testing voting systems.  The EAC's

 

         19   role will be to select those -- to federally

 

         20   approve those laboratories that we use.  In the

 

         21   draft guidance, it appeared that there may be --

 

         22   the existing system may continue with the EAC

 

         23   taking the role of NASED in that process.  I'm not

 

         24   sure -- maybe -- just because maybe I'm misreading

 

         25   that, but I just wanted to point that out and hope

 

 

 


 

                                                                       75

 

 

 

          1   -- and reiterate and encourage you to look at any

 

          2   process that -- they was showing the current system

 

          3   for testing and certifying voting equipment in this

 

          4   country.  It's not only broken but it's virtually

 

          5   non-existent.  We strongly support this view of the

 

          6   current process and would encourage you to develop

 

          7   a stronger process as possible within the capacity

 

          8   of the resources that Congress provides to you.

 

          9   Voting systems intended for sources of recording,

 

         10   storing, reproducing accurate lists of qualified

 

         11   voters of ballots for the use in public elections

 

         12   should have well defined critical requirements.

 

         13   Those critical requirements are only those aspects

 

         14   of this -- of both of those type of systems that if

 

         15   they fail would mean that an otherwise qualified

 

         16   person attempting to register to vote would not be

 

         17   able to, or a qualified voter attempting to vote

 

         18   would not be able to vote or have that vote counted

 

         19   as cast or retained as cast. There is -- okay, the

 

         20   last point is voter verified paper audit trail.  At

 

         21   the end it basically says that it's option.  And it

 

         22   also include -- the [inaudible] voter verified

 

         23   paper audit trail is not mandatory. There are 24

 

         24   states today that have passed laws in this regard,

 

         25   and 13 with proposed legislation.  All of the

 

 

 


 

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          1   recommendations from -- that you will be making are

 

          2   voluntary in nature.  States should be encouraged

 

          3   to, whenever possible and when it's accessible,

 

          4   that voter verified paper audit -- voter verified

 

          5   paper audit trails are not -- should not be

 

          6   prohibited, but should be encouraged, and

 

          7   encouraged in a way that will allow any voter to be

 

          8   able to independently cast a ballot as well as

 

          9   verify the ballot that is left, and the audit trail

 

         10   instrument that's left with it, if it's intended to

 

         11   be the ballot or only for audit purposes.  States

 

         12   should have routine processes for doing an audit of

 

         13   the results of each election that they conduct.

 

         14   Those audits can be the decision of the state or at

 

         15   the discretion of the state of how they want to use

 

         16   that audit information, but I think that it's very

 

         17   important for that audit information for

 

         18   transparency purposes to also be available to the

 

         19   public.  It may also provide a valuable resource to

 

         20   the library of information that the Commission will

 

         21   be putting together to better understand what

 

         22   happens in elections before, during, and after the

 

         23   process.  In closing, I would like to thank the

 

         24   Commission for all of the work on these Standards,

 

         25   to encourage them to include in the standards and

 

 

 


 

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          1   direct to states that these are minimum standards,

 

          2   that they should be encouraged to aggressively seek

 

          3   out ways to retire levels of standards if their

 

          4   states have the resources and the opportunities

 

          5   present themselves to do so.  Voluntary guidance to

 

          6   states can lead to better elections in this nation.

 

          7   The attention that's been brought to bear because

 

          8   of very close elections speak to the health about

 

          9   democracy, that people in this nation do take an

 

         10   ownership in their elections that they conduct in

 

         11   their state, and local, and national level.  And

 

         12   they should be encouraged to participate in that

 

         13   process by making it as open and accessible as

 

         14   possible, through transparency and audit capacity.

 

         15   Thank you.

 

         16             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you very much.  Mr.

 

         17   Lott?

 

         18             MR. LOTT:  Yes.  Thank you Chairman

 

         19   Hillman, and thank you Commissioners for inviting

 

         20   me to attend today.  I think the Commission has

 

         21   done a good job in balancing peoples' fears that

 

         22   voting systems contain errors, with the benefits of

 

         23   not trying to have a one size fit all for all the

 

         24   states.  The Guidelines generally seem to be, in a

 

         25   large part, a clearinghouse of what's kind of the

 

 

 


 

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          1   best received information or knowledge on a lot of

 

          2   the issues, regarding everything from security to

 

          3   all the other issues that are covered here.  I

 

          4   think the Guidelines should also be commended for

 

          5   not explicitly -- for explicitly recognizing that

 

          6   perfection is costly.  And while election machinery

 

          7   tends to work fairly well, we could spend the

 

          8   entire countries wealth and still not ensure

 

          9   absolute, 100 percent guarantee that they'll be no

 

         10   mechanical breakdowns, and things will work as

 

         11   promised.  There's a range of other issues.  I like

 

         12   the flexibility here across, not only, different

 

         13   types of machines but where the votes can be

 

         14   counted.  And, you know, explicit recognitions of

 

         15   things, such as there's no single best way to

 

         16   design software.  There's - motivations for reform

 

         17   here are pretty obvious.  People are concerned

 

         18   about the integrity and accuracy of the decision

 

         19   election system.  We have a Harris Poll that just

 

         20   came out.  It shows that about 14 percent of voters

 

         21   are somewhat confident about the electoral, 16 --

 

         22   six percent are not at all confident.  It varies by

 

         23   party, about 11 percent of Democrats and only about

 

         24   one percent of Republicans.  It's hard to know how

 

         25   much of that is driven by political concerns versus

 

 

 


 

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          1   actual concerns that people have.  You know,

 

          2   accusations of fraud are probably inevitable in a

 

          3   democratic system, and given what's at stake, I

 

          4   guess it's -- if I worry, if anything, that people

 

          5   are going to claim that problems exist even when

 

          6   nothing do exist. Fortunately, I think many of the

 

          7   perceived concerns are relatively easy to prove,

 

          8   conspiracy theories that developed about computer

 

          9   voting machines after the 2004 election in Ohio.  I

 

         10   think with the Edison, Media Research Project, and

 

         11   others have been fairly easily dealt with.  But I

 

         12   think the Commission, even though it's kind of

 

         13   outside its main bailey wig [phonetic], so to

 

         14   speak, indirectly addresses these type of

 

         15   conspiracy type stories, as well as allays people's

 

         16   fears generally about how the election system

 

         17   works, simply by issuing the Guidelines.  We hear

 

         18   discussions about paper trails, such as just what

 

         19   was being brought up. I think the very effect of

 

         20   the guidelines go through and explicitly talk about

 

         21   that there are different ways that you can go and

 

         22   achieve the same type of ends that you can achieve

 

         23   with paper trails.  It helps overcome a lot of the

 

         24   debates that have been publically made in the media

 

         25   where it seems like there is something unique or

 

 

 


 

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          1   magical about paper trails that aren't be

 

          2   accomplished through other types of technology. And

 

          3   one can go and talk abut that more.  One thing I do

 

          4   think is very important is the voluntary nature of

 

          5   the Guidelines.  And I think there are very strong

 

          6   reasons for encouraging the voluntary nature.

 

          7   First, not all the jurisdictions are the name.

 

          8   Paper ballots, for example, seem to work very well

 

          9   and relatively rural areas, though obviously they'd

 

         10   probably be a disaster if they were used in urban

 

         11   areas, we have some elections where you have a huge

 

         12   number of items on the ballot, where others where

 

         13   there's relatively few. My own research that I've

 

         14   talked about before in front of the Commission

 

         15   indicates that some types of methods of voting tend

 

         16   to work very well for some races, and other types

 

         17   of voting, other types of machines may work better

 

         18   for other races, even down the ballot in the same

 

         19   election.  So there are a lot of trade offs that

 

         20   exist there.  The second point to make is that

 

         21   there is a value to experimenting.  You would never

 

         22   learn or never be able to improve things without

 

         23   experiments. And you ran -- run into practical

 

         24   problems in real world settings, that would not be

 

         25   encountered in laboratory settings.  Even diversity

 

 

 


 

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          1   within states is important, not just across states.

 

          2   It makes it much easier to test the cost and

 

          3   benefits of different types of voting machines.  In

 

          4   fact, it's really only possible to do certain

 

          5   tests.  If you have variations within states who

 

          6   you can control for the same people, running for

 

          7   the same offices, across different types of

 

          8   machines that are being used.  Third thing to bring

 

          9   up is that allowing diversity and experiments, I

 

         10   think, raises the probability that mistakes will

 

         11   occur.  But at the same time, diversity also lowers

 

         12   the cost of any given mistake that occurs.  With

 

         13   many different machines and setups being used in a

 

         14   state, it is likely that a state in one county will

 

         15   be sufficiently important, and then it will effect

 

         16   -- affect the results in the entire state.  It is

 

         17   even rarer that the mistake will affect the result

 

         18   in the key state and it could swing the

 

         19   presidential election.  Let me just give you some

 

         20   numbers just to kind of illustrate this. Just take

 

         21   a very simple example.  Let's say we had 20

 

         22   jurisdictions and all 20 were using some different

 

         23   type or method of voting, whether it be -- whether

 

         24   it's central count, or local count, or different

 

         25   types of machines, or just the organization of the

 

 

 


 

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          1   ballot. And let's assume, just make up some simple

 

          2   numbers here to illustrate this, that there's a

 

          3   five percent chance that any one of those types of

 

          4   voting methods will experience a problem.  And

 

          5   let's also assume that there's a five percent

 

          6   chance that the results in any one of those

 

          7   jurisdictions would be small enough that the

 

          8   differences between the winners and losers would be

 

          9   small enough that the type of election machine

 

         10   problem could affect the outcome.  Well, the

 

         11   probability that you're going to have a problem in

 

         12   any given year is essentially one.  You know,

 

         13   you're going to have -- there's a five percent

 

         14   chance, and you have 20 counties, and it's very

 

         15   likely in an year you'll have a problem.  But the

 

         16   probability that you're going to have a problem and

 

         17   it's likely to affect the outcome of the election

 

         18   is extremely small.  It's five percent times five

 

         19   percent.  It's going to be .025 percent, a very

 

         20   small number there.  Now, you can imagine if

 

         21   instead you were to have some type of national

 

         22   guidelines that everybody had to follow, if there's

 

         23   still a five percent chance that they'll have a

 

         24   problem, that means that one in every 20 years

 

         25   you'll going to have a problem.  It's a lot less

 

 

 


 

                                                                       83

 

 

 

          1   frequently than if you have each one of the

 

          2   jurisdictions all have their own method of doing

 

          3   it.  Because you'll have some problem, but it will

 

          4   be located in one of those 20 jurisdictions.  The

 

          5   difference is that whenever that problem comes up

 

          6   once every 20 years it's going to be a disaster

 

          7   because it's going to affect all the jurisdictions

 

          8   there.  And it's very likely going to affect one of

 

          9   the jurisdictions where it would've close enough

 

         10   that it's going to affect the outcome of the

 

         11   election.  So once every 20 years you're going to

 

         12   have a result that's going to create a big problem,

 

         13   whereas if you look at the first case where

 

         14   everybody is doing their own thing, so to speak,

 

         15   it's really only one every 400 years.  You know,

 

         16   it's five percent times five percent.  Now, there's

 

         17   one thing to take into account here and that is, we

 

         18   made these percentages up, how can we change them

 

         19   to get some idea, because it's possible by using

 

         20   the best information you'll lower the probability

 

         21   that you'll have a bad event when everybody is

 

         22   using the same system from five percent down to one

 

         23   percent.  That would be a huge change if you could

 

         24   reduce the probability of a problem occurring by

 

         25   five fold.  But it would still more likely that

 

 

 


 

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          1   you'd have a disaster occurring, you know, if it's

 

          2   one percent, that's one out of every 100 elections

 

          3   there, versus this other cases where you allow

 

          4   diversity where disaster would be occurring one out

 

          5   of every 400 elections.  And so you could still

 

          6   have a big massive improvement in how well you're

 

          7   able to run elections when you do things centrally

 

          8   and yet still have a much higher probability that

 

          9   you're going to end up having an election that's

 

         10   contested when you actually have a problem, then

 

         11   you would under a unified system, let's say.  The

 

         12   fourth point that I'd like to bring up is setting

 

         13   rigid guidelines is very difficult and it's also

 

         14   very costly. There's lots of references in the text

 

         15   to having best practices.  It's one thing to go --

 

         16   or saying that machines are going to be setup so

 

         17   voters can easily identify something.  You know,

 

         18   it's one thing to go and mention those things, a

 

         19   thing to explicitly set them up and make them

 

         20   extremely well defined, and that's very difficult,

 

         21   and I'll mention something later on about that. The

 

         22   proposed guidelines are advisory, and that is

 

         23   emphasized at different points in the draft.  My

 

         24   only concern is that rules that frequently start

 

         25   off as advisory end up becoming the required

 

 

 


 

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          1   standard.  And on way that this could occur is

 

          2   through legal challenges; for example, it's

 

          3   possible that judges at some point are going to go

 

          4   and use the guidelines as a yard stick for which

 

          5   they're going to go and judge the behaviors of

 

          6   individual jurisdictions.  And what you may want to

 

          7   try to think about doing, I think in order to try

 

          8   to solve this problem, if you're concerned about it

 

          9   also, is by having some discussion in there about

 

         10   why it's voluntary.  You know, not an explicit

 

         11   listing out of all the reasons why it's voluntary,

 

         12   but at least some type of benefits that can exist

 

         13   from having a voluntary system, so that if a court

 

         14   were to go and rely on this as some type of

 

         15   guideline in the future that it's going to look at

 

         16   deviations from there as being the basis of making

 

         17   a ruling.  It would then have to explicitly take

 

         18   into account that you would have -- have not only

 

         19   said that these were voluntary, but also at the

 

         20   time -- same time offer arguments for why you

 

         21   believe it's good to have a voluntary system.  One

 

         22   thing that I noticed when I was reading through is

 

         23   that some of the rules seem arbitrary, at least to

 

         24   me.  And there could've been explanations that I

 

         25   missed to some extent.  For example, you know, one

 

 

 


 

                                                                       86

 

 

 

          1   of the cases on page 3.24, the guidelines states

 

          2   that machines must have a 99 percent, at least,

 

          3   up-time.  You know, there's no explanation for why

 

          4   the standard or where it comes from.  One percent

 

          5   of a twelve hour period of time essentially means

 

          6   seven minutes.  Now, I don't know, seven minutes

 

          7   seems like a relatively short period of time for

 

          8   me. You know, it could be ten minutes or fourteen

 

          9   minutes. It seems like there should be some type of

 

         10   recognition there, at least if you've done

 

         11   empirical work it would be interesting to try to

 

         12   see some type of trade off of the cost and benefits

 

         13   of choosing different amounts of time.  If you have

 

         14   something open for 11 hours, you're talking about

 

         15   an error of only six minutes of length. And there

 

         16   might be some unintended consequences from these

 

         17   types of rules.  For example, you want the vendors

 

         18   to go and come up with a list of procedures and

 

         19   what have you to try to ensure this one percent

 

         20   error rate.  Well, one thing that could happen, for

 

         21   example, is that what might have happened is a

 

         22   precinct would put all of its machines on the

 

         23   floor, in some sense, to be used, but if you have

 

         24   these types of rules, you may want to keep one off

 

         25   the floor, you know, just so you can quickly

 

 

 


 

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          1   replace it and try to keep the downtime to a

 

          2   minimum at that point.  It seems like if I have 12

 

          3   machines and I were to have them running I could

 

          4   have voting occur more quickly during the day and

 

          5   just simply remove one from the floor and move down

 

          6   to 11, than rather have 11 up during the entire day

 

          7   and keeping 1 as something that would be saved in

 

          8   reserve. But it seems like the way the guidelines

 

          9   are written up, in terms of the language, you'd

 

         10   always want to keep one in reserve rather than put

 

         11   all your machines on the floor that you have there

 

         12   at the time.  There are just little things like

 

         13   that, that when you're reading through it -- again,

 

         14   I could be misreading what the intent is.  But the

 

         15   security issues I think are generally well done.

 

         16   Indeed, a lot of it is following what has been

 

         17   current practice within the industry. One safeguard

 

         18   that I think is there, but it might be useful just

 

         19   to make explicit, is that if you have problems in

 

         20   terms of things being transmitted over public

 

         21   telecommunications networks, you have a backup

 

         22   that's there in any of these DREs or other types of

 

         23   machines, and that is you have CDs or other things

 

         24   that you can go back and double check whatever

 

         25   information was transmitted publicly there, in

 

 

 


 

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          1   order to double check -- to recount things.  So

 

          2   you're not -- even if some type of fraud were to

 

          3   occur in terms of the telecommunications, the

 

          4   original data is still there and still able to be

 

          5   checked.  I appreciate the time that you all have

 

          6   and I appreciate you all inviting me coming to talk

 

          7   to you.  Thank you.

 

          8             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Thank you very much.

 

          9   Commissioners, unfortunately, we don't have much

 

         10   time here.  We've got about five minutes per

 

         11   Commissioner for Q&A with the panelist.  And,

 

         12   Commissioner Martinez?

 

         13             MR. MARTINEZ:  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         14   I'll just ask a couple of quick questions. Thank

 

         15   you both for your testimony and for you time and

 

         16   efforts to get here and provide the testimony.  Ms.

 

         17   Coney, in your written testimony I do want to help

 

         18   clarify for me some of the statements that you

 

         19   made.  On page ten of your submitted written

 

         20   testimony --

 

         21             MS. CONEY:  Okay.

 

         22             MR. MARTINEZ:  -- you talked about the

 

         23   certification process.

 

         24             MS. CONEY:  Right.

 

         25             MR. MARTINEZ:  And the differences in

 

 

 


 

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          1   languages from the initial recommendations that

 

          2   were submitted to by the TGDC to the EAC, and then

 

          3   some language where we amplified what we see as our

 

          4   role in the certification process.

 

          5             MS. CONEY:  Right.

 

          6             MR. MARTINEZ:  And I'm trying to figure

 

          7   out from your group's perspective, are you reading

 

          8   section 231 different from how we're reading it. In

 

          9   other words, it seems to me from your comments that

 

         10   perhaps you don't feel we are the entity that

 

         11   should be certifying, decertifying, and

 

         12   recertifying?  Go ahead.

 

         13             MS. CONEY:  Okay, let me be clear.  It

 

         14   doesn't matter what we think.  It's the authorizing

 

         15   committee and the people who wrote the -- HAVA, and

 

         16   passed it.  Those are the peoples whose opinions

 

         17   about what the intent of the legislation are most

 

         18   important. What I -- we were reading this for is

 

         19   are we sticking with the current certification

 

         20   process where we have the ITA's, and then NASED in

 

         21   the process, or are we going to keep that same

 

         22   process but take NASED out and the EAC is going to

 

         23   be in that process?  Now I know the law -- HAVA

 

         24   says six months after you finally get through with

 

         25   this you start on next phase of an auditor's task,

 

 

 


 

                                                                       90

 

 

 

          1   which is NIST will compile a list of laboratories

 

          2   that they feel will be suitable for certification

 

          3   of voting technology.  That list will come to you.

 

          4   You will look at that list.  You can add to that

 

          5   list or you can determine whatever list that you're

 

          6   going to have as those labs that will be certifying

 

          7   voting technology within the United States. When I

 

          8   read this -- when we looked over it and we went

 

          9   back and forth on it, it sounded like the ITA's,

 

         10   the de facto labs that will be used, and whatever

 

         11   that curtain list, labs and others that are on that

 

         12   list, and that the EAC would replaced NASED's role

 

         13   in doing this. That's the thing that I wanted --

 

         14   you know, we looked at it and said, okay, it's an

 

         15   opportunity to clarify that before the guidance

 

         16   gets out.  If this is your intent, okay, if it's

 

         17   not, then there's an opportunity to revisit that.

 

         18             MR. MARTINEZ:  And I appreciate that,

 

         19   yeah, and I think that's what we're looking for in

 

         20   the testimony and the comments is for all of us to

 

         21   all get on the same page.

 

         22             MS. CONEY:  Yeah, yeah.

 

         23             MR. MARTINEZ:  And I think that's what

 

         24   we're trying to do.

 

         25             MS. CONEY:  Yeah.

 

 

 


 

                                                                       91

 

 

 

          1             MR. MARTINEZ:  And so, yeah, and the

 

          2   reason I bring it up is I've never had a discussion

 

          3   with anybody who says, you know, it's the job of

 

          4   the EAC to accredit labs, and then the labs go off

 

          5   and do the certification without any governing

 

          6   entity, or without any umbrella entity, and NASED

 

          7   serves that role right now.

 

          8             MS. CONEY:  Right, you've --

 

          9             MR. MARTINEZ:  But the way we read

 

         10   Section 231 --

 

         11             MS. CONEY:  Yeah.

 

         12             MR. MARTINEZ:  -- Congress intends for us

 

         13   --

 

         14             MS. CONEY:  Yes.

 

         15             MR. MARTINEZ:  -- to take over --

 

         16             MS. CONEY:  Yes, absolutely.

 

         17             MR. MARTINEZ:  -- that certification

 

         18   process. So it sounds like we're in agreement about

 

         19   that.

 

         20             MS. CONEY:  Absolutely, we're in an

 

         21   agreement on that.  What we're looking at the

 

         22   current process with the ITA's is it's not working.

 

         23   And the assessment is that it is not only broken

 

         24   but it is virtually non- existent.

 

         25             MR. MARTINEZ:  I understand.

 

 

 


 

                                                                       92

 

 

 

          1             MS. CONEY:  That process -- those labs

 

          2   have - - that component of that process got to be

 

          3   revisited, and to the extent that the resources

 

          4   would allow you to find the best labs to look at

 

          5   voting technology.  That would be a great

 

          6   improvement over the current process.

 

          7             MR. MARTINEZ:  Got you, and I appreciate

 

          8   that clarification.  The other issue I wanted to

 

          9   explore with you just very quickly is the issue of

 

         10   verification --

 

         11             MS. CONEY:  Okay.

 

         12             MR. MARTINEZ:  -- under the security,

 

         13   proposed security section.

 

         14             MS. CONEY:  Um-hmm.

 

         15             MR. MARTINEZ:  And is it your position,

 

         16   your organization's position that verification must

 

         17   occur through a VVPAT mechanism, or are you also,

 

         18   as we had some testimony previously from a local

 

         19   election administrator who's saying, look, there's

 

         20   other ways to verify; we may not have that

 

         21   technology fully matured enough that we can write

 

         22   requirements or guidelines for it.  But are you

 

         23   wedded to VVPAT or wedded to the idea generally of

 

         24   simply that DRE systems ought to have some method

 

         25   of verification?

 

 

 


 

                                                                       93

 

 

 

          1             MS. CONEY:  The one thing that EPIC has a

 

          2   resources is some of the vast technologist

 

          3   available, especially people that have worked in

 

          4   this field.  When you look at the issue of how do

 

          5   you make sure that this particular thing happened

 

          6   at this particular point in time, the only reason

 

          7   paper is mentioned, and the only reason paper has

 

          8   been around for over 5,000 plus years is it has a

 

          9   unique quality.  If you bend it, if you make a mark

 

         10   on it, you can't hide that, it can't be undone.

 

         11   That's the security feature that all technologists

 

         12   who are very concerned about, not just voting

 

         13   technology and being able to verify whatever took

 

         14   place is in fact what took place, but a lot of

 

         15   other areas as well.  There are other applications

 

         16   -- other technologies that are out there,

 

         17   cryptographic schemes that are out there, write

 

         18   once medium technology that's out there, but it

 

         19   hasn't been put into voting technology.  That's

 

         20   going to take time, because once someone comes up

 

         21   with a method that they say this is absolutely the

 

         22   sure fire method to do this, the technology

 

         23   community will pick it a part and it will either

 

         24   prove itself to be actually that or it will fail.

 

         25   And in the meantime, we're in an evolutionary

 

 

 


 

                                                                       94

 

 

 

          1   process where we're trying to find out how do we

 

          2   get from point A to point B right now, the best

 

          3   medium for doing all of those things that we've

 

          4   talked about is this.  Everything else might

 

          5   present itself to actually do that, but in fact can

 

          6   you prove it?  That's how come we talk about audit

 

          7   capacity, even with paperless systems you have a

 

          8   ballot image, you're going to have to do a random

 

          9   -- a representative sample recount of those images

 

         10   to compare with what the DRE actually said it did,

 

         11   in order to have some kind of way to evaluate how

 

         12   good it is at actually doing that.

 

         13             MR. MARTINEZ:  Okay, I appreciate that.

 

         14   I think my times is just about up.  Mr. Lott, would

 

         15   you agree that the role of the EAC is to set

 

         16   benchmarks for performance and reliability, and

 

         17   that we ought to allow states the latitude and the

 

         18   discretion to be able to meet those benchmarks

 

         19   based upon the decisions that they make at the

 

         20   state and local level?

 

         21             MR. LOTT:  Yes, I believe the EAC can

 

         22   perform a very important role of being a

 

         23   clearinghouse for the best information that's

 

         24   there, and helping to use that to set those type of

 

         25   standards.  And I agree with the second part of

 

 

 


 

                                                                       95

 

 

 

          1   your statement too.

 

          2             MR. MARTINEZ:  Yeah, no, and I wanted to

 

          3   just express my agreement with the spirit of your

 

          4   testimony, quite frankly, that the discretion is

 

          5   within state and local governments and how we're

 

          6   going to administer our elections, and yet there is

 

          7   a service that can be provided I think by an entity

 

          8   like the EAC, and I think you've captured that

 

          9   pretty well in your comments.  The other thing I

 

         10   also want to say is that Congress clearly said that

 

         11   these are voluntary guidelines, so I also

 

         12   appreciate your suggestion that perhaps we ought to

 

         13   make that clear in case it doesn't look so clear in

 

         14   the process of litigation.  I think that's

 

         15   something that we perhaps ought to consider.  My

 

         16   time is up otherwise I'd explore some other

 

         17   questions with you.  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         18             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Okay, Mr. Vice-Chairman?

 

         19             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Thank you, Madame Chair.

 

         20   Ms. Coney, I'm glad that you brought up the

 

         21   humidity issue.  I was in Ohio on August 2 for a

 

         22   special election there for Congress, and of the

 

         23   seven counties one of the counties was using

 

         24   optical scan equipment for the very first time;

 

         25   they had switched over from punch card --

 

 

 


 

                                                                       96

 

 

 

          1             MS. CONEY:  Um-hmm.

 

          2             MR. DEGREGORIO:  -- but the vendor of the

 

          3   folks who sold them the equipment didn't explain to

 

          4   them that when you have high humidity, you have to

 

          5   calibrate it differently to take those ballots in.

 

          6   And so, the result was the final returns from that

 

          7   county didn't come in to close to midnight --

 

          8             MS. CONEY:  Oh, yeah.

 

          9             MR. DEGREGORIO:  -- because of the

 

         10   machines. And I'm glad that you brought this to our

 

         11   attention because I do think it's something that we

 

         12   ought to take a look at before we finalize these

 

         13   guidelines and to make sure that these are tested

 

         14   under real life conditions.  And I know that many

 

         15   counties -- many states have elections in August,

 

         16   Missouri used to have them, and I know that punch

 

         17   cards used to swell and we used to have problems

 

         18   with it.  You mentioned the DRE paper trail.

 

         19             MS. CONEY:  Um-hmm.

 

         20             MR. DEGREGORIO:  And you have a problem

 

         21   with the paper roll issue.

 

         22             MS. CONEY:  Yeah.

 

         23             MR. DEGREGORIO:  And I recognize that the

 

         24   State of Nevada that mandated the voter verified

 

         25   paper audit trail uses equipment that has such

 

 

 


 

                                                                       97

 

 

 

          1   paper rolls in them.  Would you have a problem if a

 

          2   polling place had more than one of these devices

 

          3   within the polling place, and therefore voters

 

          4   would be directed to either one of those machines

 

          5   randomly so therefore you couldn't keep track on a

 

          6   voter roll because they'd be going from one to the

 

          7   other, and the roll then -- we have two different

 

          8   rolls and two different machines, would that be

 

          9   acceptable?

 

         10             MS. CONEY:  That's the kind of question I

 

         11   would definitely pose to the Committee itself, the

 

         12   National Committee for Voting Integrity.  I'd

 

         13   suspect that you would need a statistician and poll

 

         14   place procedures to try to figure out how to keep

 

         15   the ballots secret, which might make still the

 

         16   application of that so much more expensive to do

 

         17   that it'd just be cheaper to figure out how to

 

         18   separate each vote at ballot and randomize them, so

 

         19   that if it's a need for a recount you can do that

 

         20   without having to worry about compromising voter

 

         21   privacy.  In the testimony it gives you a lot of

 

         22   legal precedence for how important voter privacy

 

         23   has been throughout the history of our nation, not

 

         24   just on federal -- in federal elections, but also

 

         25   local elections and state elections.  It is

 

 

 


 

                                                                       98

 

 

 

          1   paramount, and anything that threatens that should

 

          2   definitely be discouraged.  And as additional aid

 

          3   to the Commission, there are other things that --

 

          4   regarding ballot marking procedures and things of

 

          5   that issue that we can provide you some guidance

 

          6   on, and I'll leave this with you.

 

          7             MR. DEGREGORIO:  I appreciate that.

 

          8   Thank you.  Mr. Lott, you mentioned the Harris Poll

 

          9   that indicated that six percent of people who voted

 

         10   in November of 2004 did not have confidence, no

 

         11   confidence at all in the voting system.  That

 

         12   translates into seven million people.  What can be

 

         13   done at the federal level and at the local level to

 

         14   help instill confidence in votes and in these seven

 

         15   million people who don't have confidence at all.

 

         16   What can we do?  We can local election officials do

 

         17   to instill confidence?

 

         18             MR. LOTT:  Well, my guess -- I mean

 

         19   obviously they are real concerns that people have.

 

         20   But I fear that a sizeable portion of that six

 

         21   percent are based upon kind of conspiracy theories

 

         22   and other things that just simply aren't born out,

 

         23   whether it be the constant discussions about some

 

         24   DRE's being used to throw the election in Ohio, or

 

         25   nationwide, or whether it be claims about how you

 

 

 


 

                                                                       99

 

 

 

          1   can only trust the results if you have a paper

 

          2   trail there.  And I think the federal government

 

          3   can do things, in particular, your Commission,

 

          4   simply by educating people that there's nothing

 

          5   unique about one particular type of paper trail,

 

          6   you know, for keeping track of the records.  Or

 

          7   it's providing some type of standards, hopefully,

 

          8   that people will believe.  I mean, I think they do

 

          9   a pretty good job anyway, but it still -- that

 

         10   doesn't take anything away from the fact that

 

         11   having some type of National Certification

 

         12   Commission wouldn't help.  And my only concern is

 

         13   that the push to have national certification on

 

         14   some of these things may eliminate some of the

 

         15   experimentation that we would normally get, and

 

         16   some of the learning that we would get about

 

         17   different types of voting machines over time.  And

 

         18   to the extent that this push towards the national

 

         19   standard isn't really based on real events; it's

 

         20   just based on incorrect perceptions that people

 

         21   have.  I think that would be too bad if we lost

 

         22   that type of experimentation.

 

         23             MR. DEGREGORIO:  Thank you.  Thank you,

 

         24   Madame Chair.

 

         25             CHAIR HILLMAN:  Commissioner Davidson?

 

 

 


 

                                                                      100

 

 

 

          1             MS. DAVIDSON:  I have one question that

 

          2   I'd like, really for both of you to answer, because

 

          3   you took two different kinds of perspectives on

 

          4   your presentation.  On -- but, obviously these are

 

          5   voluntary standards, and we can't do anything to

 

          6   change that. But do you see that the best practices

 

          7   that the EAC will be putting out will help improve

 

          8   even those states that don't accept our standards.

 

          9   Do you feel that they would do that, and I'll start

 

         10   with you, Ms. Coney?

 

         11             MS. CONEY:  I think that the interest in

 

         12   improving elections and responsiveness to public

 

         13   concerns regarding the elections are evident by the

 

         14   amount of legislative activity that's taking place

 

         15   across the nation, not just in states where they've

 

         16   had very close elections, like Washington State, or

 

         17   states like Nevada that have been very proactive

 

         18   and trying to work on the cutting edge of

 

         19   addressing those concerns. I don't think that is

 

         20   going to change anytime soon.  I think the

 

         21   standards will give a benchmark for states and

 

         22   those who are interested in how to improve

 

         23   elections, how to make sure they're as good as they

 

         24   possibly can be, a starting point.  But they should

 

         25   be encouraged to go beyond that because a lot of

 

 

 


 

                                                                      101

 

 

 

          1   the ideas for how to make improvements will come

 

          2   from the local and state governments.  And they'll

 

          3   kind of go up to the federal level and be adopted,

 

          4   which is typically the process that we've seen in a

 

          5   lot of policy areas, and it's beneficial to be able

 

          6   to do that.  I think it will have an impact, but

 

          7   making sure states understand they should look

 

          8   beyond, not just at the issues of what they can do,

 

          9   but what can they do securely?  And being able to

 

         10   justify those situations where they decide to

 

         11   pursue avenues that may pose some kind of risk just

 

         12   to find the cost, the benefit, the tradeoff for

 

         13   making those kind of decisions.

 

         14             MS. DAVIDSON:  Mr. Lott?

 

         15             MR. LOTT:  Well, I think the guidelines

 

         16   will hopefully encourage discussion.  My concern is

 

         17   that they will be more than just voluntary, just as

 

         18   somebody who has been involved in litigation, I

 

         19   have seen the types of rules that judges adopt over

 

         20   time and what they rely on, and again I mentioned

 

         21   this before, I think it would be beneficial if

 

         22   someplace in the guidelines you explained why

 

         23   Congress or why you think it was important to have

 

         24   a voluntary system.  There must be some arguments

 

         25   that you have in your mind about what you would be

 

 

 


 

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